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Civil Procedure
Renewed Motion to Amend: If at First You Don't Succeed.

.

?

Under North Carolina's judicial system, which provides for both
multi-judge districts' and rotation of superior court judges within the
divisions, 2 it is not uncommon for different judges of the superior court
to deal with the same case during the process of litigation. In a recent
decision, Calloway v. Ford Motor Co.,3 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that one superior court judge may, in the exercise of his
discretion, allow a motion previously denied by another superior court
judge if there has been a material change in conditions between the
denial of the first motion and the petition for the second.4
Calloway was a civil suit for injuries caused by the malfunction of
the seatbelts in a police patrol car manufactured by defendant Ford and
sold by defendant Matthews Motors, Inc. Superior Court Judge Hasty
denied defendant Matthews' motion for leave to amend to plead the
defense of the statute of limitations. When Matthews renewed this motion seven months later, a second superior court judge, Judge Ervin, also
denied the motion, stating that although he was inclined to grant the
motion, he lacked authority to do so since he was bound by Judge
Hasty's previous ruling. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court
found no abuse of discretion with respect to the original denial of Matthews' motion to amend, the court did find an abuse of discretion in
Judge Ervin's later denial of the same motion. Judge Ervin erred in
failing to take cognizance of new facts which materially changed the
conditions surrounding the motion. Matthews' co-defendant, Ford, had
somehow managed to amend and plead the same statute of limitations
defense that had been denied to Matthews. 5 Judge Ervin then not only
refused plaintiff's motion to strike this defense but in addition granted
summary judgment for Ford.6 The court held that this change in the
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41 (Supp. 1971) provides for four judicial divisions and thirty judicial

districts, eight of which have more than one resident judge.
2

N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 11 provides that the "principle of rotating Superior Court Judges

among the various districts of a division is a salutary one and shall be observed."
3281 N.C. 496, 189 S.E.2d 484 (1972).

1Id. at 505, 189 S.E.2d at 490.
3See note 6 infra.
'The proceedings in this case, in which Ford escaped liability on the very defense which was
denied to Matthews, reflect some interesting maneuvering. The plaintiff filed his suit within three
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positions of the co-defendants constituted a change in conditions that
required that Matthews be allowed to amend to plead the statute of

limitations. Thus, in Calloway the supreme court has specifically delineated an exception to the well-established rule in North Carolina, that
one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another
superior court judge made in the same action.
In order to justify the "changed conditions" exception, the court
in Calloway established a definitional syllogism leading to the desired
conclusion. The court began its analysis by defining an order that denies
a motion to amend pleadings as an interlocutory order.' For although
the "no appeal rule"9 applies in full force where the judgment is final
with respect to the matter involved,"0 the rule has been said to have no

application to interlocutory orders." Interlocutory orders, which are
judgments that do not determine issues but direct some further proceedyears of the accident, though not within three years from the date of purchase. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-15 (Supp. 1971) now provides that the statute of limitations in an action involving bodily
injury or defective property, where the defect was not readily apparent, will start running when
the injury was discovered or ought reasonably to have been discovered. However, the rule in effect
at the time of the suit was that an action for damages resulting from defective machinery accrued
at the time of the sale and not at the time substantial damage occurred. Thurston Motor Lines,
Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d 413 (1962). Neither Matthews nor Ford
pleaded the defense of the statute of limitations in their answers. Approximately one year and five
months later, Matthews moved for leave to amend to plead the statute of limitations, but was
denied such leave by Judge Hasty. Four days after the denial of Matthews' motion, Ford filed an
amended answer pleading the statute of limitations, stating that the amendment was filed "by leave
of Court granted by the Honorable Fred H. Hasty." No such leave appears in the record. Apparently plaintiff's counsel did not object to this amendment because he did not read it, relying instead
on Ford's representations of the content. Record at 46-47, Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., II N.C.
App. 511, 181 S.E.2d 764 (1971). However, when Matthews tried the same tactic, the plaintiff's
attorney moved to strike the defense before Judge Beal, who granted the motion based on the
previous ruling by Judge Hasty. Matthews renewed its motion for leave to plead the statute of
limitations inasmuch as it would only be "just and equitable" since the co-defendant Ford had been
allowed to so amend. When Ford moved for summary judgment, plaintiff's attorney realized what
was happening and moved to strike Ford's amendment since it had not been filed with the court's
permission. Nevertheless, Judge Ervin did not allow plaintiff's motion to strike, did not allow
Matthews' motion to amend, and granted summary judgment for Ford. 281 N.C. at 497-500, 189
S.E.2d at 486-87.
'1 MCINTOSH NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 163, at 96-97 (2d ed. T. Wilson & J. Wilson 1956); 2 J. STRONG, NORTH CAROLINA INDEX Courts § 9, at 446 (2d ed, 1967).
Usually this policy is expressed in the phrase "no appeal lies from one superior court judge to
another." E.g., Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Hanner, 268 N.C. 668, 670, 151 S.E.2d 579, 580 (1966).
'281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 488.
'See note 7 supra.
"Broadhurst v. Board of Comm'rs, 195 N.C. 439, 444, 142 S.E.2d 477, 480 (1928).
"Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 693, 120 S.E.2d 82, 91 (1961);
Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N.C. 427, 429, 139 S.E. 835, 836 (1927).

1973]

RENEWED MOTION

ing preliminary to final decree, are subject to change by the court during
the pendency of the action to meet the exigencies of the case. 2 However,

rather than concluding its analysis on the basis of the power of the trial
judge over the case during trial, the court proceeded to struggle with

concepts such as the "no appeal rule" and res judicata, which are more
relevant after final judgment.13 Even though the court could have disposed of this case on the grounds that the first denial of leave to amend

was an interlocutory order, therefore subject to change, the court instead formulated an exception to the rule that no appeal lies from one

superior court judge to another. This note will attempt to evaluate the
possible policy considerations which gave rise to the Calloway decision,

both as a disposition of the case on its facts and as a precedent.
By statute, interlocutory orders are not appealable except by a
grant of certiorari. 4 Therefore the usual procedure for a party who

wishes to challenge a denial of leave to amend would be to enter an
exception and to present the question on appeal after final judgment. 5

If the challenge is successful, the supreme court can allow the party to
amend on remand pursuant to its supervisory powers." In such a case,

the time and resources of both litigants and court would have been
wasted in a futile litigation to a judgment from which the parties can
appeal. Since a judge can modify his orders prior to a final judgment,

it is arguable that in the interests of efficiency a subsequent judge, also
hearing the case prior to final judgment, should have the same unrestricted power.
"See cases cited note 11 supra.
"While the policy of res judicata applies to a final judgment to preclude later litigation of
the same claim, the principle of precluding litigation of issues already decided within a given case
is termed "law of the case." Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REv.
I. The policy considerations behind the "no appeal rule" parallel those involved in the doctrine of
the law of the case. Both reflect the desire of the court to have consistency in decisions, to avoid
needless relitigation of issues already determined, to put an end to litigation, and to afford due
respect to decisions of judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Id. However, since North Carolina
recognizes law of the case primarily as applying to decisions on a former appeal, the doctrine would
not apply in the Calloway situation. See Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 536-37, 91
S.E.2d 673, 681-83 (1956). Occasionally where a litigant fails to seek relief on appeal, the appellate
court will state that the action of the trial court is binding as the law of the case. See, e.g., Wall v.
England, 243 N.C. 36, 39, 89 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1955). However, as pointed out by Professor Vestal,
this is not really a law of the case situation since the binding effect is due to the litigant's failure
to raise the issue rather than because the ruling of the court is controlling as such. Vestal, supra
at 21.
"N.C. CT. App. R. 4.
15d.

"8See, e.g., the cases reviewed by the court. 281 N.C. at 503-04, 189 S.E.2d at 489-90.
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However, the fact that the renewed motion is made before a different judge introduces policy considerations more applicable to a disposition of the case on appeal than at the trial level. Although the renewed
motion was not technically an appeal, the court in Calloway extended
its analysis to cases involving the "no appeal rule" in an attempt to
adhere to the "considerations of orderly procedure, courtesy, and comity"' 7 which engendered the rule. In a case involving issues similar to
those encountered in Calloway,8 Judge Learned Hand considered two
possible justifications for a "no appeal rule": "1) the second judge
should defer to the rule of the first as a matter of mutual respect between
the members of the same court; 2) if he does not so defer, the defeated
party may shop about in the hope of finding a more favorably disposed
judge."' 9 Judge Hand quickly rejected the first reason as "clearly untenable" since "judicial sensibilities" should play no part in the disposition
of a litigant's rights. 2 However, he concluded that the second reason
had "much to recommend it, and, as a matter of practice, has been
universally regarded a sufficient reason for treating the first ruling as
conclusive."' 21 Judge Hand was careful, however, to classify this "no
appeal rule" as the product of strong policy considerations and not a
22
rule of law.
In formulating the "changed conditions" exception, perhaps the
supreme court was trying to set forth a standard which is capable of
uniform application. The effect of the "no appeal rule" on interlocutory
judgments has resulted in numerous semantic refinements 2 which have
not been applied consistently. In Greene v. Charlotte Chemical Laboratories, Inc.24 the supreme court found error in the action of a superior
court judge in striking certain portions of an answer which had not been
7281 N.C. at 504, 189 S.E.2d at 490.

"Dictograph Prods. Co. v. Sonotone Corp., 230 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1956).
"Id. at 134-35.
21Id. at 135.
21Id.

"2d.

"The rule that one judge may not modify the order of another is usually phrased so as to
exclude interlocutory orders. See, e.g., Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.C.

680, 693, 120 S.E.2d 82, 91 (1961). The exception for interlocutory orders is narrow, though,
because an interlocutory order affecting some substantial right claimed by a party may not be

vacated on the ground that it is erroneous but must be appealed. Id. Accordingly, res judicta does
not apply to ordinary motions incident to the progress of the trial, but only to those involving a
substantial right. E.g., Overton v. Overton, 260 N.C. 139, 146, 132 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1963).
24254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961).
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struck by a previous superior court judge. Although the second ruling
was legally correct, the court held that the second judge had no authority to overrule another superior court judge. The court apparently found
that even though the action on the pleadings was interlocutory in nature,
it affected a substantial right. In Overton v. Overton,25 however, the
court indicated that an amendment would not affect substantial rights.
The court stated that on remand the parties could renew their previously
denied motion to amend since res judicata applied only to motions
involving substantial rights.
Under the Calloway test, a court faced with such a renewed motion
to amend would phrase its inquiry in terms of changed conditions rather
than substantial rights. The procedure would be familiar since North
Carolina courts have long recognized an exception to the "no appeal
rule" for divorce cases, in which a decree awarding custody of minor
children can be modified by a second judge where there has been a
change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare. 26 The changed
conditions in Calloway are significantly different, however, from the
type of changed conditions which are material in divorce cases. In
Thomas v. Thomas27 the court transferred custody of children from
mother to father, finding that events occurring since the original order
indicated that the mother was an unfit person. Unlike the change in
Thomas, the modification of the second judge's order in Calloway was
not mandated to adjust the parties' legal rights to reflect a change in
their conditions external to the litigation. In Calloway Judge Ervin's
adherence to Judge Hasty's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion
because of changes in the positions of the parties within the context of
the lawsuit. The court in Calloway in effect required Judge Ervin to
grant the formerly denied leave to amend because of action that he had
taken on the suit. Judge Ervin denied the plaintiff's motion to strike the
statute of limitations defense from Ford's answer (a similar motion to
strike the defense from Matthews' answer had been granted) and also
granted summary judgment for Ford on the basis of the statute of
28
limitations defense.
-260 N.C. 139, 132 S.E.2d 349 (1963).
261MCINTOSH NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 7, § 163, at 96-97;
see, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461,466, 130 S.E.2d 871, 875 (1963) where the court found
"a material change in circumstances" which warranted a modification of the decree.
-259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).
"See note 6 supra.
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The extent to which the Calloway exception to the "no appeal rule"
will respect the "considerations of orderly procedure, courtesy and comity which engendered the rule ' 29 depends on how the courts construe
"changed conditions" in a given situation. If the changed conditions
arise in a context in which the second judge realizes that the first judge
incorrectly interpreted the applicable law, it would seem obviously
wasteful to adjudicate the case using incorrect principles since such
action would probably be reversed on appeal." But if "changed conditions" can arise from artful maneuvering within the suit,3" there would
appear to be a real danger that this exception could be abused in order
to allow a litigant to find a more favorably disposed judge in the event
that a first motion was denied. As a matter of practice, courts have
rarely deviated from a prior discretionary ruling even where they have
the unquestioned power to do S0.32 Indeed the considerations of avoiding judge shopping, embarrassment to the court, and burdensome litigation are most compelling where the court is dealing with discretionary
rulings.3
The rule that no appeal lies from one superior court judge to another reflects a sound policy judgment. A ruling by a trial judge is
binding in the case, subject to reversal on appeal. The party who wins a
trial motion can proceed with his case without fear that the same point
may be relitigated during the course of the trial. An exception to this
rule for the type of "changed conditions" found in Calloway could easily
enable a disappointed litigant to "try, try again." Hopefully, in considering any renewed motion to amend, North Carolina courts will construe the requirement of "changed conditions" strictly in light of the
policy reasons behind the "no appeal rule."
KENNETH

R.

KELLER

State Court Venue under the National Banking Act
Can national banking associations be sued in state courts in coun2281 N.C. at 504, 189 S.E.2d at 490.
-"SeeVestal, supra note 13, at 19; Annot., 132 A.L.R. 14, 49-69 (1941).
3
See note 6 supra.
"See TCF Film Corp. v. Gourley, 240 F.2d 711, 713 (3d Cir. 1957) (a second judge should
adhere to the ruling of the first judge "except under the most extraordinary circumstances");
Dictograph Prods. Co. v. Sonotone Corp. 230 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1956).
2
Annot., 132 A.L.R. 14, 49 (1941).
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ties where they maintain branch banking offices? In Security Mills, Inc.
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,' the North Carolina Supreme Court

found venue in the branch location to be permissible by its unpreceBanking
dented interpretation of section ninety-four of the National
3
Act,2 which controls venue in suits against national banks.
In Security Mills plaintiff brought an action for negligence in Buncombe County against Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. when one of Wachovia's Buncombe County branch offices cashed checks payable to Security Mills over forged payee's endorsements. Wachovia maintains
branch offices in several of the state's one hundred counties, but has its
principal place of business, as specified by its organization certificate,
in Forsyth County.'
Contending that section ninety-four of the National Banking Act
established the bank's principal place of business as the proper forum,
the defendant moved for change of venue to Forsyth County. The motion was denied by the Buncombe County Superior Court, and the court
of appeals affirmed.'
On certiorari the supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Lake,
affirmed the holding of the lower courts denying a change in venue.
Based on its unprecedented interpretation of section ninety-four of the
National Banking Act, the court held that national banks doing business
in North Carolina could be sued in counties in which they conduct
branch business.6
Section ninety-four provides:
"Actions and proceedings against any association under this
chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United
States held within the district in which such association may be
established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county
or city in which said association islocated having jurisdiction in similar
cases." 7

The court found that the word "located" in reference to state court
proceedings imported a requirement different from the requirement that
1281 N.C. 525, 189 S.E.2d 266 (1972).
212 U.S.C. § 94 (1964), quoted in text accompanying note 7 infra.

3281 N.C. at 532, 189 S.E.2d at 271.
11d. at 526, 189 S.E.2d at 267.
513 N.C. App. 332, 185 S.E.2d 434 (1971).
'1d. at 532, 189 S.E.2d at 271.
712 U.S.C. § 94 (1964) (emphasis added).
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suits in federal court must be brought in the district in which the bank
is "established." A bank is "established" in that place specified in its
organizational charter as the bank's principal place of business,8
whereas a bank is "located" wherever it maintains a branch conducting
general banking business As a matter of policy the Security Mills court
found it unreasonable to require branch bank customers to sue in distant
counties. The expense and inconvenience of such suits might prevent
small depositers from obtaining judicial relief." Federal cases decided
under the "established" test were distinguished and state decisions relying on the federal precedent were said to have been wrongly decided. 1
As an alternative basis for denying the bank's motion and almost
as an afterthought,"2 the court relied on Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles,
Inc.,' 3 which held that setting up a branch to conduct general banking
business in a county other than that in which the bank was established
was a manifestation of the bank's intent to waive its section ninety-four
privilege. 4 The court concluded that Wachovia's operation of sixtythree branches in counties throughout North Carolina indicated its consent to be sued in each of those counties, at least on causes of action
arising out of the operation of each particular branch. 5
The unique and well-reasoned interpretation of the venue section
of the National Banking Act by the Security Mills court can be appreciated only upon examination of developments in the banking system
and in the statutory and case law governing it. Section ninety-four was
originally enacted in 1864, and despite changes in banking practices,
including the growth of branch banking, its substance has remained
'Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936).
'281 N.C. at 529-32, 189 S.E.2d at 269-71.
1"Id. at 532, 189 S.E.2d at 271.

"Federal cases include Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 (1963); Leonardi v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936); Schmitt v. Tobin, 15
F. Supp. 35 (D. Nev. 1935); Cadle v. Tracy, 4 F. Cas. 967 (No. 2279) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873). State

cases based on this federal precedent ihclude Gregor J. Schaefer Sons, Inc. v. Watson, 26 App.
Div. 2d 659, 272 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1966); Tuthill v. George S. May Int'l Co., 55 Misc. 2d 54, 285
N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
'2The court held that "[i]f. . . the. . . bank is not 'located' .
within the meaning of this
Act of Congress, . . . by maintaining and operating. . . a branch wherein it conducts its general
banking business . . . [it] has waived its privilege against being sued .
"281 N.C. at 532, 189
S.E.2d at 271.
'1212 Pa. Super. 185, 240 A.2d 90, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968).
1"1d. at 193, 240 A.2d at 94-95.
"1281 N.C. at 532, 189 S.E.2d at 271.
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unchanged since that time.' At the time of enactment, the Act limited
a national bank's operation to its principal place of business.17 In 192718
and again in 193311 the Act was amended to allow branch banking so

that national banks might better compete in the growing money market
with state-chartered banks, many of which had been given the authority

under state law to establish branches."0 But section ninety-four was not
amended when the national banks were given authority to establish

branches, so the section does not speak to the venue for suits arising out
of the conduct of a national bank's branch offices. Case law interpreting
section ninety-four holds that its venue provisions apply to all actions
against national banks, not just to those arising under the Act. 2' A
national bank's section ninety-four privilege, furthermore, has been held
to be mandatory, not permissive, in its application; that is, if the bank
does not waive its privilege, venue will be governed by the dictates of

section ninety-four.2
The interpretation given the "location" language of section ninetyfour prior to Security Mills dates back to Manufacturers' National

Bank v. Baack,2 3 decided in 1871, which held that a national bank is
"located" only at the principal place of business specified in its organization certificate.24 This interpretation occasioned no harsh results in
1871 when national banks maintained offices for general business at
only one location.25 The leading state case standing for the same proposition is Raiola v. Los Angeles National Trust & Savings Bank,21 de-

"For discussion of the historical background of section ninety-four see Lapinsohn v. Lewis
Charles, Inc., 212 Pa. Super. 185, 189, 240 A.2d 90, 92, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968); Note,
An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 767, 768-69
(1966).
"Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa. Super. 185, 189, 240 A.2d 90, 92, cert. denied,
393 U.S. 952 (1968); Note, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV., supra note 16, at 768-69.
IsThis amendment permitted national banks to establish branch banks within their charter
location in limited circumstances. Act of Feb. 24, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228.
"The 1933 amendment authorized national banks to establish branch banks beyond their
charter location. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 189-90.
2°Rushton v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 298 Mich. 417, 299 N.W. 129 (1941); see Note, 34 GEo.
WASH. L. REv., supra note 16, at 769.
2
"Cadle v. Tracy, 4 F. Cas. 967 (No. 2279) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873).
"Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 373 U.S. 591 (1963); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
2116 F. Cas. 671 (No. 9052) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871).
2
11d. at 673-74.
2'Note, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv., supra note 16, at 769 n.34.
21133 Misc. 630, 233 N.Y.S. 301 (N.Y. City Ct. 1929).
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cided in 1929, again before branch banking was permissible outside the
charter location. Even though they were decided prior to the advent of
branch banking, Baack, Raiola, and their progeny continued to be relied
on as precedent in cases decided after branch banking was authorized.
Courts have failed to consider whether the advent of branch banking
warrants changing the interpretation previously given the "location"
2
language of section ninety-fourY.
Only two courts2 had previously considered whether a national
bank is "located" in counties where branches are maintained, and neither of these had considered the possibility of a re-interpretation of
section ninety-four.2 1 In Gregor J. Schaefer Sons, Inc. v. Watson,'
decided in 1966, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
held in a memorandum opinion that a national banking association is
"located at the place listed in its certificate of incorporation as its
principal place of business or main office, even though it maintains
branches in other counties of the state ... ."I' The Schaefer decision,

however, relied on precedent that was not on point. It relied either on
cases brought in federal court under the "established" provision of section ninety-four in which the "location" issue was not considered or on
cases brought in state courts but decided before branch banking was
possible.32 Two judges dissented, stating that the federal cases were not
in point and that it was incongruous to say that a bank is not located
in a jurisdiction in which it maintains numerous offices. 3 In a 1968
case, Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc.,34 the First Camden National
Bank was sued in Pennsylvania. 35 The bank operated a branch in Pennsylvania, but its principal place of business was in New Jersey." The
Pennsylvania court found no authority for the proposition that the term
21See, e.g., Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); Note, 34 GEo. WASH,
L. REV., supra note 16, at 767.
"Gregor J. Schaefer Sons, Inc. v. Watson, 26 App. Div. 2d 659, 272 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1966);
Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa. Super. 185, 240 A.2d 90, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952

(1968). Lapinsohn, however, involved a branch bank in Pennsylvania of a national banking association incorporated in New Jersey-unlike Schaefer and Security Mills where the national bank was

incorporated in the same state as the branch bank.
2

'See note 28 supra.
326 App. Div. 2d 659, 272 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1966).
'11d. at
, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
32Id.
3Id. at _, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Beldock & Christ, JJ., dissenting).
34212 Pa. Super. 185, 240 A.2d 90, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968).
'-Id.at 187, 240 A.2d at 91.
uId.
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"located" should encompass the place of business of branch banks. 1
Nevertheless, they pointed to policy reasons why suits should be permitted at the site of the bank's branches and relied on a waiver theory to
allow suit to be brought in Pennsylvania. 8
Thus the North Carolina Supreme Court, when it decided Security
Mills, did not have the benefit of well-reasoned or logical precedent. Of
course, the North Carolina Supreme Court is not bound by other state
-decisions. The United States Supreme Court, the only court that can
set compelling precedent, had not spoken to the issue of whether a bank
was "located" within the meaning of section ninety-four at that place
where it had established branch offices. The Security Mills court was
thus able to treat the question presented as one of first impression.
The Security Mills decision is consistent with the purpose of general venue doctrine to provide a convenient forum for the parties. The
original purpose of section ninety-four was to ensure that national banks
were forced to defend actions only in convenient forums.30 Congress
sought to prevent the "interruption in [a bank's] business that might
result from [its] books being sent to distant counties in obedience to
process from state courts."4 This purpose is generally agreed to be less
important today:"

"The inconvenience and interruptions of banking business . . . discussed in 1889 have . . . been . . . minimized, by present modes of
rapid transportation and communication[,] by mechanical and electronic accounting systems[,] and [by] photostatic and microfilming
processes . . . . [T]he present pre-trial practice and liberalization of
the burthe rules respecting documentary evidence have further eased
4' 2
involved.
be
may
banks
which
in
litigation
to
incident
den
Thus the purpose of section ninety-four is no longer promoted by strict
interpretation of its venue provisions. In fact, when branch banks keep
records concerning local business at the location of the branch, the most
convenient place for them to defend a suit is the county where the
"Id. at 188, 240 A.2d at 92.

1id. at 192-94, 240 A.2d at 94-95.
"First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141 (1889).

1"Id. at 145.
"Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa. Super. 185, 193, 240 A.2d 90, 9,l (1968); Note,
34 GEO. WASH. L. REv., supra note 16, at 772-73.
"Chaffee v. Glens Falls Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 204 Misc. 181, _ 123 N.Y.S. 635, 638
(Sup. Ct. 1953), affd mem., 283 App. Div. 694, 128 N.Y.S.2d 539, appeal denied, 283 App. Div.
793, 129 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1954).
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branch bank is located. 3 Even though some national banking associations keep records at centralized locations, modern record-keeping and
copying methods should prevent great inconvenience to the bank even
if they are sued elsewhere."
Furthermore, the possibility of minor inconvenience to the bank is
probably insignificant in relation to the burden on individual plaintiffs
who sue banking associations at branch locations. Limiting venue to the
principal place of business in practice may deprive many plaintiffs of
the opportunity to litigate small claims.
The North Carolina court, in Security Mills, was not the first
judicial body to attempt to ameliorate the harshness of section ninetyfour by finding a waiver by the bank when it established a branch in a
locality other than that where the bank was established." Schaefer and
Lapinsohn discussed previously, also considered this waiver issue." The
Schaefer court concluded that "while operation of a branch within the
county would not in [and] of itself amount to a waiver, it may be
considered along with other evidence of intent of waiver.",4 Other evidence considered by the Schaefer court to show an intention to waive
the bank's section ninety-four rights were documents making it amenable to process and statements in its charter or "other official documents
of the bank wherein the bank has . . .represented that it is present
within [the county] . . . as a member of the business community of the
county and readily available to answer any claims involving it within the
county." 4 Schaefer would then appear to require an express intention
of the bank to waive its immunity to suit outside its "established" home.
The Lapinsohn court found waiver more readily than the court in
Schaefer, noting that a bank "by setting up a branch to conduct general
43Note, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV., supra note 16, at 772-73.
"Id.;
see Chaffee v. Glens Falls Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 204 Misc. 181, 123 N.Y.S. 635, (Sup.
Ct. 1953), affid mem., 283 App. Div. 694, 128 N.Y.S.2d 539, appeal denied, 283 App. Div. 793,
129 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1954).
"See, e.g., Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923). It has been "well settled that
section ninety-four is a personal privilege, waiveable by the bank by failure to assert it or by
conduct inconsistent with its retention." First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145 (1889).
This principle was reaffirmed in 1963 in Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591, 594
(1963). The central issue today, in the branch banking context, is whether the mere maintenance
of a branch bank in the jurisdiction is sufficient to constitute a waiver by a national bank of its
section ninety-four privilege.
"See notes 28-38 and accompanying text supra.
"126 App. Div. 2d at _
272 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
481d.
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. has manifested an intent to be found in that

jurisdiction for purposes of suits arising out of any business conducted
there."
Security Mills found a waiver of section ninety-four based on the
Lapinsohn precedent without discussing the Schaefer requirements for
waiver. The defendant bank's operation of sixty-three branches throughout North Carolina for the purpose of competing for general banking
business and its frequent exercise of its privilege to bring suit itself in
branch locations were found sufficient to manifest its intention to waive
the privilege for suits arising out of a transaction in the operation of the
branch bank.50
The waiver theory thus permitted the Security Mills court to reach
the same result as it did with a re-interpretation of section ninety-four.51
A drawback to the waiver theory is that its fictional nature may leave
the parties uncertain as to which forum the court will decide is proper.
The proper venue for actions should rest on facts more easily ascertained than what the bank's intention is when it establishes a branch. If
the waiver theory were relied on to determine the proper venue for a
suit against a bank in a state as large in area as North Carolina, the
mere possibility that venue would be at the bank's principal place of
business, if situated at a great distance from the branch, would discourage litigation because of the inconvenience and greater expense in travel
and the necessity of hiring attorneys in both locations. The waiver approach thus appears less advantageous from the standpoint of predictability of the location of the law suit.
More significantly, however, the supreme court appears to have
based its decision primarily on a re-interpretation of section ninety-four,
for the opinion speaks to this issue in depth and treats waiver cursorily
11212 Pa. Super. at 193, 240 A.2d at 94. Lapinsohn also set out some of the factors to be
considered in making a determination as to whether a bank has waived its venue-limiting privileges

and rendered itself amenable to suit in a jurisdiction by establishing a branch there. These factors
include whether a building is maintained in the jurisdiction, whether employees work there, whether

full banking services or only limited services are provided at the branch location, whether the
branch bank is soliciting customers and competing with local banks, whether the bank pays local
taxes, whether deposits and withdrawals can be made at the branch, and whether bank records
are located there. Id.

0281 N.C. at 532, 189 S.E.2d at 271.
51Of course, the application of the waiver theory assumes that the meanings of "established"
and "located" are identical and that the drafters of section ninety-four did not use two different

words to mean two different things.
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as an alternative reason.12 Unfortunately, the court, by adding the
waiver alternative, has weakened the significance of its well-reasoned
and courageous interpretation of section ninety-four.
The court's interpretation of section ninety-four has one drawback,
however, for unlike its finding of waiver, venue at a branch location is
not expressly limited to causes of action arising out of business conducted at the branch bank. The availability of suit at branch locations
for all causes of action against the bank might prove onerous for the
bank. For example, a plaintiff transacting business with one branch
office might bring suit in a distant county where another branch is
located. It appears, however, that the court could solve such a problem,
if it should arise, by limiting the location of a bank for purposes of
section ninety-four only to the branch bank with which the plaintiff
conducted business. On balance, however, the possible inconvenience to
a bank of being sued in a branch location when the cause of action arose
elsewhere does not outweigh the need to provide a convenient forum for
plaintiffs.

Thus the preferable basis for allowing suit in the state court in the
branch location is Security Mills' interpretation of section ninety-four

because of the greater certainty of location of venue it provides. Unlike
previous interpretations of section ninety-four, the Security Mills decision shows a judicial awareness of modern banking practices permitting
full-service branches. Security Mills recognizes the true relative burden
to the parties today as achieved by modern duplicating methods, communication processes, and discovery methods. It is therefore to be
hoped that the Security Mills' interpretation of section ninety-four will
be followed in the future by other courts.
ELIZABETH HAZEN POPE
"The court's alternative holding is both ambiguous and inconsistent. It is inconsistent to say
that a bank has no right to change in venue because it is "located" under section ninety-four at
the branch office and to say that the right may be waived. The ambiguity of the reasons for this
alternative approach creates problems in determining the true significance of the decision. The
court does not state reasons for the alternative holding. It may be that the North Carolina court
found waiver as an alternative so that the same ultimate decision, to allow suit in the branch
location, would be reached if the court's re-interpretation of section ninety-four were reversed upon
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. On the other hand, the court may have decided the
issue in the alternative so it can reverse itself and characterize as dictum its re-interpretation of
section ninety-four should this interpretation prove unworkable in practice.
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Trial of Issues by Implied Consent under Rule 15(b)

North Carolina's adoption in 19701 of its new rules of civil procedure, modeled after the federal rules, promised a more flexible system

of pleading and trial practice.2 The North Carolina Supreme Court gave

3
the rules a liberal reading in their first major test, Sutton v.Duke,

which fully endorsed the concept of notice pleading. Recently, in
Mangum v. Surles4 and Roberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds

Memorial Park,5 two decisions involving the implied consent doctrine
under rule 15(b),' the court reaffirmed the break with code formalism.
Its view of the Roberts complaint, however, reopened questions about

notice pleading that had appeared settled by Sutton.
In Mangum v. Surles' a trustee sued to set aside a deed executed

by a seventy-nine-year-old woman at the behest of her stepgrandchildren. The trustee alleged incapacity; he also claimed that the

grandchildren had assumed a confidential relationship with the elderly
woman and that their arrangement of and acceptance of the transfer was
"a fraudulent act." 8 At trial plaintiff produced witnesses who tended to
support the allegations of incapacity,9 while defendants' witnesses testified that her mental condition, which admittedly resulted in a legal
determination of incapacity a year after the conveyance, had developed
only after the deed was executed." Mrs. Matthews herself testified that
'Ch. 803, § i, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 842, amending ch. 954, § 10, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1354.
2See generally Louis, A Survey of Decisions under the New North CarolinaRules of Civil
Procedure,50 N.C.L. REV. 729 (1972).
'277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
'281 N.C. 91, 187 S.E.2d 697 (1972).
5281 N.C. 48, 187 S.E.2d 721 (1972).
IN.C.R. Civ. P. 15(b) provides:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, either before or after judgment, but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be served thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission
of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence.
7281 N.C. 91, 187 S.E.2d 697 (1972).
'Id. at 92, 187 S.E.2d at 698.
OId.
'Id. at 93, 187 S.E.2d at 698.
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on the date of the transfer defendants took her to the office of their
lawyer, told her they wanted her to sign a five hundred dollar note for
them, and thereby procured execution of the disputed instrument without her comprehension." This evidence was received without defense
objection.12 At the close of all testimony, plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint to add a specific allegation that defendants "did with intent
to deceive, practice a fraud upon the said Mary B. Matthews."' 3 Plaintiff also tendered to the court not only the issue of capacity but also
those of undue influence and fraud. Both the amendment and the submission of the latter two issues were denied. 4 When the jury found for
defendants, plaintiff appealed the refusal to bring the other issues into
the case. 5
The court of appeals, insisting that a motion to amend was at the
discretion of the trial judge and finding no evidence tending to suggest
fraud or undue influence, ruled that the trial judge had not abused his
discretion. 6 Trustee Mangum then petitioned the supreme court for a
writ of certiorari.
The supreme court reversed. In her opinion for the court, Justice
Sharp first disagreed with the court of appeals that the record contained
no evidence tending to prove fraud; she concluded that plaintiff's evidence made out a prima facie case on that issue. 7 She then faced the
principal question, whether rule 15(b)'s implied consent doctrine mandated jury consideration of the new legal theory raised by the evidence.
Relying on analogous federal decisions 8 she concluded that rule 15(b)
required that issues litigated by consent be treated as part of the case
and that amendment to conform the pleadings to the evidence should
be freely allowed. 9 The opinion also held that although an amendment
was not necessary to bring the issue before the jury, rule 9(b)20 and good
"ld.
"Id.
1id. at 94, 187 S.E.2d at 699.
1Id.
15Id.

"112 N.C. App. 547, 551, 183 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1971).
17281
N.C. at 95, 187 S.E.2d at 700.
"Id. at 97-98, 187 S.E.2d at 701.
"Id. at 98, 187 S.E.2d at 701-02.

"N.C.R. Civ. P. 9(b) provides: "In all averments of fraud, duress or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally."
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consent in the first trial be
technique required that the issue litigated by
2
made part of the pleadings at any retrial. 1
The second case, Roberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds Memorial Park,2 involved a golf cart accident. Plaintiff, one of the defendants' regular patrons, after renting a golf cart from defendant 3 noticed some lack of firmness in the cart's brakes, which he decided was
a characteristic of the vehicle.24 He continued to play without incident
until the tenth hole. There, having attempted to come to a stop at the
crest of a steep incline, he found the brakes of no use.2 With all passengers aboard, the cart rolled backwards 28down the hill, overturned, and
caused plaintiff serious personal injury.
Plaintiff, alleging defective brakes, complained that defendants
were negligent in maintaining the cart, in inspecting it, and in failing to
warn him of its danger and its proper use on steep terrain.27 At trial
plaintiff produced an expert witness, a design engineer for the company
that manufactured the car, who testified that the accident could only
have been caused by excessive wear on either the brake lining or the
brake cable. Either of these defects could easily have been detected by
visual inspection.28 The engineer also testified that brakes in proper
working condition would have prevented backward as well as forward
motion." Plaintiff himself then testified that the defendant golf professional remarked after the accident that he should have known the cars
had no brakes when going backwards.3 At this point opposing counsel
offered objection that apparently went to the admissibility under the
hearsay rule of defendant's remarks to the plaintiff. Opposing counsel
did not, however, object to the evidence on the ground that it broadened
the scope of the trial from the question of defective brakes to that of
no brakes.
At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendants requested and re21281 N.C. at 99, 187 S.E.2d at 702.
-:281 N.C. 48, 187 S.E.2d 721 (1972).
2id. at 50, 187 S.E.2d at 722. The suit was against both the park and its employee, a golf

professional.

"1d. at 51, 187 S.E.2d at 722.

2ld. at 51, 187 S.E.2d at 723.
"Id. at 52, 187 S.E.2d at 723.

vId. at 50-51, 187 S.E.2d at 722.
21Id. at 52, 187 S.E.2d at 723.

nId.
"Id. at 54-55, 187 S.E.2d at 724-25.
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ceived a directed verdict," and plaintiff appealed. The majority of the3
court of appeals in a brief opinion 31 found no evidence of negligence
A minority was persuaded that the evidence would permit a jury to find
and that the defect was discoverable
both that the brakes were defective
34
by a reasonable inspection.
On further appeal, a majority of the supreme court apparently
agreed with the court of appeals that the evidence did not support
plaintiff's allegations of negligence.35 The evidence that the court believed would overcome a directed verdict was Roberts' testimony that
the golf pro knew the car had no reverse brakes.3" Since the majority
found this issue to be outside the pleadings," however, it determined
that the matter for decision was whether rule 15(b) would operate to
amend the pleadings," thereby legitimizing that evidence. The majority
concluded that since defendants had not objected to the introduction of
the testimony on the grounds that it broadened the issues, the lack of
brakes should be deemed litigated by consent.39 With this evidence
properly before the court plaintiff's case was held sufficient to be given
to the jury.4"
Justice Sharp, concurring in the result, questioned the reasoning of
the majority's decision. She argued that under rule 8(a)(1) 4' and rule 84,
forms 3 and 4, the allegations were sufficient to permit introduction of
the evidence without amendment or consent" for at least three reasons:
(1)
that a charge of defective brakes "is surely broad enough to support
evidence that they worked well in one direction only;" (2) that plaintiff's
allegation that he applied the brakes "all to no effect" was adequate to
give the required notice of that issue; and (3) that brakes that worked
31d. at 53, 187 S.E.2d at 723.
3212 N.C. App. 69, 182 S.E.2d 611 (1971).
33d. at 72, 182 S.E.2d at 613.

3Id. at 72-73, 182 S.E.2d at 613-14 (Hedrick, J., dissenting).
-1281 N.C. at 54-55, 187 S.E.2d at 724.

38Id. at 50, 60, 187 S.E.2d at 725, 728.
7Id. at 55, 187 S.E.2d at 725.
"Ild.
31d.at 59, 187 S.E.2d at 727; see text accompanying note 31 supra.
40
M. at 60, 187 S.E.2d at 728.
4
"Rule 8(a)(l) provides: "[A complaint shall contain] a short and plain statement of the claim
sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or
series of transactions or occurrences intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief ..
4

"

1[A] complaint which is already sufficient has no need of amendment either by the express
permission of the court or by operation of law." 281 N.C. at 60, 187 S.E.2d at 728.
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in only one direction were per se defective.13 For these reasons she

insisted that consideration of rule 15(b) was irrelevant.
These two cases raise at least three procedural points that will be
dealt with in succession: the interpretation of rule 15 (b); the requirement

that a formal amendment be made after litigation by consent before a
retrial; and the relationship between rule 8(a)(1) and rule 15(b).

Before the North Carolina legislature adopted the new rules, the
relationship between a litigant's pleadings and his proof was governed

by the doctrine of variance and by the courts' sparing grant of amendments. Details of this complicated and highly technical scheme have
been discussed elsewhere;" it suffices here to note that any material

variance, even if offered without objection, would lead to a total failure
of proof.45 Amendment was possible, but its scope was restricted," and

a court's discretion was often exercised against a careless pleader. Only
7
manifest abuse of the court's discretion was grounds for reversal.
New rule 15, governing amendment and variance, was modeled
closely after federal rule 15;18 however, North Carolina courts have not
all49 been quick to embrace the federal reading of 15(b).5 ° Mangum and

Roberts are welcome, therefore, in reaffirming Sutton's promise to read
the North Carolina rules in the light of federal experience.
In interpreting rule 15(b)'s 'implied consent' or 'litigation by consent' doctrine, the two cases relied explicitly on Dean Phillips' analysis.51
43d.

"Note, Pleadings-Materialand Immaterial Variance, 41 N.C.L. REv. 647 (1963).
"Id. at 651-52.
""The right to amend pleadings does not permit the litigant to set up a wholly different cause
of action or change substantially the form of the action originally sued upon." Anderson v.
Atkinson, 235 N.C. 300, 301, 69 S.E.2d 603, 604 (1952); see Louis, Civil Procedure (Pleadings
and Parties),Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REv. 823, 836-38 (1967).
"Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 264 N.C: 79, 80, 140 S.E.2d 763, 764
(1965).
"1FED. R. Civ. P. 15. Some differences do exist. N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(a) permits an amendment
as a matter of course within thirty days if certain conditions are met; the federal rule allows only
twenty days. N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(b) uses the language "before or after judgment" while the federal
language is "even after judgment." N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(c) is significantly different in wording than
its corresponding federal number.
"See, e.g., Helson's Premiums & Gifts, Inc. v. Duncan, 9 N.C. App. 653, 177 S.E.2d 428
(1970).
"See 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.13, at 983-84 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE]. But see United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 124 F. Supp. 818, 827 (E.D. Wash.
1954), rev'd on other grounds, 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957),
insofar as it allows trial by implied consent.
"I MCINTOSH NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 970.80, at 239-40 (Phillips
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Phillips has stated that when evidence not within the pleadings is offered, rule 15(b) obliges opposing counsel to object immediately. Even
if he does object, the rule states that the court "may allow" the pleadings to be amended and "shall do so freely when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be served thereby and the objecting party fails
to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits."53 The court
may "grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence."54 In other words, if timely objection is raised, the pleadings
must be amended or the evidence cannot be introduced. The burden of
persuading the court rests, however, not on the party seeking amendment but on the party opposing it. He must convince the judge that even
if a continuance is granted to give him time to prepare to meet the new
allegations, his case will be prejudiced. 5 Otherwise, the judge "shall
freely" grant the amendment. 6
If opposing counsel fails to object on the proper grounds, a presumption will arise that consent is given to the broadened scope of the
trial. Under this presumption all issues raised will be treated as if they
were in the pleadings. Professor Moore confirms what the language of
15(b) implies: "Rule 15(b) is not permissive in terms; it provides that
issues tried by express or implied consent shall be treated as if raised in
'57
the pleadings.
The presumption of consent will be difficult to overcome. Although
it is not clearly enunciated in these two cases, other courts" and commentators 9 point out that if a party does not object when new evidence
Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as PHILLIPS]. For federal interpretation see cases cited MOORE 98384 n.2.
52
"A party who fails to object to evidence is of course initially presumed to have given implied
consent by silence. He can avoid the effect only by satisfying the court that under the circumstances, his consent . . . should not be implied from his failure to object to particular evidence. This

may be a most difficult position to sustain." PHILLIPS § 970.80, at 240.
ON.C.R. Civ. P. 15(b).

5ld.
55In Roberts, though there was objection to the introduction of the golf professional's re-

marks, 281 N.C. at 54-55, 187 S.E.2d at 724-25, it was not on the grounds that the evidence was
outside the pleadings. Id. at 59, 187 S.E.2d at 727. Consequently, consent to litigate the broadened
issue could be implied.
5

"Id. at 58, 187 S.E.2d at 726-27; see, e.g., J.C. Millett Co. v. Distillers Distrib. Corp., 258
F.2d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1958).
"MOORE § 15.13[2], at 996.
"See, e.g., Wirtz v. F.M. Sloan, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 56
(3d Cir. 1969).
"See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.8, at 171 (1965); PHILLIPS § 970.80, at 239.
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is first raised, he may not do so later on grounds of prejudice. The chief
remaining argument for one objecting, after both sides have rested, is
that he failed to see the full implications of the proof. Professor James
has observed that "[e]ven astute trial counsel cannot be asked to see all
the implications and ramifications of offered evidence when these go
outside the pleadings." 60 Indeed, he would shift the burden: "A failure
to object should be construed as consent.

. .

only if it was reasonably

apparent that the evidence would open up this new issue, and also what
the nature of the issue was, at the time the evidence was offered." 61
Despite such arguments, the draftsmen of the rule place the burden on
the opposing party. Phillips' warning that "[c]ounsel cannot in prudence
under this rule fail to object to any evidence which seems even remotely
to be opening up issues not raised by the pleadings '6 2 seems appropriate.
If the issue has been litigated by consent and if the opposing counsel
fails to satisfy the court that he was not unreasonable in failing to
perceive the broader issue, no formal amendment is necessary. As
Mangum makes clear, "The pleadings are regarded as amended . . .
even though the defaulting pleader made no formal motion to
amend." 6 Though a sentence in the Roberts case seems to dispute this"
a careful reading shows only that the opinion at that point has chosen
to speak of implied consent as a kind of "amendment"; indeed, at
another point in the opinion the court reverts to the distinction between
pleadings "deemed amended" by consent and pleadings that are formally amended."
While no amendment is actually necessary where consent has occurred, Mangum holds that as a matter of law one is permissible when
the issues have been broadened by consent.6 In fact, both decisions urge
for the sake of good practice that the formal move should be made. 7
Mangum goes further than this; it requiresthat an amendment be made
COF.
JAMES, supra note 55, at 169. See also Gallon v. Lloyd-Thomas, 264 F.2d 821, 825 & n.3

(8th Cir. 1959)).

supra note 55, at 169.
12PHILLIPS § 970.80, at 240.
0281 N.C. at 98, 187 S.E.2d at 702.
""Under the new Rules the trial must proceed within the issues raised by the broad pleadings
unless the pleadings are amended." 281 N.C. at 56, 187 S.E.2d at 722.
fId. at 57, 187 S.E.2d at 727. Dean Phillips made the distinction. PHILLIPS § 970.80 at 23637 n.96.
6281 N.C. at 99, 187 S.E.2d at 702.
111d.; 281 N.C. at 59, 187 S.E.2d at 727.
"JAMES,
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when a retrial is held for variance or for failure to submit issues raised
by the evidence. "8
Under the old variance doctrine, if the proof offered touched on a
new cause of action, a barrier was raised that plaintiff could not scale
even by amendment. " In fact, a statute 0 forbade the court to exercise
its discretion when a claim was substantively changed. As these new
decisions make evident, however, rule 15(b) will not brook such a restriction. Mangum, which was tried on an allegation of incapacity, was
held to be enlarged by the introduction of additional evidence to include
two previously unalleged theories of recovery. Justice Sharp's opinion
cited numerous analogous federal cases for the point," and Justice
Branch, speaking for the court in Roberts, reached a similar conclu2
sion.1

The treatment given rule 15 by the North Carolina court is so
firmly consonant with the philosophy expressed in Sutton that the majority's initial conclusions about the pleadings in Roberts seem discordant. In his complaint, as noted earlier,73 plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent in maintaining the cart, in failing to discover its
defect, and in failing to instruct in its use on steep terrain. Yet Justice
Branch found the introduction of the defendant professional's evidence
to be a variance that was cured only by rule 15(b)'s liberal allowance of
amendment and implied consent.74
There are few explanations to account for the majority's reasoning
on this point. Perhaps pleadings, though sufficient to survive a motion
68This holding, not a part of federal practice, provokes several questions. Does this command
become a requirement for all issues retried, or does Justice Sharp's groupings of reasons-"orderly
procedure, compliance with Rule 9(b), and good technique," 281 N.C. at 99, 187 S.E.2d at

721-suggest that those issues raised by the evidence which are not listed in 9(b) need not be
subjects of formal amendment? If an attorney fails to amend his complaint, is he foreclosed at
retrial from attempting to reintroduce the evidence by amendment? If, instead of amending, the
attorney merely reintroduces the evidence and litigation by consent occurs, is this implied consent
negatived by the failure to amend the pleadings prior to trial? Good form certainly encourages

formal amendment on retrial, but the concern for the merits which characterizes the new procedural philosophy seems offended by this well-meaning, but technical addition to the rules. "Techni-

calities and form are to be disregarded in favor of the merits of the case." Sizemore, GeneralScope
and Philosophy of the New Rules, 5 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1969).
"Lane v. Griswold, 273 N.C. 1, 17, 159 S.E.2d 338, 349-50 (1968); George A. Hormel & Co.
v. City of Winston-Salem, 263 N.C. 666, 676, 140 S.E.2d 362, 369 (1965).
"Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-163 (1953) (repealed 1967).
"1281 N.C. at 97-98, 187 S.E.2d at 701.
72281 N.C. at 59, 187 S.E.2d at 727.
"See text accompanying note 26 supra.
7281 N.C. at 56, 187 S.E.2d at 725.
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for dismisal under rule 12(b)(6),75 may not be sufficient without amendment to permit introduction of evidence that departs even slightly from
a preliminary conclusion about liability incorporated in the complaint.
In the Roberts case plaintiff seems clearly to have fulfilled the notice
function that, according to Sutton,76 was to indicate to opposing counsel
the occurrence at issue and the claim for relief sought. Roberts' attorney
had described the brake problem, prematurely, as a "defect." When
evidence at trial modified that description-there were no brakes at all
in reverse-the court resurrected the doctrine of variance, though it was
deprived by rule 15(b) of substantive effect. Its newfound life seems to
have assumed a strange form; one who pleads with specificity may
encounter old variance difficulties, while one who takes advantage of
minimal notice requirements without pre-judging the facts or specifying
legal theories in detail will escape without the need to argue later for
amendment or implied consent.
Even this account fails to explain why the court found insufficient
plaintiff's allegation that negligence occurred when defendant failed to
warn about the use of the cart on steep terrain or plaintiff's description
in the complaint of his attempt to apply the brakes, "all to no effect."
The issue was not, of course, North Carolina's stringent standards of
proof in negligence cases, 77 but the perception of adequate pleading.
In summary, though the North Carolina Supreme Court applied
rule 15(b) with good will, the majority's need even to reach the question
of implied consent suggests that it harbors reservations about abandoning altogether the rigor of code pleading.
JOHN CHARLES BOGER
"Most of the cases that have looked to N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) and Sutton have arisen in the
context of motions to dismiss. See Forrester v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 117, 184 S.E.2d 858 (1971);
Redevelopment Comm'n v. Grimes, 277 N.C. 634, 178 S.E.2d 345 (1971); Thompson v. Watkins,
15 N.C. App. 208, 189 S.E.2d 615 (1972); Clouse v. Chairtown Motors Inc., 14 N.C. App. 117,
187 S.E.2d 398 (1972); North Am. Acceptance Corp. v. Samuels, 11 N.C. App. 504, 181 S.E.2d
794 (1971); Cassels v. Ford Motor Co., 10 N.C. App. 51, 178 S.E.2d 12 (1970).
7277 N.C. at 102, 176 S.E.2d at 165.
nThese requirements are discussed in Byrd, Proofof Negligence in North Carolina(pts. 1-2),
48 N.C.L. REV. 152, 731 (1970).
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II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Establishing Residence for Tuition Purposes
In addition to the funds collected through tuition fees, the state of
North Carolina currently spends over fifteen hundred dollars annually
to defray the expenses of each student enrolled in the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.' Since this money must come primarily
from the taxes paid by North Carolina citizens, the General Assembly
has empowered the Trustees of the University to set tuition rates2 and
to charge residents of other states a rate higher than that charged North
Carolina residents.3 Pursuant to this power the Trustees have established regulations for determining the residence of its students., In
Glusman v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina,' two law
students, Kenneth Glusman and Anthony Lamb, asserted that although

they could not meet the tests of the regulations, they were in fact North
Carolina residents and therefore, that the denial of in-state tuition rates
'Glusman v. Trustees of Univ. of North Carolina, 281 N.C. 629, 632, 190 S.E.2d 213, 216
(1972).
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-143 (1966), as amended, id. § 116-143 (Supp. 1971).
3
id. § 116-144 (1966).
'The regulations relevant to this note were adopted in 1967 and are set out in Glusman v.
Trustees of Univ. of North Carolina, 281 N.C. 629, 631, 190 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1972):
1. General: The tuition charge for legal residents of North Carolina is less than for
nonresidents. To qualify for in-state tuition, a legal resident must have maintained his
domicile in North Carolina for at least the six months preceding the date of first
enrollment or re-enrollment in an institution of higher education in this State.
3. Adults: A person twenty-one years of age or older is eligible for in-state tuition if
he has maintained continuous domicile in North Carolina for the six months next
preceding the date of enrollment or re-enrollment, exclusive of any time spent in attendance at any institution of higher education. An in-state student reaching the age of
twenty-one is not required to re-establish residence provided that he maintains his domicile in North Carolina.
4. MarriedStudents: The legal residence of a wife follows that of her husband, except
that a woman currently enrolled as an in-state student in an institution of higher education may continue as a resident even though she marries a nonresident. If the husband
is a nonresident and separation or divorce occurs, the woman may qualify for in-state
tuition after establishing her domicile in North Carolina for at least six months under
the same conditions as she could if she were single.
For the current regulations see RECORD OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF
LAW 18-20 (1972). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-143.1 (Supp. 1971).
5281 N.C. 629, 190 S.E.2d 213 (1972), appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S. Oct. 25,
1972) (No. 72-635).
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was a denial of equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina held, however, that the regulations were reasonable and
that the petitioners were not denied equal protection.
Petitioners did not challenge the power of the state to charge nonresidents a tuition rate higher than that charged residents, nor did they
challenge the power of the state to require a reasonable period of residence as a condition for granting in-state rates. Courts that have upheld
the power to charge the higher rates have reasoned that since most of
the funds supporting the state institutions are provided by residents of
the state in taxes, the higher tuition charged nonresident students would
tend to distribute more equitably the cost of operating the institutions.'
A waiting period has been upheld as providing the nonresident an
opportunity to contribute his tax money to the state, thereby distributing more equitably the cost of operating the university,7 and as furnishing evidence of the student's bona fide intent to remain in the state
permanently.' The North Carolina regulations, however, went beyond
the above requirements and provided not only that the student must be
a resident of North Carolina for a period of six months9 but also that
the six months must be "exclusive of any time spent in attendance at
any institution of higher education."' 0 Thus a nonresident cannot become a resident for tuition purposes so long as he remains a student,
regardless of his intention to remain in the state, regardless of the taxes
he pays, and regardless of the time he spends in the state. Since only
students were prohibited from becoming residents for tuition purposes,
Glusman and Lamb attacked this regulation for unconstitutionally denying to students the rights accorded to other domiciliaries of North
Carolina."
Petitioners Glusman and Lamb originally enrolled in the University of North Carolina as nonresidents. It was stipulated that they subsequently established residence in the state for the requisite six-month
period and that they were classified as residents for voting and tax
'Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853 (1969); Clarke v.
Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
'Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971);
Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396

U.S. 554 (1970).
'Bryan v. Regents of Univ. of California, 188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922).
'This regulation has since been codified and extended to one year by N.C. G.N.
143.1 (Supp. 1971).
1"See note 4 supra.
11281
N.C. at 636, 190 S.E.2d at 218.

STAT.

§ 116-
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purposes. It was further stipulated that both had the intent of remaining
in the state indefinitely and that "the only reason why both were denied
. . . reclassification for tuition purpose . . .was that neither main-

tained a residence in the state for six continuous months exclusive of
time spent while in attendance at the University of North Carolina
School of Law."'" Having been denied a hearing before the Residence
Status Committee of the University of North Carolina, Glusman and
Lamb petitioned for review of their classification in Wake County Superior Court. Glusman sought to recover the difference between the nonresident fees he had been required to pay and the fees required of a
resident. Lamb sought an order classifying him as eligible for in-state
tuition status. Judge Braswell held:
[T]he tuition regulations which provide that the residence status of any
student is forever to be determined as of the time of his first enrollment
in an institution of higher education in North Carolina, and that residence status may not thereafter be changed if he continues re-enrollment without first having dropped out of school for at least a sixmonths' period, [are] declared unconstitutional. 3
The case was certified for appeal directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court. 4
Two tests have been developed by the United States Supreme
Court for determining when the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been violated. To satisfy the traditional test the
classification must be reasonably related to a legitimate state objective
or purpose."' This "reasonableness" test does not impose a particularly
stringent standard on the states, as the United States Supreme Court
has indicated:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
"Id. at 633, 190 S.E.2d at 216.
"Id. at 634, 190 S.E.2d at 217.
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1964) (providing for initial appellate review by the North
Carolina Supreme Court).
"5E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913); Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).

1973]

RESIDENCE FOR TUITION

1015

some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
In recent years, however, another test has been applied if the state law
tends to deter the exercise of a fundamental right such as the right to
vote or to travel between the states.1 7 In these cases the classification
not only must be reasonable but must promote a compelling state interest. There is no presumption of legislative correctness here;1 8 the burden
falls to the state to justify its classification. 9
Prior to Shapiro v. Thompson"° residence requirements in the tui2
tion cases were challenged under the traditional equal protection test. 1
Shapiro held that a one-year residence requirement for obtaining welfare payments deterred the exercise of the right to travel between the
states and tested that requirement under the compelling interest test.
Subsequently two cases were filed that challenged one-year residence
requirements for in-state tuition rates. In Starns v. Malkerson22 and
Kirk v. Board of Regents" the courts held that the objective of the
tuition policy was not to deter interstate movement as the objective had
been in Shapiro. Furthermore, the denial of low-cost education was
hardly on the same level as the denial of the basic necessities of life and
was, therefore, much less likely to deter interstate movement. 24 These
courts found that the requirements did not exact a penalty for interstate
travel and, therefore, that they should be tested by traditional equal
protection standards.
In stipulating that the regulations did not impede interstate travel,
the petitioners in Glusman apparently accepted the reasoning of these
courts, and with this issue aside the North Carolina Supreme Court was
unwilling to find that the right to low tuition rates was a fundamental
right requiring the use of the compelling interest test.2 5 An argument
could have been made that the facts in Starns and Kirk were distinguishable from those in Glusman and that the compelling interest test should
"McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 (1972).
-394 U.S. 618 (1968).
"See, e.g., Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 122 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
2326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
23273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).

11326 F. Supp. at 237-38; 273 Cal. App. 2d at
11281 N.C. at 637, 190 S.E.2d at 219.

-_

78 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67.
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have been applied. Those cases involved regulations requiring one year
of residence in the state to qualify for in-state rates, but there was no
prohibition against qualifying while attending school. The prospect of
paying nonresident fees for one year is quite different from the prospect
of paying those fees for four or more years; consequently, the North
Carolina regulations seem much more likely to deter interstate movement. Furthermore, it is not certain that the Starns and Kirk decisions
are still good law. In Dunn v. Blumstein0 the United States Supreme
Court examined a Tennessee residence requirement for voting. Tennessee had argued that the residence requirement was not intended to deter
and, in fact, did not deter interstate travel. In reply to this argument
the Court stated:
This view represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law. It is
irrelevant whether the disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is the
more potent deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding
that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have other "right
to travel" cases in this Court always relied on the presence of actual
deterrence. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling interest
test would be triggered by "any classification which served to penalize
the exercise of that right [to travel]."' '
The Glusman court next had to determine whether the regulations
were reasonable under the traditional test. Two state courts, reviewing
statutory provisions similar to the regulations challenged in North Carolina, had held them to be reasonable standards for ascertaining
whether the former nonresident had become a bona fide resident of the
state.18 Another court had disagreed strongly:
Under the interpretation placed upon the foregoing quoted regulation
by the Board it would necessarily follow that a student who is a
nonresident of the State at the time of initial enrollment at the College
would, if he attends each regular term, retain such status throughout
his entire college career irrespective of the fact that he may have
become a bona fide resident . . . .Under such interpretation it does
not afford any opportunity to show a change of residential or domiciliary status and does in effect deny equality of opportunity to persons
of the same class who are similarly situated and for that reason it is
2692 S. Ct. 995 (1972).

2ld. at 1001-02 (emphasis by the Court).
28Landwehr v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964); Thompson v.
Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
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an unreasonable regulation . . . .It is the denial to the applicant of
an opportunity to be heard in the matter .. .that constitutes the
objectionable feature of the regulation here considered."

Other state courts have held it permissible to presume that a nonresident
student does not become a bona fide resident while he attends school,
but at the same time have indicated that they would not be inclined to
uphold an absolute classification that did not give the student an oppor30
tunity to overcome that presumption.
Glusman and Lamb urged that a 1965 decision of the United States
Supreme Court, Carrington v. Rash,3 1 should control this case. In
Carrington the Supreme Court struck down a provision in the Texas
Constitution that denied a serviceman from another state the right to
acquire a voting residence in Texas while he remained in service. The
state argued that it had a valid interest in protecting the franchise from
transients. The Court agreed that Texas could take reasonable steps to
assure that its voters were bona fide residents, but that "[b]y forbidding
a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, the Texas
Constitution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the
32
Fourteenth Amendment."
The majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court did not find
Carringtoncontrolling on the issue:
The real holding in Carringtonwas that a burden may not be imposed
on, or a right denied to, a group labeled "nonresident," when such
labeling, with such attendant imposition and denial, is not reasonably
related to the state interest it seeks to protect. In the present case,
petitioners are not labeled as "nonresidents." Whether the denial of a
2'Newman v. Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 95,349 P.2d 716,718-19 (1960); accord, Kline v. Vlandis,
346 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1972) (invalidating a Connecticut law which classified students on the
date of first enrollment and allowed no changes under any circumstances); Thompson v. Board of
188 N.W.2d 840, 845 (1971) (McCown, J., dissenting).
Regents, 187 Neb. 252, _
"Similarly here, the durational residence requirement is not set up in terms of an
absolute classification. A student from another state, like petitioner, is classified as a
nonresident because he is presumed to be in California primarily for educational purposes. If appropriate facts and circumstances arise subsequent to a student's classification as a nonresident, there is nothing in the regulation that would prevent petitioner's
reclassification as a resident . . . .There is here. . . no arbitrary permanent classification of nonresidency which prohibits her from subsequently proving that she does, in
fact, qualify for resident tuition.
78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 268 (1969); accord,
Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, -,
Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 122-23 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
31380 U.S. 89 (1965).
11d. at 96.
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benefit to a certain class of residents (domiciliaries) in the present case,
with its peculiar facts, is reasonably related to the state interest the
classification is meant to protect, is not determined by the holding in
Carrington,involving an entirely different set of facts.3"
It must have come as some surprise to Glusman and Lamb to discover
that they were not being labeled nonresidents. Since state law only
authorizes the trustees to collect higher tuition rates from "nonresidents, ' 34 it is clear that petitioners are classified as nonresidents for
tuition purposes just as Carrington was classified as nonresident for
voting purposes. Moreover, the Court made no attempt to explain how
the facts in Carringtonwere "entirely different." Carrington was domiciled in Texas where he owned a house and paid property taxes. He
intended to remain in Texas but was denied the right to vote solely
because he was in the service. 35 To become a resident for voting purposes, Carrington would have had to resign from the Army just as
Glusman and Lamb would have had to drop out of school to become
residents for tuition purposes.
An argument could be made that a distinction lies in the fact that
Carrington dealt with a fundamental right-the right to vote-but the
decision in Carringtonwas based on the traditional reasonableness test,
not the compelling interest test.31 If it was unreasonable to forbid a
11281 N.C. at 637, 190 S.E.2d at 219. The court's statement of the "real holding" of
Carrington is not only confusing but appears to be inaccurate since the United States Supreme
Court was not discussing the rights of nonresidents. Carrington was stipulated to be a domiciliary
of the state of Texas. 380 U.S. at 91. He was labeled nonresident only for voting purposes; it was
not the label itself which concerned the Supreme Court but the fact that only servicemen were
forbidden to change that label and to acquire a voting residence in Texas.
3
1N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 116-144 (1966).

11380 U.S. at 91.
""The compelling state interest test, as applied to a State's denial of the vote, seems to have
come into full flower with Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 ....
[A]s I read
Carrington,the standard there employed was that the voting requirements be reasonable." Dunn
v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1013 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring). There is some disagreement
on this point. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 683
(1966), said that Carrington was an application of the traditional equal protection standard; but
he changed his mind in his dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660 (1969): "The Court
applied an abnormally severe equal protection standard to a Texas statute denying servicemen the
right to vote, without indicating that the statutory distinction between servicemen and civilians was
generally 'suspect'." A careful reading of the case favors Justice Blackmun's interpretation. The
Court makes no mention of a compelling state interest or of placing the burden on the state to
justify its action. Instead, it stated that the state can impose "reasonable" restrictions, but that
the restrictions under review imposed "invidious discrimination." 380 U.S. at 96. This language
fits nicely with the traditional test; moreover, it is certainly likely that if the Court intended to
depart from the traditional test, it would have indicated that intention clearly.
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soldier to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, it should be
equally unreasonable to forbid a student to do the same, and therefore,
the reasoning of Carringtonshould control Glusman if it is heard by the
United States Supreme Court.3 1 When a presumption is incapable of
being overcome by even the strongest proof, it becomes by its very
nature arbitrary.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in upholding the regulations
reasoned that if it is permissible to charge nonresidents a higher rate
than that charged to residents,38 some method must be devised for
determining who pays which rate. The objective of the six-month nonattendance requirement is "to assure that students who benefit from the
in-state tuition subsidy the State provides for its citizens are in fact its
own citizens. ' 39 The court stressed that domicile, defined as physical
presence plus intent to make a home, is not a sufficient test since "the
determination of a student's domicile is especially difficult and subject
to doubt."4 The addition of the six-month nonattendance requirement
"adds objectivity and certainty to the requirement of domicile,"41 and
therefore is a reasonable way to assure that only North Carolina citizens
get benefit of in-state tuition.
In stressing that the objective of the regulations was to assure that
only North Carolina citizens benefit from in-state tuition, the court
seemed to abandon its attempt to defend its application of the traditional equal protection test and instead implicitly asserted that Lamb
and Glusman were not even citizens and, therefore, were not entitled to
equal treatment. If a person lives in North Carolina, votes in North
Carolina, and pays taxes in North Carolina, can it be seriously suggested that he is not a citizen of North Carolina? If the court was
concerned with establishing a test for citizenship, it need only have
looked to the fourteenth amendment which provides: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside."4 2 Since one must reside in North Carolina to qualify to vote in
the state43 and since it was stipulated that the petitioners had estab"The case has been appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 41 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S.
Oct. 25, 1972) (No. 72-635).
"See text accompanying note 6 supra.
31281 N.C. at 639, 190 S.E.2d at 220.
401d.
41Id.
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2(1).
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lished residence for voting,44 it is clear that petitioners were residents of
North Carolina and, therefore, were by definition citizens. If the only
purpose for the regulations were to assure that the beneficiaries of low
rates were citizens, how could it be reasonable to deny the benefit to one
who was in fact a North Carolina citizen? Obviously, the regulations
imposed something other than a test of citizenship. By discussing the
regulations as though they formulated a test of citizenship, the court
obscured the real issue of the case: the unequal treatment by the state
of two groups of its citizens.
The court seemed concerned about the high cost of education 5 and
may have felt that it was only fair to charge new citizens more for
education, since they had not contributed tax money to the state, and
therefore, that the real objective of the regulations was to assure that
each student bore a fair burden of the cost of education. Viewed in this
way, the regulations are no more defensible, for they were in no way
related to the amount of taxes paid by the citizen. One person could
move to the state six months in advance of enrollment and never pay
any taxes but still qualify for in-state rates. Another person could move
to the state five months in advance of enrollment, buy a house on which
he pays property tax, hold a part-time job earning income taxed by the
state, live here for eight years as a student, and still be classified as a
nonresident. If this was the object of the regulations, how could it be
reasonable to deny a person any opportunity to show that he has borne
his fair burden of the cost?
Perhaps the court feared that some students would establish a residence solely to take advantage of low rates and then leave the state upon
graduation.46 The state may well have an interest in assuring that the
people whose education it subsidizes remain in the state to contribute
the talents they obtained through that education. Perhaps the real objective of the regulations was to prevent false claims of intent to reside
permanently in the state. That this objective is not reasonably achieved
by the regulations is demonstrated in Justice Higgins' dissent:
[T]he rule for all practical purposes raises a conclusive, irrebuttable
presumption that he has not changed in fact, but continues a nonresident. The trustees say any other rule would permit false claims. However, the purpose of the hearing is to determine the bona fides of a
11281 N.C. at 633, 190 S.E.2d at 216.
45
1d. at 638, 190 S.E.2d at 220.

"See id.
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claim rather than conclusively to presume it to be false. .

.

. The fact

that false claims may be filed is not ground to deny just ones.'"
Moreover, since there was nothing to prevent a person who intended to
leave the state upon graduation from dropping out of school for six
months to get the low rates, the regulations may not even have effectively prevented false claims.
Petitioner Lamb asserted an additional ground for relief. Regulation No. 445 allowed a nonresident woman to become a legal resident
by marriage to a resident man. Judge Braswell found that Lamb had
married a person who had been classified by the Trustees as a legal
resident of the state of North Carolina,4 9 and Lamb contended that
Regulation No. 4 discriminated against him solely on account of sex and
thereby denied him equal protection of the law. The court, however,
read the regulation together with the other regulations"0 and interpreted
it to bestow only domicile on the nonresident woman:
Under the regulations, domiciliary status was not equivalent to in-state
tuition status. Although a woman was deemed a domiciliary of North
Carolina from the date of her marriage, to become eligible for in-state
tuition a married woman, just as Lamb or any other student, had to
establish actual residence in this state for six continuous months exclusive of the time spent while in attendance at an institution of higher
education. 1
Since Lamb was stipulated to be a domiciliary of the state, he had no
standing to object to the automatic bestowal of domicile on the nonresident woman. 2 The regulations are not clear; but the interpretation of
the North Carolina court follows the reasoning of two other courts
"Id. at 643, 190 S.E.2d at 222.
"See note 4 supra.
"1281 N.C. at 633, 190 S.E.2d at 217.
*'Seenote 4 supra.
"1281 N.C. at 641, 190 S.E.2d at 221-22. This interpretation of the regulations was contrary
to the interpretation it was given by the Residence Status Committee of the University of North

Carolina at Chapel Hill. The Committee applied Regulation No. 4 so as to give the nonresident
female in-state status immediately upon marriage to the resident male. Nonresident females married to nonresident males were unable to change their status, whether or not they attended school,
until their husbands qualified for in-state rates. In the course of this litigation, Regulation No. 4
was abandoned and all females are today considered independent of their husbands. Interview with
Robert A. Melott, member of Residence Status Committee of the University of North Carolina

at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill, Jan. 29, 1973.
"1281 N.C. at 641, 190 S.E.2d at 221.
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dealing with similar provisions. 53 This issue is not being appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
It seems clear that the current regulations are needlessly harsh and

arbitrary. 4 North Carolina does have an interest in equalizing the cost
of operating its institutions and in preventing false claims of residence,
but these objectives can be achieved in a more equitable way. Requiring
an initial period of residence may be appropriate, but there should be
some opportunity to change the classification after that period ends. The

state of Nebraska, which had similar regulations55 upheld by its state
court 56 subsequently amended its law to allow reclassification after an
5
initial period of residence when certain other objective tests were metY.
Other states presume that persons who originally register as nonresident
students are in the state primarily for the purpose of education and not
with the intention of becoming permanent residents. However, the presumptions imposed by these states are not irrebuttable.58 The presump"Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed. 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
5
The harshness of the current rule is aptly demonstrated in Fox v. Trustees of Consol. Univ.
of North Carolina, 16 N.C. App. 53, 190 S.E.2d 884 (1972), which discusses the application of
that rule not to tuition rates but to admission to the University. The Medical School of the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill only allows 15% of its first-year class to be composed
of nonresidents. Because the number is so small, entrance as a nonresident is much more competitive; the result is that a person who could have been admitted as a resident might not be admitted
as a nonresident. Thus, a student who spends four years in a North Carolina undergraduate school,
marries a North Carolina girl, and fully intends to spend the rest of his life in the state will be
faced not just with the prospect of four more years of nonresident fees but may not even be given
the right to an education.
-Ch. 582, § 1, [1965] Laws of Neb. 1877, as amended NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502 (1971).
56
Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
57
NEB. REv. STAT. § 85-502.01 (1971) provides:
No person shall be deemed to have established a home in Nebraska where he is habitually present unless he shall execute an affidavit of intent that the State of Nebraska is
his permanent residence and has been his permanent residence for one year immediately
prior to the execution of the affidavit of intent, and he shall:
(I) Have been registered to and be eligible for voting in Nebraska state elections;
(2) Have continually for one year immediately prior to the beginning of the semester or summer session for which the student is enrolling;
(a) Paid applicable Nebraska sales and Nebraska income tax as a Nebraska
resident; and
(b) Registered and had assessed for applicable taxation in Nebraska, all personal
property requiring registration, as may be owned by such person; or
(3) Own a home in Nebraska in which such person is residing, or have executed a
contract to purchase and be making payments on a home in Nebraska in which such
person is residing.
"See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2654c, § I(e)(3) (1965):
Individuals twenty-one (21) years of age or over who have come from without the state
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tion could place the burden on the student to prove that he has become
a bona fide resident. Such a burden would not be easy to meet, but those
who do deserve reclassification would at least have the chance to demonstrate that fact.59 A similar presumption is already employed by this

state in determining the right of a student to vote in his college town,60
and this may be the fairest way to handle the problem.
WILLIAM C. LIVINGSTON

No Right to Counsel for the "Undisciplined Child"
Beginning with the adoption by Illinois of a juvenile court statute
in 1899,1 the juvenile court system has spread to every state, including

North Carolina, whose juvenile court system was created in 19 19.2 Most
of the constitutional safeguards afforded adults in criminal cases had

not been extended to the juvenile proceeding because of its protective,
rather than adversary, nature 3 when the United States Supreme Court,
in In re Gault,4 defined the impact of the due process requirement of
the fourteenth amendment upon juvenile proceedings. The Court held
that an accused juvenile offender is entitled in delinquency proceedings
and who register in an educational institution prior to having resided in the state for a
period of twelve (12) months shall be classified as "nonresident students," and such
"nonresident student" classification shall be presumed to be correct as long as the
residence of such individual in the state is primarily for the purpose of attendance at
educational institutions; provided, however, that a "nonresident student" may be reclassified as a "resident student" upon representation of conclusive evidence that he has in
fact been a legal resident of Texas for at least twelve (12) months immediately preceding
such reclassification.
5
Many factors could be presented as tending to prove residence: registration for voting,
payment of local and state taxes, ownership of property in the state, and residence of spouse. Since
the current regulations include everyone eighteen years of age or older, a relevant factor may be
whether the student is self-supporting. If he is supported by his parents, their residence may be
important. No single factor should be conclusive, but the Residence Status Committee should be
able to consider all these factors in determining the correct classification.
CHall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 608, 187 S.E.2d 52, 57 (1972). For
discussion of such presumptions in the voting context see Note, Consitutional Law-The Equal
Protection Clause and the Student's Right to Vote Where He Attends School, 50 N.C.L. REV.
1148 (1972).
'Law of April 21, 1899, §§ 1-21, [1899] Ill. Laws 131 (now ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701
(Smith-Hurd 1972)).
2
Ch. 97, §§ 1-26, [1919] N.C. Sess. L. 243 (now N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-277 to -289 (1969)).
'E.g., Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32 (1953); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M.
140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); State ex rel. Toney v. Mills, 144 W. Va. 257, 107 S.E.2d 772 (1959).
4387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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to notice of specific charges in time to prepare adequately to meet
them; 5 to representation by counsel, appointed in the case of indigency;
to confrontation by and cross-examination of the witnesses against him;7
and to the privilege against self-incrimination. 8 North Carolina's juvenile court statute was amended in 1969 to comply with the holding of
Gault,9 although the juvenile's right to counsel was limited to delinquency proceedings only.'" An attack on the constitutionality of this
limitation confronted the North Carolina Supreme Court in the recent
case of In re Walker," in which the juvenile complainant sought to
overturn her delinquency adjudication on the basis of the absence of
counsel at her prior "undisciplined child" hearing.'" The court upheld
5Id. at 33.
'Id. at 41.
Ild. at 56.
11d. at 55.
9Ch. 911, § 2, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1049 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-285 (1969)).
"In the adjudication part of the [juvenile] hearing, the judge shall. . . protect the rights
of the child and his parents in order to assure due process of law, including the right to
written notice of the facts alleged in the petition, the right to counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. In
cases where the petition alleged that a child is delinquent or undisciplined and where
the child may be committed to a State institution, the child shall have a right to assigned
counsel as provided by law in cases of indigency.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-285 (1969). Only a child who is adjudged delinquent may be committed
to a state institution. Id. § 7A-286(5) (Supp. 1971). See also In re McAllister, 14 N.C. App. 614,
188 S.E.2d 723 (1972) (adjudication of delinquency based on violation of probation imposed at
prior "undisciplined child" hearing void for failure to serve adequate notice on juvenile prior to
the "undisciplined child" hearing).
"282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972).
"Complainant also attacked the statute on the ground that it denied equal protection of the
laws to the "undisciplined child," first, by providing appointed counsel for delinquency proceedings
only and, secondly, by subjecting the "undisciplined child" to the risks of probation and incarceration for acts that do not constitute criminal offenses and for which adults would not be subjected
to the same risks of probation and incarceration. The court found these classifications, the "undisciplined child" versus the "delinquest child" and the "undisciplined child" versus the adult, to be
reasonably related to the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act and therefore rejected the equal
protection argument. Id. at 39, 191 S.E.2d at 710. But cf In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47, 52-53 (3d
Cir. 1971) (defendant's condition as a juvenile found guilty of petit larceny did not place him in a
status sufficiently different from that of an adult convicted of the same offense to justify denial of
the absolute right of appeal granted to adults); In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 431, 264 A2d 614, 617
(1970) (under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment there can be no valid
distinction between a juvenile and an adult offender that justifies subjecting the juvenile to a longer
maximum commitment in the same institution for the same conduct).
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972) (no constitutional requirement of unanimous jury verdicts) supplies additional grounds
for the North Carolina Supreme Court's rejection of complainant's equal protection argument,
although the case was not discussed in Walker. The Court in Johnson rejected the "bootstrapping"
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the constitutionality of the statute against this attack. 3

On August 17, 1971, Valerie Lenise Walker, a child of less than
sixteen years of age, was adjudged an "undisciplined child"" in a juvenile court hearing at which she was not represented by counsel. The
adjudication was based on the judge's finding that Valerie was "regularly disobedient" to her parents and refused to obey school rules. 5 She

was placed on probation subject to specified conditions of behavior. 6 On
September 21, 1971, the court counselor filed a petition and motion for

further consideration of the case, alleging that Valerie was a "delinquent
child" as defined by section 7A-278(2) of the General Statutes 17 in that
theory that because a state constitution requires unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases requiring
punishment at hard labor, the equal protection clause requires its availability in all other criminal
cases. Id. at 364. Similarly, in Walker it cannot be said that because the Constitution requires the
assistance of counsel in "delinquency" proceedings, as established by Gault, the equal protection
clause requires its availability in all other juvenile proceedings.
The Walker court also held that even if a test stricter than "reasonable relationship" should
apply because complainant's fundamental right to liberty was involved, "[T]he desire of the State
to exercise its authority as parens patriae and provide for the care and protection of its children
supplies a 'compellingly rational' justification for the classification." 282 N.C. at 39, 191 S.E.2d
at 710. The court did not consider what success, if any, the state was having in its efforts to protect
and care for its children through the juvenile court system and correctional institutions. It has been
argued that factors such as the punitive nature of correctional institutions and the juvenile's loss
of liberty should be considered in determining whether a state's justifications of discriminatory
treatment of juveniles are compelling or reasonable. See Note, Juveniles-Adjuducationof Delinquency-Maximum Sentences, 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 689, 693 (1971); Comment, Juvenile
Law-Equal Protectionfor Juveniles in the Post-AdjudicativeProcess, 9 SAN DIEo L. REv.345,

353 (1972).
3
See note 12 supra. Chief Justice Bobbitt filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sharp
joined. 282 N.C. at 42, 191 S.E.2d at 711.
""'Undisciplines child' includes any child who is unlawfully absent from school, or who is
regularly disobedient to his parents or guardian or custodian and beyond-their disciplinary control,
or who is regularly found in places where it is unlawful for a child to be, or who has run away
from home." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(5) (1969).
"1282 N.C. at 30, 191 S.E.2d at 705.
"The conditions were:
1.That she be of good behavior and conduct herself in a law-abiding manner; 2. That
she mind and obey her parents and not leave home without permission and then to go
only to places that she has permission to go and return as directed; 3. That she attend
school regularly during the school year and obey the school rules and regulations; 4. That
she report to the court counslor as directed, truthfully answer questions put to her
concerning her conduct, behavior, associates and activities and carry out requests given
her concerning such . ...

Id. at 31, 191 S.E.2d at 705.
"" 'Delinquent child' includes any child who has committed any criminal offense under State
law or under an ordinance of local government, including violations of the motor vehicle laws or a
child who has violated the conditions of his probation under this article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-

278(2) (1969) (emphasis added).
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she had violated conditions of the probation order." Consequently, another hearing was held on October 15, 1971, prior to which a public
defender was appointed to represent Valerie. Before the introduction of
any evidence, Valerie's counsel moved to vacate the order of August 19,
1971, because she was not represented by counsel at that time and was
unable to defend herself against the charge. The motion was denied, and
the hearing resulted in a finding that Valerie was "a delinquent child
for having violated the conditions of probation and that she [was] in
need of the discipline and supervision of the state."' 9 As a result, she
was committed to the control and supervision of the North Carolina
Board of Juvenile Correction. 0
On appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals,2 no error was
found although the court said that the order of August 19, 1971, declaring Valerie to be an "undisciplined child," was defective on due process
grounds because no attorney represented her at the hearing. 2 The court
found, however, that independent findings of fact were made at the
second hearing, and since that hearing was not improper, the order
resulting therefrom could stand.2
On further appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court also found
no error but on the ground that the first hearing was not improper
because Valerie had no constitutional right to counsel at that time. The
court based this finding on its interpretation of Gault and section 7A286 of the General Statutes and on the distinctions between a juvenile
proceeding and a criminal prosecution.2 4 This note will consider the
court's interpretation of these sources in relation to relevant decisions
in other courts and in relation to conditions as they actually exist in
juvenile courts today.
In re Gault involved a fifteen-year-old boy, Gerald, who was taken
into custody as a result of a complaint that he had made lewd telephone
calls. At the conclusion of the hearing on the charge, Gerald was committed as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School. Upon
review of Gerald's habeas corpus petition, the United States Supreme
Court outlined the constitutional requirements of a juvenile hearing but
"1282 N.C. at 31, 191 S.E.2d at 705.
"Id. at 34, 191 S.E.2d at 706-07.
1d. at 34, 191 S.E.2d at 707.
In re Walker, 14 N.C. App. 356, 188 S.E.2d 731 (1972).
12d. at 360, 188 S.E.2d at 733.
231d. at 360, 188 S.E.2d at 733-34.
2282 N.C. at 37, 191 S.E.2d at 708.
20
2
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restricted the application of its opinion to juvenile hearings that involve
the risk of commitment:
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified
of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or

if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child."

The North Carolina General Assembly attempted to comply precisely with the holding of Gault establishing a juvenile's right to counsel.
Section 7A-451(a)(8) provides: "An indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in the following actions and proceedings:

. .

.(8) In the

case of a juvenile, a hearing as a result of which commitment to an
institution

. . .

is possible."26 Another explanation of the right is found

in the legislature's definition of a juvenile hearing in section 7A-285: "In
cases where the petition alleges that a child is delinquent or
undisciplined and where the child may be committed to a State institution, the child shall have a right to assigned counsel as provided by law
in cases of indigency."27 However, since under North Carolina law only
2 s
a "delinquent child" is subject to commitment to a state institution
the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the North Carolina statute as providing no right to counsel at a hearing on a petition alleging
a child to be "undisciplined."
Valerie argued, however, that both Gault and the North Carolina
statutory law can be interpreted to extend the right to counsel to a
hearing to determine whether a child is "undisciplined." Such a result
is obtained if the word "may" in Gault29 and in section 7A-28511 and
the word "possible" in section 7A-451(a)(8) 1 are given broad interpre"In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (emphasis added).
"-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(8) (1969) (emphasis added).
-Id. § 7A-285 (1969) (emphasis added).
2-"(4) In the case of any child who is delinquent or undisciplined, the court may:
a. Place the child on probation . . . or
b. Continue the case. . . or if the child is delinquent, the court may
c. Commit the child to the care of the North Carolina Board of Juvenile Correction
Id.

§

7A-286(4)(a)-(c) (1969) (emphasis added), as amended, id. §§ 7A-286(4)-(5) (Supp. 1971).
'-See text accompanying note 25 supra.

'-See text accompanying note 27 supra.
'See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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tations. Valerie argued that since she was found "delinquent" solely on
the basis of her violation of certain probation conditions imposed when
she was adjudicated an "undisciplined child," the "undisciplined" hearing was one which might, at some future time, result in her commitment
to an institution in which her freedom would be curtailed. This argument was accepted by the dissenting justices, 32 but the majority refused
so to extend the holding of Gault.
Valerie also argued for a right to counsel at the hearing on an
"undisciplined child" petition on the theory that such a hearing is a
"critical stage" in the juvenile process because it subjects the child to
probation and violation of probation subjects the child to commitment.3 3 A broad "critical stage" test has been used by the United
States Supreme Court to determine the scope of the sixth amendment
right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, 34 but the North Carolina
Supreme Court refused to employ the test in Walker because a juvenile
court proceeding "is not a criminal prosecution within the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment . . . -35 While this fact is true, it is also a fact
that the juvenile court proceeding "has not yet been regarded as devoid
of criminal aspects merely because it usually has been given the civil
label. ' 3 Many legal scholars would say that the punitive aspects of the
juvenile system outweigh any rehabilitative benefits derived.3 1 Since the
United States Supreme Court has taken the initial step of applying the
right to counsel to juvenile proceedings as a requirement of due process,
one could argue that constitutional tests applied in criminal cases must
be employed to determine the scope of that right. Few courts have
considered this argument, but the Georgia Court of Appeals adopted it
in Freeman v. Wilcox 31 when it held that the confession of a youth
3282 N.C. at 43-44, 191 S.E.2d at 712.
331d. at 37, 191 S.E.2d at 708.
3
1E.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970), quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 227 (1967) ("whether the hearing is a 'critical stage' requiring the provision of counsel depends

.. . upon an analysis 'whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the
• . . confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice' "); Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 134 (1967) ("appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a
criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected"); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("[the accused] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him").
282 N.C. at 37, 191 S.E.2d at 708.
38
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
"See Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 281, 32021 (1967).
18119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969).
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during detention was inadmissible in a delinquency proceeding because
he had not been advised of his right to counsel. Recognizing that the
holding in Gault was made specifically with reference to the adjudicatory stage of the proceeding, the Georgia court concluded that:
[L]ogic would require that the same rights now afforded ordinary
citizens throughout all "critical" stages of the criminal process must
be afforded to children in any particular stage of a juvenile delinquency
process if the results of any particular stage can have a direct effect
on the final determination and39the final determination may result in a
restraint on a child's freedom.
In 1971, the Georgia legislature adopted this reasoning in its new
Juvenile Court Code: "Except as otherwise provided . . .a party is
entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceed-

ings alleging delinquency, unruliness and deprivation and if, as a needy
person, he is unable to employ counsel, to have the court provide counsel
for him." 4
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in Walker that
"[t]he right to counsel delineated in Gault has not been extended to

other procedural steps in juvenile proceedings," 41 there was some precedent for doing So.12 Had the court followed this precedent, however,
the result in Walker might have been the same in view of the court's
characterization of the initial hearing on the "undisciplined child" petition as "merely incidental" to the subsequent delinquency hearing based
on violation of probation. The dissent, on the other hand, described
the initial hearing as "absolutely essential" to the validity of the subse-

quent commitment." This latter description is certainly a greater indica39

1d. at 328, 167 S.E.2d at 166.

"GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2001(a) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added). An "unruly child" as de-

fined in id. § 24A-401(g) (Supp. 1972) is substantially similar to an "undisciplined child" as defined
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(5) (1969). It should be noted, however, that an "unruly child" is
subject to commitment to a state institution, but only if the court finds that the child is not
amenable to any other treatment provided by the Code. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2303 (Supp. 1972).
"1282 N.C. at 38, 191 S.E.2d at 708.
"In addition to GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2001(a) (Supp. 1972), see MD. ANN. CODE art.
26 §§ 70-18(d), -19(a) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. FAMILY Cr. AcT §§ 241, 758 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
Other states extending the right to counsel to "undisciplined" children also allow commitment of
such children to state institutions. E.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-225, -241(A)(2) (Supp. 1972);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§701-20(l), 705-2(l)(b) (1972); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.351,
.353(B) (Anderson Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-96, -100 (Supp. 1971).
"1282 N.C. at 38, 191 S.E.2d at 709.
111d. at 44, 191 S.E.2d at 712.
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tion of the possibility that the initial hearing would qualify as a "critical
stage" of the delinquency proceeding than the description used by the
majority.
Whether the initial hearing was "merely incidental" to the subsequent commitment might depend, in part, on whether the initial adjudication could be relitigated at the subsequent delinquency proceedings
when the juvenile would be represented by counsel. The North Carolina
Supreme Court did not discuss this factor, but it appears from the North
Carolina statutes that such a relitigation can take place." The juvenile
court is given continuing jurisdiction during the minority of a juvenile
who has been adjudicated "undisciplined" and has authority to modify
or vacate its order in the case." The possibility of relitigation in the
presence of counsel of the initial adjudication diminishes the significance
of the initial hearing; but relitigation with counsel may not afford the
same protection that the presence of counsel at the initial hearing would
have afforded. A court would be unlikely to vacate its original finding
of an "undisciplined child" at a subsequent hearing based on the child's
violation of probation imposed, erroneously or not, as a result of the
"undisciplined child" holding. Had the child been represented by counsel at the initial proceeding, there might have been no probation and
hence no violation and no need for further appearance in court.
In view of the court's refusal to recognize in the "undisciplined
child" proceeding the possibility of commitment to a state institution
resulting therefrom, any further attempt by Valerie to equate the juvenile proceeding with a criminal trial would have been unavailing since
most states have not extended the right to counsel to criminal trials in
which no possibility of incarceration exists.4" At the time of Valerie's
"undisciplined child" hearing many states continued to restrict the right
to counsel to felony cases." These states were relying on a strict interpretation of Gideon v. Wainwright," the United States Supreme Court
decision that extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to the
"sN.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-286 (Supp. 1971).
4

61d.

4

See Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States,
3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1970).
4
'E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.035 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3001 (1972); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 705-5 (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4503 (Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 402017 (Supp. 1972); see Comment, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 47, at 111-19.
4"372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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states. Other states, including North Carolina," had extended the right
to misdemeanor cases in which the accused might be imprisoned if
convicted-at least for some minimum period of time. Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin"'extended the right to counsel to all criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment for any length of time. In the Court's view, "'The denial of the
assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail sentence.' "52
Though Argersingerdoes not apply to the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings, since commitment to a state institution is not the
equivalent of imprisonment in a jail,5" it tends, by analogy, to reinforce
the North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Walker by extending the
right to counsel in criminal cases no farther than Gault extended it in
juvenile proceedings: a right extending to proceedings which "end up in
the actual deprivation of a person's liberty .

.

. -54 The result of this

holding would seem to be that when an accused refuses to pay a fine
imposed at a trial without counsel, no jail sentence could be imposed in
the alternative without relitigation of his guilt with the assistance of
counsel. The parallel situation in the juvenile system would be, as in
Walker, a child's refusal to obey probation rules imposed at a hearing
without counsel, followed by commitment to a state institution as a
result. If the Argersingerruling applied to juvenile proceedings, relitigation of the issues that resulted in the probation order would be required
before commitment could be imposed as the penalty.
Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion in Argersinger,
however, that there may be serious inequities in a trial de novo,55 and
relitigation for the purpose of imposing a harsher sentence may violate
the constitutional guarantee against being twice placed in jeopardy for
""An indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in the following actions and proceed-

Any felony case, and any misdemeanor case for which the authorized punishment exceeds
ings: (1)
six months imprisonment or a five hundred dollars ($500.00) fine.

N.C. GaN.

STAT.

§ 7A-

451(a)(I) (1969).
51407 U.S. 25 (1972).
51Id. at 38, quoting Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 102, 458 P.2d 414, 418 (1969).
"In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 533, 169 S.E.2d 879, 889 (1969), aff'd sub non2. McKeiver v.

Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
"Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).

"[A]second trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could make use of
evidence which came out at the first trial when the accused was uncounseled. If the second trial
were held before the same judge, he might no longer be open-minded." Id. at 54. See also text
accompanying note 46 supra.
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the same offense." In view of these problems in the criminal system, the
United States Supreme Court, in Justice Powell's view, is moving towards extension of the rule in Argersinger to all petty offenses regardless of penalty." Should the Court so rule, juveniles such as Valerie
would have a stronger argument for similar extension of the right to
counsel in juvenile proceedings. The question would then be whether the
Court would fall back upon traditional legal distinctions between children and adults" and conceptual differences between criminal trials and
juvenile proceedings59 as justification for different treatment of juveniles.
In In re Burrus, ° the first major decision of the North Carolina
Supreme Court dealing with the rights of post-Gaultjuveniles, the court
stated that to equate the protective custody of children under the juvenile laws with the trial and punishment of adults under the criminal
statutes was a non sequitur."'In the words of the court: "There are still
many valid distinctions between a criminal trial and a juvenile proceeding." 2 However, the court did not enumerate these distinctions, perhaps
because of uncertainty that differences do actually exist at the present
time. Critics of the juvenile court procedures believe that youths are in
fact being treated as criminals, 3 and even the United States Supreme
Court has described the juvenile courts as being only "theoretically"
engaged in rehabilitating juvenile offenders.64 On this ground, the critics
argue that all constitutional safeguards afforded adults in criminal trials
-"407 U.S. at 54. Traditionally, the double jeopardy guarantee was not extended to juvenile
proceedings, but recent cases have so applied it. E.g., Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d
370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971). Contra, State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. App.
1971). See Note, Double Jeopardy and the Waiver ofJurisdiction in California'sJuvenile Courts,
24 STAN. L. REV.874 (1972); Comment, Double Jeopardyin Juvenile Justice, WASH. U.L.Q. 702
(1971).

11407 U.S. at 51.
u"While the rights of infants are not superior, they are of greater concern to acourt of equity
than those of adults, and the rights of infants must be protected by the court, while adults must
protect their own rights." 43 C.J.S. Infants § 19 (1945).
59See text accompanying note 3 supra.
40275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), aff'd sub nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.

528 (1971) (juveniles adjudged delinquent for unlawfully obstructing traffic not entitled to trial by
jury).

"I1d. at 533, 169 S.E.2d at 889.
621d.
"Note, 67 CoLUn. L. REv., supra note 37, at 320.
""The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of

society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966)
(emphasis added).
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must be afforded youths in juvenile proceedings, including the right to
counsel at every "critical stage" of the proceedings.
Yet the courts are reluctant to abandon their idealistic concept of
juvenile courts in hopes that the worthy goals envisioned for juvenile
courts can be achieved. 5 For this reason most attempts to expand the
holding of Gault have met with defeat. 6 The Gault decision indicated
that compromise may be the only solution to the dilemma: "[T]he
observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly
administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of
the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. 6' 7 The Court also said
in Gault: "Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." 8 The presence of counsel may improve the rehabilitative effects of the juvenile court system by increasing
the juvenile's confidence in the fairness of the proceedings and enhancing his impression of their importance.69 In view of this fact, the logical
solution may be to create a modified form of advocacy in the juvenile
courts with a specialized bar educated in the philosophy and procedures
of the juvenile court. 70 The attorney's function would be not only to
protect the rights of the juvenile offender, but to advise and counsel him
and, most importantly, to impress him with the seriousness and the
fairness of the proceeding.
CHAN POYNER PIKE

Unconditional Habeas Corpus Rights for Defendants Acquitted for
Insanity
When a defendant in a criminal trial is found not guilty because of
""Whatever may be the shortcomings of the juvenile court, and there are many, we are not
inclined to hamstring the State in its efforts to deal with errant children as wards of the State
instead of criminals." In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 534, 169 S.E.2d 879, 889-90 (1969), aff'd sub
non. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
"See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 227 Ga. 140, 179 S.E.2d 248, aft'd, 123 Ga. App. 243, 180
S.E.2d 258 (1971); In re Jones, 46 Ill. 2d 506, 263 N.E.2d 863 (1970); In re Fletcher, 251 Md.
520, 248 A.2d 364 (1968); In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968); In re Burrus, 275 N.C.
517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), aff'd sub nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re
Jackson, 21 Ohio St. 2d 215, 257 N.E.2d 74 (1970).
"1387 U.S. at 21.
OId. at 18.
"Note, 67 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 37, at 324-25.
'lId. at 326.
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insanity, he obtains a full acquittal and "is entitled to all the protection
and constitutional rights as if acquitted upon any other ground."' Although North Carolina 2 and most states require that the defendant be
confined to a mental hospital either by automatic confinement upon
acquittal' or after a separate determination of insanity by judge4 or
jury,5 in the eyes of the law this commitment of indefinite duration is
not considered punishment for the crime but a protective measure for
society and for the individual himself.' The confinement remains legal
only so long as the patient remains insane; when his mental health is
restored, the defendant has a constitutional right to be released from
confinement. 7 One traditional method of obtaining release has been
through the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. This note will examine
section 122-86 of the North Carolina General Statutes and the North
Carolina Supreme Court decision in In re Tew holding the habeas
corpus provision of the statute unconstitutional.
In 1965 John Tew was indicted for the murder of his wife and
pleaded insanity as a defense. The jury returned a verdict of "not guilty
by reason of insanity," and Tew was then lawfully committed to
Dorothea Dix State Hospital in Raleigh pursuant to section 122-84. In
1969 Tew failed to obtain his release in a habeas corpus proceeding. At
the hearing, the attorneys representing Tew were precluded from offering evidence tending to show that the testimony of two doctors at the
hearing was substantially different from statements they had made previously concerning Tew's mental condition. Alleging that it was essential to obtain evidence from Tew's former attorneys that would show
that the doctors' testimony was without foundation and that pressure
'In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 419, 48 S.E. 789, 791 (1904).
GEN. STAT. § 122-84 (1964).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

2N.C.
'E.g.,

§ 39-8-4(2) (1963);

GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page Supp. 1972); see Note, The

Insanity Defense: The Need for Articulate Goals at the Acquittal, Commitment, and Release
Stages, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 743-47 (1964).
4
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 429 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1971);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §
'E.g., MISS. CODE ANN.

16(b) (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-84 (1964).
§ 2575 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1351 (1964); Wyo. STAT.

§ 7-242(b) (1957).
'In re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 553, 121 P. 492, 498 (1912); Salinger v. Superintendent of Spring
Grove State Hosp., 206 Md. 623, 628, 112 A.2d 907, 909 (1955).
7
Overholser v. Boddie, 184 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1950); In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 42325, 48 S.E. 789, 792-93 (1904); see Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 849, 865 (1960).
'280 N.C. 612, 187 S.E.2d 13 (1972).
ANN.
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of public censure had been brought to bear on the doctors, Tew's new
attorneys obtained another hearing on a writ of habeas corpus. The writ
ordered the authorities at the hospital to bring Tew before the court for
a hearing to determine Tew's sanity.'
The findings of fact made by the court in the second habeas corpus
proceeding asserted that "petitioner has . . . been restored to his right
mind, is now sane, and his mental condition is not now such as to render

him dangerous to himself or other persons.""0 However, despite this
finding, section 122-86 did not authorize the court to release petitioner.
Section 122-86 provides that a person acquitted of a capital felony can
be discharged from confinement only by an act of the General Assembly, and a person acquitted of a lesser degree crime can be discharged

only by order of the Governor. In addition, the statute states:
Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent such
person so confined in the hospitals designated in § 122-83 from applying to any judge having jurisdiction for a writ of habeas corpus. No
judge issuing a writ of habeas corpus upon the application of such
person shall order his discharge until the superintendents of the several
State hospitals shall certify that they have examined such person and
find him to be sane, and that his detention is no longer necessary for
his own safety or the safety of the public."

Because the superintendents refused to certify that Tew had regained his
sanity, the judge was required to remand Tew to the custody of the
hospital."2
9

Record at 14-15, In re Tew, I1 N.C. App. 64, 180 S.E.2d 434 (1971).
"Id. at 18. In addition to this finding, the court said:
(2) That since his commitment the petitioner received excellent care and treatment; that
since February 1969 he has worked in the supply room of the hospital, has been in the
presence of men and women, and has not at any time shown any disposition to harm
himself or anyone else;
(3) That the petitioner's mental condition has considerably improved since his commitment, his drug treatment having been discontinued over two years ago, and recent
psychiatric examinations by qualified experts reveal no evidence of any mental disorder;
(5) That the petition has had symptoms of paranoia which are now in remission; and
the Superintendent of Dorothea Dix Hospital does not recommend his unconditional
release . . ..
Id. at 17-18.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-86 (1964) (emphasis added).
"The court also concluded in its findings of fact that "while the Court has some doubt as to
the validity of the proviso of G.S. 122-86, it is the Court's opinion that this Court is not authorized
Record at 18, In re Tew, 11 N.C. App. 64, 180 S.E.2d 434
to discharge the petitioner .
(1971).
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On appeal Tew argued that the last sentence of section 122-86 was
unconstitutional, 3 but the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the lower court, finding that the release procedure "in
no way violates due process. Any change in the procedure is a matter

for the legislative branch of the government and not the judicial. We
think the proceeding as now enacted provides due process."' 4 The ma-

jority summarily dismissed the constitutional issue, but a dissenting
opinion by Judge Britt questioned the statute's legality: "[T]he courts
should rely heavily upon persons who are specially trained in the field
of mental health. Nevertheless, the courts should not be deprived of the
power and duty to determine ultimately if a person is legally and properly detained."' 5 The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sharp, sided with Judge Britt, reversed the
court of appeals, and declared the last sentence of section 122-86 unconstitutional for not meeting the requirements of due process. 6
Section 122-86 has no counterpart in other state statutes.)7 Most
states provide a statutory procedure for release 8 and disallow habeas
corpus until the statutory remedies are exhausted." Some vest ultimate
'3Petitioner argued that the statute violated sections 19 and 21 of Article I of the North
Carolina Constitution. Section 19 guarantees equal protection of the laws and due process of law
to all persons. Section 21 provides: "Every person restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy
to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the restraint if unlawful, and that remedy
shall not be denied or delayed. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended."
Since the Tew court found a violation of due process, it is assumed the court based its decision on
section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
"In re Tew, II N.C. App. 64, 67-68, 180 S.E.2d 434, 436 (1971).
'lid. at 69, 180 S.E.2d at 437.
16280 N.C. at 619, 187 S.E.2d at 18. A second argument was made by Tew's attorneys that
would have supported the holding of unconstitutionality. By requiring Tew to obtain the certifications of the superintendents of the "several state hospitals," the statute indicates that "the petitioner or no one else could get such a service from the superintendents in the absence of a
requirement that they make any examination or report." Brief for Appellant at 10, In re Tew, II
N.C. App. 64, 180 S.E.2d 434 (1971). Although the court did not find it necessary to discuss this
issue, the near impossibility of obtaining such a certificate might constitute an unconstitutional
interference with one's right of habeas corpus. If the certification requirement itself were not
unconstitutional, the manner in which one had to obtain it might have been a denial of due process.
"7See Note, Releasing Criminal Defendants Acquitted and Committed Because of Insanity,
The Need for BalancedAdministration, 68 YALE L.J. 293, 294 n.3 (1958).
"E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (Supp. IV, 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 15, 27
(1972); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 87 (McKinney 1971); see Weihofen, supra note 7, at 865;
Note, 68 YALE L.J., supra note 17. See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 57 (1964).
"9See In re Timm, 129 Kan. 126, 281 P. 863 (1929); State ex rel. Colvin v. Superior Court,
159 Wash. 335, 293 P. 986 (1930).
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while others require

judicial hearings." A number of states require a certification similar to
that required in North Carolina, 22 but judicial statutory interpretation

has in most of these states provided alternative remedies when certifica-

tion was arbitrarily withheld.2 3 Although a state may authorize a cer-

tain procedure for discharge, often the procedure will not be exclusive
of other legal remedies, such as habeas corpus. 24 Thus a patient may

resort to the special proceeding on the issue of his sanity and yet have
the remedy of habeas corpus available if certifications are arbitrarily
withheld or if bad faith is alleged.

The provisions of section 122-86 authorizing release only by an
order from the Governor or by an act of the General Assembly are

unique and seem inconsistent with the principle that one acquitted for
reasons of insanity is not guilty and is not confined for punitive reasons.
The release should not resemble an official pardon; it should be obtained
by a statutory civil proceeding similar to that provided in most other
states.
North Carolina's original release provision, as enacted in 1899,
"E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1972), § 88-505.6 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.39 (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4420 (1969).
"E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1026, -1026a (West 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (Supp.
1973); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.76.070
(Supp. 1972) (allows a hearing with a jury).
"E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-(3) (1963); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (Supp. IV,
1971); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 16(e) (1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.76.070 (Supp.
1972).
"3For example, one court has said:
The good faith of public officers in their official acts is, at the outset, always presumed.
If that presumed good faith was assailed by proper pleadings and made a specific issue,
we might well concede-for the sake of the argument-that justice would require a
speedy trial of the issue whether the officer has abused his discretion in failing to give
the notice provided for by the petition referred to.
Parker v. People, 108 Colo. 362, 365-66, 117 P.2d 316, 318 (1941); and another has similarly
spoken: "The presumption is that the officer will do his duty faithfully, but if the certificate should
be corruptly or oppressively withheld the applicant would not be without remedy." In re Clark,
86 Kan. 539, 552, 121 P. 492, 497 (1912).
"E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(g) (Supp. IV, 1971); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39
(Page Supp. 1972).
"Massachusetts did have a statute similar to North Carolina's, requiring a special order from
the governor for the release of defendants who had murdered. Now, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123,
§ 16 (1972) provides a statutory procedure for all defendants acquitted by reason of insanity to
obtain release. By holding only the last sentence of 122-86 unconstitutional, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has maintained the validity of the provisions giving the legislature and the governor
the power to release criminal defendants.
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provided for release only by an act of the General Assembly or by an
order from the Governor. For failing to provide any habeas corpus
rights, the statute was declared unconstitutional by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1904 in In re Boyett. 8 Accepting Boyett's argument
that he was denied due process of law," the court said that Boyett was
entitled to a judicial inquiry into the cause of his restraint, and although
"[t]he Legislature may make laws, prescribe rules of action and provide
remedies not provided by the Constitution, the judiciary alone can administer the remedy." 8 After this decision the North Carolina General
Assembly in 1905 added the habeas corpus provisions to the statute.
Except for minor wording alterations, the statute has remained unchanged since that time.
Tew argued, and the court agreed, that the change made in 1905
not
remedy the unconstitutionality of the statute2 9 but simply redid
placed one non-judicial body (the legislature) with another (the superintendents). The court interpreted the Boyett decision to require that a
judicial officer have unfettered power to authorize release on a habeas
corpus writ." This seemed especially necessary in order to allow a
remedy when a patient charges that the superintendents were mistaken,
that they acted in bad faith, or that they withheld certification arbitrarily. By requiring an unconditional certification from the very persons
charged with the wrongful detention, section 122-86 essentially defeats
the purpose of the writ-to permit judicial discretion to release those
illegally detained. Because the judge was not permitted to make an
independent determination of issues, Tew was deprived of any effective
31
remedy. Thus the requirements of due process were not met.
Since even today many people harbor fear, resentment, or prejudice
toward defendants committed for insanity, it is not difficult to understand why the General Assembly added the certification requirement to
section 122-86. As a safety measure, the amendment attempted to give
ultimate authority for releasing a defendant from his confinement to
administrators (presumably physicians) trained and knowledgeable in
26136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904). See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 95 (1964).
"136 N.C. at 421, 48 S.E. at 792.
21Ad. at 423, 48 S.E. at 792.
2280 N.C. at 617, 187 S.E.2d at 17.
'OId. at 618-19, 187 S.E.2d at 18.
"Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (holding that petitioner was denied equal
protection and due process when he was committed indefinitely after he was declared incompetent
to stand trial).
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the field of psychiatry. The supreme court in its opinion recognized this
concern of the General Assembly 32 but was unwilling to compromise a
defendant's constitutional rights and the courts' power to issue the writ
for the sake of additional protection of the public safety. The opinion
argued that because psychiatry is still an inexact science and because
doctors are not infallible, 33 an erroneous judgment concerning sanity
is not unlikely.
The protection of the public from premature releases of mental
patients has, in some jurisdictions, taken the form of an increased bura the District of
den of proof standard. In Ragsdale v. Overholser"
Columbia Circuit granted a petitioner a habeas corpus hearing pursuant
to a statute that specially provided for an unconditional writ of habeas
corpus for those acquitted by reason of insanity.3 5 In Ragsdale the
confined defendant sought release through this statutory channel and
attempted to prove his sanity by a preponderance of the evidence. The
court, however, concluded that one who is seeking release has a burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he has fully recovered. The
court said that "if an 'abnormal mental condition' renders [petitioner]
potentially dangerous, reasonable medical doubts or reasonable judicial
doubts are to be resolved in favor of the public and in favor of the
subject's safety.""
The Ragsdale result has been criticized as placing an inordinately
heavy burden on a non-criminal's effort to obtain a discharge from
confinement.3 7 It is uncertain from the Tew opinion whether the
Ragsdale burden of proof standard was adopted for North Carolina.
The court cited the Ragsdale decision with approval and quoted from
the "reasonable doubt" provision.3 8 In remanding Tew's case, however,
the court simply said, "the burden of proof will be upon petitioner. The
judge will consider all the evidence offered by both petitioner and the
State and make his findings therefrom."3 9 There was no mention of the
standard of proof necessary for the defendant to gain release.
32280 N.C. at 618, 187 S.E.2d at 17.
-"Id.at 619, 187 S.E.2d at 18.
34281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
-""Nothing herein contained shall preclude a person confined under the authority of this
section from establishing his eligibility for release under the provisions of this section by a writ of
habeas corpus." D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(g) (Supp. IV, 1971).
n281 F.2d at 947.
"See Note, Criminal Law: Commitment and Release of Criminal Defendants Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 1961 DUKE L.J. 481.
"280 N.C. at 620, 187 S.E.2d at 18-19.
"Id. at 621, 187 S.E.2d at 19.
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This failure to specify the burden of proof standard leaves uncertain
the future of the Tew case and those similar to it. Although a judge now
has the unfettered authority to grant a release, it is doubtful that a
defendant will be able to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt if
any of the hospital superintendents testify that the petitioner is not yet
sane. This would be essentially the same result that obtains when a
certificate has been refused under section 122-86. By deleting the certification requirement, the blatantly unconstitutional last sentence has been
removed from the statute, but the court may have restored public safeguards through an increased burden of proof standard. Whether the Tew
decision has made it any easier for a patient to obtain a release will
depend on the standard of proof employed by the courts. The incongruity of the Ragsdale rationale, in imposing the strictest standard of proof
for a non-criminal plaintiff in a civil trial, would be more blatant if the
rationale were adopted in Tew because the court's focus was on the
validity of section 122-86 and not on the petitioner's necessary quantum
of proof.
Although the infirmity of section 122-86 has now been removed
from the statute by the Tew decision, North Carolina's other statutes
governing the rights of mental patients should be reevaluated in light
of recent developments in psychiatry, and release procedures for these
patients should be restructured to protect their constitutional rights.
Nowhere is the need for reexamination more clearly illustrated than in
the remaining portions of section 122-86. Perhaps North Carolina
should look to the statutes of other states as models of efficient procedures whereby the public interest will be safeguarded and the patient's
rights constitutionally protected."
ELIZABETH M. LEIGHT

III
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Kidnapping-Changes in the Asportation Requirement
The movement of a victim during the commission of another crime
is an act that could result in a conviction for kidnapping. But how far
"See D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. IV, 1971) (the D.C. statute takes into consideration
all remedies available to the patient, and provides for an explicit civil release precedure); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1973). See generally Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 3.
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must the victim be moved? In State v. Murphy' the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a relatively slight movement of the victim
incidental to the commission of an assault, if the movement was accomplished by the use of force or fraud, was sufficient to sustain a conviction
for kidnapping. But in State v. Dix,2 the court held that the forced
movement of a jailer from the front door of the jail building to the cell
area while the defendant was helping several friends escape was not
sufficient asportation to constitute kidnapping.
In Murphy the defendant, after meeting his thirteen-year-old victim on a basketball court near the victim's home, suggested that they
play on another court in the area. While en route to the second court,
the defendant told the victim that he wanted to see some squirrels and
that he knew where some were. The victim agreed to accompany the
defendant.3 They walked approximately 150 feet down a path by a
wooded area and then sixty-two feet into the woods. At that point, the
defendant severely beat and then burned the victim. Murphy was convicted of felonious assault and kidnapping. The court did not discuss the
sufficiency of the distance that the victim was moved (approximately
213 feet) except to say that "[a]ny carrying away is sufficient" and that
"[t]he distance is immaterial." 5 The main issue to which the majority
directed its discussion was whether the use of fraud resulting in a movement of the victim constituted kidnapping, a question that seems to have
been long settled in North Carolina.' Chief Justice Bobbitt, the only
dissenting justice, ignored the fraud issue and stated that kidnapping
required a deprivation of liberty that he was unable to find on the facts.
But even Chief Justice Bobbitt considered the asportation sufficient.7
In Dix the defendant, after having escaped from a state prison
camp in another county thirteen hours earlier, went to the Rockingham
1280 N.C. 1, 184 S.E.2d 845 (1971).
2282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973).

'North Carolina has long recognized that kidnapping can be found where the asportation of
the victim has resulted from fraud as well as from force. State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 178 S.E.2d
577 (1971); State v. Gough, 257 N.C. 348, 126 S.E.2d 118 (1962); State v. Witherington, 226 N.C.
211, 37 S.E.2d 497 (1946); State v. Harrison, 145 N.C. 408, 59 S.E. 867 (1907).
'280 N.C. at 6, 184 S.E.2d at 848. The defendant's suggestion that they move to another
basketball court was found by the court not to be for the purpose of committing an assault. The
only fraud practiced upon the victim was the suggestion, while en route to the second basketball
court, that they go look at some squirrels. Thus the only asportation was the movement into the
woods after the suggestion concerning the squirrels was made.
VId. at 5, 184 S.E.2d at 847.
6See note 3 supra.
1280 N.C. at 10, 184 S.E.2d at 850-51.
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County jail where he aided the escape of three friends. Dix knocked on
the outside door of the jail and pointed a gun at the jailer when he
answered the door. Then, at gunpoint, the defendant moved the jailer
from the front door across the waiting room, through the jailer's office,
and through a hall leading into the cellblock area, a total distance of
sixty-two feet. After releasing his friends, Dix locked the jailer into a
cell, where the jailer remained until released by a trusty some ten minutes later.
In a rather curious departure from its approach in Murphy, the
court in Dix concentrated almost exclusively on the question of asportation as an element of kidnapping. After briefly viewing the development
of the law, the court discussed and rejected the proposition that distance
of movement is immaterial in kidnapping.8 Referring to several recent
North Carolina kidnapping cases, including Murphy, the court stated
that all of them were distinguishable because they involved "substantial" asportations. Having thus disposed of prior North Carolina cases,
the court discussed the new approaches to asportation in California"
and Michigan." The opinion stated that the court was aware of the
possibility of abusive prosecutions under the present North Carolina
rule, especially under circumstances of great public pressure for the
imposition of severe penalties for "especially outrageous" crimes.'2 The
court then held that the sixty-two-foot asportation of the jailer in Dix
was not sufficient to constitute kidnapping. The victim was not removed
from the environment in which he was found (the new Michigan test),
there was no movement that was not purely incidental to the defendant's
assault, and no risks were created that were not inherent in the escape
(the California test).
Kidnapping has been recognized as a crime during most of recorded history.' 3 In England at common law, kidnapping was defined
8282 N.C. at 496, 193 S.E.2d at 899-904
'Id. at 497-98, 193 S.E.2d at 901.
"E.g., People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969). This case

involved forced movements from room to room in the victims' homes while robbery and rape were
being committed. The court held that there was no kidnapping where the movement was incidental

to the commission of the intended crime and where there was no increase in the risk of injury to
the victim other than that which was incidental to the crime being committed.
"People v. Adams, 34 Mich. App. 546, 192 N.W.2d 19 (1971). This case involved a movement

of 1500 feet of a prison guard during a riot in the prison. The court held that there was no
kidnapping if the victim was not removed from the environment in which he was found.
282 N.C. at 501, 193 S.E.2d at 904.

"14 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *

219. It is noted there that kidnapping is mentioned

both in the Bible and in the early Roman law.
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as "the forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman, or child
from their own country and sending them into another."' 4 Common law
considered kidnapping an aggravated species of false imprisonment
characterized by the element of asportation. 5 Where the offense was
committed in the Northern Counties of England for the purpose of
ransom or plunder, a statute made the kidnapping a felony punishable
by death and forfeiture. This statute is of particular importance in
relation to subsequent American kidnapping statutes because it applied
where the victim was "carried out of same countries, or to some other
place within the same."'" The American law of kidnapping was un-

doubtedly affected by this statute. 7 As the common law developed in
America, the requirement that the victim be removed from the country
was eliminated. 8 The states began to develop their own statutory definitions, and the old common law emphasis upon the elements of unlawful
detention and the "carrying away" of the victim were changed in many
states either by reducing the necessary degree of movement constituting
asportation or by emphasizing some other element such as secrecy.,9
By and large, the various state statutory definitions of kidnapping
have developed separately both from each other and from English common law. Since the passage of the Federal Kidnapping Act, many states
have changed their statutes by increasing the penalty, and often by
changing the elements of the crime."0 Before 1932 the separate state
statutes were the only kidnap laws. It is interesting to note that in 1932
kidnapping was a capital offense in only six of the forty-eight states.2'
Organized kidnapping, because of the lack of uniform state laws and
because of the relatively light penalties, was widespread. 2 In 1932
shortly after the kidnapping of the child of Charles A. Lindbergh, the
Federal Kidnapping Act, or the "Lindbergh Law" as it is popularly
1Id.
151 E. EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429,430 (1806). Although English common law considered
kidnapping involving asportation from the country to be only a misdemeanor, later commentators
felt that this should be a capital crime.
"Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
"Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (West 1970): "Every person who forcibly steals, takes, or arrests
any person in this state, and carries him into another country, state, county, or into another part
of the same county ....
"
"State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550 (1837); 2 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 671 (2d ed. 1858).
11R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 177 (2d ed. 1969); see text accompanying note 30 infra.
20Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 540 (1953).
2275 CONG. REC. 13285 (1932) (remarks of Representative Celler).
2275 CONG. REC. 13284 (1932) (remarks of Representative Cochran).
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known, was passed. 3 The federal act, in both its original and its present
forms, retains the common law requirement of asportation. 24
Today the statutory elements vary widely from state to state. Many

states distinguish between taking or detaining a person against his will,
called "simple" kidnapping, and taking or detaining a person for ransom or for some other form of extortion, often called "aggravated"
kidnapping.2 The two crimes, with the exception of extortion in the
latter, involve the same elements, but aggravated kidnapping carries a
greater penalty." Some states no longer use the common-law definition
of kidnapping in which the principal element is asportation. These statutes involve elements such as "restraint ' 27 or "forcibly or secretly confining. '2 8 Other states still require asportation as the primary element
but have significantly reduced the necessary degree of movement."
Many states now use a combination of elements,-"abduction," "se-

creting," "confinement," "detention," "seizure," or "stealing" -each
of which alone is sufficient to constitute kidnapping."0 Kidnapping
under such statutes may involve asportation, but there is no necessity
that it exist.
To summarize, state kidnapping statutes can be classified into three
basic types: those involving some primary element other than asportation; those having a reduced degree of asportation as the primary ele-

ment; and those having several alternative elements independently suffi13Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326. The present version of this law is the Kidnapping
Act, 218 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (1970).
'Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970) states:
"(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who has
been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away and
held for ransom or reward or otherwise. .. "
2E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 207, 209 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1311 (1972); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 26 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.00-.25 (McKinney 1967);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 163.225(1), .235 (1971).
2
6E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 207, 209 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1311 (1972); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 26 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.00-.25 (McKinney 1967);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 163.225(l), .235 (1971).
2E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.00-.25 (McKinney 1967).
21E.g.. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 26 (Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.581
(1972).
2
1E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (West 1970), which states, "Every person who forcibly steals,
takes, or arrests any person in this state, and carries him into another country, state, or county,
or into another part of the same county .... " (Emphasis added.)
10E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-44 (1963); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.26 (Page
1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-36 (1950).
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cient to constitute the offense. The North Carolina statute does not fit
precisely into any of these categories. It provides that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation or any individual, male or female, or its or their agents to kidnap or cause to be
kidnapped any human being, or to demand ransom of any person firm
or corporation, male or female, to be paid on account of kidnapping,
or to hold any human being for ransom ....
Any person, or their agent, violating or causing to be violated any
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction therefor, shall be punishable by imprisonment for life.',
Since no definition of kidnapping is given in our statute, it has been
held that, in accordance with section 4-1 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, 32 the common-law definition of kidnapping applies. 33 The
North Carolina Supreme Court has found the common-law definition
to be "the unlawful taking and carrying away of a person by force and
34
against his will."
The wording in the North Carolina kidnapping statute does seem
to distinguish sin..ple kidnapping and kidnapping for ransom.3 5 However, unlike most c, the statutes discussed above, there is no distinction
in relation to the penalties involved." It is possible for a judge, in his
discretion, 37 to pass identical sentences whether there is a substantial
3

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1969). The predecessor of this statute, (ch. 699, § 1, [1901] N.C.
Sess. L. 923) stated in part: "That any person who shall forcibly or fraudulently kidnap any person
shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction may be punished in the discretion of the Court not
exceeding twenty years in the State's Prison." This statute was repealed in 1933 after the Lindbergh
kidnapping so that the maximum punishment might be increased from twenty years to life imprisonment, in the discretion of the judge. See footnote 37 infra.
3'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1969) states that all parts of the common law heretofore in use in
this State which are not inconsistent with, or otherwise provided for by present law are in full force.
"State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 49, 178 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1971); State v. Bruce, 268 N.C.
174, 184, 150 S.E.2d 216, 224 (1966); State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 541, 139 S.E.2d 870, 874
(1965).
31
State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 49, 178 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1971); State v. Bruce, 268 N.C.
174, 184, 150 S.E.2d 216, 224 (1966); State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 541, 139 S.E.2d 870, 874
(1965). However, State v. Witherington, 226 N.C. 211, 212, 37 S.E.2d 497, 498 (1946), added to
this definition the words "or to seize and detain him for the purpose of so carrying away." But
the use of this latter part of the definition was rejected in State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 50, 178
S.E.2d 577, 582 (1971), as being at variance with the common law.
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1969): "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to kidnap . ..
or to demand a ransom of any person." (Emphasis added.)
"sSee text accompanying notes 25-26 supra and cases cited therein.
3
State v. Kelly, 206 N.C. 660, 663, 175 S.E. 294, 296 (1934), held: "The word 'punishable'
as used in section two of the act indicates the intention of the General Assembly to leave the term
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movement of the victim combined with a demand for ransom or whether
all that occurs is a relatively slight movement incidental to the commission of some other crime.
The definition of the crime of kidnapping in North Carolina apparently has remained unchanged since the common-law requirement that
the victim be removed from the country fell into disuse during the early
development of criminal law in the United States." Until recently, the
conviction required either a substantial movement of the victim or a
demand for ransom. State v. Lowry,39 the first case to state that it was
the fact of forcible removal and not the distance that constituted the
crime of kidnapping, involved a movement of only three hundred feet.
But in that case the victims were held for ransom before being released.
Since the North Carolina statute uses an alternative form, "to kidnap
• . . or to demand ransom . . . or to hold . . . . for ransom,"4 there
appears to have been no need for any movement at all to constitute
kidnapping in Lowry. One might observe at this point that if, as our
statute seems to say, holding for ransom is alone enough to constitute
kidnapping, the North Carolina kidnapping statute involves factors
other than those found in the common-law definition despite the many
supreme court cases that have held that the common-law definition
applies.41
In Lowry the court, after stating that it was the fact of asportation
and not the distance which constituted kidnapping, cited only two California cases as authority." It is interesting to note that since Lowry,
California has held that a movement of the victim that is incidental to
the crime being committed and that does not increase the risk of bodily
harm does not constitute kidnapping. 3 Subsequent North Carolina
cases that have stated that the distance the victim is moved is unimportant have cited Lowry or a case referring to Lowry as authority despite
its lack of prior case-law support and despite the possibility that the
statutory offense could have been found in Lowry on the basis of the
of imprisonment in the discretion of the court ....

This holding was cited with approval in State

v. Bruce, 268 N.C. 174, 184, 150 S.E.2d 216, 224 (1966), and in State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536,
541, 139 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1965).
332 J. BISHOP, supra note 18, § 671.
-'263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870 (1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1969).
"See. e.g.. cases cited note 33 supra.
"2People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958); People v.
Oganesoff, 81 Cal. App. 2d 709, 184 P.2d 953 (1947).
OPeople v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969).
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ransom demand alone.44 All the cases with the exception of State v.
Reid" and Murphy that have held that distance is not important have
themselves involved a rather substantial movement of the victim.46 In
Reid the victim was moved only seventy-five feet. This movement consisted of being dragged from the victim's own property through a hedge
onto a vacant lot where he was bound and gagged. However, the defendant in Reid was granted a new trial on the kidnapping charge because
of prejudicial error in the judge's charge. Thus, prior to Murphy, the
only North Carolina case that had found kidnapping solely on the basis
of a minor asportation was a court of appeals case in which the defendant's conviction was reversed for other reasons; and the out-of-state
cases that had originally been used as the basis for the North Carolina
holdings as to degree of movement were no longer valid.47
With no sound prior case law upon which to base the holding in
Murphy that the degree of asportation was unimportant, the court
might have looked for support to the common-law background of our
kidnapping statute. However, as previously stated, the English common
law originally required a carrying out of the country.4" The common law
in America has been refined to the extent that asportation from the
country is no longer required,49 but the subsequent modifications of
some of the state kidnapping laws that have substantially reduced the
degree of movement required have occurred in statutes, not by additional modification of the common law. In fact California apparently
felt that the existing state of the common law was such that to declare
the movement of a victim from one part of a county to another part of
the same county to be kidnapping required legislative enactment."0 Even
one of the more recent definitions of common-law kidnapping that has
"E.g., State v. Hudson, 281 N.C. 100, 104, 187 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1972); State v. Barbour, 278
N.C. 449, 454, 180 S.E.2d 115, 119 (1971); State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 51, 178 S.E.2d 577,
581 (1971).
155 N.C. App. 424, 168 S.E.2d 511 (1969).
"For example, in State v. Hudson, 281 N.C. 100, 101-02, 187 S.E.2d 756, 757-58 (1972), the
victim was driven from her home to the defendant's home and then to a secluded area; in State v.
Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 43-44, 178 S.E.2d 577, 578 (1971), the victim was driven away and then
forced into a wooded area and held there for four and one half hours; and in State v. Barbour,
278 N.C. 449, 452, 180 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1971), the victim was forced to drive a distance of nine
or ten miles.
17See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra and cases cited therein.
"14 W. Blackstone, supra note 13 at *219.
"State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550 (1837); 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 18, § 671.
"CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (West 1970).
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often been cited5 by the North Carolina Supreme Court requires "conveying the imprisoned person to some other place.' 52 The definition of
kidnapping presently used in North Carolina is "the taking and carrying
away of a person by force and against his will."53 Although such a
definition could be considered not contrary to the common law, it is
doubtful, and in no place is it shown, that the common-law crime of
kidnapping ever contemplated that any conveying would be sufficient.
In the Dix decision the North Carolina Supreme Court has used
recent Michigan and California decisions to determine the degree of
asportation required. The Michigan case, People v. Adams, 4 held that
the victim must be removed from the environment in which the defendant found him. Movement short of that has no significance independent of the crime that was intended. The Michigan Court of Appeals
went on to say that "the relevant environment is the totality of the
surroundings, animate and inanimate."55 In People v. Daniels"'the California Supreme Court held that where the movement of the victim is
merely incidental to the intended crime and does not substantially increase the risk of harm over that necessarily present as a result of the
intended crime, the asportation is not sufficient to constitute kidnapping. In Dix the court observed that the asportation of the jailer was
purely incidental to the intended crime, that no risks were created by
the movement that did not inhere in the escape, and that the jailer was
not carried away from the environment in which he was found. It is, of
course, possible that the court could hold in subsequent cases that this
new approach to determining asportation is to be used only when the
offense occurs inside a building. But it is unlikely that the decision will
ever be so restricted since, in addition to the question of movement from
one part of a building to another part, the court directed itself to determining "the requisite asportation in terms of linear measurement" and
to delimiting the word "place." 57 Moreover, prior out-of-doors kidnappings were discussed in terms of substantiality of asportation.5 '
"E.g., State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 51, 178 S.E.2d 577, 583 (1971); State v. Lowry, 263
N.C. 536, 540, 139 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1965); State v. Gough, 257 N.C. 348, 352, 126 S.E.2d 118,
121 (1962).
522 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 750, at 573 (9th ed. 1923) (Emphasis added).
"E.g., State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 454, 180 S.E.2d 115, 118 (1971): State v. Ingland,
278 N.C. 42, 47, 178 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1971).
134 Mich. App. 546, 192 N.W.2d 19 (1971).
1Id. at 568, 192 N.W.2d at 30.
"71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969).
"1282 N.C. at 494, 193 S.E.2d at 899.
-"Id. at 494-98, 193 S.E.2d at 899-901.
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The Dix opinion seems to require an overruling of Murphy, but the
court elected to distinguish the case instead, saying that the distance that
the victim was moved in Murphy was substantial. Apparently, substantial movement occurs somewhere between 62 and 213 feet! There is no
difference in the kind of movement involved in the two cases: in Murphy
the asportation was incidental to the intended crime of assault; and the
victim was not removed from his environment since he had been playing
out-of-doors and was asported only to a nearby wooded area. It could
have been argued that a risk of harm beyond that necessarily present in
an assault on the street was created by the asportation into the woods
where more time could be taken to perpetrate the offense and where the
chance of discovery was decreased.59 But if the court employed such a
distinction it did not articulate it. Such a treatment of Murphy seems
especially inconsistent with the logic of the Dix opinion, since the court
quotes language from People v. Adams" to the effect that a change in
the victim's circumstances, not the extent of the asportation, determines
whether there has been a kidnapping."'
The Dix opinion quoted still other language from Adams62 to the
effect that a kidnapping definition allowing conviction for any
asportation would permit abusive prosecution. 3 The court stated that
it is generally recognized that abusive prosecutions have been common
where there is a public clamor for an extreme penalty because an "especially outrageous" crime has been committed.64 From this standpoint,
too, it is surprising that Murphy was so lightly treated in Dix, since
Murphy involved a particularly offensive assault for which the severest
possible penalty was undoubtedly desired by the public.
In spite of the inconsistencies in Dix's treatment of the Murphy
case, the new rule is a substantial and desirable departure from the old
line of cases defining kidnapping. It is much less likely now that anyone
will be convicted of a crime that he did not intend to commit merely
because the act technically falls within a broad and vague range of
prohibited acts. The new decision is also more in line with the common
law on which the North Carolina kidnapping statute is based.
"Id. at 502, 193 S.E.2d at 904. Although the risk of harm test was discussed in Dix, it was

not used in the analysis of Murphy.

1O34 Mich. App. 546, 568, 192 N.W.2d 19, 30 (1971).
6282 N.C. at 500-01, 193 S.E.2d at 903.
634 Mich. App. at 560, 192 N.W.2d at 26.
1282 N.C. at 501, 193 S.E.2d at 903-04.
"Id. at 501, 193 S.E.2d at 904.
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Many of the difficulties in this area could be avoided by statutory
revision. If the new asportation definition were combined with a statute
that distinguished false imprisonment, simple kidnapping, and kidnapping for ransom and that established separate maximum sentences for
each, the chances of a conviction for a "technical kidnapping" and
subjection to an unconscionably broad discretion in determining punishment would be ended.
WILLIAM S. PATTERSON

Standing of the State to Raise the Constitutional Rights of a Defendant
in Order to Convict Him
In the North Carolina legislative session of 1969 a small proviso
was added to the statute concerning the right of indigent defendants to
counsel.' The proviso stated simply that in a case involving a capital
offense an indigent defendant could not waive his right to counsel during
any critical stage of the proceedings.2 The proviso was not long-lived; it
was deleted from the statute in the next session of the General Assem'Ch. 1013, § 1, [1969] N.C. Sess L. 1154, as amended N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 7A-457(a) (Supp.

1971).

2

An indigent person who has been informed of his rights under this subchapter may,
in writing, waive any right granted by this subchapter, if the court finds of record that
at the time of the waiver the indigent acted with full awareness of his rights and of the
consequences of a waiver. . . . A waiver shall not be allowed in a capital case,
Ch. 1013, § 1, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1156.
Sections 7A-450 to -470 of the North Carolina General Statutes deal with the entitlement of
indigent persons to representation. Pertinent parts of the statute are as follows:
Whenever a person, under the standards and procedures set out in this subchapter,
is determined to be an indigent person entitled to counsel, it is the responsibility of the
State to provide him with counsel .
N.C. GEN. STAT. 7A-450(b) (1969).

...

(a) An indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in the following actions and
proceedings:
(1) Any felony case. ...
(b) In each of the actions and proceedings enumerated in subsection (a) . . . entitlement to the services of counsel begins as soon as feasible after the indigent is taken into
custody .

. .

. Entitlement continues through any critical stage of the action or

proceeding including, if applicable:
(2) A pretrial identificationprocedure at which the presence of the indigent is
required.
Id. § 7A451(a) (1969) (emphasis added).
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bly. 3 It remained in existence long enough, however, to become the
basis of two significant holdings by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
These holdings, both found in State v. Mems,4 are of continuing importance in North Carolina law, though the statute that gave rise to them
is no longer in effect.
The court first held that the state as party litigant had standing to
challenge a statute's constitutionality even though the state asserted that
the statute was unconstitutional as it applied to the defendant.5 The
court then held that a statute that prohibited a criminal defendant from
waiving his right to counsel was unconstitutional as a denial of defendant's constitutional right to represent himself.6
3

Ch. 1243, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. 1809, amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-457(a) (Supp. 1971).
4281 N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d 164 (1972).
5Id. at 669-70, 190 S.E.2d at 172.
'Id. at 670-72, 190 S.E.2d at 172-73. The statute that was found to be unconstitutional
concerned only indigent defendants. In addition to finding the statute unconstitutional per se for
interfering with a defendant's right to appear and defend in person, the court also found the statute
violative of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV) and article I, sections 17 and 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina. 281 N.C. at 673,
190 S.E.2d at 174. No attempt will be made in this note to analyze the ramifications or test the
validity of the court's decision with regard to equal protection. However, brief recognition should
be given to two recent and as yet not widely accepted theories, one of criminal procedure and the
other of constitutional law, that support a position contrary to the one taken by the court.
The first is embodied in a dissenting opinion of Justice Peters of the California Supreme Court
in the case of People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967). One of the
issues in that case was whether two minor Mexican-American defendants with less than a high
school education, one of whom had a tested I.Q. of between 65 and 71, could ever be said to
knowingly and understandingly waive their constitutional rights. The majority of the court adhered
to the familiar "totality of circumstances" rule to hold that such a waiver could be made. Id. at
389, 432 P.2d at 219, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 603. Justice Peters found the "totality of circumstances"
rationale inadequate to protect minors. In its place he wished to substitute a rule that "no minor
may waive his constitutional rights unless he has the advice and counsel of an adult," specifically
a friendly adult. Id. at 396-97, 432 P.2d at 223, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 607. The special solicitude for the
incapacity of minors with regard to sophistication as to constitutional rights could arguably be
extended to include the economically disadvantaged of our society, at least to the extent of holding
that it is no denial of equal protection to insist that an indigent cannot waive constitutional rights
until examined by an impartial magistrate.
A second development, this one in constitutional law, could be urged in concurrence with the
Lara argument to defeat condemnation of the proposed statute on constitutional grounds. This is
the development of the doctrine of "benign discrimination," which has as a basic tenet that
discrimination in favor of a disadvantaged group does not do violence to the equal protection
clause. A law that prevented an indigent defendant from waiving his constitutional rights until he
had been examined by an impartial magistrate would be just such benign discrimination. After the
progress from Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), to Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972), it can scarcely be gainsaid that in the vast majority of cases it is certainly to a defendant's
advantage to be aided by counsel.
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Charles E. Mems was suspected of rape. At the time of his arrest
he was given formal Miranda7 warnings. At first Mems expressed a
desire to have counsel, but before counsel could be obtained, he changed

his mind and in writing waived his right to have counsel present. He was
then subjected to a lineup. 8 After the lineup but before trial Mems again
changed his mind and obtained the services of counsel. At trial Mems's
attorney sought to have an in-court identification stemming from the
lineup proceedings excluded on the grounds that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive and that the waiver of counsel was not made with
full knowledge of the circumstances. The trial court overruled both
contentions and permitted the in-court identification to be made. On
appeal Mems's counsel for the first time raised the issue of statutory
protection by claiming that the unrevised version of section 7A-457(a)
of the General Statutes expressly prohibited waiver of counsel by a
criminal defendant in a capital case.' The unrevised version was in effect
at the time of Mems's arrest.
In answer, the state contended that the statute was unconstitutional
because it deprived a criminal defendant of his right to defend himself,
a right alleged to be implicit in the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
The first issue that the North Carolina Supreme Court had to decide
was whether the state had standing to raise the question of the constitutional validity of the statute.
The court found that the state had standing."0 Noting the well'in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966), the Supreme Court held that once a suspect in
a criminal investigation had been taken into custody he must be warned of the following: his right
to remain silent; the fact that anything he might say could be used against him; his right to counsel;
his right to have counsel appointed if he were unable to afford private legal assistance.
'A lineup is specifically included in the definition of "critical stage" provided by § 7A-45 1(b);
see note 2 supra,
'282 N.C. at 665, 190 S.E.2d at 169.
"The question of whether a party has standing to raise a particular issue is of importance in
state as well as federal judicial proceedings. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution
confines federal jurisdiction to cases in controversy. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to require litigants coming before a federal court to meet certain tests, most
notably relating to injury in fact and (less easily understood) zone of interests before their standing
is recognized. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
State courts do not have Article III restrictions to worry about but do have their own state
constitutions and judicial precedents with which to contend. North Carolina has no specific consti.
tutinal provision limiting state court jurisdiction to cases in controversy. Theoretically, the state
courts need not adhere to the strict standing requirements of the federal courts. In fact, however,
by judicial custom and precedent the state courts do adhere to strict case in controversy requirements when deciding whether they have jurisdiction to hear an issue. Nicholson v. State Educ.
Assistance Authority, 275 N.C. 439, 168 S.E.2d 401 (1969). The North Carolina Supreme Court

1973]

STANDING OF STATE

1053

settled rule that "the unconstitutionality of a statute may be asserted
only by a litigant who is adversely affected by the statute,"'" the court
found that the state was adversely affected because the defendant would
prevail in his appeal if the statute were held constitutional and the state
would thus lose the conviction of Mems obtained at trial. This is a rather
peculiar adverse interest to be asserted by a state and sustained by a
court. No authority for basing standing of a state on such reasons was
cited in the opinion and none has been found in a search of cases. There
are instances, to be discussed below, in which courts have permitted
government officers to raise questions concerning the constitutionality
of statutes. All of these instances involve areas of civil, not criminal
litigation. In no case prior to State v. Mems has the state as prosecutor
been found to have standing to assert the constitutional rights of a
defendant as a means of overturning a statute under which the defendant
was seeking protection in a criminal proceeding.
As a general rule a government has no standing to raise the issue
of the constitutionality of statutes passed by its legislative branch. There
are several exceptions to this general rule, which from an analysis of
cases seem to fall into three general categories.' 2 The first category
covers instances in which the government, acting in a proprietary rather
than a governmental capacity, alleges a statute to be unconstitutional
as to itself. For example, in Vandiver v. Williams 3 the Georgia Supreme Court found that the state as obligee on a surety bond had
standing to contest the constitutionality of the statute relating to place
for service of process to bond debtors. The distinction between proprietary and governmental capacity is a vexed one in the law. 4 A simple,
does have apparent constitutional authority to issue advisory opinions but does so rarely and then
only in the form of non-binding opinions of individual judges responding to questions from the
General Assembly. See Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C.L. REV. 297
(1949).
"281 N.C. at 669, 190 S.E.2d at 172.
'"The following groupings are essentially categories the author has culled from reading cases
and should not be mistaken for judicially recognized categories. For an earlier, similar attempt to
categorize see Note, Power ofa State Officer to Raise a ConstitutionalQuestion, 33 COL. L. REV.
1036 (1932).
1218 Ga. 60, 126 S.E.2d 210 (1962). See also City of Buffalo v. State Bd. of Equalization &
Assessment, 46 Misc. 2d 675, 260 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1965).
"Courts have had considerable difficulty in distinguishing a proprietary function from a
governmental function. The explanation given by Judge Walter H. Sanborn in Trust & Say. Bank
v. City of Arkansas City, 76 F. 271, 282 (8th Cir. 1896), and quoted with approval by Judge Parker
in City of High Point v. Duke Power Co., 120 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1941), is as good as any:
"A city has two classes of powers-the one legislative, public, governmental, in the exercise of
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and therefore inadequate, explanation is that when a governmental unit
undertakes an activity which a private citizen or corporation could undertake, it acts in a proprietary capacity. If the government is doing
something that only a government can do it acts in a governmental or
sovereign capacity. In Mems, the state in its role as prosecutor was
acting in what is clearly a governmental capacity and therefore could
not fall into this category of exceptions to the general rule denying the
state standing to contest the constitutionality of statutes. Furthermore
the state did not allege infringement of its own constitutional right. It
alleged infringement of the defendant's right. 5
The second category covers instances in which the Attorney General raises the issue of the constitutionality of a statute on behalf of all
the citizens of a state."6 The rationale is that the Attorney General as
chief law officer of the state must have access to the courts to vindicate
public rights and raise issues of public importance. 17 In order to bring
suit, the constitutional rights of the public at large must be at issue, not
simply those of a narrowly defined class of individuals. 8 The Attorney
General's capacity to bring suit does not appear to cover instances in
which the Attorney General is a party adverse to the individual whose
constitutional rights he is allegedly attempting to protect, nor does it
appear to cover instances in which the Attorney General is a prosecutor
in a criminal proceeding. Therefore Mems does not fall within this
category of exceptions either.
The third category covers instances in which the subject matter of
which it is a sovereignty and governs its people; the other proprietary, quasi private, conferred upon
it, not for the purpose of governing its people but for the private advantage of the inhabitants of
the city, and of the city itself as a legal personality."
The court held in the High Point case that the purchase and sale of electric power by the city

was an undertaking carried on in its private and proprietary capacity. Id. at 869.
'There is considerable authority for the rule that a litigant may assert only his own constitutional rights and immunities. See Medrano v. Allee, 347 F. Supp. 605 (1972); Cheaney v. State,
-

Ind. _

285 N.E.2d 265 (1972). If the state has standing as a party litigant, logically it

must fall under the same general rules that govern party litigants.

"For an early case finding and explaining the Attorney General's capacity in this realm see
State ex rel Brewster v. Roane, 98 Kan. 43, 158 P. 38 (1916).
"For a fairly exhaustive explanation of the reasons why an attorney general is given standing
see State ex. ref. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 198-200, 155 So. 823, 826-27 (1934).
A more recent pronouncement is found in State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199 N.W.2d

738 (1972).
"The Attorney General derives authority to bring suits in the name of the public and for the
public from the traditional common-law conception of the Attorney General's role. See Capitol
Stages v. State ex rel.
Hewitt, 157 Miss. 576, 591, 128 So. 759, 763 (1930).
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a statute involves issues of great public interest or importance and a
particular state official charged with the duty of complying with the

statute does not wish to do so because he believes the statute is unconstitutional. Under ordinary circumstances a public official cannot question

the constitutionality of a statute as a defense to a mandamus proceeding
compelling him to fulfill his statutory duties.19 But under this "great

public interest" exception, most commonly encountered when the disbursement of public funds is involved,20 the public official is permitted

to raise questions concerning the constitutionality of the statute.
There are several other exceptions to the general rule denying a
state standing to contest the constitutionality of a statute. One occurs

when a public official alleges a personal or property interest at stake
that makes his concern for the constitutionality of a statute greater than

that of any other individual. 2' Another occurs when a public official
2
raises the issue of constitutionality on advice of the Attorney General.

1

Another occurs when a court's jurisdiction is involved and the court on
its own motion raises the issue of the constitutionality of the statute
23
under which jurisdiction has been conferred.
The reason for permitting the state to raise issues of the constitu-

tionality of a statute in the Mems case falls under none of the recognized
excpetions to the general rule denying standing to a state to challenge
the constitutionality of statutes. The only reason for permitting the state

to raise the issue of the constitutionality of a statute was that failure to
permit the state to raise the issue would cause the state to lose on appeal.

The reasoning of the court, if taken to its logical conclusion, would
permit the state as prosecutor to challenge the constitutionality of any
"'See State ex rel. Williamson v. County Court, 363 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1963). and cases cited
therein for a statement of this general rule; accord, Smith v. Flournoy, 238 La. 432, 115 So. 2d
809 (1959); Louisiana Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Wheeling Frenchman, 235 La. 332, 103 So. 2d
464 (1958).
10E.g., Green v. City of Pensacola, 108 So. 2d 897 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959); Fulton Foundation
v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 13 Wis. 2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 318 (1961). In Fulton the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found that "[t]he issue of whether public funds are being diverted to a private
purpose clearly is a matter of great public interest." The specific problem concerned the validity
of a gift tax exemption.
"In State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Kelly, 377 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Mo. 1964), defendant
constable alleged that personal liability under a statutory bond for disbursement of funds gave him
a greater interest than any other citizen in the constitutionality of the statute under scrutiny. The
court accepted the allegation but simply found that defendant could not, on the particular facts of
the case, be held liable on his bond.
uJd.
"Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958).
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statute that would interfere with the state's ease in obtaining a conviction. Such reasoning completely undermines traditional requirements of
standing and for that reason alone should perhaps be severely criticized.
But for those who find traditional rules concerning standing to be a
nuisance anyway and are not sorry to see them undermined or subverted, there are additional grounds for criticizing the decision of the
court in this particular case. The statute which the state was permitted
to challenge was a statute designed to afford a defendant in a criminal
proceding protection for what the legislature deemed to be that defendant's rights.
Following the holding of Mems, whenever such a statute is passed
by the General Assembly a clear choice is open to the prosecuting
officers of the state. They can obey the statute, in which case its possible
unconstitutionality can be raised as an issue only by the defendant. This
is as it should be; the statute was passed to protect the defendant and if
he is unhappy with it because he feels it abridges other rights more
worthy of protection he should be the one to say so. The other course
open to the prosecution is to ignore the statute and, if the defendant
complains about this in court, raise the issue of the constitutionality of
the statute as a defense to the defendant's complaint. Such a result is
objectionable for two reasons. First, it requires a private citizen, a criminal defendant at that, to defend the constitutionality of legislative action
against the power and resources of the state's prosecutorial department.
The criminal defendant is put in the position of having to argue for the
enforcement of the law against the prosecution. Secondly, the result
permits the prosecutorial branch of the government freely to secondguess the legislature as to what protections should be available to a
criminal defendant.
After deciding that the state had standing to attack the constitutionality of the state under which Mems was seeking protection, the
court considered the merits of the state's contention. The court found
the statute to be unconstitutional in that the statute deprived a criminal
defendant of his constitutional right to appear and defend himself in
24
person .
24281 N.C. at 670-72, 190 S.E.2d at 172-73. This note will not undertake a full-scale discussion
or critique of the rationale that the right to appear and defend in person is of constitutional stature.

Three recent treatments of the subject in law reviews have analyzed this issue. See Comment, SelfRepresentationin Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the ProSe Defendant, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1479
(1971); Note, CriminalProcedure:Right to Defend ProSe, 48 N.C.L. REv. 678 (1970); Note, The
Right to Defend Pro Se, 3 TEx. TECH L. REv. 89 (1971).
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Where in the Constitution is such a right found? The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in all criminal
proceedings the accused shall have the right to assistance of counsel. 5
In Gideon v. Wainwright26 the United States Supreme Court found
assistance of counsel to be fundamental to due process and therefore

applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution.2 1 More than thirty years ago in the case of Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann,21 the Supreme Court suggested by way
of dictum that the right to counsel carried with it a "correlative right

to dispense with a lawyer's help. '2 9 For more than twenty years thereafter various federal courts of appeals, uncertain of the reach of the
language of Adams, reached conflicting decisions when confronted with
the problem of deciding whether the right not to have counsel had

achieved constitutional stature.30 In 1964 the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Plattner,finally stated unequivocally that the right of a defendant to "conduct and manage his own case pro se.

.

. is a right arising

out of the Federal Constitution and not the mere product of legislation
or judicial decision."

37

Subsequent verdicts of federal courts have con-

sistently found a constitutional right to appear pro se.32 Whatever judicial energy has been expended on the issue since Plattner has been
confined primarily to defining the parameters of the right rather than
33
questioning its existence.
25

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

2372 U.S. 335 (1963).

"The Court in Gideon confined the requirement of counsel to instances in which a defendant
was charged with a felony. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), extended the requirement
to include instances in which a defendant was charged with a misdemeanor.
2317 U.S. 269 (1942).
"ld. at 279.

-'See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911
(1959) (not a constitutional right); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 920 (1958) (a constitutional right); United States v. Private Brands Inc., 250 F.2d 554
(2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958) (a modified constitutional right).
31330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930
(1970); Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1048 (1970);
Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); United
States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970); Bayless v.
United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967).
3E.g., United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1003
(1969); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1965). In Catino the
court distinguished the right to appear pro se if claimed prior to trial from the right to dispense
with counsel and proceed pro se once trial had begun. The court found the former right to be
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A vast majority of state constitutons include a provision that purports to give a defendant the right to appear and defend in person. 4
However, regardless of state constitutional authority the Second Circuit
held in 1965 that the right was fundamental to due process and thus
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 5 North
Carolina has no distinct constitutional provision, and the North Carolina Supreme Court based its decision concerning the constitutional
right on dicta from past North Carolina cases and on precedent from
federal cases.36
The right to defend pro se is a unique constitutional right; 3 it is a
mirror-image right, so to speak. The sixth amendment contains several
provisions designed to afford a criminal defendant a fair trial. These
include the rights to a speedy trial, to a public trial, to an impartial jury,
to confront witnesses, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and to have the assistance of counsel for one's defense. No one
would suggest that the right to a speedy trial implies a correlative right
to an unspeedy trial or that the right to an impartial jury implies a
correlative right to a partial jury. And yet the courts seem to find a clear
implication in the right to counsel of a correlative right to dispense with
same. Even if one accepts the finding that there is such a right the
question still remains whether a statute could be written to afford a
defendant assurance of the affirmative right to have counsel without
unqualified, while the latter was within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny. In Maldonado
the court determined that notice of the existence of the right to appear pro se did not have to be
given to defendant.
3'See Note, 3 TEX. TECH L. REV., supra note 25, at 90 n.6.
-"United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965).
"The court cited three North Carolina cases for the proposition that the court had "repeatedly held that the defendant in a criminal proceeding has a right to handle his own case without
interference by, or the assistance of, counsel forced upon him against his wishes." 281 N.C. at 67071, 190 S.E.2d at 172-73. The three North Carolina cases were State v. Morgan, 272 N.C. 97,
157 S.E.2d 606 (1967); State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 139 S.E.2d 667 (1965); and State v. Bines,
263 N.C. 48, 138 S.E.2d 797 (1964). The Morgan and Bines cases concerned whether a knowing
and effective waiver of counsel had been made (in both instances defendant urging that such waiver
had not been made). McNeil considered whether an indigent who did not like his appointed counsel,
but did not wish to appear pro se, had made a knowing and effective waiver of counsel when, being
forced to choose between his appointed counsel and appearing pro se, he chose the latter. In no
North Carolina case cited by the court was a defendant alleging reversal on the ground that his
right to defend pro se had been denied.
"Informative critiques of decisions holding the right to defend pro se to be of constitutional
stature can be found in Comment, 59 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 25, and Note, 48 N.C.L. REV.,
supra note 25.
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interfering with his alleged constitutional right to dispense with counsel.
Such a statute could conceivably be written.
The statute would say that in any crime in which the potential
penalty was such as to meet the criteria of seriousness as defined by the
United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana3 s a defendant
would not be allowed to waive his constitutional rights to counsel and
to remain silent until he had been examined as to capacity for waiver
by an impartial magistrate.3 9 Any perusal of digests and case reporters
would reveal that an inordinate amount of judicial and legal energy is
being expended on deciding whether waivers of constitutional rights by
criminal defendants are knowing and intelligent and therefore valid. A
statute such as the one suggested would diminish the litigation about
validity of waiver by insisting that an impartial official, not a potential
adversary in a criminal proceeding, determine whether a defendant is
competent to waive his rights." Such a statute would impinge only
slightly on a defendant's right to appear and defend in person. After
determination of requisite capacity by a magistrate, a defendant would
be permitted to waive whatever rights he pleased.
Some problems arise in determining whether all defendants would
come under the umbrella of the statute. A statute that afforded protection to some but not all criminal defendants could be assailed on equal
protection grounds for protecting too few or too many defendants. The
court in State v. Mems found a classification based on indigency to be
constitutionally invalid as repugnant to the equal protection clause,42 but
if the statute were as limited as the one proposed (as compared to the
one condemned) the court might find the classification to be legitimate.
42
Other criteria, such as the age of the person, might also be used.
Whatever criteria are chosen, a defendant protected by a statute such
as the one suggested would be assured of meaningful assistance of coun-391 U.S. 145 (1968). The court in Duncan implied without specifically holding that serious
offenses were those which carried a potential penalty of more than six months in prison. The

specific holding was that a crime punishable by two years in prison was a serious crime.
3
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), held that in order for a waiverof a constitutional right to be valid, the waiver had to be knowing and intelligent.
"In a New York case, Chief Justice Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals in dissent
expressed belief that the court's insistence on examination by a judicial officer as a prerequisite to
waiver of constitutional rights would be a good idea. People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 280-82, 213
N.E.2d 441, 444-45, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104, 108-09 (1965).
"See note 6 supra.
"See discussion of Justice Peters' dissent in note 6 supra.
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sel if such were desired. The judicial proceeding would be less vulnerable
to appeal on the grounds of unconstitutional deprivation of right to
counsel, and the right of a defendant to appear and defend in person
would be infringed hardly at all.
MARIANNE K. SMYTHE
IV
ELECTION LAW
Student Suffrage-The Illusory Right to Vote

Is the student entitled to vote in his college community? The question' was presented to the North Carolina Supreme Court in Hall v.
Board of Elections,2 in which the court had to consider whether an
eighteen-year-old Meredith College student should be allowed to vote
in Wake County where she attended school. The court in Hall for the
first time addressed the issue of the appropriate voting residence of
North Carolina's college and university students.3 But more importantly, the case involved a claim of suffrage under the twenty-sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution.'
The plaintiff left her home town to enter college in June 1971. She
resided in a campus dormitory and returned to her parents' home on
holidays. She relied on her parents for financial support and for storage
of personal property not needed at school. Her parents received her
grades, and she retained banking and religious connections in her home
town. She expressed a desire to attend law school upon graduation from
Meredith. 5 Her residential circumstances were typical of many students
'The first reported American case considering this question appears to be Putnam v.Johnson,
10 Mass. 488 (1813).
2280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972).
'Cf. In re Hall's Guardianship, 235 N.C. 697, 704, 71 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1952) (student does
not acquire domicile at his educational institution if he intends to return to his original home)

(dictum); Gower v. Carter, 195 N.C. 697, 698, 143 S.E. 513 (1928) (residence for purpose of
acquiring an education does not lead to loss of former domicile) (dictum).
'U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate

legislation.
1280 N.C. at 603, 187 S.E.2d at 54.
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across the country and in many respects were similar to those of young
members of the nation's labor force. The plaintiff was denied voter
registration in Wake County in October 19716 as were many college
students across the country. Plaintiff appealed 7 to the Wake County
Board of Elections, which affirmed the registrar's decision. She then
sought redress in superior court.
On advice of counsel plaintiff began cutting ties with her home
town. Pending trial she opened a checking account in Wake County and
changed her driver's license and college registration addresses? The
Wake County Superior Court heard her case de novo0 and held that
plaintiff was a resident of Wake County and entitled to register there
as a qualified voter."1
On direct appeal, 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court accepted the
superior court's finding of fact 3 and affirmed. The triumph for the
plaintiff, an apparent victory for student suffrage, was undermined,
however, by the court's adoption of the strict common-law rules: (1) that
a student is presumed not to be domiciled in his college community and
(2) that a student must intend to remain in his college community
indefinitely before domicile is acquired. 4 The student has the burden of
showing that he is not merely sojourning in the community for purposes
of obtaining an education."1
The North Carolina constitution provides: "Any person who has
resided in the State of North Carolina for one year and in the precinct,
lId. at 602, 187 S.E.2d at 53.
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§163-75 to -76 (1972) (the voter has a right to appeal the denial of
registration for any reason by the local registrar and to have a hearing before the county board of

elections).
8280 N.C. at 602, 187 S.E.2d at 53.

'Id. at 603, 187 S.E.2d at 54.
'0"Any person aggrieved by a final decision of a county board of elections denying registration
may. . . appeal therefrom to the superior court. . . . IT]he matter shall be heard de novo .
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-77 (1972).

"1280 N.C. at 604, 187 S.E.2d at 54.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b)(1) (1969) (the supreme court may review a cause before determination by the court of appeals when the "subject matter of the appeal has significant public

interest").
"The court was reluctant to adopt the superior court's finding of fact: "Certainly the foregoing evidence would have fully justified the judge below in finding that plaintiff was temporarily

sojourning in Raleigh for the purpose of attending college; that she had not abandoned her domicile
in Tarboro; and that she was, therefore, not eligible to vote in Raleigh." 280 N.C. at 611, 187

S.E.2d at 59.
"Id. at 608, 187 S.E.2d at 57.
"Id. at 609, 187 S.E.2d at 57.
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ward, or other election district for 30 days next preceding an election
. . . shall be entitled to vote at any election held in this State."'" Al-

though plaintiff had lived in Wake County for thirty days, the board of
elections contended that she was not a bona fide resident of the county.
Bona fide residency requirements are commonly justified on several
grounds: (1) prevention of multiple voting, (2) necessity of excluding
nonresidents in order to maintain the integrity of local elections, and (3)
assurance of an interested and informed electorate. 7 It is important to
focus on these justifications in order to evaluate the court's reasoning
in Hall.

While it is clearly within a state's power to impose reasonable
residency requirements, 8 bona fide residency requirements hardly appear necessary to stop multiple voting." North Carolina's voting fraud
legislation"0 and voter registration system2 ' should be sufficient to deter
multiple voting without disfranchising students. Likewise, there are no
valid reasons for concluding that students are any less interested and
informed than other voters.22 Therefore, the most apparent reason for
denying student participation in the local elections of college communities is the desire to exclude students as outsiders. This motive has been
characterized candidly by some courts as a fear that students will overwhelm the polls in their college communities. 23 The ratification of the
twenty-sixth amendment, which lowered the voting age and greatly increased the number of eligible student voters, is bound to have intensified these fears. Yet, strangely enough, it has only been with the advent
"N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2(1). North Carolina's one-year durational residency requirement
is no longer valid. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793
(M.D.N.C. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 1034 (1972).

"7Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 685-88, 189 N.W.2d 423, 430-31 (1971); Worden v. Board

of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, _
294 A.2d 233, 244 (1972); Thompson, The Problem of College
Student Voting: Proposed Solutions, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 398, 411 (1971); Comment, State
Residency Requirements for Purposes of Voting: The Eligibility of Students to Vote In Their
College Communities, 21 AM. U.L. REv. 774, 778-79 (1972); Comment, Student Voting Rights In
University Communities, 6 HARV. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. Lia. L. REv. 397, 398 (1971). See also State
ex rel. Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N.C. 115, 121 (1883) (prevention of fraud).
' 5Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354 (1972); Worden v. Board of Elections, 61 N.J. 325,
-,
294 A.2d 233, 239 (1972).
2°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-275 (1972).
21
1d. §§ 163-65 to -78 (1972).
2See Worden v. Board of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, - 294 A.2d 233, 244 (1972).
"Anderson v. Pifer, 315 II1. 164, 168, 146 N.E. 171, 173 (1924); Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich.
670, 691, 189 N.W.2d 423, 432 (1971); Goben v. Murrell, 195 Mo. App. 104,._.
, 190 S.W. 986,
988 (1916); Worden v. Board of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, _
294 A.2d 233, 245 (1972).
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of the twenty-sixth amendment that courts have been willing to destroy
completely previous barriers to student suffrage. 4
Bona fide residence, like most legal phrases, is open to varying
interpretation. In a broad sense "residence" is defined as "a factual
place of abode," 5 while in a narrower application "residence" is synonymous with domicile.2 Under the former definition the student would
qualify as a resident of his college community, while the latter definition
requires that the student make some stronger showing of nexus with the
college community. Unfortunately for students, courts have traditionally equated residence and domicile in voting cases, 27 as the court did
2
in Hall. 1
Domicile is generally regarded as "the place where a person dwells
and which is the center of his domestic, social and civil life. ' 29 For
purposes of voting the essential inquiry the court has to make is whether
the student has effected a change of domicile. Since both the age of
majority and the minimum voting age in North Carolina are eighteen,
anyone who is of voting age is competent to acquire a domicile of
choice.30 The courts have followed two separate rules on what constitutes change of domicile for voting purposes. There is agreement that
to establish a new domicile, the changing party must (1) be present in
the new locality, (2) intend to abandon the old domicile, and (3) intend
to adopt the new locality as a new domicile of choice." Once these
elements are established, the more liberal rule would recognize a change
of domicile by the potential voter.32 The more stringent rule recognizes
"See cases cited note 64 infra.
"BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
"State ex rel. Owens v. Chaplin, 228 N.C. 705, 708, 47 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1948).
"McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 175 (1950).
21280 N.C. at 605, 187 S.E.2d at 55.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11-12 (1971).
"At common law an unemancipated minor could not acquire a domicile of choice and was
presumed to be domiciled with his father. Thayer v. Thayer, 187 N.C. 573, 574, 122 S.E. 307, 308
(1924). In some states the presumption conflicts with the 18-year-old voting age in that voters
between ages 18 and 21 are incompetent to acquire a domicile of choice and must vote at their

parents' domicile. This presumption is no longer relevant to North Carolina voting cases since the
legislature has abrogated the common law definition of minority, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-1 (Supp.

1971), and designated in its place that any person attaining age 18 is an adult. Id. § 48-2(1) (Supp.
1971). See also Jolicouer v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971) (judicially

rejecting this common-law presumption).
'Note, Minors' Voting Residence, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 811-12 (1972).
"State ex rel. May v. Jones, 16 Ohio App. 2d 140, 242 N.E.2d 672 (1968); Asbahr v. Wahl,
164 Wis. 89, 159 N.W. 549 (1916); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-The Equal Protection Clause and
the Student's Right to Vote Where He Attends School, 50 N.C.L. REV. 1148, 1150-51 & n.ll
(1972).
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that the above three elements are essential to a change of domicile, but
requires that the voter also intend to remain in the new locality permanently or indefinitely.3 3 The court in Hall chose to follow the more
stringent rule, 34 and thereby placed a heavier burden on students seeking to vote in their college locality.
Whether a new domicile is acquired (and concurrently the old one
abandoned) is a factual question of the changing party's intent to acquire a domicile of choice.315 Up to the point of making this factual
determination, the same rules theoretically apply to students and nonstudents alike. In some states, however, the statutes, constitutional provisions, and judicial rules expressly prejudice the student in his efforts
to show an intent to establish a new domicile. 3 The most marked of
these are "gain-or-loss" provisions, of which Alabama's is a typical
example: "No person shall lose or acquire a residence either by temporary absence from his or her place of residence without the intention of
remaining, or by being a student of an institution of learning ... ."38
North Carolina does not have a gain-or-loss statute expressly limiting
student residence, 39 but section 163-57(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes does provide that a person does not gain residence in a
county he enters for temporary purposes "without the intention of making such county his permanent place of abode."4 It can be argued that
this provision should be construed to have the same effect as a gain-ormFrakes v. Farragut Community School Dist., 255 Iowa 88, 121 N.W.2d 636 (1963); Goben
v. Murrell, 195 Mo. App. 104, 190 S.W. 986 (1916); Kegley v. Johnson, 207 Va. 54, 147 S.E.2d

735 (1966); Note, 50 N.C.L. Rev., supra note 32, at 1150 & n.10. Contra, Ramey v. Rockefeller,
348 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (state can constitutionally go no further than determining if
the student intends to make the place his home for the present); Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F.
Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972) (indefinite intent test held to violate equal protection).

There is some confusion whether an interpretation of "indefinite" would include a student who
has no definite intent to leave the university community following graduation. Compare Shivelhood
v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (D. Vt. 1971) with Kegley v. Johnson, 207 Va. 54, 147 S.E.2d

735 (1966).
1'280 N.C. at 608, 187 S.E.2d at 57.
Shivelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (D. Vt. 1971).

"'Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559, 563 (D.N.H. 1972) (other groups with similar
domiciliary intent as students were allowed to register); Anderson v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 1195,

1196 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (more stringent test applied to students than to others).
7E.g., LA. CONST. art. 8, § 11; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 54:10 (Supp. 1972). See generally
Note, 50 N.C.L. REv., supra note 32, at 1149 nn.3 & 4.
"'ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 17 (1959).
3

1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-57(7) (1972) applies gain-or-loss to teachers but not to students.

"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-57(3) (1972).
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loss statute.41 Courts again split as to the proper interpretation of a gainor-loss provision. One line of cases construes these provisions to create
a presumption of nonresidence in the school community.12 Other cases
interpret the statute to make a student's presence in the community
neutral for purposes of determining voting residence.13 Conversely,
other courts have held that the gain-or-loss provisions violate equal
protection of the laws because they place an unnecessary burden on the
student.44
Rather than use a statutory approach, the Hall court adopted the
common-law principle," reflected in the more stringent statutory approach above, that a student is presumed not to be domiciled in his
college community." Although this principle does not preclude a student
from establishing a change of domicile, the onus is on the student to
overcome the rebuttable presumption of nonresidence and to show by a
preponderance of evidence47 his presence in the new location, his abandonment of his former domicile, his intent to establish a new domicile
in his college community, and his intent to remain in the new locale
indefinitely. For the student, who is more likely than not to leave the
community upon graduation, this is a difficult burden to carry.
Traditionally courts have considered countless factors as indicative
of domiciliary intent. The court in Hall" looked to the various criteria
set forth in the Opinion of the Justices" in which the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in an advisory opinion held that presence for
educational purposes would not establish voting residence. The Massachusetts court looked to circumstances of family relations that would
place an almost impossible burden on today's undergraduate student:
"Cf. In re Sugar Creek Local School Dist., 185 N.E.2d 809, 812-13 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1962).
2
E.g., Wilson v. Symm, 341 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Merrill v. Shearston, 73 Colo. 230,
214 P. 540 (1923).
"E.g., Whittington v. Board of Elections, 320 F. Supp. 889, 891 (M.D.N.Y. 1970); Palla v.
Board of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36, 47, 286 N.E.2d 247, 252, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860, 867 (1972); Kegley

v. Johnson, 207 Va. 54, 57, 147 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1966).
"Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972); Johnson v. Darrall, 337 F. Supp.
138 (S.D. Ind. 1971); Shivelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Vt. 1971); Bright v. Baesler,
336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Ky. 1971); Anderson v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D. Ohio 1971);
Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971); see Note, 50 N.C.L. REv., supra note
32.
4See Welch v. Shumway, 232 I11.54, 88, 83 N.E. 549, 562 (1907).

"1280 N.C. at 608, 187 S.E.2d at 57.
1Id. at 609, 187 S.E.2d at 57. Some states apply a clear and convincing evidence test. See,
e.g., In re Goodman, 146 N.Y. 284, 287, 40 N.E. 769, 770 (1895).
'1280 N.C. at 609-10, 187 S.E.2d at 58.
'p46 Mass. (5 Met.) 587 (1843).
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If he has a father living; if he still remains a member of his father's
family; if he returns to pass his vacations; if he is maintained and
supported by his father; these are strong circumstances, repelling the
presumption of a change of domicil.
. . . [O]r if, having no parent, or being separated from his father's
family, not being maintained or supported by him; or, if he has a
family of his own. . . or by purchase or lease takes up his permanent
abode there, without intending to return to his former domicil; if he
depend on his own property, income or industry for his support;-these
are circumstances, more or less conclusive, to show a change of domicil, and the acquisition of a domicil in the town where the college is
situated.50
Other courts have considered the following to be relevant-place of
banking;"' location of church attendance;" place represented as applicant's residence on insurance, tax, and other forms;53 place of registration of automobile;54 or any other factor that might show attachment
(or lack thereof) with either the former place of domicile or the college
community. All of these factors represent a cutting of the parental and
hometown strings and naturally create a greater burden on the eighteenyear-old 5 because the factors are to a large degree relative to the length
of time a person has been away from home."0
It should be remembered that the court is trying to measure objectively the student's intent to establish a residence in his college community. In the context of student suffrage at least four states of mind
are attributable to students-(l) intent to return to the parents' community, (2) intent to leave the university community upon graduation
and to settle in a place other than the parents' community, (3) intent to
remain in the university community, and (4) no definite postgraduate
intent as to domicile. 57 When the student intends to return to his former
Old. at 589-90.
"Frakes v. Farragut Community School Dist., 255 Iowa 88, 92, 121 N.W.2d 636, 638 (1963).
2
5

Id.

uPtak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 299, 220 S.W.2d 592, 596 (1949); Michaud v. Yeomans,
115 N.J. Super. 200, - 278 A.2d 537, 539-40 (Law Div. 1971).
5
McCoy v. MeLeRoy, 348 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
-"See,e.g., Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 108, 112, 75 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1947) ("These
students are family men, not college boys away from their parental homes").
-"Theself-supporting, married student presents little problem to the courts as registration is
usually granted. See Reiner v. Board of Elections, 54 Misc. 2d 1030, 283 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. Ct.),
affd, 28 App. Div. 2d 1095, 285 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1967).
57
Worden v. Board of Elections, 61 N.J. 325,-., 294 A.2d 233, 245 (1972); Singer, Student
Power at the Polls, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 713-14 (1970); Comment, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGliTS-CIv. L.
REv., supra note 17, at 407.
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domicile, he cannot register in his college community even under the
most lenient common-law principles because he does not possess the
requisite intent to abandon his former domicile. s Since students in this
group probably retain greater interest in their hometown elections, it is
unlikely that they even attempt to register in their college communities.
On the other hand, students in category three-those who intend to
remain in their college community after graduation-should be extended the right to vote in that community because they meet both the
strict and liberal common-law tests for change of domicile. It appears
that these students have no problem registering if they can show that
they have a job in the college community following graduation or some
other postgraduate connection with the college community.59
The students in category two, who intend to settle in a third community but who do not yet live there, and the uncertain students in the
fourth category pose the most difficult intent problems. Presumably
these two categories contain a large number of students."0 For career
and other reasons these students have no present intent to return to their
home towns. By applying to register in their college community they
show a preference for that community over their former domiciles. 1
Many courts, however, require these students to vote in their former
domiciles by absentee ballot or to return to their former domicile to vote
because their presence in the college community is for the temporary
purpose of obtaining an education.12 The result is that many of these
students are forced to cast their votes in communities where they have
neither interests nor connections. In addition to the injustice in requiring
the student to vote where he has no interest, there is blatant inequity in
the application of these common-law principles. When facts show some
connection with both the former residence and the college residence as
in Hall, the registrar is practically free to interpret the facts according
to his own prejudices.13 When registration is refused, few students are
financially able to pursue legal remedies.
"Michaud v. Yeomans, 115 N.J. Super. 200, 278 A.2d 537 (Law Div. 1971); Kegley v.
Johnson, 207 Va. 54, 147 S.E.2d 735 (1966).
"See, e.g., In re Garvey, 147 N.Y. 117, 41 N.E. 439 (1895).
"Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527, 533 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
"eWordenv. Board of Elections, 61 N.J. 325,
, 294 A.2d 233, 244 (1972).
"See, e.g., Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 298, 220 S.W.2d 592, 595 (1949); Anderson v.
Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 167-68, 146 N.E. 171, 173 (1924); In re Barry, 164 N.Y. 18, 20, 58 N.E. 12, 13
(1900); Seibold v. Wahl, 164 Wis. 82, 85, 159 N.W. 546, 548 (1916).
3

See Kegley v. Johnson, 207 Va. 54, 58, 147 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1966) (evidence submitted that

student-husband was denied registration, but his wife was registered); Singer, supranote 57, at 703-
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In recent years several courts have realized that the right to vote is
meaningless if it has to be exercised in a locality of no interest to the
voter. 4 These courts also recognize that the student population is not
significantly more mobile or transient than other segments of the population.65 These courts demand that the same standards be applied to
students as are applied to nonstudents.66 In turn, the intent approach is
rejected in favor of what appears to be an interest test. The most important factors are not parental relations and business ties but indicia of
the effect on the student of the political processes of the locale where
he dwells: physical presence, dominance of local laws and regulations,
children in public schools, payment of local sales and gasoline taxes and
other charges, the fact that the student has to deal with local governmental bodies, and classification as a resident of the college community
by the Census Bureau. 7 Obviously, when a court adopts these political
interests as indicia of voting residence, it automatically rejects the
common-law principles that have virtually denied students the right to
vote in their college communities. 8 As a result of this new approach,
many students are allowed to register in their college communities. The
interest test is based on the spirit of the twenty-sixth amendment," as
aptly described by the California Supreme Court in Jolicoeur v.
Mihaly:"
[A youth] will not be brought into the bosom of the political system
by being told that he may not have a voice in the community in which
he lives, but must instead vote wherever his parents live or may move
to.
06 (registration statute used to prevent students from voting for black candidate); Thompson, supra
note 17, at 403-05 (unequal treatment of students in various North Carolina college communities).
'4Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972); Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565,
488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971); Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971);
Worden v. Board of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d 233 (1972); see Singer, supra note 57, at
720; cf. State ex rel. May v. Jones, 16 Ohio App. 2d 140, -, 242 N.E.2d 672, 675 (1968)
(legislature must facilitate rather than impede the right to vote).
'Worden v. Board of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, _
294 A.2d 233, 244-45 (1972).
6
See cases cited note 64 supra.
"7Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 689, 189 N.W.2d 423, 431-32 (1971); Worden v. Board
of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, _, 294 A.2d 233, 244-45 (1972); cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419,
424-26 (1970).
"Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972) (court suggests alternatives to
domicile test).
"'For pertinent legislative history behind the twenty-sixth amendment see Jolicoeur v.Mihaly,
5 Cal. 3d 565, 573-75, 488 P.2d 1, 5-7, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701-03 (1971).
115 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971).
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.. . Rights won at the cost of so much individual and societal
suffering may not and shall not be curtailed on the basis of hoary

fictions that these
men and women are children tied to residential
71
apron strings.
For the growing minority of courts that champion the right of
students to vote where their votes will count, the fear that students will
overwhelm the polls is more theoretical than real. 72 Even if there is a
real threat that students will vote as a bloc, these courts refuse to allow
the establishment in power to silence the opposition by dispersing its
votes. Other courts achieve much the same result by relaxing commonlaw principles.73 Others who still fear the results of student suffrage not
only prevent students from voting in their college communities by applying presumptions against their domicile there, 4 but also discourage students from casting their ballots because the ballots have to be cast at a
place of no significant political interest.
In Hall the court adopted a strict approach to student suffrage. By
refusing to overturn the lower court's finding of fact, however, the court
permitted a plaintiff who intended to leave her college community upon
graduation to register to vote in that community. Even though the result
was inconsistent with the principles of domicile the court established,
plaintiff was allowed to vote in the community of her immediate political interests, as opposed to the community of her past political interests.
It is to be hoped that registrars and lower courts in North Carolina will
continue the liberal approach to their fact-finding functions that was
evidenced by the Wake County Superior Court.
JACKIE DON DRUM

'id. at 575, 488 P.2d at 7, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 703; accord, Manard v. Miller, 53 F.R.D. 610,
615 (E.D. Va. 1971) (dissenting opinion), affd, 405 U.S. 982 (1972); Worden v. Board of Elections,
61 N.J. 325, .- , 294 A.2d 233, 243-44 (1972).
"Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 576-77 n.7, 488 P.2d 1, 8 n.7, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 704 n.7
(1971); Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 693, 189 N.W.2d 423, 433 (1971); Worden v. Board of
Elections, 61 N.J. 325,
, 294 A.2d 233, 245 (1972).
"State ex rel. May v. Jones, 16 Ohio App. 2d 140, _
, 242 N.E.2d 672, 675 (1968).
"4Michaud v. Yeomans, 115 N.J. Super. 200, 278 A.2d 537 (Law Div. 1971); Kegley v.
Johnson, 207 Va. 54, 147 S.E.2d 735 (1966).
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V
EVIDENCE
Admissibility of Evidence to Impeach Credibility
The North Carolina courts have decided three cases in the last term
concerning the admissibility of evidence for impeachment purposes:
State v. Williams1 prohibits admissibility of evidence of prior arrests
and indictments; State v. Miller2 permits evidence of conduct committed
by the defendant while a juvenile which, if committed by an adult, would
have constituted a criminal conviction; and Ormond v. Crampton3 allows admission of the length of sentence imposed for prior convictions.

A.

EVIDENCE OF PRIOR ARRESTS AND INDICTMENTS

In State v. Williams4 defendant, a Marine Corps corporal, was
convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon on the basis of testimony
of the robbed gas station attendant, who identified Williams in a lineup,
and of a police detective who organized and observed the lineup. Defendant had also testified in his own behalf.' Defendant's appeal arose from
testimony given on cross-examination in which he was asked whether
he was at that time under indictment in three nearby towns for armed
robbery. Defendant, after objecting, answered affirmatively about two
of the indictments and stated that he did not know about the third.' The
question presented on appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court was
whether a witness, including the defendant in a criminal case, may be
impeached on cross-examination by questioning him about indictments
against him for criminal offenses other than those for which he is then
on trial.7
1279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971).
2281 N.C. 70, 187 S.E.2d 729 (1972).
316 N.C. App. 88, 191 S.E.2d 405 (1972).
4279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971).
VId. at 664, 185 S.E.2d at 175.
'Id. at 665-66, 185 S.E.2d at 175-76.
71d. at 669, 185 S.E.2d at 178. The court also found the lineup identification procedure to'
which the defendant was subjected illegal since there was no evidence that defendant had been
advised of his right to have an attorney present and had waived that right. There was evidence
only that he was advised "of his rights" and that he fully understood "them." Id. at 668, 185 S.E.2d
at 177.
Furthermore, because of the illegality of the line-up procedure, the admission of ill-court
testimony as to the identification of defendant by the victim at the line-up was held to be error for
which defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 668, 185 S.E.2d at 178.
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In reversing Williams's conviction, the supreme court began its
analysis by affirming the rule that "for purposes of impeachment, a
witness, including the defendant in a criminal case, is subject to crossexamination as to his convictions for crime. ' 8 The court then considered
the case of State v. Maslin,9 which had held that cross-examination as
to prior or pending indictments was permissible for the purpose of
impeaching the defendant as a witness. The Maslin court had reasoned
that evidence of a mere accusation should be excluded, but an indictment, while accusatory, was "more than a bare charge."' 0 Because an
indictment is an accusation made by a body of persons selected by law
and sworn to certain duties and is based upon legal testimony," the
Maslin court held that the ordinary rule as to charges should not apply.
The Williams court determined that none of the cases cited in
Maslin in support of the holding actually "decided or considered
whether it was permissible to cross-examine the defendant as to prior
or pending indictments against him. 1 2 In addition, the Maslin reasoning was found no longer to be persuasive. Maslin and those decisions in
accord with Maslin were expressly overruled and Williams was granted
a new trial:
We now hold that, for purposes of impeachment, a witness, including the defendant in a criminal case, may not be cross-examined
as to whether he has been indicted or is under indictment for a criminal
offense other than that for which he is then on trial. . . .[W]e overrule State v. Maslin, supra, and decisions in accord with Maslin, on
the basic ground that an indictment cannot rightly be considered as
more than an unproved accusation.
A fortiori, we hold that, for purposes of impeachment, a witness,
11d. at 669, 185 S.E.2d at 178.
9195 N.C. 537, 143 S.E. 3 (1928).
'OId.at 541, 143 S.E. at 6.
"Id., citing four cases dealing with the formalities of indictment: State v. Stewart, 189 N.C.
340, 127 S.E. 260 (1925) (number on grand jury); State v. Walker, 32 N.C. 234 (1849) (wording
of indictment); State v. Tomlinson, 25 N.C. 32 (1842) (time within which indictment must be
brought); and State v. Christmas, 20 N.C. 410 (1839) (deviation between indictment and trial
record).
12279 N.C. at 670, 185 S.E.2d at 178. The court there said:
Three of the decisions cited in Maslin, namely, State v. Garrett, 44 N.C. 357 (1853),
State v. Lawhorn, 88 N.C. 634 (1883), and State v. Holder, 153 N.C. 606, 69 S.E. 66
(1910), held that, for impeachment purposes, a witness, including the defendant in a
criminal action, may be asked on cross examination whether he has been convicted of
unrelated criminal offenses.
Id. (Emphasis by the court.)
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including the defendant in a criminal case, may not be cross-examined
as to whether he has been accused, either informally or by affidavit on
which a warrant is issued, of a criminal offense unrelated to the case
on trial, nor cross-examined as to whether he has been arrestedfor
such unrelated criminal offense. 3
The Williams court reasoned that an indictment was an accusation,
arrived at in secret session, possibly based on hearsay, and not based
on any determination of guilt or innocence. To allow a jury to consider
a prior or pending indictment against a defendant, reasoned the court,
would run counter to the basic legal tenet that a defendant is presumed
innocent and must be proven guilty by the state. 4 Furthermore, the
court noted that the rule it was adopting "is in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority (near unanimity) in other jurisdictions,"' 5
as only two jurisdictions, Kansas and Michigan, unequivocally permit
cross-examination about prior or concurrent accusations or indictments
not resulting in convictions. 6
Although the actual importance of the decision may be minimal, 7
the Williams case has been applied in North Carolina at least five times
in the last year. In State v. Stimpson,5 a murder case decided the same
day as Williams, the supreme court held that prejudicial error was
committed in allowing evidence of defendant's indictment for murder
in New York in 1964. The trial court had based its ruling on Maslin,
but the supreme court found error since Maslin had just been overruled.'
Both Williams and Stimpson were cited in State v. Spillars" in
which a new trial was ordered because of the admission into evidence
of an affidavit, accompanying a search warrant, that contained hearsay
statements indicating defendant's complicity in another crime without
showing that he had been convicted of that crime.2' Williams was cited
"1279 N.C. at 672, 185 S.E.2d at 180 (emphasis by the court).
"4Id.at 673, 185 S.E.2d at 180.
"Id., citing Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1421 (1951).
"State v. Bigler, 138 Kan. 13, 23 P.2d 598 (1933); People v. Foley, 299 Mich. 358, 300 N.W.
119 (1941). See also 3A J. WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE § 980a, at 835 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970),
' 7See text accompanying note 31 infra.
8279 N.C. 716, 185 S.E.2d 168 (1971).
"Id. at 725, 185 S.E.2d at 173.
20280 N.C. 341, 185 S.E.2d 881 (1972).

21Id. at 353, 185 S.E.2d at 889. However, the Spillars decision might not have been different
even if the affidavit had not contained any indications of the defendant's complicity in another
crime since the affidavit contained hearsay statements that deprived the accused of his rights of

confrontation and cross-examination. Id. at 352, 185 S.E.2d at 888.
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as authority for the proposition that "an accused may not, for the
purpose of impeachment, be questioned as to whether he has been indicted or arrested for an unrelatedcrime. ' 22 Williams, however, did not
limit its ruling to indictments for "unrelated crimes" as Spillarsseemed
to indicate, but applied to indictments for any "criminal offense other
' 23
than that for which [defendant] is then on trial.
The importance of the Williams holding may be greatly undermined by the holding and dicta of State v. Gainey. 4 There defendant
assigned as error the overruling by the trial court of his objection to
questions by the solicitor concerning a previous arrest.2 The supreme
court found no error because the trial took place before the Williams
decision at which time the solicitor's questions were competent. 26 The
holding has created considerable confusion. Gainey seemingly held that
the Williams rule was prospective only-that it did not apply to cases
in which the trial preceded Williams. The holding in Gainey was expressly followed in State v. Jones27 by the court of appeals which said,
"The Supreme Court has since indicated that the rule in Williams ap12
plies only to trials which occurred after the decision in Williams. 1 If
the Gainey rationale were correct, however, the supreme court should
not have applied Williams in ordering a new trial in Stimpson as discussed earlier. 29 While the two holdings are clearly inconsistent, the
effect of the conflict will be minimal as it concerns only those trials
which preceded the Williams decision.
The Gainey opinion also contained dictum to the effect that
Williams did not change the rule allowing a witness to be questioned as
to whether he has committed specific criminal acts or reprehensible
conduct.3 1 Such a view indicates that the Williams rule can be easily
avoided; a prosecutor need only rephrase his question to ask not whether
a defendant was indicted for a specific act but whether he actually
committed the act. In this manner a prosecutor may obtain admittance,
for impeachment purposes, of almost all the information admissible
22d. at 352, 185 S.E.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
p279 N.C. at 672, 185 S.E.2d at 180.
24280 N.C. 366, 185 S.E.2d 874 (1972).
"Id. at 372, 185 S.E.2d at 879.

11Id. at 373, 185 S.E.2d at 879.
2714 N.C. App. 558, 188 S.E.2d 676 (1972).

"Id. at 560, 188 S.E.2d at 678.
"See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.

"1280 N.C. at 373, 185 S.E.2d at 879.
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under the old Maslin rule .3 The one protection left to the defendant is
that evidence of a prior arrest or indictment remains inadmissible.
Professor Brandis, in his newly published revision of Stansbury's
North CarolinaEvidence, has recognized this practical limitation on the
scope of Williams.3 2 He writes:
Very recently the Court, most laudably, has barred crossexamination regarding an indictment or other charge of crime, as
distinguished from a conviction. However, under the general principle
that the witness may be cross-examined about specific acts of miscon3
duct, he may still be asked whether he committed the crime. 1
Professor Brandis sees a further limitation on the Williams rule in that
it "applies when the purpose of the inquiry is to throw light on the
character of the witness. In some situations the fact that a witness is
currently under indictment may tend to show bias. When that is the
case, the inquiry should be permissible. ' 34 This exception to the
Williams rule would largely be favorable to the defense since the bias
in this situation involves the possible control of the state over a prosecution witness who is himself under indictment at the time of testifying.
3
The Williams rule has been extended somewhat in State v. Long. 1
Defendant Long was convicted of unlawfully selling marijuana in spite
of his alibi that at the time of the alleged sale he had been elsewhere in
the presence of one McNamara. McNamara did not testify, but several
of Long's friends did. On cross-examination of two of these defense
witnesses, the solicitor was permitted to bring before the jury the fact
that McNamara was at the time of trial under indictment for four
counts of violating narcotic drug laws. In ordering a new trial, the
court of appeals cited Williams and held that if evidence of McNamara's indictment would not have been competent for purposes of impeaching his credibility had he been a witness, a fortiori it was not
"However, a defendant can answer falsely to such a question and his answer will be held to
be conclusive. See State v. Sheffield, 251 N.C. 309, 111 S.E.2d 195 (1959); State v. King, 224 N.C.
329, 30 S.E.2d 230 (1944).
21 STANSBURY's NORTH CAROLINA EVIENC § 112, at 344-45 (Brandis rev. 1973).
mId. However, the cross-examiner, in questioning a witness about the possible commission
of crime, should be limited by a good faith rule requiring some information as a basis for such
questions, thereby preventing "impeachment by insinuation." Id. at 345 & n.30.
-Wd. at 345 n.28.
"-See id. § 45, at 123.
3814 N.C. App. 508, 188 S.E.2d 690 (1972).
-Id. at 512, 188 S.E.2d at 693.
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competent to impeach the credibility of the defendant or any other
witness.38 This case extends the Williams rule to prevent evidence of
one person's indictment being used for impeachment of the defendant's
or another person's credibility. Such an extension seems justified by the
rationale of Williams, that an indictment, being a mere accusation, is
not to be utilized as an impeachment tool.
B.

EVIDENCE OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS

In State v. Miller"0 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
a criminal defendant could be cross-examined with reference to conduct
committed by him while a juvenile which, if committed by an adult,
would have constituted a conviction of crime." The fifteen-year-old
defendant in Miller was convicted of first-degree burglary allegedly
committed by him when he was fourteen. 1 Defendant was asked on
cross-examination if he had previously been convicted of specific unrelated crimes. Over objection of counsel he testified that he had been
convicted of housebreaking and of mail fraud." The supreme court,
based on its previous decision in State v. Alexander, 3 held that no
prejudicial error had been committed.
In Alexander the defendant, aged twenty-one, had been questioned
on cross-examination about a 1965 conviction, at which time he was
fifteen. Over objection, he testified, "When I was a juvenile, in 1965, I
was convicted of store breaking and larceny."" The court found no error
because it reasoned that the rule allowing impeachment on crossexamination with respect to previous convictions of crime applies to
every defendant who takes the stand, regardless of his age at the time
of his previous conviction.45
The controversy arose in Miller because defendant testified that he
had been convicted of breaking and entering at the age of fifteen. However, sections 7A-277 and 7A-287 of the North Carolina General Statutes provide unique procedures for criminal defendants under the age
"Id. at 513, 188 S.E.2d at 693.
39281 N.C. 70, 187 S.E.2d 729 (1972).

1"Id. at 80, 187 S.E.2d at 734.
"The age of accountability in North Carolina is set at age sixteen by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-

277 (1969).
"1281 N.C. at 78, 187 S.E.2d at 733.
43279 N.C. 527, 184 S.E.2d 274 (1971).
"Id. at 535, 184 S.E.2d at 279.
11Id. at 535, 184 S.E.2d at 280.
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of sixteen. Section 7A-287 states, inter alia, that a child is not convicted
but is "adjudicated" delinquent or undisciplined.46 Defendant argued
that admission of his testimony as to the prior conviction was erroneous
since he had not been convicted but instead had been adjudicated delinquent. The court held that the gist of defendant's testimony was that he
had been found guilty of conduct which, if committed by an adult, would
be criminal. Whether such conduct resulted in an adjudication or a
conviction would make no difference as to its effect upon defendant's
credibility as a witness. 7 Thus the court found no error in the admission
of such testimony.
The Miller decision to allow impeachment of a criminal defendant
by questions concerning prior juvenile adjudications directly contradicts
the protective policy towards juvenile offenders promulgated by the
North Carolina General Assembly in section 7A-287 of the General
Statutes. Through this provision the General Assembly sought to protect juvenile offenders by providing for an "adjudication" rather than a
"conviction" when a defendant under sixteen years old is found guilty
of prohibited conduct. The statute further evidences a legislative intent
to limit the availability and use of juvenile records by providing that
such records "shall be withheld from public inspection and may be
examined only by order of the judge.""
The majority of jurisdictions statutorily forbid any subsequent use
of juvenile proceedings except in the same court on a later appearance
by the same defendant.49 In states having these prohibitory provisions
the courts have generally excluded all evidence of adjudication of juvenile delinquency. ° In other jurisdictions there is little case law; however,
most states with statutes that procedurally distinguish between "adjudications" and "convictions" for a juvenile offense have, nevertheless,
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-287 (1969).
11281 N.C. at 80, 187 S.E.2d at 734.
4

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 7A-287 (1969). The majority of juvenile statutes, like North Carolina's,

in an attempt to protect rather than penalize the youthful offender, provide that proceedings in
juvenile court are not criminal in nature. See, e.g., In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449
(1962); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1128 (1955).
4
See I J.WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 196(2)(c), at 673 & n.5 (Supp. 1970) citing forty-two

such jurisdictions; Annot., 147 A.L.R. 443 (1943).
O'See, e.g., Love v. State, 36 Ala. App. 693, 63 So. 2d 285 (1953); People v. Witt, 159 Cal.
App. 2d 492, 324 P.2d 79 (1958); State v. Coffman, 360 Mo. 782, 230 S.W.2d 761 (1950); People
v. Peele, 12 N.Y.2d 890, 188 N.E.2d 265, 237 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1963).
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allowed criminal defendants to be questioned as to prior juvenile adjudications.51
The prevailing view in the federal courts has been that a juvenile
adjudication may not be used for impeachment purposes. 2 In Cotton
v. United States,53 the Tenth Circuit held that even though the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act 54 did not expressly provide that adjudications
of delinquency should not be used against the juvenile in any other
proceedings, it was, nevertheless, prejudicial error to permit crossexamination of a defendant as to his alleged adjudication as a juvenile
delinquent arising out of the same type of offense. In addition, rule
609(d) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence provides that evidence
of juvenile adjudication is generally not admissible but that the judge
may "allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than
the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack
the credibility of an adult and the judge is satisfied that admission in
evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence."
Consequently, the Miller decision allowing admission of prior juvenile adjudications for impeachment purposes stands in contravention of
the legislative policy in North Carolina and the general rule nationwide.
C.

LENGTH OF SENTENCE

An additional method of impeachment was considered in Ormond
v. Crampton," a civil action to recover damages for injuries allegedly
inflicted. There the North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in
allowing questions to be asked of plaintiffs witness regarding the length
of sentence imposed on him as a result of a prior conviction. The witness
had been sentenced to an eighteen-month imprisonment for breaking
and entering and was allowed, over objection, to so answer. The witness
was also asked if he had served the sentence, to which he replied affirmatively.56
5"See, e.g., State v. Homolka, 158 Kan. 22, 145 P.2d 156 (1944), in which the Kansas Supreme
Court held that although a state statute provided that juvenile proceedings were not deemed to

classify an act by a juvenile as criminal in character, a defendant may still be questioned concerning
these proceedings for purposes of impeachment.

"E.g., Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966); Thomas v. United States, 121
F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
-355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966).

518 U.S.C. §§ 5031-37 (1970).
"16 N.C. App. 88, 191 S.E.2d 405 (1972).
111d. at 91, 191 S.E.2d at 408.
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The Ormond court, considering the question of admissibility of the
length of sentence for impeachment purposes, found "no controlling
authority in North Carolina on this point.""7 The court discussed the
supreme court case of State v. McNair" in which the court allowed the
admission of evidence that defendant had been given a sentence of
eighteen months and was on probation at the time the alleged offense
for which he was being tried was committed.59 The McNair court had
held that admission of evidence as to the quantum of punishment,
though normally impermissible, was not in this case prejudicial error
since the defendant had been placed on probation, a fact that "would
seem to put defendant in a more favorable light. .

..

""

The Ormond court, though, refused to follow the intimation in
McNair that such evidence is ordinarily inadmissible and held that no
error had been committed in allowing testimony as to the sentence
imposed for a prior conviction. The court based its decision on the fact
that the sentence imposed generally bears a relation to the gravity of
the offense and the circumstances of the particular case."' Thus it seems
reasonable to say that if prior criminal acts are relevant to the credibility
of a witness, then the amount of punishment imposed for a particular
act, generally a reflection of the seriousness of that act, is equally relevant to credibility.
STEPHEN

T.

SMITH

Proof of Black Panther Membership to Show Intent
State v. Jennings,' a court of appeals case, arose out of a dispute
'71d. at 92, 191 S.E.2d at 409. The law in this area is unsettled at best. Each jurisdiction seems
to follow a different rule: some allow testimony as to punishment, e.g., White v. Commonwealth,
312 Ky. 543, 228 S.W.2d 426 (1950); some hold such testimony immaterial, e.g., Hartfield v. State,
186 Miss. 75, 189 So. 530 (1939); others draw distinctions based on whether there was confinement
in a penitentiary, e.g., Smith v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 53, 123 S.W.2d 655 (1939), work on a road
gang, e.g., Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v. Foster, 38 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), or
punishment for a crime involving moral turpitude, e.g., Herring v. State, 14 Ala. App. 93, 71 So.
974 (1916). For two attempts at stating the law in this area see 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507(c), at
413 (1957) and Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1421 (1951).
-272 N.C. 130, 157 S.E.2d 660 (1967).
11Id. at 133, 157 S.E.2d at 663.
111d. at 134, 157 S.E.2d at 664.
"116 N.C. App. at 92, 191 S.E.2d at 409.
'16 N.C. App. 205, 192 S.E.2d 46 (1972).
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between members of the Black Panther Party in Winston-Salem and
their landlord. Although the Panthers had paid their rent regularly, their
landlord attempted to evict them from their headquarters. The Black
Panthers styled this action harassment by the "power structure of High
Point . . . in cahoots"'2 with their landlord. Accordingly, they refused
to leave. Police came in force to evict them, and three of the Black
Panthers responded with gunfire that wounded one of the policemen.
Defendants were each convicted of felonious assault on a police officer
with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury. There was evidence of a
3
conspiracy to defy the authorities.
Among numerous questions appealed in the case was whether certain evidence relating to the Black Panther Party was admissible. The
Jennings court held that where there is evidence of a conspiracy, the fact
that defendants "may have been, or were, members of the Black
Panther Party" and the fact that a sign on their house read "Death to
the Fascist Pigs"' 4 are competent to show "motive, intent and a purpose2
1d.
3

at 209, 192 S.E.2d at 49.
1d. at 212, 192 S.E.2d at 51. If there is evidence of a conspiracy even though conspiracy
was not formally charged, evidence rules based on the existence of conspiracy may be used. In
Jennings, evidence of conspiracy was used to justify admission of the contested evidence. Id.
11d. The sign on the front of the house, with flanking pictures of two black panthers (feline),
read in its entirety:
From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. National Committee
to Combat Fascism in America.
Legal Aid Here
Free All Political
Prisoners!!!

COMMUNITY CENTER
Community Control
of police for a
people's community
Socialism

-Free breakfast program
-Free clothing program
-Liberation school to teach our youth
-Community political education classes
-Free daycare center
Power to the People!!! Death to the
Fascist Pigs
An organizing bureau of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Id. at 212-13, 192 S.E.2d at 51.
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ful, common design to commit an unlawful assault with intent to kill
"5

State v. Hairston' is the only substantially analogous case that
North Carolina courts have considered. 7 Hairston, however, is distinguished from Jennings because evidence of defendants' common membership in a political organization was introduced to show that the
defendants had associated together-not to show intent or motive. In
Hairston the defendants were members of a group called "Mau Mau."
Evidence of their membership was held relevant to a theory of conspiracy to rob and kill because that evidence showed that the defendants had
associated together and practiced with firearms in the course of their
membership in "Mau Mau." Since evidence of membership was not
introduced to show motive or intent as it was in Jennings, no evidence
was allowed to show the political nature of the group or its purposes.'
To use membership in a political organization and political slogans
to prove intent, not association, however, is to attribute to an individual
the objectives of his organization.' Whether this should be permitted on
the facts of Jennings raises questions about relevance, prejudice, and
first amendment rights that were not discussed in Hairston.
State v. Jennings was neither argued nor decided on a first amendment theory. The court ruled simply that proof of intent is relevant
where the act is in dispute." Having found relevance, the court was
unconcerned with the prejudicial impact of the evidence on the jury.
Though it did not discuss the issue of prejudice, the Jennings court was
51d. at 212, 192 S.E.2d at 51. Because relevance was found, the court of appeals held that a
Black Panther magazine and daily reports showing the defendants' activities for the party on
particular days were admissible in evidence. Defendants objected to the admission of the magazine
and reports.
6280 N.C. 220, 185 S.E.2d 633 (1972).
7State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E.2d 561 (1971), held any mention of the Black Panthers
irrelevant where there was no conspiracy alleged, where the defendant apparently was not actually
a member of the Black Panthers, and where the evidence was taken from a tape recording itself
the subject of objection. In State v. Marshburn, 268 N.C. 558, 151 S.E.2d 21 (1966) (per curiam),
defendant's membership in the Ku Klux Klan was found irrelevant when defendant and his wife
allegedly assaulted a third woman for family reasons. Curiously, the defendant himself attempted
to introduce the evidence of his affiliation with the Klan.
1280 N.C. at 231-32, 185 S.E.2d at 640.
'In Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136 (1943), Justice Murphy wrote for the
Supreme Court that "under our traditions beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association. . . . [M]en in adhering to a political party or other organization notoriously do not subscribe
unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles."
"Brief for Appellants at 13-16.
"16N.C. App. at 212, 192 S.E.2d at 51.
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apparently following the principle of State v. Cox, 2 which held that if
evidence is relevant for any purpose, it will be admitted regardless of
its prejudicial impact. 3
The Cox rule seems overly inflexible and inappropriate to deal with
the sensitive issue of admissibility of political evidence that was raised
in Jennings. First, evidence that raises first amendment questions requires special handling. Secondly, the strong likelihood of a prejudicial
impact on the jury was not offset by the comparatively weak probative
value of the evidence. And finally, there was an abundance of other
evidence probative of the same issues which the political evidence was
introduced to prove. On the facts of the case the contested evidence was
unnecessary.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS

The Communist Party membership cases" alerted the federal
bench to the constitutional dangers of proving criminal intent by the
mere fact of membership in a political organization.1 5 The result was a
general tightening of standards of proof in such cases. In Noto v. United
States the Supreme Court said:
[An] element of a membership crime . . . must be judged strictissimi
juris, for otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the
legitimate aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending
to accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his
adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes, because
of other and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily
share."6
The organized efforts to protest the war in Vietnam in the 1960's
occasioned specific application of these principles in a broader context
when the First Circuit decided United States v. Spock.17 Dealing in that
12201

N.C. 357, 160 S.E. 358 (1931); accord, State v. Hairston, 280 N.C. 220, 185 S.E.2d 633

(1972); State v. Sneedon, 274 N.C. 498, 164 S.E.2d 190 (1968); Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
227 N.C. 561, 42 S.E.2d 905 (1947).
"See note 45 infra.
"Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961);
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
"5See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
231-34 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 329-34 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244-47 (1957).
16367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961).
t1416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal. Rptr.
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case with an alleged public conspiracy to aid and abet draft resistance,
the court found the dangers identified in Noto present in what was called
a "bifarious" conspiracy. 8 A bifarious conspiracy was defined as a
conspiracy whose ultimate objective is legal but whose intermediate
objectives are both legal and illegal. In Spock the ultimate objective was
to galvanize opposition to the war. Intermediate objectives included
signing a general "call" to resist the draft and abetting draft resistors.
The threat to the first amendment freedoms of a party to the agreement
who subscribes only to the legal objectives is obvious. He is liable to find
himself prosecuted as a conspirator because of his protected association
on the basis of acts of his coconspirators attributable to him by conspirapy law. The threat of prosecutions on this basis encourages selfcensorship."9 Individuals might fear to exercise their rights of free speech
and association because of their uncertainty about the criminal consequences if their fellows should subsequently break the law. For this
reason, Spock in effect restricted the government's use of conspiracy
indictments in cases of public, political agreements whose objects are
both legal and illegal. The court said:
First Amendment rights of free speech and free association

. . .

are

of such importance that they must prevail if the government's interest
in deterring substantive crimes before they take place is insubstantial,
or there is a "less restrictive alternative" by which the substantive evil
may be prevented."0

The specific mechanism employed in Spock to protect innocent
parties to these agreements was to restrict proof of specific intent to
accomplish the illegal objectives in bifarious and political conspiracies
to three categories of evidence:
500 (1970), applies the guidelines established in Spock in a detailed, documented opinion. For a
discussion of the progression from the Communist Party cases to Spock, see Nathanson, Freedom
ofAssociation and the Quest for Internal Security: Conspiracy From Dennis to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw.
U.L. REv. 153 (1970).

11416 F.2d at 172-73. The conspiracy in Spock was characterized for purposes of the first
amendment and conspiracy law by the following peculiar features: (a) intertwined legal and illegal

objectives; (b) the public setting of the agreement; (c) political purposes of the agreement; (d) loose
confederation of possibly innocent and possibly guilty parties. Id. at 169.

"See Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 687-91, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500, 509-12 (1970),
for a thorough, amply documented discussion of self-censorship and the first amendment.
20416 F.2d at 170, citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-68 (1967); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-17 (1964); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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[a] [T]he individual defendant's prior or subsequent unambiguous
statements; . . .
[b] [T]he individual defendant's subsequent commission of the very
illegal act contemplated by the agreement; or...

[c]

[T]he individual defendant's subsequent legal act if that act is

"clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of rendering effective the

later illegal activity which is advocated."'"
Although first amendment issues were not argued in State v.
Jennings, the Spock guidelines might well have been applied. According
to the court, "there was considerable evidence of a conspiracy to openly
defy the . . . authorities. '2 Evidence of the agreement to defy the
authorities (so far as reported in the opinion) consisted primarily of
petitions found on one of the defendants. 23 The petitions asserted that
"the people" and not the police would decide whether or not the Black
Panthers vacated their headquarters. 4 The common design to resist the
"power structure" in protest against attempts to stifle the Black Panthers was therefore both public and political, the threshold requirements
for applying the Spock standards. Evidence was not developed to show
conclusively whether the defendants undertook both legal and illegal
objectives. It can be argued consistently with the facts, however, that
the ultimate objective of the common design was to express opposition
to harassment by the power structure, a legal goal. The intermediate
objectives, arguably, were mixed. Legal objectives may have been to
protest the ejectment passively and to promote community support for
the Black Panther Party. The obvious illegal objective was to resist
police action with arms. The legal objectives in such a case would be
protected by the first amendment. An innocent participant, exercising
his first amendment right to express his opposition by protest, could
have been inside the house at the time of the shooting-or, for that
matter, far away from the scene of the crime-without having the specific intent required for conviction of conspiracy; yet by conspiracy law
25
the acts of his partners might have been attributed to him.
21416 F.2d at 173.
126 N.C. App. at 212, 192 S.E.2d at 51. The court used the presence of conspiracy evidence
to distinguish Jennings from Lynch, see note 7 supra.

"The petitions apparently had been circulated in the neighborhood. They contained thirtyone signatures. 16 N.C. App. at 209, 192 S.E.2d at 49.
24

Md.

"State v. Butler, 269 N.C. 733, 153 S.E.2d 477 (1967). In Jennings a fourth person was with
the defendants inside the house, was tried, and was acquitted. 16 N.C. App. at 207, 192 S.E.2d at

48.
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By the Spock standards of admissibility neither membership in the
Black Panthers nor the panther-festooned sign reading "Death to the
Fascist Pigs" should have been competent to show specific intent. Neither constitutes an "unambiguous statement," nor is either a "subsequent act." To introduce them in proof of intent would threaten the first
amendment rights of anyone who might have subscribed only to the
legal objectives encompassed ii the common design.
On the other hand, equally consistently with these facts, one could
contend that the defendants agreed together simply to remain inside
their house in all events and to resist eviction with arms if necessary. In
such a case the common design might be political, but the sole objective
would be illegal. 6 The Spock restrictions would not apply because there
would be no legal objectives warranting first amendment protection."
Even in this case, however, the effect of introducing evidence of political
affiliation is to chill first amendment rights. The membership and slogan
proof surely did not show specific intent to assault policemen in resisting
the summary ejectment. At most it only tended to establish a general
hostility toward policemen or a more-than-usual readiness to react violently to police action. Yet many may be members of the Black Panther
Party and in sympathy with its purposes and not be violently hostile to
police.28 To allow introduction of such evidence in a case in which the
defendants were not pursuing any necessary Black Panther goal would
be to attribute to every member of the Black Panthers a general motive
to harm policemen. The obvious effect of such a practice would be to
discourage political affiliation with the Black Panther Party in derogation of the first amendment right to free association. That effect would
be entirely out of balance with the need of the state to introduce such
2
evidence in the first placeY.
In light of the abundance of other proof of motive, intent, and
common design in this case, 0 protection of free speech and association
seem warranted even if the conspiracy was entirely illegal. As a California court said in a similar case:
"Although the court did not say so explicitly in Spock, application of the new standards will
surely be for the court, not the jury. Otherwise, the damaging evidence would be in the minds of

the jurors regardless of its legal status in the trial. See, e.g., United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d
1116 (2d Cir. 1969).
'See 416 F.2d at 172-73.
2
1For an indication of the beneficent purposes of the Black Panthers in Winston-Salem, see
the rest of their sign quoted note 4 supra.
"See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
'See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
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[A]ny rule of law which unnecessarily discourages the exercise of free

speech by making it dangerous to engage in certain constitutionally
protected activities must fall."'

[I]t does not matter that the conduct which the state purports to penalize, criminally or civilly, is not itself what the First Amendment pro-

tects-it is the effect of such
sanctions on the Constitution's promises
32
which will be scrutinized.
RELEVANCE, PREJUDICE, AND NECESSITY

Jennings was decided without recourse to the first amendment.
There being no precise North Carolina precedent for the question of
showing political membership, general rules of evidence were pressed
into service. The experience of the federal courts with members of the
Communist Party has led them to develop more specialized rules to deal
with evidence of political membership. One federal case dealt explicitly
with the conditions under which proof of membership in the Communist
Party is relevant to prove motive or intent. In United States v.
Rosenberge the Second Circuit considered whether membership in the
party was probative of intent or motive when the defendants were
charged with conspiring to gather atomic secrets for the benefit of a
foreign country, 34 a violation of the Espionage Act. 5 Rosenberg upheld admission of the membership evidence even though the court recognized the inflammatory effect of labeling the defendants Communists."
Although clearly troubled by the use of such evidence, the court felt that
admission was warranted for two reasons. First, a substantial connection had been demonstrated between membership and the offense
charged; the government had introduced testimony to the effect that
3

Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 686-87, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500, 509 (1970).
1d. at 698, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
1195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952). This was the celebrated case of
atomic-secrets spying during World War II. Ultimately the Rosenbergs were electrocuted. See
generally L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY (1972); W. & M. SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN
INQUEST (1965). For cases dealing with the Black Panther Party, see also United States v. Bowe,
360 F.2d i, 14 (2d Cir. 1966) (membership in Black Liberation Front and Canadian separatist
organizations "clearly relevant" to show association in a conspiracy to blow up the Statute of
Liberty-element of intent or motive not separately discussed); In re Shead, 302 F. Supp. 569
(N.D. Cal. 1969) (in grand jury investigation, evidence of involvement with Black Panthers and
learning to use firearms may lead to evidence of intent to promote riots).
31195 F.2d at 595-96.
-18 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1972).
3
See note 44 infra.
32
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members were required on pain of expulsion from the party to collect
secret information for use by the U.S.S.R. Also, the trial judge had
repeatedly cautioned the jury that membership in the Communist Party
did not prove any element of the crime.3"
In cases dealing with members of the Communist Party furthermore, the Supreme Court has held on due process grounds that illegal
party purposes must be proved separately and in the context of each case
before evidence of party membership can be used to show intent to
violently overthrow the government.3" The party's dedication to the
violent overthrow of the government had to be re-established in each
case with fresh evidence relevant to the time and place of the specific
defendant's conduct.39 And in order to justify imputing an illegal purpose to the entire organization, "substantial direct or circumstantial
evidence

. .

. , strong and

. . .

persuasive" was required."

Thus in the federal courts before membership in a political party
can be introduced to show motive or intent a definite connection must
be demonstrated between the party and the crime committed, and that
connection must be established with evidence linked to the time and
place of the crime. In State v. Jennings no such showing was required.
The evidence reported that tended to show a connection between the
crime (assault of policemen) and the Black Panther Party was the sign
("Death to the Fascist Pigs") and the petition vowing that "the people"
would decide whether the Panthers moved out. Neither persuasively
demonstrates that the Black Panther Party in Winston-Salem had a
general policy of violence toward the police, nor does either show that
hostility toward the police was a necessary concomitant of membership
in the local party." Individual members might have been in sympathy
with the party's purposes without bearing any ill will toward the police.
The sign is the only evidence that directly suggests a local policy of
3!95 F.2d at 595-96.
3
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.

232 (1957); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Sehneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.

118 (1943).

z 9Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 230-34

(1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 329-34 (1957); see Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244-47 (1957).
"Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961).
"See note 4 supra.
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violence, and it seems remote from the circumstances of the eviction of

the Panthers from their headquarters.42
The obvious danger in this case is that the jury, upon learning that

the defendants were members of the Black Panthers, might be influenced by popular associations of the Black Panther Party with violence,

revolution, and hostility toward police. The widely reported activities of
Black Panthers in other places are clearly irrelevant to a North Carolina

trial stemming from the service of an execution in summary ejectment,
yet it seems very likely that evidence of the defendants' membership in
the party and evidence of their provocative sign had an effect on the jury
beyond its intrinsic probative value. 3
Undeviating adherence to the State v. Cox pronouncement" would

seem to dictate that the contested evidence should be admitted without
a second glance at its potential for prejudice. But, as Professor Brandis
observed in his revision of Stansbury's North CarolinaEvidence,
[elven relevant evidence may . . . be subject to exclusion where its
probative force is comparatively weak and the likelihood of its playing
4

On the face of the evidence the crime appears to be the reaction of particular individuals to
ejectment from their property and not the implementation of Black Panther Party policy. Without
more, it would seem credulous to take "Death to the Fascist Pigs" literally. Recently the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized the function of such language in Cohen v. California, in
which Justice Black wrote for the majority:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: It conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of
the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for that emotive function
which practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated. Indeed as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "[o]ne
of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and
measures-and that means not only informed and responible criticism but the freedom
to speak foolishly and without moderation." Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S.
665, 673-74 S.Ct. 1240, 1245, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944).
403 U.S. 24, 26 (1971). In Cohen the Supreme Court recognized that the words "Fuck the Draft"
sewn on a jacket were not intended literally. Also, the Communist Party membership cases, cited
note 14 supra, distinguished between advocating the overthrow of the government "abstractly" and
literally.
3
For cases that recognize the prejudicial effect of revealing that a litigant is a member of
the Communist Party see United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 838 (1952); Grant Ass'n v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945); Mencher v.
Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947).
""The State could not be deprived of the benefit of evidence which was relevant and material
because it might also have a tendency to prejudice the defendants in the eyes of the jury." 201 N.C.
357, 360, 160 S.E. 358, 359-60 (1931).
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upon the passions and prejudices of the jury is great. This is not a
general rule of exclusion [however], but it supplies the reason for a
number of specific rules . . . and is a factor to be considered, along
with those of unfair surprise and confusion of issues, in determining
whether a particular item of evidence should be rejected on the ground
of remoteness."

No specific rule of exclusion (except perhaps the Spock rule) has been
formulated to protect against weakly probative but substantially prejudicial evidence when the proponent seeks to introduce evidence of political affiliation. Nonetheless, as indicated by Professor Brandis, in cases
where no specific rule applies, evidence has been held irrelevant when it

was at least somewhat probative but when the probativeness was counterbalanced by prejudice." Such evidence is held to be too remote al5

' STANSBURY's NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 80, at 243 (Brandis rev. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as BRANDIS], citing Pearce v. Barham, 267 N.C. 707, 149 S.E.2d 22 (1966); Modern Elec.
Co. v. Dennis, 259 N.C. 354, 130 S.E.2d 547 (1963); State v. Stack, 12 N.C. App. 101, 182 S.E,2d
633 (1971). Professor Brandis cites the following specific rules of exclusion as examples: exclusion
of proof of liability insurance, exclusion of evidence of the defendant's character in a criminal trial,
exclusion of proof of character by specific acts, and exclusion of evidence of compromise offers.
BRANDIS § 80, at 243 n.35.
Elsewhere, Professor Brandis says:
[I]t is commonly said that all relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded by some
specific rule [State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 141 S.E.2d 506 (1965); State v. Snecdon,
214 N.C. 498, 164 S.E.2d 190 (1968)]; but to make this statement true the word "relevant" must be used in a less inclusive sense than in the foregoing definition [that evidence
is relevant if it has any logical tendency however slight, to prove a fact in issue in the
case]. Evidence may have some tendency to prove a fact and still be inadmissible because
its probative force is so weak that to receive it would confuse the issues, unfairly surprise
the opponent, or unduly prolong the trial. [State v. Brantley, 84 N.C. 766 (1881).]
BRANDIS § 77, at 235-36.
"'Although Professor Brandis cites no cases to support this last proposition, he cites cases to
illustrate that admission of irrelevant evidence may cause reversal if there is prejudice, which seems
also to support the assertion that relevant evidence may be excluded if it is prejudicial. State v.
Strickland, 208 N.C. 770, 182 S.E. 490 (1935), was the trial of a father for having committed incest
with his daughter. Evidence that the daughter was born before her father married her mother was
held to be irrelevant. A reversal was awarded because the evidence was prejudicial. Arguably this
evidence was remotely relevant as showing a propensity in the father for illicit sex. The court
correctly found that it should have been excluded. The underlying justification was that the potential for prejudice far outweighed the probative value. The court did not admit to balancing in this
manner, however, finding instead simply that the evidence was irrelevant and that its admission
had been prejudicial error.
State v. Brady, 238 N.C. 404, 78 S.E.2d 126 (1953), is a similar case. In that case evidence
that on prior searches lawmen found the defendant in possession of four or five bottles of whiskey
(a legal quantity) was held to be irrelevant in a trial for the illegal sale of taxpaid whiskey. Whiskey
had been found in the same place on all occasions; only the quantity varied from the prior searches
to the search that led to arrest. Here as in Strickland the excluded evidence was arquably probative
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though prejudice, more than remoteness, may be the concern of the

court. This suggests that the Cox rule is not iron-clad and that in appropriate cases relevant evidence may be excluded if the danger of prejudice

is too great. In view of the sensitive first amendment issues involved in
admission of political evidence, in view of the weak connection in
Jennings between the nature of membership in the party and the crime

charged, and especially in view of the likely prejudice that would result
from showing that the defendants were Black Panthers, perhaps this was

an appropriate case in which to carve another exclusion out of the
general rule of admissibility.

A peculiarity of Jennings is that the State had no need to prove
motive and intent by Black Panther-related evidence. A wealth of evi-

dence of intent was available." In the words of the court:
The evidence of an intent to kill is clear and compelling. One who fires
a 30.06 rifle at the middle of the chest of another person who is
standing within shooting range has the intent to kill. No other inference is logically permissible."

Evidence of common design, too, was abundant. The defendants were
all apprehended at the battle site. They were members of an organized
group whose nature and purposes were irrelevant49 to the trial but the

possession of whose headquarters was the subject of a gunfight between
the police and defendants. Why the political evidence was required is

difficult to understand.50

to some degree, but the likelihood of prejudice was probably what caused the court to ban the proof
as irrelevant.
This is similar to the rationale that justifies the specific exclusionary rules, see note 46 supra.
For example, the character rule excludes evidence of character if its only relevance is to show a
propensity to commit certain acts. Although such evidence may be probative of issues in the trial,
since it shows the defendant's disposition, the evidence is regarded as too remote and tending to
confuse the issues. Therefore it is excluded. BRANDIS §§ 99, 103-04, 111.
'T Evidence of motive would be unnecessary where the doing of the act can be proved by
overwhelming evidence. See BRANDIS § 83.
1S16 N.C. App. at 215, 192 S.E.2d at 52.
"Proof that the defendants were members of an organized group may be relevant, for example,
to explain their use of petitions and their common occupancy of the house. Proof of the political
nature of the group and its general objectives is not relevant and is prejudicial. This parallels
treatment of membership evidence in cases where membership is used to prove association. Although the jury should be aware of the existence of a group, there is no call to identify the group
with its politics. In the case of notorious organizations such as the Communist Party, or the Black
Panther Party, the name of the organization as well as evidence of its policies should be kept from
the jury.
"OCf. State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E.2d 889 (1963). Foust suggests that redundant
prejudicial evidence, although relevant, may not be admitted. In that case ten color phoographs
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In view of the other objections to it, the fact that the contested
evidence was unnecessary to the State's case rendered exclusion all the
more desirable. In a similar situation the Rosenberg court stated that
the trial judge had the discretion to exclude inflammatory evidence. 1 In
North Carolina, short of permitting trial judges this discretion, at least
a cautionary or limiting instruction should be required for whatever
minimal safeguard it would provide.
CONCLUSION

The court of appeals held that the defendants in Jennings had a fair
trial. In regard to the issue of intent the court was surely correct,
Evidence of intent to commit the assault was overwhelming and uncontradicted. 3 Nonetheless the decision to admit evidence of Black
Panther Party membership and party slogans to show motive, intent,
or common design was regrettable. No North Carolina precedent required the decision. If the evidence was relevant, it was only remotely
so. And the prejudicial effect on the jury was not justified by the slight
degree of relevance, especially in view of the profusion of evidence more
probative of the same issues.
Of greater concern is that the North Carolina courts should guard
against threats to first amendment freedoms. The nexus between political party and crime should be immediate and persuasive, and the government interest in presenting the evidence should be substantial before
evidence relating to political affiliation is admitted to show the mental
element of any crime. 54 In the first amendment area particularly, judges
52

were introduced to show that the victim died of a gunshot wound in the chin after defendant had
offered to stipulate the cause of death.
51195 F.2d at 596. Rosenberg stated that the trial judge has the discretion to exclude inflammatory evidence, although federal courts also hold that if evidence is relevant it will be admissible
with the defendant bearing the risk of prejudice not eliminated by a cautionary instruction. Id. See
also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 255-56 (1961); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
228-29 (1941); Scalf v. Bennett, 408 F.2d 325, 328-29 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bowe, 360
F.2d 1, 14 (2d Cir. 1966); Miller v. Oberhauser, 293 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir. 1961); Travis v. United
States, 269 F.2d 928, 938-39 (10th Cir. 1959).
1216 N.C. App. at 216, 192 S.E.2d at 53.
"Id. at 214-15, 192 S.E.2d at 52. The defendants offered no evidence. Id. at 209, 192 S.E.2d
at 49.
"See generally NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958). These cases in tandem with those cases cited in notes 14-15 supra (particularly Noto and
Yates) support a requirement in the first amendment area that standards of relevance should be
satisfied only by necessary, rather than reasonable, connections. For a discussion of normal standards of relevance, see BRANDIS § 78, at 237. A similar requirement, albeit phrased differently,
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should weigh, on a case-by-case basis, the state's need for the evidence
and its probative value against the danger posed to a free political

climate. Especially in first amendment cases, judges should be required
to exclude objectionable evidence.
EDWARD C. WINSLOW III

VI

FAMILY LAW
Child Support and Pre-Chapter 48A Consent Judgments
The grant of voting rights to eighteen-year-olds 1 has prompted a

trend to remove from this group the privileges as well as the disabilities
of minority. 2 Accordingly, Chapter 48A of the General Statutes, 3 effective July 5, 1971,1 which lowered the age of majority in North Carolina
from twenty-one to eighteen, was subsequently held to terminate the
obligation of child-support at age eighteen.' It was unclear, however,

whether pre-Chapter 48A consent judgments in alimony and divorce
actions that imposed child-support obligations under the standardized

language, "until the minor child reaches his majority or is otherwise
emancipated," required that the obligation continue until the child
reached the age of twenty-one notwithstanding the statute. In Shoaf v.

ShoaP the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the support obligation of a father under such a consent judgment ceased when the statute
emancipated his eighteen-year-old son and reversed the contrary concluwas implicit in Rosenberg. In other words, evidence of political affiliation should be admitted only
if it bears a necessary relation to the issue of which it is probative.
'U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; N.C. CONST. art. VI, § I.
'E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-215.2 (1972); CAL. CIV. CODE § 25 (West Supp. 1972);
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-104 (Spec. Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.244(52) (Supp. 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 48A (Supp. 1971) provides:
§ 48-1. Common law definition of "minor" abrogated. The common law definition of
minor insofar as it pertains to the age of the minor is hereby repealed and abrogated.
§ 48-2. Age of minors. A minor is any person who has not reached the age of 18 years.
4
July 5, 1971, was the date of certification by the United States Administrator of General
Services that the twenty-sixth amendment had been ratified by the legislatures of at least threefourths of the states. 36 Fed. Reg. 12725 (1971). Ch. 585, § 3, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. 510 provided
that N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 48A (Supp. 1971) was to be effective when the twenty-sixth amendment
was certified.
5Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348 (1972).
6282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972).
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sion of the court of appeals 7 that the obligation continued until the child
became twenty-one.
In May 1970 Peggy Shoaf brought an action against her husband,
Ted Shoaf, for alimony without divorce and for custody and support of
their seventeen-year-old son, Jeffrey. In June 1970, prior to the effective
date of Chapter 48A, the district court awarded the plaintiff temporary
alimony, child-custody, and child-support under the terms of a consent
judgment that restated an agreement reached between the parties obligating Ted Shoaf to pay child support until Jeffrey "reach[ed] his majority or [was] otherwise emancipated." '
In November 1971 Peggy Shoaf, who had meanwhile obtained an
absolute divorce, brought a contempt proceeding against her former
husband for failure to continue child-support' payments in accordance
with the consent judgment.' Ted Shoaf moved to modify the consent
judgment by deleting any requirement to pay child-support, alleging
that since Jeffrey had reached the age of eighteen in January 1971 and
ceased to be a minor as of the operational date of Chapter 48A, his
obligation under the consent judgment had terminated." The district
court denied the motion and ordered Ted Shoaf to continue payments
until his son reached twenty-one. The court of appeals affirmed, accepting the district court's conclusion that the consent judgment constituted
a contract between the parties and further holding that both the law in
force at the time of the execution of the contract, in this case the
common-law age of majority, and the intent of the parties controlled
and that the defendant was obligated to make payments to his son until
he reached twenty-one." The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
and held that since child-support orders are subject to modification on
change of circumstances and since the legislature unequivocally changed
the circumstances by enacting Chapter 48A, the defendant's obligation
had ceased, and he was properly entitled to a modification of the consent
12
judgment.
To protect the welfare of infants within its jurisdiction, North Carolina imposes a common-law 3 as well as statutory duty 4 on a father"
7Shoaf v. Shoaf, 14 N.C. App. 231, 188 S.E.2d 19 (1972).
1282 N.C. at 288, 192 S.E.2d at 299.
'1d. at 289, 192 S.E.2d at 301.
Id.
114 N.C. App. at 235, 188 S.E.2d at 20.
12282 N.C. at 292, 192 S.E.2d at 303.
"Pace v. Pace, 244 N.C. 698, 94 S.E.2d 819 (1956) (per curiam); Pickelsimer v. Critcher,
210 N.C. 779, 188 S.E. 313 (1936) (per curiam).
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to support his minor child. The reasonable needs of the minor child for
health, education, and maintenance must be furnished by the father

according to the accustomed standard of living of the child and his
parents in light of their particular circumstances."6 This duty continues

until the child is emancipated, 17 and since it is neither a debt nor a
property right in the minor child but is a personal obligation of the

father, the father's obligation ceases on his death. 8
In actions for alimony and divorce the trial court assumes authority
to determine child custody and support. 9 Frequently in divorce and

alimony actions, child-support as well as alimony, custody, and marital
property rights are determined by consent judgments resting on an

agreement reached by husband and wife. While a majority of jurisdictions hold that a consent judgment incorporating or restating the agree-

ment between husband and wife supersedes the contract,"0 North Carolina recognizes that certain consent judgments are not adjudications by
the court but are declarations by the court of its approval of the contract

settling the legal rights between the parties.2 ' Therefore, North Carolina
courts have interpreted it as any other contract. Whether a consent
judgment is a contract or an adjudication turns of the form of the
judgment. 22

"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (Supp. 1971).
'It should be noted that a father, while primarily liable for supporting his minor child, is not
exclusively liable. The father, the mother, and any organization standing in loco parentisare liable
for support in that order. A court may order that one or more of the above provide support. The
court may also order support from the estate of the minor child. Id.
61d. § 50-13.4(c) (Supp. 1971).
'71d. § 51-13.4(b) (Supp. 1971); 281 N.C. at 290, 192 S.E.2d at 302. However, if a child on
reaching majority is mentally or physically incapable of self-support, the duty of support continues.
Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8 (Supp. 1971).
"Layton v. Layton, 263 N.C. 453, 139 S.E.2d 732 (1965); Elliott v. Elliott, 235 N.C. 153, 69
S.E.2d 224 (1952).
"N.C. GEN.STAT. § 50-13.5(b)(3)-(6) (Supp. 1971).
"'Domestic Relations, Ninth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 40 N.C.L. REv.
482, 530 (1962); Comment, Divorce Agreements: Independent Contract or Incorporationin
Decree, 20 U. CHi. L. REV. 138, 139-40 (1952); see, e.g., Estes v. Estes, 192 Ga. 94, 14 S.E.2d
681 (1941); Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio 214, 198 N.E. 579 (1935).
"2Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69-70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 242-43 (1964).
22d.; Domestic Relations,40 N.C.L. REv., supra note 20, at 529-30. The difference in form
between the two types of consent judgments is apparent. The consent judgment in Davis v. Davis,
213 N.C. 537, 196 S.E. 819 (1936) is a typical contract-consent judgment since the judge merely
approved the contract. The consent judgment, after stating findings that the agreement was fair
and freely consented to, provided in part: "[lit is now, therefore, by consent, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the separation agreement made and entered into between the
plaintiff and defendant, a copy of which is attached hereto. . . is hereby in all respects approved."
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North Carolina cases have frequently stated that neither contracts
nor adjudications involving child-support are ever final in the courts.23
Since the child is considered a ward of the court until the child is
emancipated,24 any adjudication by the court determinative of custody
or support is deemed res judicata only on the state of facts existing at
the time of the order and is therefore subject to modification on a
showing of changed circumstances.
However, when a consent judgment has been construed as a contract, the recent trend has been to enforce consent judgments as contracts binding on the courts in the absence of fraud or mistake when
enforcement would promote the best interest of the child.2" In Church
v. Hancock27 a consent judgment was entered in a divorce action in
which the father agreed to pay child-support until 1969. Before that date
the daughter married and thus became emancipated.28 In requiring the
father to continue his support payments, the court held that the father
had contracted away his right to terminate his duty to support when his
daughter married and that he had a contractual obligation to support
his daughter beyond his common-law obligation. 9
A distinction between contractual provisions binding on the courts
and those which the courts may set aside under certain circumstances
was drawn in Owens v. Little."0 In that case, a mother sought to recover
from her former husband technical school expenses for one of her children under a deed of separation.3 1 The father alleged, however, that the
Record at 12 (emphasis added). In contrast, the consent judgment in Stancil v. Stancil, 255 N.C.
507, 121 S.E.2d 882 (1961) is a typical adjudication-consent judgment setting out the agreement
between the parties in judgment: "IT APPEARING to the Court that the parties hereto have
agreed upon the amount of alimony ....

IT IS NOW, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the

defendant pay to the plaintiff alimony and subsistence for herself the sum of $250.00 per month
." Record at 6.
"McLeod v. McLeod, 266 N.C. 144, 153, 146 S.E.2d 65, 71 (1966); Bishop v. Bishop, 245
N.C. 573, 575, 96 S.E.2d 721, 724 (1957); Story v. Story, 221 N.C. 114, 116, 19 S.E.2d 136, 137
(1942).
2
Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7 (Supp. 1971); Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 177 S.E.2d 455
(1970). The purpose of modification is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the child
and the ability of the father to meet those needs. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77
(1967).
2
6E.g., Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 178 S.E.2d 425 (1971); Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257
N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Owens v. Little, 13 N.C. App. 484, 186 S.E.2d 182 (1972).
-261 N.C. 764, 136 S.E.2d 81 (1964).
281d. at 765, 136 S.E.2d at 82.
'Id. at 767, 136 S.E.2d at 83.
-113 N.C. App. 484, 186 S.E.2d 182 (1972).
3

11d.

CONSENT JUDGMENTS

1973]

1095

mother had subsequently obtained a court order modifying the deed of
separation to increase the amount of child-support and that included
within that order was a further modification which relieved him of his
contractual obligation to pay for the child's college expenses.3 2 The
court of appeals recognized that the contractual provision establishing
an amount of child-support could be judicially modified because of the
compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of minors, but held
that the contractual provision providing trade school expenses was not
subject to modification by the court. The court applied the principle that
to the extent that a contract creates obligations beyond the legal obligations of support, it is binding on the court and enforceable like any other
contract, but to the extent that it does not satisfy the support obligation,
the court will refuse to recognize it and will issue its own order for the
welfare of the child.
On the basis of the case law culminating in Owens, the issue of
modification in Shoaf would appear to turn of the form of the consent
judgment. If the court found the consent judgment to be an adjudication, the judgment would be susceptible to modification after enactment
of Chapter 48A. However, if the consent judgment were a contract,
modification would appear to be precluded by the Owens distinction
since the contractual support obligation in Shoaf exceeded the legal
obligation under Chapter 48A.
Unlike the court of appeals, which held the consent judgment to
be a contract, the supreme court did not expressly address the issue.
Therefore an analysis of the Shoaf opinion is necessary to determine
whether the court considered the consent judgment to be an adjudication
or an affirmation of a prior contract.
To support its decision allowing modification after enactment of
Chapter 48A, the supreme court emphasized that no vested right was
created in the consent judgment because courts have inherent power to
modify future support payments 3 and also because minority as a
status rather than a right is subject to change by the legislature.3 4
Although it is well-settled that a judgment is generally personal property
giving rise to vested rights that a legislature cannot destroy with retroactive law,35 child-support orders are not final judgments but are subject
'lid. at 488, 186 S.E.2d at 185.
13282 N.C. at 291, 192 S.E.2d at 303.
34

1d.

'5E.g., Arnold S. Murdock Co. v. Industrial Comm., 314 Il. 251, 145 N.E. 342 (1924).
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to modification and do not give rise to rights in future payments."
Courts have also agreed that since minority is a status37 and the established age of majority is a rule of convenience rather than substantive
law, the legislature could change it even though it materially affected
personal privileges in infancy.38 However, these principles would not
have foreclosed the parties in Shoaf from creating vested rights in child
support based on the existing definition of majority at the time the
contract has been executed. Since such a contract would create obligations beyond those now legally required by Chapter 48A and if the
Shoaf court had considered the consent judgment an affirmation of a
contract, it could not modify the terms without the consent of the parties, absent fraud or mistake, and be consistent with its previous decisions.38 Therefore, the court's reasoning that no vested rights were
created withstands analysis only if the consent judgment was considered
by the court to be an adjudication.
The court also reasoned that the district court did not have jurisdiction to order child-support beyond the emancipation of the child." However, only under an adjudication-consent judgment theory did the jurisdiction of the district court depend on the existence of the legal support
obligation," for under a contract-consent judgment theory, the district
court's jurisdiction is not terminated when the legal obligation ceases
but continues2 as long as there are enforceable support obligations under
4
the contract.
Since the court's reasoning was correct only if the consent judgment was an adjudication, it is not surprising that an examination of
the consent judgment reveals that it clearly is an adjudication in form.
After first stating findings of fact, the consent judgment in Shoaf provided: "IT IS NOW, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED, by the consent of the parties as follows . . . .(5)
. . .said payments for shall support shall continue until such time as
'E.g., Rosher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 556, 71 P.2d 918 (1937); State v. Kiessenbeck,
167 Ore. 25, 114 P.2d 147 (1941).
'E.g., Valley Nat'l Bank v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538, 159 P.2d 292 (1945); In re Davidson's Will,
223 Minn. 268, 26 N.W.2d 223 (1947); Elliott v. Elliott, 235 N.C. 153, 69 S.E.2d 224 (1952).
'SE.g., Valley Nat'l Bank v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538, 159 P.2d 292; Springstun v. Springstun,
131 Wash. 109, 229 P. 14 (1924).
"See note 26 supra.
4282 N.C. at 290, 192 S.E.2d at 302.
"See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
4'See Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 178 S.E.2d 425 (1971); Layton v. Layton, 263 N.C.
453, 139 S.E.2d 732 (1965); Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
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said minor child [Jeffery] reaches his majority or is otherwise emancipated . . . ."' In the leading case of Stancil v. Stancil," this form was
held to be an adjudication.

In light of this conclusion, the obvious holding for the court in
Shoaf to have made was that the consent judgment was an adjudication,

that the court of appeals erred, and that the judgment was subject to
modification by Chapter 48A. Nevertheless, the court injected consider-

able confusion into the case. First, the court failed to make an express
determination of the type of consent judgment at issue. Secondly, it
erroneously relied on Holsomback v. Holsomback 5 as authority that
support provisions in contract-consent judgments are always subject to
modification."
An analysis of Holsomback shows that the court misinterpreted the
case. In Holsomback the court held that the consent judgment in ques-

tion constituted a contract as to the property-settlement provisions and
was therefore binding, but that the separable provision for alimony was
an adjudication and was therefore subject to modification." The case

clearly does not support the court's otherwise unsupported contention
that contract-consent judgments are always subject to modification.

Nevertheless, when a pre-Chapter 48A contract-consent judgment is
presented under the facts of Shoaf, the court is apparently seeking to

allow modification, a clear departure from its previous decision. Although few cases in other jurisdictions have decided the effect of prestatute contract-consent judgments, the trend 8 has been consistent with
the court of appeals result in Shoaf in refusing modification.
In Wilcox v. Wilcox 9 the fact situation was identical to that of
"Record at 8, 10, Shoaf v. Shoaf, 14 N.C. App. 231, 188 S.E.2d 19 (1972).
44255 N.C. 507, 121 S.E.2d 882 (1961).
45273 N.C. 728, 161 S.E.2d 99 (1968).
4
The court premised its discussion of Holsomback, an alimony case, on the assertion that
alimony and child support fall into the same "category." 282 N.C. at 292, 192 S.E.2d at 303.
However, the Shoafcourt failed to disclose into what "category" they both fall. It should be noted
that alimony is a property right in the wife which she may contract away. Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C.
126, 128 S.E.2d 235 (1962). Child-support is a personal obligation which cannot be contracted
away. See text accompanying note 18 supra. The court in Shoaf stated that the court of appeals
erroneously failed to distinguish marital property settlements which are binding and child-support
provisions which it asserts are always subject to modification. 258 N.C. at 292, 192 S.E.2d at 303.
"1273 N.C. at 732, 161 S.E.2d at 102. A consent judgment may contain both contractual
provisions and adjudications. If the agreement sanctioned by the court does not cover all the
matters to be decided between the parties, the court may set these matters out in judgment after
approving the contract. Holsomback is a good example of this.
"Collins v. Collins, 418 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1967); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1966).
"1406 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1966).
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Shoaf.0 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, after determining that the
consent judgment constituted a contract, held that it was constitutionally bound to incorporate into the contract the laws existing at the time
the contract was executed as well as enforce the intent of the parties and
concluded that the father was obligated to support his child until the
child reached twenty-one. Wilcox was reaffirmed in Collins v. Collins5
where the court emphasized that twenty-one was the age contemplated
by the parties when they used the term "majority" prior to enactment
of the statute lowering the age of majority. Since the intent of the parties
controlled, the defendant was obligated to continue support until the
child reached twenty-one.
Nevertheless, modification of a contract-consent judgment has
been allowed in Tennessee. In Garey v. Garey" the father had agreed
to pay support until each of his children reached twenty-one or were
otherwise emancipated. The court held that, under the terms of the
contract, the "otherwise emancipated" clause encompassed a change in
the age of majority by statute and therefore the father's obligation
ceased when his child was emancipated by operation of law.
The enactment of Chapter 48A presents several policy reasons for
terminating the support obligation at eighteen despite the character of
the consent judgment. If the consent judgment is formulated as a contract, parties who entered into consent judgments prior to July 5, 1971,
arguably would be required to support their children until they reached
twenty-one.13 Parents under these pre-Chapter 48A contract-consent
judgments would be required to continue child-support for their children
without the attendant benefits of the right to control them54 and without
the right to their services and income 5 after they reached eighteen. On
the other hand, parties who enter into consent judgments after that date
will only be required to support their children until they become eight"0 The consent judgment in Wilcox was entered prior to the effective date of Ky. REv.
STAT. § 2.015 (1970) lowering the age of majority in Kentucky from twenty-one to eighteen.
51418 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1967). Interestingly, the consent judgment in Collins contained a clause
subjecting the agreement to further orders of the court. In North Carolina, this clause would be
sufficient to make the consent judgment an adjudication rather than a contract consent judgment,
Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N.C. 620, 194 S.E. 278 (1937).
52._ Tenn. _
482 S.W.2d 133 (1972).
"It is well settled that the laws which exist at the time and place of the making of a contract
affecting its enforcement or discharge are considered to be a part of the contract as though
expressly referred to. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve, 262 U.S, 649 (1923); Pike
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 161 S.E.2d 453 (1968).
mN.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-44.1 (1971).
"Daniel v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 171 N.C. 23, 86 S.E. 174 (1915).
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een. These reasons seem to have influenced the court to seek a result in
Shoaf that would allow modification of both types of pre-Chapter 48A
consent judgments."
However, the decision in Garey presents a solution that would
allow modification without undermining the supreme court's enforcement of contract-consent judgments when the obligation under the contract exceeds the legal obligation. Prudent counsel have made the "otherwise emancipated" clause standard usage, so it would appear that
most pre-Chapter 48A contract-consent judgments could be modified by
57
interpreting the clause to encompass emancipation by legislative act.
Since child-support obligations now cease at eighteen, contractconsent judgments will undoubtedly play a more significant role in providing support when a child may need it for education after he reaches
eighteen. When the common-law period of minority was in effect, a
child was still subject to support during his college or trade-school years.
Accordingly, North Carolina held that a father was obligated to furnish
college expenses under his duty to educate his minor child if the father
had the means to afford it and if a college education was customary in
his standing in the community." The enactment of Chapter 48A terminates the support obligation before a child generally reaches college age.
Therefore the only way a college or post-high school education can be
secured for a child must be by contract.
The most likely explanation for the Shoaf dictum is that the court
has decided to allow the modification for policy reasons, and the lack
of case authority to support the modification forced the court to distort
Holsomback. The court might have allowed modification for both types
of consent judgments by adopting the majority rule, which disregards
the contractual nature of consent judgments. However, such a decision
would have radically altered the flexible dichotomy the court has developed in order to solve a temporary and unique problem. Whenever
support beyond the eighteenth birthday of a child is a desirable objective
in a divorce action, contract-consent judgments will be a useful device,
adding flexibility to the options of the court and the parties. It would
""The defendant had paid every cent and more than his legal obligation required. Not only
the father's, but likewise the mother's duty to support [the child], ceased at the time he came of
age. Thereafter, he was under no obligation to conform his life to the wishes of either parent. They
were freed of any obligation to support him." 282 N.C. at 291, 192 S.E.2d at 303.

"The fact that "twenty-one" was used in Garey rather than "majority" should be immaterial,
for whether
either word was used, the parties contemplated it to mean twenty-one.
5
Zande v. Zande, 3 N.C. App. 149, 164 S.E.2d 523 (1968).
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be unfortunate if the implications of Shoafto favor judicial modification
regardless of the form of consent judgments would impair the future of
contract-consent judgments in North Carolina when they will be more
useful than ever in the promoting of interests of North Carolina children.
THOMAS S. STUKES

VII
LAND FINANCE
Rights in the Proceeds of a Foreclosure Sale-The Court Helps Those
Who Help Themselves
Ordinarily, when a mortgage or deed of trust is foreclosed by sale,
the mortgagor or trustor is entitled to any net proceeds from the sale
after payment of costs, taxes on the land, other assessments provided
by law, and the obligation secured by the mortgage or deed of trust.1
The rights of the mortgagor or trustor to the surplus fund, however, are
subordinate to the rights of a junior lienor 2 if the junior lienor was a
party to the action to foreclose3 or received notice of sale under a power
of sale.' The junior encumbrancer's lien against the land is cut off by

the foreclosure sale to which he was a party or of which he had notice
and is transferred to the surplus fund. Since the rights of the junior
encumbrancer in the land, though subordinate to those of the senior
lienor, are superior pro tanto to the rights of the mortgagor or trustor,
the junior encumbrancer is entitled to have his claim satisfied out of the
surplus fund as against the mortgagor or trustor. Some state courts
have held that the junior encumbrancer is entitled to payment from the
surplus fund even though his debt is not yet due. 6
'Shillaber v. Robinson, 97 U.S. 68 (1877); Ridley v. Jim Walter Corp., 272 N.C. 673, 158
S.E.2d 869 (1968); Bradburn v. Roberts, 148 N.C. 214, 61 S.E. 617 (1908).
2Markey v. Langley, 92 U.S. 142 (1875); Dockrey v. Gray, 172 Cal. App. 2d 388, 341 P.2d
746 (1959); Tucker v. Crown Corp., 136 Fla. 517, 527, 183 So. 740, 745 (1938); Waybright v.
Turner, 129 Fla. 310, 176 So. 424 (1937).
'Soles v. Sheppard, 99 II1.616 (1881).
'Winslow v. McCall, 32 Barb. 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860).
'Cowan v. Stoker, 100 Utah 377, 115 P.2d 153 (1941).
'Fagan v. People's Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Minn. 437, 57 N.W. 142 (1893); Moss v. Robertson,
56 Neb. 774, 77 N.W. 403 (1898) (dictum).

1973]

FORECLOSURE SALE

1101

However, in In re CastillianApartments, Inc.7 the North Carolina
Supreme Court refused to allow the junior lienor to satisfy his lien from
the surplus fund when the debt was not due. The supreme court affirmed
an order denying the petition of the holder of a second deed of trust to
have the surplus from the sale under the first deed of trust immediately
paid over to the petitioner and ordering investment of the fund and
payment of the interest to the debtor.' The facts of the case were unusual
in several particulars. First, although the debtor had defaulted on the
indebtedness secured by the first deed of trust, thus triggering the power
of sale which it contained, he had not defaulted on any payments due
on the debt secured by the second deed of trust? Secondly, there was
no provision either in the note or in the second deed of trust that provided for acceleration in the event of foreclosure under the prior obligation."0 Finally, the junior encumbrancer's note had been held usurious
in an earlier case" because of a limited partnership agreement that had
been exacted by the lender as additional consideration for the loan,
which already bore the maximum eight percent interest rate.12 In accord
with the North Carolina usury statute, 13 all interest had been declared
forfeited. 4 Thus CastillianApartments involved a non-interest bearing
loan on which principal payments 5 had been kept current and under
which foreclosure and sale pursuant to a prior deed of trust was not an
event of default or a condition of acceleration. Any one of these circumstances is unusual, but this combination of all of them presented a
situation for which there was no direct precedent.
Normally, when the debtor is unable to pay the senior lienor, he is
also unable to pay the junior lienor, so that the indebtedness owed both
creditors will likely be in default. Additionally, if the senior lienor has
foreclosed and sold the land, the debtor will seldom be motivated to
7281 N.C. 709, 190 S.E.2d 161 (1972).
'id. at 710, 190 S.E.2d at 161. This case was initiated as a special proceeding under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 45-21.32 (1966) to determine rights in the surplus fund that had been deposited with the
clerk of court pursuant to the authority of id. § 45-21.31(b) (1966).
'281 N.C. at 710, 190 S.E.2d at 162.
[Old.
"Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971).
1id. at 530-31, 180 S.E.2d at 828.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-8 (1965).
"Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 532, 180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971).
"The petitioner had loaned the debtor $250,000 for approximately five years at 8% interest
payable monthly, with principal payments of $500 per month payable commencing approximately
a year after the loan was made. Record at 11, in re Castillian Apartments, Inc., 281 N.C. 709,
190 S.E.2d 161 (1972).
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continue payments to the junior lienor. As a consequence, the junior
lienholder will usually be in a position to foreclose in his own right" or
to acquire the surplus, at least to the extent of his overdue payments,

when the senior lienor forecloses.
The typical second deed of trust or second mortgage contains a
provision stipulating that upon foreclosure on the first encumbrance the
entire indebtedness may be accelerated at the option of the junior
lienor. 17 Courts have generally held such acceleration provisions to be
valid and enforceable to the letter."8 Therefore, in the typical case the
junior encumbrancer will be entitled not only to the surplus to the extent
of his claim, but also to a deficiency judgment for the balance."
Although payment was not yet due according to the terms agreed

upon by the parties in Castillian Apartments, the petitioner cited a
Minnesota case, Fagan v. People's Savings & Loan Association," as

authority for payment to the junior lienor of any surplus arising from
the sale under foreclosure by the senior encumbrancer notwithstanding
this absence of default. The court in that case noted that the plaintiff
was not suing to collect the unmatured debt, but rather to recover the
proceeds of his security:
[W]hen land is sold on a first mortgage, which is subject to a subsequent lien, the lien is transferred from the land to the surplus money.
"6The provision in the instruments of the parties of a right to an action to foreclose upon
default is unnecessary. The right to maintain the action arises automatically upon default. Jardine
v. Hawks, 44 Idaho 237, 256 P. 97 (1927); Raper v. Coleman, 192 N.C. 232, 134 S.E. 481 (1926);
Scheibe v. Kennedy, 64 Wis. 564, 25 N.W. 646 (1885).
17See, e.g., Bohland v. Horn, 107 N.J. Eq. 570, 153 A. 588 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931).
8
The leading case is Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930). The court
there refused to grant relief against such a clause despite the fact that it was triggered by an
inadvertent clerical error, which the mortgagor promptly sought to correct. This case has been
generally followed but widely criticized. See Rosenthal, The Role of Courts of Equity in Preventing
Acceleration Predicatedupon a Mortgagor'sInadvertent Default, 22 SYR. L. REv. 897 (1971).
"The majority of jurisdictions construe the mortgage and the note together, so that even if
the acceleration clause appears only in the mortgage, the mortgagee has the advantage of acceleration not merely for purposes of claiming the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, but also for purposes
of obtaining a deficiency judgment. Note, Bills and Notes-Acceleration Clause in Mortgage as
Affecting Maturity of Notes-Distributionof Proceeds of Foreclosure Sale, 9 N.C.L. Rav. 201,
202 (1931). In North Carolina, however, it appears that if the acceleration provision is only in the
mortgage or deed of trust and not in the note, the holder of the note has no right to a deficiency
judgment beyond payments actually in default. In this state, apparently, it is not to be supposed
that a debtor in granting the privilege of acceleration in the mortgage or deed of trust intended
this privilege to apply to the principal obligation per se, but only to its security. Brown v. Osteen,
197 N.C. 305, 148 S.E. 434 (1929).
255 Minn. 437, 57 N.W. 142 (1893).
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The proceeds of the sale, after satisfying the first mortgage, stand in
place of the equity of redemption to those who had title to or a lien
upon it. The right to this surplus passes to the grantee or assignee of
the mortgagor by a conveyance of or mortgage upon the equity of
redemption; and the court will always direct the application of the
money according to the rights of the parties as they existed previous

to the alteration of the estate. In case of future installments to become
due on the first mortgage; or, in case of a second mortgage, not due,
the mortgagees would be entitled to the surplus to the extent necessary
to pay their mortgages in full. If the debt was on interest, that would
be saved; if not on
interest, a deduction would be made by way of
2
rebate of interest. 1
The court noted that a Minnesota statute, "which is but declaratory of
what the law has always been, expressly provides for this being done in
case of future installments on the same mortgage. But the principle is
the same in the case of second mortgages.1 22 There was no explanation
as to how this principle can be applied to a situation involving a junior
mortgagee whose mortgage is not in default.
An analysis of this principle's application "in the case of future
installments on the same mortgage" may help to provide the missing
rationale of Fagan. A comparison of the North Carolina position with
the majority position on the general rules of law that underlie this
principle may help to explain the rejection of this principle in Castillian

Apartments.
When a mortgage secures an indebtedness payable in installments
or by a series of notes, and one of these installments or notes is overdue
and unpaid, the majority view is that, absent agreement to the contrary,
the mortgage can be foreclosed, notwithstanding the fact that other
installments or notes are not yet due.2 Indeed this right to foreclose
upon partial default is so strong, where it is recognized, that any agreement not to foreclose in such a case is strictly construed. 24 This view
clearly favors the mortgagee.
21

1d. at 442, 57 N.W. at 144.
2Jd.
21G. OSBORNE,
[hereinafter cited as

§ 325, at 679-80 (2d ed. 1970)
Black v. Reno, 59 F. 917 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1894); Scheibe v. Ken-

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
OSBORNE];

nedy, 64 Wis. 564, 25 N.W. 646 (1885). The corollary to this is that the statute of limitations on
foreclosure begins to run, as to each installment, from the day it becomes due and is unpaid. George
v. Butler, 26 Wash. 456, 67 P. 263 (1901).
242 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1505, at 990
(8th ed. 1928).
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When the right of foreclosure has accrued upon default of one of

several installments or notes secured by the mortgage, there is a split
of authority as to whether the security may be divided. The majority
view, again favoring the mortgagee, permits partial foreclosure." Thus,
where the property can be sold in parcels without injury to the remainder, a sale of only so much as is required to satisfy the amount due will
be held, and the lien will continue unextinguished upon the remainder.
Upon a subsequent default the mortgagee may foreclose again, and so
on until the debt is satisfied or all the land is sold."t
North Carolina takes the minority position under these circumstances and refuses to recognize the right of the mortgagee to foreclose

upon partial default absent a clear provision in the instrument. 2 Where
the right to foreclose upon default of fewer than all installments is
specifically granted in the instrument, North Carolina case law refuses
to permit foreclosure on less than all of the land, viewing the mortgage
as involving "one debt" and "one pledge." 8 This can be burdensome
"OSBORNE § 325, at 680.
n2 C. WILTsIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

§ 695,
at 112-23-24 (5th ed. 1939).
"In Harshaw v. McKesson, 66 N.C. 266, 267-68 (1872), the court stated unequivocally: "A
Court of Equity will never decree a foreclosure until the period limited for payment of the money
be passed, and the estate in consequence thereof forfeited to the mortgagee, for it cannot shorten
the time given by express covenant and agreement between the parties, as that would be to alter
the nature of the contract to the injury of the party affected." This doctrine was strengthened by
Worley v. Worley, 214 N.C. 311, 199 S.E. 82 (1938), where the court strictly construed a mortgage
providing for foreclosure "'if default be made in the payment of said bonds of the interest on same,
or any part of either at maturity,'" and held that a foreclosure sale was premature, since interest
was in default prior to maturity and not "at maturity" of one of the notes. Id. at 312-13, 199 S.E.
at 82-83. On the other hand, it is clear that North Carolina courts will honor express stipulations
in the mortgage providing for foreclosure on default of any payment of interest or principal. Raper
v. Coleman, 192 N.C. 232, 134 S.E. 481 (1926). Consistent with the North Carolina rule that,
absent agreement, a right to foreclose does not accrue until the last note or installment is due and
unpaid is the fact that the statute of limitations has been held not to bar foreclosure and application
of proceeds to all installments secured by the mortgage until default on the last installment. Demai
v. Tart, 221 N.C. 106, 19 S.E.2d 130 (1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-47, 45-21.12 (1966). But see
E.H. & J.A. Meadows Co. v. Bryan, 195 N.C. 398, 142 S.E. 487 (1928). A North Carolina statute,
enacted in 1949, can be interpreted to preclude application of proceeds from a foreclosure sale to
notes barred by the statute, but there have been no cases interpreting the statute. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-21.11 (1966).
""The debt may be split into bonds, or it may be payable in a series of notes, but
in a broad sense it remains true that there is but one debt, which arose out of one
transaction. In like manner, there is only one pledge, although there may be many
parcels of land, and many types of security. It follows that a foreclosure must be of the
entire security; and, no matter how many parcels of land there may be, all should be
included in the suit. . . . It follows that a foreclosure upon one of two parcels will
preclude a later foreclosure upon the other."
Layden v. Layden, 228 N.C. 5, 8,44 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1947), noted in 26 N.C.L. REv.316 (1948).
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to the mortgagee who finds it necessary to foreclose for non-payment
of an installment: he is thereafter barred from foreclosing for the balance of his obligation. 9
By the majority view, where the land cannot be sold piecemeal
without injury to the whole,
the final judgment may direct that the whole property be sold discharged from the entire mortgage debt, and that the proceeds of the
sale, after deducting the costs of the action and the expenses of the sale,
be either applied to the satisfaction of the whole sum secured by the
mortgage, with such a rebate of interest as justice requires; or be first
applied to the payment of the sum due, and the balance, or so much
thereof as is necessary, be invested at interest for the benefit of the
plaintiff, to be paid to him from time to time as any part of the
principal or interest becomes due . . .3
This result is followed and explained in a Minnesota case involving a
foreclosure under a power of sale for default on an installment:
The rule here laid down is the same as a court of equity would
apply in case of foreclosure by suit, and has the same reason for it, to
wit: that, by the sale, the lien of the mortgage upon the tract sold, both
for the part of the debt then due and payable, and for the residue, is
exhausted, and the lien transferred to the fund arising from the
sale ....
. . .[Thus] the security of this mortgagee, as against the land
mortgaged, is gone, and he must look to the fund made by the sale.
If, out of this, he can receive only the amount due and payable at the
time of the sale, and the overplus must be paid to the mortgagor, then
his security is cut down to security for the amount then due, and is lost
to him as to the residue.
The parties to the mortgage surely never intended any such re3
suit. '
21Layden v. Layden, 228 N.C. 5, 8-9, 44 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1947). However, it appears that,
perhaps in response to Layden and the North Carolina Law Review note discussing it, the legislature in 1949 provided by statute for foreclosure in parcels without discharge of the lien on the

remaining land until full satisfaction of the obligation. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§§ 4-21.8 to -21.9 (1966);

see Sale, A Survey ofStatutory Changes in North Carolinain 1949, 27 N.C.L. REv. 405, 480-81

(1949).
12 C. WILTSIE, supra note 26, § 696, at 1124-25. Although these provisions are statutory in
New York, the treatise writer states that "[tihe provisions of the statute simply declare the rules
and formulate the principles by which courts of equity, without statutory provisions, are necessarily

governed in foreclosure suits." Id.; see
3

OSBORNE

§ 325, at 680.

Fowler v. Johnson, 26 Minn. 338, 342-43, 3 N.W. 986, 990-91, affd on rehearing,6 N.W.
486 (1880).
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The purpose, then, of such disposition of proceeds, is to conserve the
security for the benefit of the mortgagee who has no further recourse
against the land. The authority for this disposition is apparently the
presumed intent of the parties that the mortgagee should not be unduly
prejudiced by his election to foreclose upon partial default. The rule,
however, not only provides that the surplus not be paid to the mortgagor, but that it be paid immediately to the mortgagee,3 2 or at least be
invested at interest for his benefit.3 3 This not only protects the mortgagee's interest in the fund that has replaced his lien in the land; it gives
him the benefit of the income from the fund. This additional benefit,
however, is consistent with the general principle in "title" and "intermediate" jurisdictions that the mortgagee is entitled to possession of the
mortgaged property upon default, together with the rents and profits
produced by it provided only that he account to the mortgagor and
junior encumbrancers for these profits. 4
The last step in the analysis of the Fagan principle is to discover
how the equitable rule that is used for a single mortgage in partial
default can be invoked to benefit a second mortgagee whose debt is not
in default. Without explanation, the court in Fagan said simply that
3Black v. Reno, 59 F. 917 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1894).
Hatcher v. Chancey, 71 Ga. 689 (1883). The practice of paying over the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale to satisfy immediately the remaining principal has the effect of accelerating this
principal for the purposes of foreclosure. But such payment does not accelerate the personhi
obligation of the mortgagor, and the cases indicate that no deficiency judgment will be decreed in
such a case. See, e.g., Olcott v. Bynum, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 44 (1872); Grape Creek Coal Co. v.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 63 F. 891 (7th Cir. 1894). The mortgagee does not have a personal
action for the balance until maturity. If the obligation calls for installment payments against the
principal, the mortgagor may have been placed in an unfortunate position. He has lost the land,
its rents and profits, the surplus fund arising from the sale of the land, and the interest from the
surplus fund. If he was unable to meet the payments before foreclosure, he will be less able to do
so after foreclosure, and thus he may be faced with a series of actions to collect the installments.
This problem does not arise, of course, where the surplus is adequate to pay the entire remaining
indebtedness. Courts of equity have had little difficulty in such a case treating the entire obligation
as due, stopping the accumulation of interest (or discounting the principal if no interest is payable),
and extinguishing the entire liability. Olcott v. Bynum, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 44 (1872); Sehreiber v.
Carey, 48 Wis. 208, 4 N.W. 124 (1879).
14n a title theory jurisdiction the mortgagee is entitled to possession of the premises either
before or after default. E.g., Cook v. Curtis, 125 Me. 114, 131 A. 204 (1925). In the "intermediate"
jurisdictions the mortgagee is entitled to possession after default. E.g., Wilson v. Reed, 270 Mo.
400, 193 S.W. 819 (1917). The earlier North Carolina cases apparently accepted the title theory
position that the mortgagee was entitled to possession and application of the rents and profits to
his debt even before a breach of the terms of the mortgage. The later cases, representing the
"intermediate" jurisdiction view, hold that he has such rights only after a breach. Brannock v.
Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967), and cases cited therein. Lien theory states generally
recognize no right in the mortgagee to possession prior to foreclosure. OSBORNE § 127, at 207-10.
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"the principle is the same in the case of second mortgages." 35 The
following analysis may provide an explanation.
Just as the first mortgagee has exhausted his remedy against the
land when the whole parcel is sold, the second mortgagee's remedy also
has been exhausted. His security in the land has been cut off when title
passes to the purchaser, and he, like the first mortgagee, can resort only
to the proceeds from the sale. It is unnecessary for the mortgagor to
default on the second mortgage, since the entire premises are sold as a
result of default on the first mortgage-with exactly the same effect
upon the remedy of the second mortgagee as upon that of the first
mortgagee.
The situation may be somewhat analogous to one in which a single
mortgage on the land secures two notes falling due in successive years.
Suppose that A holds the note which matures first and B holds the
remaining note. According to the majority rule, if all the land is gone,
B's security in the land is cut off, and his lien attaches instead to the
proceeds. Again by the prevailing view, the holder of the undue note
would be entitled to reach the surplus to the extent of his lien or to have
the surplus invested for his benefit. Similarly, in the Fagan-Castillian
situation the second mortgagee, like B, has been divested of his lien on
the land and remitted to a lien in the proceeds by two distinct acts of
two other persons: (1) the mortgagor has defaulted on an obligation
owing to another person; and (2) the person whose debt is in default has
elected to foreclose and sell the land. It follows that the second mortgagee should be entitled to the proceeds just as B would be entitled to
them; and so the Fagan court held.
The point of difference, overlooked by the Fagan court, is that the
indebtedness owing to the second mortgage is secured by a separate and
subordinate instrument with its own terms and conditions. This difference was apparently felt not to be material.
There is another consideration weighing in favor of payment of the
surplus over to a second mortgagee after a foreclosure sale on default
of the first mortgage. Despite the absence of a technical default by the
terms of the second mortgage, there is, in effect, a breach whenever the
mortgagor defaults on a prior mortgage and permits foreclosure on the
property, thereby impairing the security of the second mortgagee.36
Such default is certainly prejudicial to the interests of the second mort1155 Minn. at 442, 57 N.W. at 144.
11281 N.C at 714, 190 S.E.2d at 164.
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gagee, who could otherwise have reasonably expected the amount of the
senior lien to diminish as the mortgagor continued to meet the payments
on the first mortgage. In Castillian Apartments, however, the court
declared that if fair market value was paid for the property at the
foreclosure sale, the security of the holder of the second deed of trust
had not been impaired.3 The court thus refused to recognize obligations beyond those expressly agreed upon by the parties.
As indicated, the facts of CastillianApartments are extraordinary.
While interest had been bargained for, it had been forfeited because of
usury. There was no default and no provision in the second deed of trust
for acceleration in the event of foreclosure under the prior deed of trust.
The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to apply the Fagan
principle to advance the realization by the junior encumbrancer of a part
of his principal. In so doing, the court adhered to a long line 3of
decisions
8
holding the parties strictly to the terms of their agreement.
In affirming the decree of the lower court ordering investment of
the fund by the clerk of court and payment of the interest to the debtor,
the court dealt equitably with both parties. The court emphasized that
there had been no default on the principal obligation and noted that to
allow payment of the surplus fund to the junior encumbrancer would
have substantially nullified the adverse consequences of the usury finding.3 The junior lienor would have been able to invest the fund and earn
interest even though interest had been precluded by the usury judgment.
Furthermore, the debtor would have lost the profits from the fund which
had replaced the land. This would have been improper, since the junior
encumbrancer's lien attached only to the fund and not to the income
produced by the fund, just as it had attached to the land but not to the
rents and profits from the land. Payment of the fund to the debtor,
however, would have destroyed the security of the junior lienor. In
taking the middle course, the court protected the interests of both parties."0
7See Eubanks v. Becton, 158 N.C. 230, 73 S.E. 1009 (1912); notes 19, 27, & 34 supra.
11281 N.C. at 712, 190 S.E.2d at 162.
"There is a seeming conflict of equities in Castiffian Apartments. The surplus fund amounted

to $118,659.98, a little more than half the remaining principal obligation of over $200,00. 281 N.C.
at 712, 190 S.E.2d at 162. (The court erroneously stated the unpaid principal balance to be

$250,000, but this fails to account for the $25,000 credit on this balance decreed in the usury finding,
Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971), and the $500 monthly
principal payments that had been paid regularly for a little over two years at the time of Castlillan
Apartments. See Record at 14, 36-37, In re Castillian Apts., Inc., 281 N.C. 709, 190 S.E.2d 161
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There are alternative solutions to the problem. The junior encumbrancer might argue that default on the first deed of trust should operate
to accelerate the indebtedness secured by the second deed of trust as a
matter of law, thereby entitling him to the surplus and to a deficiency
judgment for the balance. The debtor could be compensated for the
absence of interest by reduction of the principal obligation to its present
value at the time of the judgment. This solution would have the advantages of obviating the administration of the surplus fund and giving the
junior lienor some present relief to compensate for the destruction of
his security in the realty. But the debtor could counter that there is no
precedent for such acceleration as a matter of law and that to impose
acceleration because of default under the prior deed of trust would be
to penalize the debtor in a manner for which he had not bargained.
A more realistic solution would be to require the clerk to accumulate the interest earned on the surplus fund for the benefit of the junior
lienor and to apply the full sum, including compounded interest, toward
the principal indebtedness upon maturity of the obligation. This would
maximize the security function of the surplus fund, which has replaced
the land as security for the indebtedness owed to the junior lienor.
A difficulty with both of these alternatives is that the parties contractually agreed that the land would secure both principal and interest,
subject to the first deed of trust. Therefore, the remaining value of the
land (represented by the surplus) stood in part to secure the interest.
Since the interest has been forfeited, it follows that the part of the value
of the land which secured the interest was also forfeited. Neither of these
alternative solutions takes into account this forfeiture; rather each,
under the facts of this case, would unjustly give the junior lienor the full
benefit of this forfeited interest security. 41
(1972).) Therefore, if this fund had been paid over to the petitioner to reinvest, it could not have
earned enough to equal the principal amount due at maturity. On the other hand, the difference
between the surplus fund and the remaining principal indebtedness would have remained payable
by the debtor, who would have been deprived of the income from the fund with which to meet the

principal payments as they accrued.
"The fact that the obligation secured by the second deed of trust had been stripped of interest
is important for another reason. The court noted that
[o]rdinarily, the impounding of the surplus pending the maturity of a second lien deed
of trust would be of no benefit to the persons obligated to pay the debt secured thereby.
The interest received on a certificate of deposit would be insufficient to cover the interest
on the note. . . . Under present conditions, the income on a certificate of deposit. ..
would exceed the amount necessary to make the monthly payments on principal. More
important, the crediting of these monthly payments on the principal will reduce substantially the amount of the unpaid principal on June 30, 1974.

1110

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Although the court's decision in CastillianApartments may appear
harsh from the standpoint of the junior encumbrancer, it enforces the
letter of the parties' agreement. Further, it protects the rights of the
debtor who has pledged his land. This is consistent with previous North
Carolina decisions that have required strict observance by the mortgagee of the terms of the agreement and have construed both statute and
contract strictly in favor of the grantor in the instrument."
The most apparent motive of the court was its concern that the
penalty for usury be fully felt by the lender. The case should thus serve
as notice to lenders seeking to evade the usury law that the courts will
consider no equities favoring such lender that would tend "to nullify
substantially the adverse consequences of its usurious transaction."43
Since, however, there is nothing in the opinion that indicates the
court would not have granted the lender relief had proper contractual
provision been made for acceleration in the event of default and foreclosure on the first deed of trust, the case should also serve as a reminder
to draftsmen to provide fully for all contingencies in preparing the
instruments that are designed to protect their clients' investments.
KENT WASHBURN

Notice Requirements of the Non-judicial Foreclosure Sale
In Huggins v. DeMent' the North Carolina Court of Appeals has
once again affirmed the practice of allowing the trustee of a deed of trust
to foreclose without direct notice to the debtor. The court refused to
accept the debtor's challenge to the foreclosure sale on the grounds that
he was deprived of his constitutional right to procedural due process
under the fourteenth amendment. The North Carolina Supreme Court
has long held that in absence of an agreement to the contrary, the
debtor2 or the junior lien holder3 is not entitled to personal notice of
281 N.C. at 712, 190 S.E.2d at 162-63. If the obligation had borne interest, no advantage would
have accrued to the debtor to have the fund remain on deposit with the clerk, and doubtless the
debtor would not have opposed the junior encumbrancer's petition for the surplus.
"See, e.g., Spain v. Hines, 214 N.C. 432, 200 S.E. 25 (1938); Woodley v. Combs, 210 N.C.
482, 187 S.E. 762 (1936); Alexander v. Boyd, 204 N.C. 103, 167 S.E. 462 (1933).
43281

N.C. at 712, 190 S.E.2d at 163.

'13 N.C. App. 673, 187 S.E.2d 412, petition for cert. dismissed, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d
898, cert. denied, 93 S.Ct. 677 (1972).
'E.g., Woodell v. Davis, 261 N.C. 160, 134 S.E.2d 160 (1964).
'E.g., Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Sanders, 264 N.C. 234, 141 S.E.2d 329 (1965).
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foreclosure since constructive notice or notice by advertisement is suffi-

cient.' In light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions in
regard to requirements of notice5 and waiver of notice,' there is some

doubt as to the future of the North Carolina position. These new decisions should be a warning to trustees that the North Carolina practice

of giving no personal notice before a non-judicial foreclosure may be a
hazardous procedure to follow in the future.

In December 1966 plaintiff Henry Huggins and his wife borrowed
798 dollars and ninety cents from Central Finance Company. The loan
was secured by executing a deed of trust to a third-party trustee on

property owned by the plaintiff in Wake County. In March of 1969
Central Finance Company notified the trustee that the plaintiffs were

in default and ordered foreclosure proceedings in accordance with the
terms of the deed. The deed of trust required that the trustee post notice

of the foreclosure on the courthouse door for a period of thirty days and
publish the notice once a week for four consecutive weeks in a local
newspaper. These two clauses are identical to the provisions of section

45-21.17(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes,7 which governs
notice requirements before a foreclosure sale when there is no provision

made in the deed of trust. Neither the statute nor the deed of trust in
this case provided for personal notice to the plaintiff, nor was any such
4

E.g., Woodell v. Davis, 261 N.C. 160, 163, 134 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1964).
E.g., Robinson v. Hanrahan, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972) (per curiam); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
'E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174
(1972).
7
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.17 (1966) provides in part:
(a) When the instrument pursuant to which a sale of real property is to be held
contains provisions with respect to posting or publishing notice of sale of the real
property, such provisions shall be complied with, and compliance therewith is sufficient
notice.
(b) When the instrument pursuant to which a sale of real property is to be held
contains no provisions with respect to posting or publishing notice of the sale of real
property, the notice shall(1) Be posted, at the courthouse door in the county in which the property
is situated, for thirty days immediately preceeding the sale.
(2) And in addition thereto,
(a) If a newspaper qualified for legal advertising is published in the
county, the notice shall be published in such a newspaper once a week for
at least four successive weeks; but
(b) If no such newspaper is published in the county, then notice shall
be published once a week for at least four successive weeks in a newspaper
having a general circulation in the county.
5

1112

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

notice given even though plaintiff was known to be living on the property at the time.
The property was sold at the courthouse door by public auction to
the highest bidder for 275 dollars. An upset bid was submitted to the
clerk of court, who ordered the property resold. The trustee gave notice
of the proposed resale by again posting the notice of resale at the courthouse door and publishing the notice in a local newspaper for two
consecutive weeks as required by statute.' The property was sold again
to the highest bidder for 401 dollars. The resale was reported and confirmed by the clerk of court, who ordered that the deed be conveyed to
the purchaser.
On September 23, 1971, after finally discovering that their property
had been sold, plaintiffs instituted an action to declare the sale null and
void on the grounds that the sale violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment because they were not given notice of the sale
or an opportunity to be heard before their property was sold. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that the failure of the trustee to give them notice
of the proposed foreclosure sale violated the fiduciary duty of loyalty
owed them by the trustee. The trial court granted defendant's motion
to dismiss under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The decision
was sustained on appeal by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, and
on further appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court the petition was
dismissed.' Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and in the alternative
refused to grant certiorari.'
The court of appeals held that there was no allegation in the complaint sufficient to show a breach of any fiduciary duty. There was no
statement that the trustee was negligent or imprudent, nor was it alleged
that he did anything other than strictly comply with the terms of the
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.29(b) (1966).
9281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 898 (1972).

"093 S. Ct. 677 (1972). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction because
jurisdiction was requested under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970) on the grounds that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-21.17(b) (1966) was repugnant to the United States Constitution. However, before the Court
can find jurisdiction the statute must have been drawn into question, and where this is not done
no jurisdiction exists. E.g., Street v. City of New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581-83 (1968). Huggins in
his appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals only challenged the constitutionality of the
action taken by the trustee and not the statute itself. 13 N.C. App. at 676, 187 S.E.2d at 414. When
the appeal was dismissed, the petition was then considered as one for certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 2103
(1971).
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deed of trust." The trustee is required only to conduct the proceedings
in accordance with the laws of North Carolina. "Making due advertisement and giving due notice" requires no more than good faith and
diligence in notifying the debtor or creditor of the trustee's intention to
sell.' 2 If the constructive notice provided for in the statute and deed of
trust is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements, then it satisfies the
fiduciary requirement of "giving due notice."' 3
The court followed the holding of Woodell v. Davis4 that there was
"no requirement that a creditor shall give personal notice of a foreclosure by sale to the debtor who is in default. . .

.""'

The court rational-

ized this result by arguing that the primary purpose of giving notice is
not so much to notify the grantor as it is to inform the public generally
so as to insure an adequate number of bidders at the public auction and
to insure a fair price." With only this purpose in mind, the court held
that the constructive notice provided for in the deed of trust and in the7
statute was sufficient to withstand attack under the due process clause.'
The Huggins court also found that plaintiff had voluntarily waived
his right to personal notice or to a hearing before the sale. The complaint had failed to allege that there was unequal bargaining power,
overreaching on the part of the creditor, or that the plaintiff did not
understand or voluntarily consent to the waiver." According to the
dictum of two recent United States Supreme Court decisions discussed
briefly by the court of appeals, the presence of these elements might
possibly have made the waiver ineffective."
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Fuentes v.
Shevin 0 cast aside any remaining doubt as to whether a debtor who has
1113 N.C. App. at 680, 187 S.E.2d at 416.
1id.
"Id.
14261 N.C. 160, 134 S.E.2d 160 (1964). The Woodells purchased a house and lot and secured
the balance of the purchase price with a deed of trust to the seller. The seller later transferred the
deed of trust to defendant. The house and lot were later sold at foreclosure without personal notice
to the Woodells and conveyed to the co-defendant Davis as the highest bidder.

"Id. at 163, 134 S.E.2d at 163.
"Id.
"13 N.C. App. at 679, 187 S.E.2d at 415.
"Id. at 679-80, 187 S.E.2d at 416.
"The court of appeals relied on D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), and
Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 190 (1972), in its brief discussion of waiver of procedural due process
rights. 13 N.C. App. at 679-80, 187 S.E.2d at 415-16.
-407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Court held unconstitutional a "claim and delivery" procedure by
which a party, by ex parte application and the posting of a bond, could have a writ issued that
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signed over title or never had legal title to property was nevertheless
protected by the due process clause." The Court held that the right to
notice attaches only to those "deprivation[s] of an interest encompassed
within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection 2' 2 and that the protection extends to possessory interests in property as well as to legal interests.2 1 Under a deed of trust the grantor is entitled to possession so long
as the terms of the agreement are complied with. This does not mean
that on default his possessory interests are lost and thus his right to
constitutional protection is gone. The fourteenth amendment "has never
been interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership, ' 24 nor does the right to be heard depend on a showing that the
debtor will prevail at a later hearing. 25 A foreclosure in North Carolina
on real property involves not only a possessory interest but also an
equity of redemption that gives the grantor of the land the "right to
redeem at any time prior to the foreclosure. ' 2 Since North Carolina
recognizes equity of redemption as a valid interest in property, a debtor
has at least two property interests that deserve to be protected.
It has been argued that any constitutional infirmity that resulted
from the failure to give a mortgagor notice would be cured by the
hearing subsequently afforded to him upon his motion to set aside the
degree of foreclosure.2Y Certainly a debtor, upon discovering the sale of
his property under a power of sale, might challenge the sale, and if the
sale were improperly conducted the courts would hold the creditor and
the trustee liable for their misconduct and possibly upset the sale. Even
though the parties might be returned to the status quo ante, this later
hearing would not cure the constitutional defect. 28 The opportunity to
be heard must be given at a "meaningful time and in a meaningful
allowed state agents to seize a person's possessions. In such proceedings the state did not give notice
of the proposed seizure, nor did it give the owner an opportunity to challenge the writ before the

property was taken. Even though the party could redeem his property prior to the formal hearing
upon posting of bond, the Court felt that this was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
procedural due process. For a good discussion of Fuentes, see Note, ConstitutionalLaw-DebtorCreditorRealtions-Furntesv. Shevin: Due Processfor Debtors, 51 N.C.L. REv. 111 (1972).
21407

U.S. at 84-87.

2ld. at 84.

21d. at 86.
24

1d.

"Id. at 87.
'-Riddick v. Davis, 220 N.C. 120, 125, 16 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1941). See also N.C. GEN. STAT,

§ 25-9-506 (1965) for the North Carolina redemption statute for personal property.
'Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).

2-Id. at 551.
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manner." 9 The lapse of time creates a greater burden for the party
bringing the challenge because records may be lost or destroyed, memories may have faded, and innocent third parties may have purchased
after or at the original foreclosure sale. The imposition of this greater
burden could make the difference in winning or losing at the later suit.
The debtor's equity of redemption that was lost at the foreclosure could
not be regained even if the debtor prevailed in the suit unless the court
ordered the original sale upset.3" If a court were unwilling or unable to
upset the sale, the plaintiff would be left with only monetary damages.
The Supreme Court has found that "no damage award can undo the fact
that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due
process has already occurred." 3' The court and the mortgagor would
not be faced with this problem if the mortgagor were given an opportunity to take action to avoid injustice prior to the sale. Only by direct
notice or by an adequate substitute could the courts be assured that the
mortgagor is fully apprised of his alternatives and that in the process
he has not lost any of his rights.
Questions frequently arise as to the adequacy of a particular form
of notice to satisfy due process in a particular fact situation. The United
States Supreme Court has refused to set up a rigid formula as to the
kind of notice that is required and has left it up to the circumstances
and conditions of each case. 32 There are some definite guidelines, however. In the famous case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. 3 the Court set out the criteria that will be used to approach the
problem.
[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture
is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous
of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any
chosed method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself
reasonably certain to inform those affected, . . . or, where conditions
do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not
substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible
and customary substitutes.
"Id. at 552.
G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 306, at 633 (2d ed. 1970).
"Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972).
32
E.g., Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956).
-339 U.S. 306 (1949).
m1 d. at 315.
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The Court in recent years has applied this standard very strictly.
In an automobile forfeiture procedure in Illinois, notice of the proceeding that was mailed to the home of the owner of the auto was held not
to satisfy due process.15 The party in question was at the time confined
to the county jail and was unable to get to the address to which the
notice was mailed, a fact of which the county was well aware. The Court
held the notice was not calculated to apprise the owner of the pendency
of the foreclosure proceeding and thus deprived the owner of due process
of law. In a similar case the notice was actually delivered to the owner
of the property but was held a deprivation of due process of law nonetheless since the owner was known by everyone in town to have been
incompetent to handle his affairs and was so adjudged by a court a short
time later." A general rule that emerges out of Mullane and subsequent
cases37 is that notice by publication or other forms of constructive
notice is not sufficient with respect to a person whose name and address
are known or easily ascertainable. The Court has taken a dim view of
notice by publication when it is the only notice given since it is wellsettled that mere newspaper publication rarely informs a landowner of
proceedings against his property. 8 Where the name, address, and interests of persons are unknown, however, necessity may require that the
state resort to other than direct notice.39
What compelling reasons could be given for not requiring personal
notice to a mortgagor before foreclosure of the deed of trust?" The
"Robinson v. Hanrahan, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972) (per curiam).
14Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
"E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S.
208 (1962); New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Ry., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
3E.g.,
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956).
39
E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1949): "This Court
has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute in another class of
cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning." The Court
in United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960), upheld the practice in Pennsylvania and California of foreclosing under a power of sale without giving actual notice to the United States Govern.
ment, which held a junior tax lien on the property. The case only discussed sovereign immunity
and did not expressly deal with the notice requirements of procedural due process. Apparently the
Court was fearful of the implications that a contrary result would have on property interests in
other states. Id. at 242.
"Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), held that in extraordinary situations a
summary procedure of foreclosure by the state may satisfy procedural due process even though
notice to the debtor was possible before the seizure. The Court found no extraordinary situation
requiring special protection for the state or the creditor in this particular case; the Court clearly
indicated that the requirements of due process might be relaxed if the right facts were before the
Court. Id. at 339.
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generally accepted reason for the popular use of a deed of trust as a
financing device is its advantages as an inexpensive and expeditious
method of foreclosure." Personal notice is said to add administrative
expenses to the sale and require a time-consuming search of courthouse
records. The mortgagor's rights are also said to be adequately protected
by the public's knowledge of the sale. 2 A defendant could further argue
that the added time and expense of personal notice could diminish credit
availability in North Carolina." In practical fact, however, it is usually
very simple to determine who the grantor is, who subsequent purchasers
may be, or the name of any junior lien holders by the use of the grantor
index at the courthouse. In the majority of cases very little time is
consumed in securing the information needed. Public knowledge of the
sale should in theory insure enough bidders to obtain a fair price, but
rarely does a foreclosure sale command a full market price.44 Even if
one concedes that the requirements of personal notice would cause additional expense and be time-consuming, such considerations are not sufficient to avoid the duty of adequate notice. 5 The Court has stated that
procedural due process was not intended to promote efficiency or to
accomodate all possible interests.4 Of course, the Court has never required that a party go through a great deal of formality to satisfy
procedural due process;4 7 in fact, it has suggested that a single letter may
often be sufficient.4 Clearly, under these conditions it could not be
contended that personal notice requirements would harm credit availability due to these extra "burdens" on the trustee and the creditor.
Defendant in Huggins argued that even if personal notice were
required, plaintiff contractually waived his right to personal notice in
1G.

OSBORNE, supra note 30, at 733.
The object of a deeds [sic] of trust is, by means of the introduction of trustees as
impartial agents of the creditor and debtor alike to provide a convenient, cheap and
speedy mode of satisfying debts on default of payment; to assure fair dealing and
eliminate the opportunity for oppression; to remove the necessity of the intervention of

the courts; and to facilitate the transfer of the note or notes secured without the necessity
for similar transfer of the security.
Mills v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 216 N.C. 664, 669, 6 S.E.2d 549, 552, (1940).
"Cotellesse, Nonjudicial Foreclosure under a Deed of Trust: Some Problems of Notice, 49
TEXAS L. REV. 1085, 1086 (1971).
3
See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 103 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
"Cotellesse, supra note 42, at 1086.
"E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971).
"6 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).

"E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
4"E.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 214 (1962).
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the deed of trust as it provided only for constructive notice upon default
and before foreclosure. The court of appeals determined that the waiver
was not constitutionally defective because plaintiff had failed to allege
that there existed unequal bargaining power or overreaching as between
the parties or that the waiver was not knowingly and intelligently
made. 9 Waiver of procedural due process rights in the civil area has
apparently been given a new breath of life as a result of two recent
United States Supreme Court decisions, D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co.5 and Swarb v. Lennox.5 ' Even though these two cases concerned
waiver of notice in general, rather than waiver of personal notice as in
Huggins, the same constitutional principles should apply. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals recognized this in Huggins by applying the
new tests for a valid waiver set up by the dictum of these cases.52
Working under the assumption that the standard of waiver in civil
cases would be no stricter than the standard used in the criminal cases,
the Court in Overmyer and Swarb discussed waiver in the light of
whether it was "voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made."5 Even
though the Court did not expressly hold that this test would be applied
in future civil litigation, the implication is there nonetheless and is further supported by dictum in Fuentes.4 The Court, however, did not limit
its discussion to these considerations. In Overmyer the Court found that
the waiver between the two corporations met this tough test, but placed
a caveat in the opinion as a warning to any future litigants that there
could be other factors that may affect the waiver standard.
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts of
other cases. For example, where the contract is one of adhesion, where

there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor
receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal consequences
may ensue. 5
These considerations proposed by the Overmyer Court were applied to the facts before the Court in Fuentes even though the case was
4113 N.C. App. at 679-80, 187 S.E.2d at 416.

"°405 U.S. 174 (1972).
51405 U.S. 191 (1972).
s213 N.C. App. at 679, 187 S.E.2d at 415.

-E.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S.at 185. For a good discussion of waiver of
procedural due process rights see Note, Constitutional Law-Cognovit Notes, Pretrial Waiver of
ConstitutionalRights in Civil Cases, 51 N.C.L. REv. 554 (1972).
1407 U.S. at 94-97.

-405 U.S. at 188.
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eventually decided on other grounds. 5 The Court took special note of
the fact that the terms of the agreement were part of a form contract:
"These terms are parts of printed form contracts appearing in relatively
small type and unaccompanied by any explanations clarifying their
meaning." 7 Due to this fact, the Court indicated that the waiver might
not have been "knowing and intelligently made." The Court went even
further and discussed the possibility that the waiver provision was also
a part of a contract of adhesion. The Court said, "There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the parties who, in any event, were
' The Court really did not have
far from equal in bargaining power."58
to decide either of these points since they decided that the purported
waiver clause was not in fact a valid waiver: "For a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least be clear. The contractual language relied upon does not, on its face even amount to a waiver
... . The contracts included nothing about the waiver of a prior hearing." (Emphasis by the Court.)59
The Court appears to be in the process of placing a heavy burden
on the creditor to show that the financing contract in fact contains a
valid waiver.6 In the future a creditor may be faced with three barriers
before a purported waiver will be sustained. First, the terms of the
instrument must clearly state that there is in fact a waiver. Secondly,
there must be a showing by the creditor that it was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Thirdly, the contract must not be the
result of unfair bargaining-i.e., a contract of adhesion.
Printed form mortgages or deeds of trust are commonly used in
North Carolina and elsewhere. Such a printed form was involved in Mr.
Huggins' loan with Central Finance Company. In light of the dictum
of Fuentes discussed above, there could be a question as to whether the
purported waiver in Huggins was in fact a waiver. The provision stated:
[I]t shall be lawful for and the duty of the Trustee to advertise at
the County Courthouse door in

. .

. County aforesaid for a time not

51See text accompanying note 59 infra.
1407 U.S. at 94.

VId. at 95.

"Id. at 95-96.
"ld. at 95: "The appellees made no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware
or made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon ... .
"Letter from Jacob W. Todd, attorney for the appellant, to the North Carolina Law Review,
January 15, 1973, with attached deed of trust identical to that used by the Central Finance
Company is on file with the North CarolinaLaw Review.

1120

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

less than 30 days, and in a newspaper published in

. .

[Vol. 51

.County once

a week for four consecutive weeks, therein appointing a day and place
of sale, and at such time and place to expose such lands and premises
at public sale to the highest bidder for cash, and upon such sale to
62
collect the purchase money and convey title to purchaser ....
The contractual language quoted does not "on its face even amount
to a waiver.""3 It does not expressly waive the grantor's right to personal notice, but only states the terms under which the trustee should
conduct the sale. Greater clarity may be needed before this would constitute a constitutionally effective waiver.
Furthermore, the mere fact that the language is contained in a
printed form in small print and is somewhat difficult to read for someone unaccustomed to legalistic prose may be important in deciding if
the waiver was knowing and intelligently made. The Supreme Court of
the United States appeared concerned with such factors in Fuentes:
The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales
contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The appellees [creditor]
made no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or
made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as a
waiver of constitutional rights.64
With the first two tests in question a creditor is still faced with the
third hurdle. The question of whether there is a contract of adhesion
would depend on the facts of each individual case. It should be'noted
that the Fuentes Court found "the parties

. . .

were far from equal in

bargaining power" 5 by the mere fact that one was a large corporation
and the other a consumer. The Court implied that such circumstances
alone may invalidate a contractual waiver, 6 but said that it was unnecessary to "canvass those consequences fully."6 7 Nevertheless, in the future
a trustee would be wise not to rely on the contractual terms of the deed
of trust to preclude a successful challenge to foreclosure.
The North Carolina Court has taken a very protective attitude
toward the duties of a trustee owed to the mortgagor and the way in
12Id. For an example of a typical form deed of trust see R. SIms & R. SIms, THE NORTH
537-44 (1951).
OFuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972).
"Id.
"Id.
'81d.
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which he must conduct the foreclosure sale.6" The courts have recognized that powers of sale in a mortgage or in a deed of trust provide an

excellent opportunity for oppression. As a result they scrutinize the
contract terms and the sale very closely to guarantee there is no variance

from the terms of the instrument. 9 The sale "must be made in strict

conformity with it"70 or a court of equity will step in and set aside the

sale. The courts were hesitant to allow non-judicial foreclosure but finally yielded after they reasoned that the mortgagor would be protected
by the presence of a third party trustee. 71 The courts in North Carolina

are inconsistent in pursuing this "protective policy," however. They
examine the foreclosure sales with a close eye when there is a challenge

for a hint of unfairness, yet they are not willing to do one thing that
could possibly assure a fair sale; require that the mortgagor be given
personal notice in order to allow him to protect his own interest. If the

mortgagor were given notice in a meaningful manner, the court would
closely or fear oppression since the parties could
not need to watch so
72

protect themselves.

Huggins v. DeMent represents a rule of law that not only may have

a short history because of serious constitutional questions,73 but appears to lack consistency with other attitudes of our court. Hopefully a

reconsideration of this issue by our court in the future will bring about
a different result. No matter what the current North Carolina position
is, however, foresighted creditors may wish to revaluate their procedures
in light of the newly emerging prejudice against the waiver of notice and
61E.g., Woodell v. Davis, 261 N.C. 160, 134 S.E.2d 160 (1964); Mills v. Mutual Bldg & Loan
Ass'n, 216 N.C. 664, 6 S.E.2d 549 (1940).
"Jenkins v. Griffin, 175 N.C. 184, 95 S.E. 166 (1918).
7
"Woodell v. Davis, 261 N.C. 160, 162, 134 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1964).
"Id. at 163, 134 S.E.2d at 163.
"Mills v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 216 N.C. 664, 6 S.E.2d 549 (1940). The North Carolina
statutes provide for several avenues for the mortgagor to protect his interests. For example, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.20 (Supp. 1971) provides for satisfaction of the debt before the sale. If the
obligation plus the expenses of the trustee are paid, the power of sale is terminated. In addition,
id. § 45-21.27 (Supp. 1971) allows any person to submit an upset bid on the property and thus
require it to be sold again. This procedure would allow the mortgagor to guarantee the highest
possible bid by bidding in himself.
"The equities in favor of a mortgagor who is in default are not as strong as that of a junior
lienholder. A mortgagor should in most cases know when he is in default and that some action
may be pending against him. With a junior lienholder however, there is very little way he can be
assured of notice of the default except by personal notice. This is not to say that both are not
entitled to notice because the defaulting mortgagor should at least be apprised of the place and
time of the sale.
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constructive notice as a substitute for direct notice. A change in procedure could avoid possible costly litigation and provide more stability in
future land conveyances that result from foreclosure sales.
WILLIAM

L.

TANKERSLEY III

VIII
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Governmental Immunity-A Wrong Step in the Right Direction
An explosion on a September morning in 1969 in a supply area of
the Winston-Salem National Guard Armory brought death and serious
injury to nine people. The explosion was caused by accumulated methane gas that escaped from the city's sanitary landfill. The North Carolina Supreme Court in Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem' refused to
permit a governmental immunity defense and found the city liable for
negligent operation of the landfill. That operation was classified a proprietary function, unprotected by immunity, because the city received
special "corporate benefit or pecuniary profit ' 2 from a contract to dispose of garbage from outside the city limits. The process used to reach
this decision illustrates the problems caused by North Carolina's continued adherence to the governmental immunity doctrine and the extent
to which the doctrine has withstood pressures for reform.
An ancient tenet of tort theory, that liability follows from a negligently sustained injury,3 and the modern convenience of spreading loss
among those best able to sustain it, facilitated by the purchase of liability insurance,4 are cumulative forces eroding the once well-established
foundation of governmental immunity. Rationally, the doctrine emanates from the medieval precept that "the king can do no wrong." 5 No
1280 N.C. 513, 530, 186 S.E.2d 897, 908 (1972).
1d.
3
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 20, 163 N.E.2d 89, 93
(1959); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376, 1377 (1939). Immunity was originally thought not to be affected
by this concept because governmental negligence was not a legally recognized wrong or dainnunt
absque injuria. David, Tort Liability of Local Government:Alternatives to Immunity from Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1, 3 (1959).
4
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 290-92, 118 N.W.2d 795, 802-03 (1962).
See generallyGibbons, LiabilityInsuranceand the Tort Immunity ofState and Local Government,
1959 DUKE L.J. 588, 590.
51 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *241-42; see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34
YALE L.J. 1 (1924).
2
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suit could be instituted against the English monarch because no court

could acquire jurisdiction over him, for all jurisdiction implies superiority of power.' The transplantation of this personalized form of immunity

into a democracy whose precepts condemn such ideas has met severe
criticism. 7 Historically, governmental immunity first became a recog-

nized defense in the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon8 where an
unincorporated county escaped liability for injury caused by a faulty
bridge.' Since its introduction into this country in 1812,1" governmental
immunity from tort has become the law in every state. 1
Most authorities agree that the traditional common-law basis of

governmental immunity will not support its viability today.' 2 If private
corporations can prosper without such protection, it is argued, municipalities should also be able to survive. 3 Additionally, it is inequitable
that an individual should suffer so that the public will not be inconvenienced." Despite these criticisms, stare decisis and inertia appear to be
the primary obstacles to reform."
' It is argued, conversely, that complete abrogation of the doctrine
is unwarranted for the following reasons. Municipal corporations
6W.BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *242; Borchard, supra note 5, at 4.
"'The difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that we consider ourselves bound by the fetters of a
medieval doctrine, often regarded as having the institutional impregnability of an article of faith,
which never had much, if any justification, and that legislatures have been unwilling to reexamine
the whole subject from the point of view of theory and history, in order to bring the law into
harmony with the practical exigencies of modern life." Borchard, supra note 5, at 3. The Supreme
Court has declared that the doctrine "the King can do no wrong" has no application in the United
States. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879).
8100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
'Critics of the doctrine recognize the anomaly that municipal immunity should derive from a
case concerning an unincorporated county instead of a municipality. See Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No.
302, 18 III. 2d 11,
12, 163 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1959).
"Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
"See, e.g., Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort (pts. I-IV), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229
(1924-1925), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927).
"See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 388-89, 381 P.2d 107, 110
(1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 215-16, 359 P.2d 457, 459-60, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 91-92 (1961).
"Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 259, 111 N.W.2d 1, 24-25 (1961) (Edwards,

J.).
"See Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 387-88, 381 P.2d 107, 109 (1963).
"Cf. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 33-36, 115 N.W.2d 618, 621-23 (1962). See
also Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 270, 111 N.W.2d 1, 12 (1961) (Black, J.); Note,
Torts-JudicialAbrogation of the Doctrine of Municipal Immunity to Tort Liability, 41 N.C.L.
REV. 290 (1963).

1124

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

should not be subjected to the same rules that determine liabilityfor the
private sector" because governmental functions are exposed to situations of more potential risk than private entities, and the public benefit
derived from these services necessitates special protection. 7 Functions
such as fire protection and those requiring the discretion of public agents
in executing police powers should be protected from fear of excessive
liability. Since the profit motivation of other corporations is superseded
by the need for public services that the municipality is statutorily required to perform, exposure to standard liability would be improper."8
There has been a pervasive reluctance to abandon immunity caused
by fear of what liability would bring. Nevertheless, the scope of the
doctrine has been gradually restricted. The first qualification of the
doctrine was a distinction between governmental and proprietary functions." Succinctly stated, when the function is governmental, public,
legislative, judicial, or discretionary, immunity precludes liability.
When it is proprietary, private, corporate, or municipal, the cloak of
immunity is dropped.20 While acting in its governmental capacity, the
municipality is acting as an agent of the state, partaking of its immunity
and protected from suit unless legislative consent is given. While per"Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability:A Public Policy Prospectus,10 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
463, 468-69 (1963); Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity, 36 So.

L. REV. 161 (1963). This principle finds elaboration in concrete arguments that liability could
bankrupt small muncipalities (cf.State v. Hill, 54 Ala. 67 (1875)) and that taxes are appropriated
for public purposes with no allowance for tort damages (Taylor v. Westerfield, 233 Ky. 619, 26
CAL.

S.W.2d 557 (1930)).
"Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 919,
922 (1966).
"Id. at 923.

"After an enormous amount of litigation on what is a proprietary function or a
governmental function, these may now be classified within broad limits: activities of fire

protection, police, education, and general government are governmental; municipal railways, airports, gas, water, and light systems are proprietary; activities involving streets,
sidewalks, playgrounds, bridges, viaducts, and sewers are governmental in some jurisdic-

tions and proprietary in others.
Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 437, 442 (1940); see
Seasongood, Municipal Corporations:Objections to the Governmental or ProprietaryTest, 22 VA.
L. REV. 910 (1936).

"In addition to the difficulty of classifying a function as governmental or proprietary, further
confusion arises in failure to distinguish these functions by the authority that municipal agents
exercise in performing them. When the distinction is made, functions are divided into discretionary-where immunity applies-and ministerial-where liability is imposed. Dodridge, Distinction
Between Governmental and ProprietaryFunctionsof Municipal Corporations,23 MicH. L. REV.

325 (1925).
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forming a function for corporate instead of public benefit, it is exercis-

by the state without the protection of its sovering a privilege granted
21
eign immunity.

22
Immunity is also restricted where insurance exists to cover loss

or where liability can be established on a nuisance theory for recovery

for property damage.2? Courts in recent years have strictly construed
the rule, and in most close cases liability is imposed. 24 Finally, the trend

of extending liability has gained such momentum that a growing minority of states have severely criticized the basis of immunity, limited its
scope, or abandoned it entirely.25 The doctrine was initially abandoned

in 1957 where the Florida Supreme Court, in Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach,2' stated that "[w]e

. .

.feel that the time has arrived to

declare this doctrine anachoristic [sic] not only to our system of justice
but to our traditional concepts of democratic government."' '

Failing to

be deterred by the absence of legislative initiative, the most frequently
quoted deterrent to judicial abrogation, the court indicated that it
"should be alive to the demands of justice. We can see no necessity for

insisting on legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves
2

1d. at 333. "The outstanding single fact about the whole batch of opinions is the virtual
unanimity of all the participating judges in the belief that movement away from sovereign immunity is desirable." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 25.02, at 469 (3d ed. 1972).
"Hall County v. Loggins, 110 Ga. App. 432, 138 S.E.2d 699 (1964); cf. Garrison v. Community Consol. School Dist., 34 11. App. 2d 322, 181 N.E.2d 360 (1962). But see Galligan v. Town
of Chapel Hill, 276 N.C. 172, 171 S.E.2d 427 (1970).
"Downey v. Jackson, 259 Ala. 189, 65 So. 2d 825 (1953) (per curiam); Wheaton v. City of
Putnam, 126 Conn. 330, 11 A.2d 358 (1940).
"Erickson v. Fitzgerald, 342 Ill. App. 223, 96 N.E.2d 382 (1950); Both v. Collins, 339 I11.
App.
437, 90 N.E.2d 285, 287 (1950); Brown v. City of Sioux City, 242 Iowa 1196, 49 N.W.2d 853

(1951).

25

City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962); Stone v. Arizona Highway
Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968);
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Evans v.
Board of County Comm'rs, Colo.
, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970); Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Perkins v. State,
252 Ind. 549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969); Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969); Haney v.
City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111
N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);
Johnson v. Municipal Univ., 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969); Willis v. Department of
Conservation & Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I.
562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 155 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
2896 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
"Id. at 132.
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originated. 128 Sixteen other jurisdictions subsequently echoed this ra29
tionale.
The development of governmental immunity in North Carolina
parallels this characteristic metamorphosis, but lags behind those jurisdictions that have allowed the doctrine to complete its evolution and
come to rest beside other worn-out relics in the common-law graveyard.
0
The problem was first encountered in Meares v. City of Wilmington"
in 1848 when the court found liability for injury caused by negligent
street construction and repair and recognized that instead of enjoying
the immunity of the sovereign as a subdivision of the state, the municipal corporation by exercising governmental power, received a special
benefit for which it should bear responsibility."1 No attempt was made
to classify the function as governmental or proprietary.
By 1889, however, the immunity doctrine, embellished with the
governmental-proprietary dichotomy, became firmly established in
Moffitt v. City of Asheville." Significantly, Moffitt cites Meares with
approval and interprets its as authority for use of the governmentalproprietary distinction.33 The doctrine as articulated in Moffitt has
remained essentially the same, but the court has also relied on a pecuniary benefit test where the classification of a municipal function as governmental or proprietary ultimately rests upon whether the city operates
%Id.
"Cases cited supra note 25.
-31 N.C. 73 (1848). North Carolina adopted the common law at the time of the Declaration
of Independence, several years prior to Russell, English precedent for the doctrine. Ch. 5, §§ i, 2,
[1778] N.C. Sess. L. 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 162 (W. Clark ed. 1905).
3131 N.C. at 80. The grant of power from the sovereign is "accepted because of the benefit
which the corporation expects to derive. . . by making it more convenient for the individuals...
to pass . . . in the transaction of business, and to benefit them by holding out greater inducement
for others to frequent the town and thereby add to its business." Id.
32103 N.C. 237, 254, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889):
The liability of cities and towns for the negligence of their officers or agents. . . depends
on the nature of the power that the corporation is exercising, when the damage complained of is sustained. A town acts in the dual capacities of an imperium in liperlo,
exercising governmental duties, and of a private corporation enjoying powers and privileges conferred for its own benefit.
When such municipal corporations are acting (within the purview of their authority)
in their ministerial or corporate character in the management of property for their own
benefit, or in the exercise of power, assumed voluntarily for their own advantage, they
are impliedly liable for damage caused by the negligence of officers or agents, subject
to their control, although they may be engaged in some work that will inure to the
general benefit of the municipality.
wid.
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the function for profit.3 4 After immunity became established, advocates

who suggested governmental liability met rebuffs such as that found in
Hines v. City of Rocky Mount:35 "The principle [of governmental
liability] . . .cannot fail to produce evils much more intolerable than

any that can possibly arise from [continued immunity]. It must necessarily become the prolific parent of a vast mass of litigation which the

municipality can respond to only by taxation, imposed alike on the
innocent and the guilty."

Yet in 1951 the General Assembly statutorily empowered municipalities to waive immunity by securing liability insurance against automobile accidents.3 6 Waiver became effective only to the extent of insur-

ance obtained, but acquisition of insurance was deemed a waiver in the
absence of affirmative action to the contrary by the city.37 Although

the doctrine has been legislatively modified, a bill introduced in 1971
to abolish governmental immunity completely was defeated.3 8 The

North Carolina Supreme Court, when it last discussed the possibility
of judicial abrogation, stated that "[i]t may well be that the logic of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is unsound and that the reasons which
led to its adoption are not as forceful today as they were when it was
adopted. However . . .we feel that any further modification or the

repeal of the doctrine of sovereign'39 immunity should come from the
General Assembly, not this court.

Since North Carolina firmly adheres to the governmental immunity doctrine, one may question why Winston-Salem was subjected to
liability when it performed a public service authorized by state statute.

The Koontz court conceded that North Carolina is among a majority
of states that recognize the rule that collection, removal, and disposition
3

See, e.g., Glenn v. City of Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 98 S.E.2d 913 (1957); McCombs v. City
of Asheboro, 6 N.C. App. 234, 170 S.E.2d 169 (1969). For other jurisdictions that follow this
doctrine see notes 51-53 infra.
-162 N.C. 409, 413, 78 S.E. 510, 511 (1913).
"Ch. 1015, § 1, [1951] N.C. Sess. L. 1007 (repealed 1971).
"Id. For an interpretation of the statute see Galligan v. Town of Chapel Hill, 276 N.C. 172,
171 S.E.2d 427 (1970). Examples of other governmental entities that can waive immunity by
purchase of insurance include city and county boards of education (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-53
(1966)), and boards of trustees of community colleges (id. § 115A-17 (1966)). The 1971 General
Assembly enacted a revised provision for municipal corporations that eliminated several statutes
imposing governmental liability. Ch. 698, §§ 1-2, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. 724 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 160A (1972)).
"Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971).

39Id.
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of garbage by a municipality within its territorial limits constitutes a
governmental function 0 because the municipality is acting as an administrative agency of the state in the interest of the public health and
general welfare." A minorityof states recognize the function as proprietary because the duty rested originally on the individual property owner
and was assumed by the municipality merely for the convenience of its
citizens.4 2 However, instead of imposing liability by adopting the minority view, the court pursued the governmental-proprietary dichotomy
further and analyzed the situation under the pecuniary benefit principle.
The city had contracted with Forsyth County to dispose of the
garbage of nearby county residents by utilizing private collectors hired
pursuant to the agreement. For this service the city received one dollar
per ton of garbage to cover the cost of disposal. By electing to contract
with the county, the city chose not to utilize a state statute that authorized removal of garbage from an area within a mile of the city limits.43
The statute provided that county inhabitants responsible for the garbage
were to bear the expense of collection and that, in default, a lien could
be attached to their property and collected as unpaid taxes.44
The court concluded that collecting the county garbage by contract
through private collectors "avoided the possibility of having to collect
the cost of removal" and the "possibility of litigation to enforce the lien
provided by the statute. 41 5 Payments made by the county for disposal
of its garbage equalled only 9.39 percent of the city's cost for the landfill
operation. 6 Cumulatively however, these factors were sufficient to
transform a traditionally governmental function into one that "inured
to the City's special corporate benefit"47 and fell within the proprietary
classification, unprotected by immunity.
40280 N.C. at 520-21, 186 S.E.2d at 903. For decisions that classify the function as governmental, see Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.2d 195 (1950); Broome v. City of
Charotte, 208 N.C. 729, 182 S.E. 325 (1935); Parks-Belk Co. v. City of Concord, 194 N.C. 134,
138 S.E. 599 (1927); Scales v. City of Winston-Salem, 189 N.C. 469, 127 S.E. 543 (1925). In
addition, see note 19 supra.
'E. MCQUILLIN, 18 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.46 (3d ed. 1963).
42
1d.

3
The city had authority "summarily to remove, abate or remedy . . . everything in the city
limits, or within a mile of such limits, which is dangerous or prejudicial to the public health; and
the expense of such action shall be paid by the person in default, and, if not paid, shall be a lien

upon the land or premises where the trouble arose, and shall be collected as unpaid taxes." Ch.
136, sub. ch. 7, § 4 [1917] N.C. Sess. L. 197 (repealed 1971).
"Id.
11280 N.C. at 528-29, 186 S.E.2d at 908.
"Id. at 529, 186 S.E.2d at 908.
11Id. In so concluding, no reliance was placed on that part of plaintiff's complaint urging the
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The court rejected the city's arguments that a function primarily
governmental fails to become proprietary by incidental corporate benefit48 or that removal of garbage for a fee that covers only collection and
disposal does not transform its governmental character." Instead it
relied on precedent establishing that a function primarily governmental
could become proprietary by sufficient operation for pecuniary profit."
The cases cited, however, do not establish the amount of revenue necessary to change the function from governmental to proprietary. By the
standard of one court a function became proprietary when operated
"principally for municipal purposes, but a substantial portion.

. .

as a

of revenue." 5 '

source
By another standard a function escaped a governmental classification when "conducted primarily as a work of the town
.. .but in part as a source of income. ' 52 By a third "liability has been
maintained although the work . . .was only partly . . .a business

enterprise, being incidental both to public and to commercial undertakings." The different criteria established by each court illustrate the
arbitrary and unpredictable nature of the pecuniary benefit test.
Although it is frequently stated that actual profit is not the controlling factor,54 the only theoretical basis offered to support the pecuniary
benefit rule is that tax dollars raised to finance governmental functions
should not be diverted to satisfy the claims of accident victims.5 Where
the municipal function returns a profit, however, there is money to
which a judgment can attach without depletion of public funds. The
victim is compensated and the public is not unduly burdened. This
rationale breaks down when profit is so minimal that funds for the
satisfaction of judgments derive primarily from tax appropriations."
The inevitable conclusion is that the distinction is motivated by a desire
to restrict immunity rather than adherence to an underlying principle
of law. The benefits that inure to Winston-Salem pursuant to its confunction to be classified proprietary because the city sold portions of the landfill property for a

profit in excess of $200,000. Id. at 523, 186 S.E.2d at 904.

"Id.

at 521-22, 186 S.E.2d at 903-04.

gid.
wId. at 523-26, 186 S.E.2d at 904-07.
"Oliver v. City of Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 502 (1869).
52Duggan v. Inhabitants of Peabody, 187 Mass. 349, 350, 73 N.E. 206, 207 (1904).
"Haley v. City of Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 293, 77 N.E. 888, 889 (1906).

"4280 N.C. at 521-22, 186 S.E.2d at 903-04.
55See note 16 supra.
5"Warden v. City of Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 252-53, 128 S.E. 375, 377 (1925).
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tract with Forsyth County are too intangible and insignificant to be
treated as a source of money to satisfy negligence claims or to transform
the garbage disposal function into a proprietary function.
The court states in Koontz that it stands at a "crossroads" created
by its application of the various rules of governmental immunity. A
truer analysis is that it has long since chosen the wrong exit. Lost now
amid the rules of immunity, the court has paradoxically traveled down
the blind alley marked "governmental function" hoping to find a way
to compensate a victim. Since this destination is accessible only by the
proprietary route, the last alternative to circumventing the dilemma is
by resort to the pecuniary benefit detour, which proves a tenuous path
to follow.
Shackled by the harsh and arbitrary results of the immunity doctrine, the court has resorted to legal fictions and artifical distinctions
that leave the immunity doctrine in hopeless confusion. After Koontz,
what victim of municipal negligence will fail to litigate a remotely colorable claim knowing the court's willingness to twist the governmentalproprietary distinction to reach an equitable result? Any protection of
municipal funds provided by immunity from suit will be dissipated by
costly fees that arise from this invitation to litigate. The logical alternative is to reexamine the immunity doctrine in North Carolina.
Reexamination or association of governmental immunity can be
successfully accomplished. The fears that have thwarted judicial action
have proved largely unfounded in jurisdictions that have abandoned the
doctrine. 8 There is little evidence of municipal insolvency or reduced
efficiency when liability is imposed. 9 Judicial initiative has often become a catalyst to legislative response and elaborate statutory provisions covering the extent of liability."
A frequent approach to abrogation of immunity is to overrule the
doctrine prospectively. 1 Exception is made for the plaintiff instituting
11280 N.C. at 529, 186 S.E.2d at 908.
"David, supra note 3, at 53; Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 921. But see Kennedy & Lynch,
supra note 16, at 178.
"David, supra note 3, at 53; Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 921. But see Kennedy & Lynch,
supra note 16, at 178.
"aVan Alstyne, supra note 17, at 979; Note, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governnen.
tal Immunity, 1964 DuKE L.J. 888.

"See, e.g., Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Molitor v. Kancland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 III. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d
26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
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the suit to reward him for attempting to alter an inequitable rule and
to prevent the reversal from becoming mere dictum.62 Some courts delay
the date when the rule becomes effective to allow the municipality to
make financial adjustments.6 3 Other decisions make the change subject
to any subsequent alterations that the legislature may seek to impose. 4
In addition, precautions to reduce the likelihood that liability will
restrict the beneficial contributions of the municipal corporation to the
public have been suggested.65 In processing claims, provision should be
made for prompt notice after the occurence of an accident, reduction
of the usual statute of limitations, maximum limits of the amount of
municipal liability, establishment of a special claims court, possible
elimination of jury trial, and continuation of immunity in some areas
for limited periods." In order that small municipalities avoid the risk
of bankruptcy, provisions could be made for payment of claims over a
period of years or by bond issue. These provisions can successfully deal
with those situations where complete liability would hinder municipal
activity.
Governmental immunity is a doctrine of uncertain origin and questionable validity. 8 Attempts to avoid the harsh results of immunity in
North Carolina have resulted in fictions and distinctions that preclude
the governmental-proprietary dichotomy from being a tool of useful
application. By hinging liability upon a contingent municipal convenience of a service primarily performed for public betterment, the Supreme Court in Koontz has presented a decision that graphically indicates that the time to reexamine the governmental immunity doctrine
has arrived.
EDWARD
2

See, e.g.,
89, 97 (1959).
"Johnson
Milwaukee,
17
84
Evans v.

S.

FINLEY, JR.

Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 28, 163 N.E.2d

v. Municipal Univ., 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969); Holytz v. City of
Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
Board of County Comm'rs, - Colo. _
482 P.2d 968 (1971); Spanel v.
Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I.
562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970).
3K. DAVIS, supra note 21, § 25.05, at 480.
6
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 293, 118 N.W.2d 795, 804 (1962).
"'David, supra note 3, at 44-45.
"In interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act which abandons immunity and establishes a
discretionary-ministerial test for determining liability the Supreme Court warns that:
the "non-governmental"-"governmental" quagmire. . . has long plagued the law of
municipal corporations. A comparative study of the cases in the. . . States will disclose
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Spot and Contract Zoning-An Appeal for Clarity
Three recent North Carolina Supreme Court cases illustrate the
confusion surrounding the existing law of spot zoning and contract
zoning in the state. In two of them, Allred v. City ofRaleighI and Blades
v. City of Raleigh,2 the rezoning was held invalid, while in the third,
Allgood v. Town of Tarboro,3 the court upheld the validity of the
zoning ordinance. In each case the court dealt with the problem of spot
zoning,4 and in two of them the court found unlawful contract zoning.'
The holdings point to a confused test of spot zoning and to an overextension of the doctrine of contract zoning. The interested parties in
the typical challenge to rezoning are the developer, the city council, and
the neighboring property owners, and they have all been hurt to some
extent by the current uncertain status of the zoning law. The commercial
developer may be reluctant to invest in real property development; the
city council may be inhibited when it considers possible amendments for
the purpose of orderly growth; and the inconsistent standards of spot
zoning may encourage costly and unsuccessful challenges by neighboring property owners.
In Allred a 9.26-acre tract situated near the Beltline in Raleigh had
been rezoned from single-family residences (R-4) to apartment-type
dwellings (R-10).' Property owners in the neighborhood were successful
in an action for a declaratory judgment ruling the ordinance invalid. The
North Carolina Supreme Court found that the City Council had rezoned the property in expectation that luxury apartments would be
constructed on the property and had not predicated the change in zoning
upon existing conditions that would warrant a change for all possible
an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the decisions in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply a rule of law that is
inherently unsound. The fact of the matter is that the theory whereby municipalities arc
made amenable to liability in an endeavor, however awkward and contradictory, to
escape from the basic historical doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).
1277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
2280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972).
3281 N.C. 430, 189 S.E.2d 255 (1972).
'Allgood v. Town of Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 442, 189 S.E.2d 255, 263 (1972); Blades v. City
of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 7 N.C. App.
602, 608, 173 S.E.2d 533, 536 (1970).
5Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 550, 187 S.E.2d 35, 46 (1972); Allred v. City of
Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 545, 178 S.E.2d 432, 440 (1971).
'277 N.C. at 533-36, 178 S.E.2d at 433-35.
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uses in an R-10
district. The court held this to be contract zoning and
7
thus, invalid.
In Blades a five-acre tract located in an attractive residential section in Raleigh near North Hills Shopping Center was rezoned from R4 to R-6 to allow the construction of townhouses.8 As in Allred, the local
owners successfully obtained a declaratory judgment ruling the zoning
ordinance invalid. The court in Blades found that isolating this tract
from the surrounding area so as to impose fewer restrictions was spot
zoning? The court also found that contract zoning existed as in Allred
and that the ordinance was invalid for both reasons.' 0
In Allgood, however, local property owners were unsuccessful in
voiding a zoning change that had permitted the completed construction
of a shopping center in Tarboro. The property in question was located
between two major highways, and the court found that under this condition there was no spot zoning because zoning the property to permit the
shopping center would have been permissible when that area was first
zoned."
The restriction of land uses through zoning was held constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in 1926 in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.' There the Supreme Court rejected the "taking
without due process" argument and an argument based upon equal
protection."
The North Carolina General Assembly, through enabling legislation, has delegated the authority to zone to the local level of government.14 When a city council acts on a zoning question, it acts legislatively, and no comprehensive review by the courts is possible. 5 A prelid. at 544-45, 178 S.E.2d at 440-41.

1280 N.C. at 535, 187 S.E.2d at 37.
11d. at 549, 187 S.E.2d at 45.
'lId. at 550, 187 S.E.2d at 46.
1281 N.C. at 442, 189 S.E.2d at 263.
12272 U.S. 365 (1926).

'1d.at 384.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1972): "For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals,
or the general welfare of the community, any city is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict
the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures . ... "

Id.

§§ 160A-382 to -387 (1972) further define the zoning power delegated and how it must be

used.
,5In re Markham, 259 N.C. 566, 571, 131 S.E.2d 329, 333 (1963).
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body concerning
the wisdom of imposing restrictions upon the use of properties within that body's legisla-

tive jurisdiction. The court may, however, inquire into procedures followed by the board
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sumption of validity attaches which the plaintiff must overcome in order
to prove the invalidity of the ordinance."0 Even though residents of a
municipality often rely on the established zoning patterns, they have no
vested right in the prior zoning and the city may amend its ordinance
in the best interests of the public.17
Spot Zoning

The two major categories of unlawful zoning amendments are spot
zoning and contract zoning. The objection to spot zoning is a constitutional one: that the zoning amendment is beyond the scope of the enabling act. The pertinent enabling language is:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general
welfare of the community, any city is hereby empowered to regulate
and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and
other structures .... 18
Zoning regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan ....

1

Thus an amendment that is classified as spot zoning is invalid on the
basis that it is not substantially related to the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare or is out of harmony with the comprehensive zoning of the city.20 The basic problem with the legal doctrine of
spot zoning is that "spot zoning" is itself merely a label that does little
to classify valid amendments and invalid amendments. One man's
"spot" is arguably another man's "small area." In order to clarify this
concept, the North Carolina courts must define spot zoning so that
interested parties, especially local city councils, will be able to make
reasonable judgments 21as to whether a proposed amendment will be later
upheld by the courts.
at the hearing before it and determine whether the ordinance was adopted in violation
of required procedures, or is arbitrary and without reasonable basis in view of the
established circumstances.
Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 550-51, 187 S.E.2d 35, 46 (1972) (citations omitted).
"Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 651, 122 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1961).
"Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 434, 160 S.E.2d 325, 330-31 (1968).

"N.C.

GEN. STAT. §

160A-381 (1972).

1id. § 160A-383 (1972).
2See 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 8-3, at 363 (3d ed. 1965); text accompany18-19 supra.
ing notes
2
'Although the size of the area affected by the proposed change has some influence on the issue,
the tract in Walker v. Town of Elkin, 254 N.C. 85, 119 S.E.2d 1 (1961), was 3.56 acres, a smaller
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To this date, no comprehensive guideline has been set forth by the
courts. Blades and Allgood illustrate this lack of clarity. The court in
Blades defined spot zoning as a
zoning ordinance, or amendment, which singles out and reclassifies a
relatively small tract owned by a single person and surrounded by a
much larger area uniformly zoned, so as to impose upon the small tract
greater restrictions than those imposed upon the larger area, or so as
to relieve the22small tract from restrictions to which the rest of the area
is subjected.

In applying this definition the court looked only to the fact that the
relatively small tract affected by the amendment was isolated from the
surrounding area.? The court, however, could have applied a seemingly
different standard that had been established earlier in Walker v. Town
of Elkin 4 and which was later quoted in Allgood:
"Different conclusions have been reached on seemingly similar factual
situations. We think the basic rule to determine the validity of an
amending ordinance is the same rule used to determine the validity of
the original ordinance. The legislative body must act in good faith. It
cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously. If the conditions existing at the
time of the proposed change are such as would have originallyjustified
the proposed action, the legislative body has the power to act.'" '
The court in Allgood found that the two enlarged highways with heavier
traffic that surrounded the tract in question were
also sufficient to support his [trial judge] conclusion that if the 1971
area than that condemned in Blades, yet the court in Walker ruled that there was no spot zoning.
Compliance with the comprehensive plan of the municipality is a statutory requirement, so that
the Planning Commission's recommendations might have some influence on the court's disposition
of the contested amendment, but in Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325
(1968), the court found no spot zoning even though the Planning Commission had declined to
recommend the zoning change.
The chief factual distinction between the recent cases ruling that there was no spot zoning and
Blades, where the court found spot zoning, is the presence of a major highway either abutting the
property (Walker) or somewhat surrounding the property (Allgood and Zopfi). However, the court
has not explained the significance of a highway as it should apply to the legal issue of spot zoning.
2 2 80 N.C. at 549, 187 S.E.2d at 45. The court cited Zopfi as authority for this definition, but
Zopfi's language is that spot zoning arbitrarilysingles out the small area, and this difference is
much more than merely semantic. 273 N.C. at 437, 160 S.E.2d at 332.
"280 N.C. at 549, 187 S.E.2d at 45.
24254 N.C. 85, 89, 118 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1961).
z'Allgood v. Town of Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 443, 189 S.E.2d 255, 263 (1972) (citation
omitted) (emphasis by the court).
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conditions "had existed at the time of the 1963 Land Development
Plan and the adoption of the Zoning Ordinanceon January 14, 1963,

the Town Council of the Town of Tarboro would have been justified
at that time in zoning the area in question B-3, Community Shopping
District .
"2...
6

The Allgood standard seems more sophisticated because the court
is willing to look beyond the fact that there is a small area that is
rezoned and to examine the surrounding circumstances to see if the
zoning change is reasonable in light of these conditions. Thus the
Allgood standard perpetuates the presumption of legislative validity, 7
while the Blades definition appears to create a counter-presumption that
any small tract zoning is ipso facto invalid.
The significance of Blades and Allgood lies in the different standards applied. The Raleigh City Council in Blades listed in detail the
reasons it had approved the zoning change. These reasons were (1)
increased traffic conditions, (2) commercial zoning of abutting property,
and (3) need for luxury townhouses in Raleigh." Despite the presumption of validity and the rule that the judiciary must not substitute its own
judgment for that of the legislature, the court closely analyzed those
reasons and found them to be insubstantial.2 Although a careful reading
of the court's reasoning in Blades might lead the reader to conclude that
the stated reasons for the ordinance were indeed inconsequential, if the
court had applied the standard used in Allgood," the result might well
have been different.
Contract Zoning

Contract zoning has been held invalid on the ground that when it
2

1d. at 442, 189 S.E.2d at 263 (emphasis by the court).

7See AlIgood v. Town of Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 189 S.E.2d 255 (1972); Zopfi v. City or
Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968); Walker v. Town of Elkin, 254 N.C, 85, 118
S.E.2d 1 (1961).
21280 N.C. at 547, 187 S.E.2d at 44.

"The increase in volume of traffic along Lassiter Mill Road is obviously due largely
to the extensive residential construction throughout this area following the adoption of
the original zoning ordinance. ...
The record shows there has been no rezoning of abutting properties from R-4 uses
to commercial uses since the enactment of the original ordinance. ...

If the need for additional luxurious town houses in Raleigh be a change in conditions since the adoption of the original ordinance in 1958, nothing in the record shows
a need for such land use in this particular area.
Id. at 547-48, 187 S.E.2d at 44-45.
3'See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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adopts zoning, a municipality is engaged in legislating and not in con-

tracting with particular property owners."' This idea can be best explained in terms of an illustration. The owner of an undeveloped parcel

of land seeks rezoning to accomplish a more favorable use of his land,
but traditional rezoning might result in hardship to his neighbors or a

burden upon the city. That is, when a zoning change is made, all uses
legislatively permissible in the new zone must be thereafter allowed. For
instance, a developer owning property in an area zoned for single-family

residences may wish to construct luxury apartments, but in order to do
so, the land must be zoned to allow all apartments. The neighboring

property owners are favorably disposed toward his development, but are
unalterably opposed to general apartment construction. The city council, on the other hand, sees a need for a greater variety of apartments

in the city and wants to be assured that if the area is rezoned, it will be
developed according to the plans it has examined. To solve this problem,
some states have permitted local legislatures to exact promises or performances from the developer in return for the requested change. 2

"contract zoning" and has been ruled
Such an arrangement is labelled
33
Carolina.
North
in
invalid
3t

Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 545, 178 S.E.2d 432, 440 (1971); Marren v.
Gamble, 237 N.C. 680, 684, 75 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1953).
The general reasoning by the courts is that contracting with property owners would be a
compromise of governmental powers, because the government would be giving away some of its
police power. See Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore,
219 Md. 164, 170, 148 A.2d 429, 433 (1959). However, the New York courts have allowed contract
zoning and in Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d
866, 869 (1960), the court answered this very question:
All legislation "by contract" is invalid in the sense that a Legislature cannot bargain
away or sell its powers. But we deal here with actualities, not phrases. To meet increasing
needs of Suffolk County's own population explosion, and at the same time to make as
gradual and as little an annoyance as possible the change from residence to business on
the main highways, the Town Board imposes conditions. There is nothing unconstitutional about it.
Another barrier to contract zoning is found in the enabling legislation in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-382 (1972): "All regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building
throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts."
However, California has the same statutory language at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65852 (West 1954),
and the courts there have allowed contract zoning to stand. E.g., Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 419, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 (1969).
32
E.g., Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, 197 Kan. 731, 421 P.2d 213 (1966); Sylvania Elec.
Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962); Church v. Town of Islip, 8
N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
For a thorough analysis of contract and conditional zoning in California, see Note, Contract
and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexibility, 23 HAST. L.J. 825 (1972).
"Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 545, 178 S.E.2d 432, 440 (1971).
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The status of the law surrounding contract zoning presents a problem similar to that of spot zoning, as the parties learned in Allred and
Blades. Allred is an important addition to the law of contract zoning,
because the court there did not find an express agreement between the
Council and the developer as to particular construction for the zoning
change, but instead examined the minutes of the Council meeting to
infer a contract:
Consideration of the minutes of the Planning Commission and of
the City Council show beyond doubt that the City Council did not
determine that the 9.26-acre tract and the existing circumstances justified the rezoning of the 9.26-acre tract so as to permit all uses permissible in an R-10 district. On the contrary, it appears clearly that the
ground on which the City Council based its action was its approval of
the specific plans of the applicant to construct on the 9.26-acre tract
"luxury apartments . . . in twin high-rise towers."
• . .Rezoning must be effected by the exercise of legislative
power rather than by special arrangements with the owner of a particular tract or parcel of land. 4
The court in Blades cited the above-quoted passage and held that
"it is quite apparent that the amending ordinance was adopted solely
because the applicant convinced the Council that it would use the property for the construction of town houses as specifically described."35
However, in so doing, the court ignored the trial judge, who had found
that the Council had considered the change for all uses permissible in
the new zone:
"That among the matter presented for consideration by the City
Council *** were the following:
"d) The right of an owner of property, which is zoned R-6, to
use the property for a sanitorium, rest home or for temporary sale of
Christmas trees.
"e) That there would be no increase in traffic on the road net
around the property as a result of any of the uses permitted in an R-6
zone as compared with the uses permitted in an R-4 zone.
"f) The adequacy of utilities in the area for any use in either an
R-4 or R-6 zone."3
3
11d.

at 544-45, 178 S.E.2d at 440-41 (emphasis by the court).
"280 N.C. at 549-50, 187 S.E.2d at 46.
33Id. at 541, 187 S.E.2d at 41 (emphasis added).
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The developer who has presented plans to a local council in an application for rezoning must now fear that the North Carolina Supreme Court
will infer a contract as in Allred. He must also fear that favorable
findings of fact that make impossible even an inferred contract will be
disregarded on appeal as in Blades.
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that the law of spot zoning and contract zoning
remains ill-defined. Although the issue of spot zoning will necessarily
be intricately involved with particular factual situations, the parties
involved need to be assured that one standard of law will be applied.
The expansion of the definition of contract zoning as exemplified in
Blades denies the essential flexibility needed by city councils for planning the rational growth of municipal areas. The developer who must
seek a zoning change before developing a tract is placed in an awkward
position after securing the amendment. Even though delay in construction means increased costs, he may be reluctant to gamble his investment until the ordinance is upheld by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. However, since there is no practical statute of limitations on
these actions, 37 he must wait until property owners challenge the validity of the new zoning." This problem of cost to the developer is compounded by permitting homeowners to prosecute their claims through
declaratory judgment actions, rather than by injunction. The complaining owner need not post bond in an action for declaratory judgment, 39
while in an injunctive action the homeowner would be required to post
bond to protect the defendant developer before proceeding." If the developer loses in court, he may apply to the city board of adjustment for
a zoning variance, but in order to be granted a variance, he must prove
that conforming to the existing zoning would work an "unnecessary
hardship."4 The North Carolina court has stated that the deprivation
'7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-56 (1969), the ten-year statute of limitations, seems to be the only
applicable limitation of action, and ten years is hardly a useful statute for a developer who has

invested in property.
8The courts may be applying a doctrine of sub rosa laches in reaching decisions about zoning

ordinances, but this is not cited in the opinions. The shopping center in Allgood was already
completed before the North Carolina court heard argument in that case, while the Blades develop-

ment had not proceeded nearly as far.
3
1N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1969).
1N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(c).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-388(d) (1972):
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of a better earning through nonconforming use of the property is not
an "unnecessary hardship" within the meaning of the law.4" The city
council that approves an amendment cannot now be certain of its validity, and consequently, the planning function of the council may suffer.
This result seems especially probable in a case such as Allred, in which
the Raleigh City Council carefully considered the effect of having the
new development in the area only to have the court find contract zoning.
The Blades expansion of contract zoning may even make it difficult for
the city council to learn what the development will be, for extensive
questioning may allow a court to more easily infer a contract.
The neighboring property owners have apparently benefitted from
the expansion of contract zoning and from the confusion surrounding
spot zoning. However, the lack of a consistent application of the spotzoning standard may encourage suits that will be unsuccessful and unnecessarily costly. Moreover, since the raison d'etre of zoning is to
encourage orderly growth, the decision to rezone is inherently a political
one, and the council hearing, if adequately publicized, is the better
forum for this debate.
W.

KIMBALL GRIFFETH

Ix
REGULATED INDUSTRIES
Public Utility Rate Regulation-Time For Re-evaluation
The basic principle underlying the regulation of rates for public
utilities in North Carolina is that the utilities should be granted such
When practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships would result from carrying out
the strict letter of a zoning ordinance, the board of adjustment shall have the power, in
passing upon appeals, to vary or modify any of the regulations or provisions of the
ordinance relating to the use, construction or alteration of buildings or structures or the
use of land, so thatthe spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare
secured, and substantial justice done.
The board of adjustment cannot disregard the enabling statute. It can merely vary the ordinance to prevent injustice when the strict letter of the provisions would work "unnecessary hardship," Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 111, 37 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1946).
For a good general discussion of the power of the board of adjustment to grant variances, see
Green, The Power of the Zoning Board of Adjustment to Grant Variances From the Zoning
Ordinance, 29 N.C.L. REv. 245 (1951).
"Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 110, 37 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1946).
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rates as will allow each to recover its operating expenses as well as to

earn a "fair rate of return" on the "fair value" of its properties in the
public service.1 This principle, which was adopted in 1899 by the state
legislature as a statutory directive to the rate-making agency, 2 appears

simple on its face; its application, however, has been the source of much
litigation.3
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (1965) provides in part:
How rates fixed.-(a) In fixing the rates for any public utility subject to the provisions
of this chapter, other than motor carriers, the Commission shall fix such rates as shall
be fair both to the public utility and to the consumer.
(b) In fixing such rates, the Commission shall: (1) Ascertain the fair value of the
public utility's property used and useful in providing the service rendered to the public
within this State, considering the reasonable original cost of the property less that
portion of the cost which has been consumed by previous use recovered by depreciation
expense, the replacement cost of the property, and any other factors relevant to the
present fair value of the property. Replacement cost may be determined by trending such
reasonable depreciated cost to current cost levels, or by any other reasonable method.
(2) Estimate such public utility's revenue under the present and proposed rates.
(3) Ascertain such public utility's reasonable operating expenses, including
actual investment currently consumed through reasonable actual depreciation.
(4) Fix such rate of return on the fair value of the property as will enable the
public utility by sound management to produce a fair profit for its stockholders, considering changing economic conditions and other factors, as they then exist, to maintain
its facilities and services in accordance with the reasonable requirements of its customers
in the territory covered by its franchise, and to compete in the market for capital funds
on terms which are reasonable and which are fair to its customers and to its existing
investors.
(5) Fix such rates to be charged by the public utility as will earn in addition
to reasonable operating expenses ascertained pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection the rate of return fixed pursuant to paragraph (4) on the fair value of the public
utility's property ascertained pursuant to paragraph (1).
'The original statutory provision provided in part:
[I]n fixing any maximum rate or charge or tariff of rates or charges for any common
carrier, person or corporation subject to the provisions of this act the said commission
shall take into consideration if proved or may require proof of the fair value of the
property of such carrier, person or corporation used for the public in the consideration
of such rate or charge or the fair value of the service rendered as in determining the fair
value of the property so being used for the convenience of the public. It shall furthermore
consider the original cost of the construction thereof and the amount expended in permanent improvements thereon and the present compared with the original cost of construction of all its property within the state of North Carolina; the probable earning capacity
of such property under the particular rates proposed and the sum required to meet the
operating expenses of such carrier, person or corporation and all other facts that will
enable them to determine what are reasonable and just rates, charges and tariffs.
Ch. 164, § 2(1), [1899] N.C. Sess. L. 292.
'Generating particularly voluminous litigation has been the controversy centering around the
determination of the fair value of the utility's properties, or rate base as it is commonly known.
Professor James C. Bonbright, renowned authority on valuation theory, has called the determina-
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One of the latest and most important in the line of North Carolina
rate regulation cases is the 1972 North Carolina Supreme Court decisions in State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. General Telephone Co.'
In a lengthy and comprehensive opinion for the court, Justice Lake
surveyed the legal aspects of public utility rate regulation in a manner
that may be viewed as a general statement of policy by the court. In
addition, this decision added new refinement to the court's interpretation of the application of section 62-133 of the North Carolina General
Statutes to the North Carolina Utilities Commission.
General Telephone involved a service-rate-increase application by
a telephone company operating in Durham, Creedmoor, and Butner,
North Carolina. In hearings before the North Carolina Utilities Commission the utility provided evidence as to the original cost, less depreciation, of its properties as well as evidence of the replacement cost, less
depreciation, of the same properties.' Section 62-133(b)(1) of the North
Carolina General Statutes provides that the fair value of the utility's
property used and useful in providing service to the public (a valuation
commonly known as the "rate base") shall be ascertained by the Utilities Commission by "considering" the reasonable original cost of the
property less depreciation, the replacement cost of the property, and any
other relevant factors.' In ruling on the application, the Commission
stated that it had considered all of these factors. The telephone company, however, felt that the replacement cost had not been given due
consideration and that the rate base was thus correspondingly low. On
appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals directed the Commission
to reconsider the replacement cost evidence.7 The court of appeals stated
that it was apparent that the Commission had arrived at the rate base
evaluation by using the original cost figure alone, a method inconsistent
with the statutory provisions.'
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals as to the consideration of replacement cost. The supreme court held that if the utility produces evidence of replacement
cost, less depreciation, for the commission, then the commission is retion of the rate base "the most widely disputed legal issue in the history of American public utility
regulation." J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 159 (1961).
4281 N.C. 318, 189 S.E.2d 705 (1972).
1d. at 355-56, 189 S.E.2d at 729.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133(b)(1) (1965).
712 N.C. App. 598, 608-10, 184 S.E.2d 526, 533 (1971).
'd. at 610, 184 S.E.2d at 533.
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quired to make and set forth in its order its finding as to such cost The
Commission, according to the court, is exercising a function of the
legislative branch when it regulates rates. It is not allowed to exceed the
power delegated to it by statute.'" Therefore, the court reasoned that the
Commission must govern its proceedings to determine "fair value" as
the statute directs by considering both original and replacement costs.
The Commission must "weigh these evidences of 'fair value' fairly in
'balanced scales' and may not disregard either, or brush either aside by
giving it 'minimal consideration only.'" Since "fair value" may not be
ascertained by any mathematical formula, the exact weight to be given
to the factors is for the expert judgment of the Commission. 2 As for
replacement cost itself, the court provided that the Commission could
take into account the appropriate allowance for depreciation, including
obsolescence, and also an appropriate allowance for inadequacy, if any,
of the properties due to faulty engineering, faulty maintenance, or other
13
circumstances.
The position of the supreme court does not present a dramatic
break with precedent. It is significant, however, because it indicates a
willingness and desire on the part of the court to continue with a strict
application of section 62-133 and to require the Commission to detail
its findings so as to insure compliance. The objective of this note therefore will be to examine section 62-133, the precepts of which were at
one time thought to be compelled by the United States Constitution,14
and to determine its relevance to modern rate regulation practices. Central to this inquiry will be consideration of the statute's legal origins,
with particular emphasis on the evolution of the rate regulation issue in
the United States Supreme Court.
The right of state legislative bodies to regulate rates of certain
businesses operating in the public sector was first tested constitutionally
in the 1877 United States Supreme Court case of Munn v. Illinois.5
Defendants in Munn asserted that a state statute that sought to fix
1281 N.C. at 360-61, 189 S.E.2d at 732. The court provided that since determination of
replacement cost might prove unduly burdensome for smaller utilities, a utility may with the
Commission's consent offer no evidence of replacement cost. Id.
1°1d. at 336, 189 S.E.2d at 717.
"Id. at 339, 189 S.E.2d at 719 (citations omitted).
"Id. at 358, 189 S.E.2d at 731.
"Id. at 365, 189 S.E.2d at 735.
"Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). Smyth was the basis for N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133
(1965). 281 N.C. at 352, 189 S.E.2d at 727.
1594 U.S. 113 (1877).
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maximum rates was repugnant to the federal constitution. They asserted
that this violated the then relatively new fourteenth amendment, which
provided that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'" The Court held that while our
system of government does not allow governmental bodies to control
rights that are purely and exclusively private, it does "authorize the
establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and
so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another."' 7 Publicly used property may be controlled to prevent abuses due to exploitation of the public by businesses that enjoy a virtual monopoly. Without
regulation, the Court stated, "the owner could make his rates at will,
and compel the public to yield to his terms, or forego the use. '"'8 Further,
the Court reasoned, private persons who devote their property to public
use in effect grant the public an interest in that use and "must submit
to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the
interest he has thus created."' 9
In 1886 the Court refined Munn somewhat by setting limits on the
rate regulation power of state legislatures." "[I]t is not to be inferred
that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without limit. This
power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the
equivalent of confiscation." 12 The Court said that rate-setting must not
deprive the property owner of just compensation or of due process of
22
law.
The United States Supreme Court made its most narrow and specific holding as to rate regulation in the 1898 case of Smyth v. Ames.23
North Carolina moved shortly thereafter to enact legislation that would
comply with the criteria that the Smyth court had determined to be
compelled by the federal constitution.2 4 Smyth is still the essential basis
for the state's current statutory provision, section 62-133. The Court in
Smyth held that the basis of all calculations of the reasonableness of
rates for regulated enterprises must be the "fair value of the property
11Id. at 119-20.
"Id. at 124.
"Id. at 134.
"Id. at 126. The Court noted that a person with property in the public use may withdraw his
grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use he is subject to control. Id.
2'Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886).
"Id. at 331.
vId.
-169 U.S. 466 (1898).
"See notes 2 & 14 supra.
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being used by it for the convenience of the public.
that in determining such a rate base

12

5 The

J 145

Court directed

the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock,

the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates pre-

scribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses,
are all matters for consideration, and
are to be given such weight as
and right in each case. 21

may be just

As a limitation on maximum rates the Court stated that the business
may charge no more than the services rendered by it are reasonably
2
worthY.
The Court, even in Smyth however, realized the problem inherent in attempting to regulate rates. In speaking of just compensation,
the Court prophetically observed, "How such compensation may be
ascertained, and what are the necessary elements in such an inquiry, will
always be an embarrassing question. 28 Since the adoption of the ratebase concept in Smyth, it has produced much spirited litigation consum29
ing untold time and energy.
The list of criteria suggested by the Smyth court was not complete
nor all-inclusive, and the Court provided no formula for weighing and
evaluating the factors.3 0 Such was not really a problem until the years
of World War I. Prior to the war, the price levels were sufficiently stable
so that the various criteria of Smyth had all led to a similar result.
However, the inflation of the war years changed the situation so that
the criteria themselves became self-contradictory. Naturally, utilities
began to push present value as the proper test in an effort to get higher
rates, while consumers advanced the measure of original cost." The
utilities won the first battle in 1923 in Missouriex rel. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission. 2 The opinion of the
Court in that case stressed the importance of present value to the rate

2i69
U.S.
2

at 546.

Id. at 547.
vid.
2
1Id. at 546.
"See note 3 supra.
"Bernstein, Utility Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive That Couldn't, 1970 WASH.
U.L.Q. 223, 241-42. This article, researched in cooperation with the Institute of Public Utilities,
Michigan State University, presents a lengthy historical analysis of the development of the Supreme Court's position on the rate regulation issue.
3
"Id. at 244-45.
-262 U.S. 276 (1923).
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base determination: "It is impossible to ascertain what will amount to
a fair return upon properties devoted to public service without giving
consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc., at the time the investi-'
gation is made."
Justice Brandeis, in a concurring opinion in which Justice Holmes
joined, 34 argued that the rate base should include only that amount
prudently invested in the utility. Capital, he observed, is what the private
investor devotes to public use. It is on this capital that one is allowed
to earn a fair return, not upon property purchased with it." Perhaps
more importantly, Justice Brandeis extended his argument to an extensive and meaningful criticism of the Smyth decision, which he termed
"legally and economically unsound. ' 36 The rate-base determination
itself is largely opinion 37 under the Smyth criteria, he observed, and not
a reliable and accurate calculation as it must by necessity be. Justice
Brandeis labeled the determination of present value of a utility a "laborious and baffling task. ' 38 He also rejected the concept of reproduction
or replacement cost,39 which is so fundamental to North Carolina's
section 62-133 after General Telephone.
The reproduction-cost measure of value was first used in a time
when accurate accounting methods were not available. Estimates of cost
to replace the property were offered as valuation of plant assets that the
utility could not otherwise value and for testing the credibility of other
evidence. As Justice Brandeis explained:
Insistence upon reproduction cost was the [consumers'] protest against
burdens believed to have resulted from watered stocks, reckless financing, and unconscionable construction contracts. Those were the days
before state legislation prohibited the issue of public utility securities
without authorization from state officials; before accounting was pre3
1d. at
31

287-88.
d. at 289.

WId. at 290.
36
1d.
"Id. at 291. Brandeis explained that utilities have no value in the economic sense:
It is impossible to find an exchange value for a utility, since utilities, unlike merchandise
or land, are not commonly bought and sold in the market. Nor can the present value of
the utility be determined by capitalizing its net earnings, since the earnings are determined, in large measure, by the rate which the company will be permitted to chargeand, thus, the vicious circle would be encountered.
Id. at 292.
3Id.
3
2Courts do not distinguish between the terms reproduction cost and replacement cost.
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scribed and supervised; when outstanding bonds and stocks were
hardly an indication of the amount of capital embarked in the enterprise; when depreciation accounts were unknown; and when book values, or property accounts,
furnished no trustworthy evidence either of
40
cost or of real value.
Justice Brandeis noted that the replacement-cost criterion was often
adopted after Smyth as the standard for fixing the rate base because of
the imagined exactitude of engineering estimates.4' "But gradually it
came to be realized that the definiteness of the engineer's calculations
was delusive; that they rested upon shifting theories; and that their
42
estimates varied so widely as to intensify, rather than allay doubts.
As more and more state utilities commissions began to realize the invalidity of replacement cost as an indicator of fair value, Justice Brandeis
noted, they began to admit the evidence of replacement cost in order to
comply with Smyth-but ignored it in setting the rate base.43 In summary, he added:
The conviction is wide-spread that a sound conclusion as to the actual
value of a utility is not to be reached by a meticulous study of conflicting estimates of the cost of reproducing new the congeries of old
machinery and equipment, called the plant, and the still more fanciful
estimates concerning the value of the intangible elements of an established business.44
Justice Brandeis further observed that when rising prices (which then
existed) subsided and the price trend turned downward, the utilities
stood to suffer heavy losses on a replacement-cost theory. 41 Similarly,
as prices rise the consumer is punished.
Later in 1923 replacement cost was rejected as a dominant measure
fair
value. In Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Railroad
of
Commission" the Court held that "[t]he refusal of the Commission and
of the lower court to hold that, for rate-making purposes, the physical
11262 U.S. at 298.
4
'id. at 299.
11Id. Brandeis cited several widely varying valuation figures made by different experts for a
utility's rate base. One example he gave was a 1915 California case in which experts set the
replacement cost on the same property at $670,163; $723,001.85; $763,028; $919,204; and
$1,031,436. Id. at n.11.
'ld.
at 301.
4
1Id.
'lId. at 302-03.
"5262 U.S. 625, 630 (1923).
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properties of a utility must be valued at the replacement cost less depreciation was clearly correct."
As might be expected, the Great Depression of the 1930's had
significant effect on the theory and practice of rate regulation. Both
present value and replacement cost certainly lost much of their attractiveness for the utilities. But more significantly, the onset of the Depression signaled a period of retreat by the United States Supreme Court
from the rate regulation field.47 By 1944 the Court had completely relinquished its position of prescribing fair rate-base determinations. In
FederalPower Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.4" the Court provided a new constitutional test for rate making. The idea of a "fair
return" on a "fair value" rate base was rejected by the Court in favor
of a test that was concerned only with the "impact" of a rate order. The
Court noted that the fixing of "just and reasonable" rates involves a
balancing of the interests of the investor and consumer. Utility rate
regulation must only insure that the enterprise will realize a sufficient
revenue to guarantee a return of operating expenses plus cost of capital,
which includes a yield to equity owners commensurate with returns in
other enterprises with similar risks.4" Justice Douglas stated for the
majority:
Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain
its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid,
even though they might produce only a meager return on the so-called
'fair value' rate base."
Hope involved an assertion by a regulated utility that some seventeen
million dollars was unjustly left out of its rate base, which the Commission set at thirty-four million dollars. Despite the size of this protested
figure, Douglas rejected its consideration by the Court, reasoning that
it was unnecessary under the new test promulgated by the Court.5 Since
Hope, the Supreme Court has substantially removed itself from disputes
over rate regulation.
Thus the requirements of the federal constitution as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court have come full circle from Munn,
17Bernstein, supra note 30, at 250-53.
49320 U.S. 591 (1944).
"Id. at 603.
5
"Id. at 605.

'lid. at 605-06.

1973]

UTILITY RA TE REG ULA TION

1149

with its authorization of regulation and delgation by the Court of rateregulation procedures, to the stringently compelled criteria of Smyth,
and back to Hope, which again saw the Court delegate the choice of
approach to fair rate regulation to others. While Hope abandoned the
necessity of Court-prescribed factors in rate-base calculation, it still
adhered to the fundamental principle that the utility must be provided
with an adequate return so as to allow continued operation. But after
Hope the states were free to establish their own methods of regulation
without the constraints laid down in Smyth.
What effect should this change in the position of the United States
Supreme Court have made on North Carolina rate procedure? North
Carolina's rate-base formulation requirements are still within the limits
of the United States Constitution. The change in procedure on the
federal level did not render section 62-133 legally invalid. However,
courts and commentators have in recent years begun to recognize the
invalidty of statutes such as section 62-133 that allow replacement cost
to be considered in determining rates. 5 As one writer observed, "Smyth
v. Ames is dead; the only remaining task is to convince the state courts
and regulatory commissions to give it a speedy burial." 53 But as
General Telephone demonstrates, the North Carolina Supreme Court
is unwilling to relax its adherence to the Smyth doctrine, despite its fall
from favor in so many quarters. Thus the burden of modernization of
North Carolina's statutory requirements must rest with the state legislature.
Two basic approaches obviously should be considered. The first of
these is to remove the criterion of replacement cost from section 62-133.
Replacement cost, with its origins in the nineteenth century, is no longer
an appropriate measure for the end of the twentieth century. While it
"2Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 564 (1945) ("there is no basis for

assuming that anyone, in the light of conditions which prevail in the street-surface railroad industry
generally, would consider reproducing any street railway system"); Missouri ex rel. Southern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring); New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R. (n.s.) 161, 168-69 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1951) ("cost of reproduc-

tion in this situation reflects a theoretical reproduction of something which, if it did not already
exist, would never be reproduced in its present form and location"; case involved a telephone rate
increase); Bernstein, supra note 30, at 260; Smith, The Reality Of The Public Utility Rate Base,
67 DICK. L. REv. 83, 91 (1962).
For a general discussion of the economic principles of rate regulation see I A. KAHN, THE

ECONOMICS OF REGULATION (1970); in particular, note the discussion of rate base determination,
id. at 335-41. See also UTILITY REGULATION (W. Shepherd & T. Gies ed. 1967).
i Bernstein, supra note 30, at 260.
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was a requisite before the days of accurate accounting procedures,54 it
is no longer needed. The determination of original cost may now be
made accurately and is a suitable criterion for the determination of the
rate base. Should the state wish to retain its adherence to a return on
present valuation of the properties and not the actual capital investment
itself, then the plant facilities as they exist may be valued. This would
certainly place the emphasis on actual valuation, the only proper inquiry, and not on false standards such as replacement cost, less depreciation, or the trending of depreciated original cost to current cost
levels. As Justice Brandeis observed some fifty years ago, replacement
cost is not a valid criterion for determining "fair value." The cost, less
depreciation, to replace new a piece of equipment thirty or forty years
old, which may be poorly engineered by modern standards and which
may provide inadequate service, cannot possibly be viewed as bearing
any relation to "fair value." The concept of replacement cost as it now
exists is simply a very costly anarchronism, one for which the people of
North Carolina must pay daily. Some would assert that it is best to stay
with the status quo since it has "worked" in the past. With the current
inflationary spiral, however, the replacement cost figure goes ever upward out of all proportion to actual value. Furthermore, trending original depreciated cost and making allowance for obsolescence, as suggested by the statute 5 and the North Carolina Supreme Court, 6 will be
just as difficult and costly, if done correctly, as determining actual value.
The General Assembly should strike the concept of replacement cost
and entrust to the Utilities Commission ample authority to exercise its
expert judgment in rate determination. The United States Supreme
Court cut North Carolina free from the "fair return" on a "fair value"
rate-base concept nearly thirty years ago. The time is long since due for
this state to quit rewarding public utility investors for their sheer existence in a time of inflationary prices. Surely if the price trend reversed,
the utilities would be the first to call for the abolishment of replacement
cost as a standard for value.
The second approach, and one which goes beyond the scope of a
note of this length in its ramifications, is for the state completely to
abandon rate-base regulation practices. Hope gave the state the right
to provide only such return to utilities as will allow continued successful
-"See text accompanying note 40 supra.
OQuoted note I supra.
51See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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operation, financial integrity, attraction of capital, and reward to investors for their risk, even if the return is meager when compared with the
rate base.17 The rate of return on the rate base is thus no longer a
constitutionally mandated inquiry and thus may be abandoned. There
is no need to evaluate the fair value rate base of a utility to guarantee a
fair return. If a rate increase is necessary, the Utilities Commission
could consider it in light of the Hope criteria, absent rate base consideration, and with proper emphasis on value of service being provided the
public. The Commission would be free to make adjustments on existing
rate levels as they are required. The new rates, if approved, could then
be weighed against the investment made to determine fair return to
investors without regard to any determination -of "fair value." Much
time, effort, and money goes into any rate-base determination, and all
too often, litigation follows the commission's holding. This may be
greatly alleviated by relieving North Carolina from the pressure of the
outmoded concepts of 1898 and Smyth v. Ames.
EDGAR

M.

ROACH, JR.

X
REMEDIES
Equity-An Inappropriate Use of Laches
Laches has been defined as a "negligent omission for an unreasonable time to assert a right enforceable in equity."' Application of the
doctrine may bar a plaintiff from recovery although he has an apparent
right to relief on the merits of the case. This refusal to grant relief is
intrinsic to the sole purpose of a proceeding in equity: to reach a fair
and equitable result.2 In Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey,3 application
of the doctrine of laches relieved the Supreme Court of North Carolina
of the necessity of resolving an issue of first impression: the nature of
the interest reserved by a grantor who conveys a tract of land but
reserves the right to stake off a specified number of acres and remove
the sand and gravel from the smaller tract. Persuasive arguments can
57See text accompanying note 50 supra.
'Stell v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 223 N.C. 550, 552, 27 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1943).
2See generally G. CLARK, EQUITY (1954).
3282 N.C. 261, 192 S.E.2d 449 (1972).
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be advanced to show that laches should not have been applied and that
the court should have found that plaintiff retained a mineral estate in
the sand and gravel on the smaller tract.

In 1952 Bryan Rock and Sand Company conveyed to Norwood
Gainey and his wife two tracts of land totaling 231 acres.4 The deed
contained the following provision:
The party of the first part expressly reserves the right to lay out
and stake off thirty-five acres of the above described land wherever it
desires and to take therefrom all sand, gravel and sand and gravel it
so desires with the right to ingress, egress and regress over any part of
said land for the purpose of removing said sand and gravel.'

Shortly after the conveyance was executed, Gainey asked Bryan's president to stake off the plot. He responded that he doubted that any useful

sand and gravel existed due to the overburden on the land. When Gainey
later requested that the tract be staked off, he was told that the land
was of no use to the vendor and that it belonged to Gainey. 6 Gainey then
cleared the land and constructed a road leading to it. He planted beans
and corn and later turned the land to grass and used it for grazing
purposes. In 1958 or 1959 a successor in interest7 to Bryan staked off a
tract of approximately thirty-five acres.8
In 1964 plaintiff, Builders Supplies Company, acquired Bryan's
interest in the sand and gravel on the tract. In 1965 employees of plain4

Builders Supplies Co. was before the North Carolina Court of Appeals on two occasions,
The first time the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for directed
verdict, and expressed the opinion that the interest created in favor of the grantor was an easement.
Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey, 10 N.C. App. 364, 178 S.E.2d 794 (1971). On remand, the jury
found that plaintiff was barred by laches from asserting title to the sand and gravel. The court of
appeals affirmed the judgment, but changed its opinion about the interest retained by the grantor,
deciding that it was a profit A prendre rather than an easement. Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey,
14 N.C. App. 678, 189 S.E.2d 657 (1972).
The facts of the case are given as they were accepted and dealt with by the supreme court
because there are several discrepancies between the facts as they were discussed by the court of
appeals and by the supreme court.
'282 N.C. at 263, 192 S.E.2d at 451.
6
The first president of Bryan died shortly after his conversation with Gainey and was succeeded
by Bailey, who testified at the trial. He stated that when Gainey renewed his request that the tract
be staked off, he replied, "Norwood, I don't want any of it. There is not any of it any good to use
whatsoever. It is yours." Id. at 264, 192 S.E.2d at 452.
7
1n the intervening years Bryan had dissolved and been reincorporated. The "successor" that
staked off the tract was actually the reincorporated Bryan Rock and Sand Company. 14 N.C. App.
at 680, 189 S.E.2d at 659.
'The tract staked off measured 33.9 acres. For convenience it will be referred to as the "thirtyfive acre tract." 282 N.C. at 263, 192 S.E.2d at 451.
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tiff went upon the land, were aided by Gainey in locating some of the
stakes placed in the original staking-out of the plot, and performed a
second survey. Although the defendant had taken sand and gravel from
the rest of the land he received in the conveyance from Bryan, he had

never removed any from the smaller tract. From the time the plot was
marked off, plaintiff's predecessor had inspected the land about every

six months, and plaintiff continued the practice until 1967. In that year
he had a representative go on the land to take test drillings. Defendant
objected to the tests and plaintiff's agent desisted. Plaintiff then brought
an action to remove a cloud from his title to the sand and gravel on the

thirty-five acre tract.'
Based on these facts, the supreme court affirmed the application
of laches to preclude recovery by the plaintiff. While the court was

correct in asserting that the circumstances that give rise to laches depend on the facts of a given case, certain elements 10 are crucial to

application of the doctrine, at least one of which is entirely absent in
the present case.

Laches, or the doctrine of stale demand," acts as an equitable
statute of limitations. Although a court of equity may apply laches by
analogy to a statute of limitations,'12 there are instances in which the

doctrine has been found to apply although the statute of limitations has
not yet run, 3 and conversely, it has been held inapplicable even after
the period of limitations is past. 4 Laches is related to several equitable
maxims, but most closely to the notion that equity will not come to the

aid of those who have been "sleeping on their rights.1'' 5 The leading
North Carolina case speaks in terms of "negligent omission" to assert
'Itis interesting to conjecture about plaintiff's strategy towards the litigation. Ejectment was
not an available remedy to plaintiff as Gainey had the right to possession and beneficial use of the
surface of the tract. However, if plaintiff had gone on the land and forced Gainey to bring an action
in trespass, the equitable defense of laches would have been unavailable. See Scott Poultry Co. v.
Bryan Oil Co., 272 N.C. 16, 157 S.E.2d 693 (1967) (as a general rule, although not universally
followed, equitable defenses are not available in a court of law).
MAlthough there are four primary elements, see text accompanying note 18 infra, seldom do
courts find it necessary to discuss more than one or two of them to resolve the issue of laches in
any given case. Finding the lack of one element obviates the need for further consideration, and
often the existence of some of the elements seems to be taken for granted.
"See, e.g., Keller v. Harrison, 151 Iowa 320, 324, 128 N.W. 851, 853 (1910).
"Benedict v. New York, 250 U.S. 321 (1919).
"Whitney v. Fox, 166 U.S. 637, 647 (1897).
"Mclntire v. Pryor, 173 U.S. 38 (1899).
"Williams v. Harrell, 43 N.C. 123, 125 (1851).
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an equitable right.1" The Restatement of Restitution states that laches
will bar a plaintiff's recovery "if he has failed to bring or, having
brought has failed to prosecute, a suit for so long a time and under such
circumstances that it would be inequitable to permit him now to prosecute the suit. ' 17 Although there are as many definitions of laches as
authors on the topic, the elements most often held to invoke application
of the doctrine are conduct by defendant giving rise to the cause of
action, delay by plaintiff in asserting his right, lack of knowledge or
notice by defendant that plaintiff would assert his right, and injury or
prejudice to the defendant or a third party if the action is not barred. 8
In its most elemental form, laches has been applied solely on the
basis of an unreasonable delay in bringing suit. 9 In that situation it is
identical in operation to a statute of limitations. More frequently, however, the courts will require defendant to show that the delay has occasioned a change in circumstances"0 that would make the granting of
2
relief inequitable. '
Detailed analysis of each of the elements of laches is unnecessary
in order to understand its misapplication to the facts of Builders Supplies Co. The court gave no concise statement of the time period under
consideration, but it appears that both the supreme court and the court
of appeals based their decisions on plaintiff's delay, and that of his2
predecessors, over the entire period from the time of the conveyance
until the action was brought.2 3 Although the court said that it need not
"Stell v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 223 N.C. 550, 552, 27 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1943).
7
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 148 (1937).
"See, e.g., Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 372 (1892); Shaffer v. Rector Well Equip. Co.,
155 F.2d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 1946).
"Courts most frequently follow the statute of limitations by analogy in this situation. See text
accompanying note 12 supra.
"E.g., O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U.S. 450, 494-95 (1902).
2

Similarly, a defendant's improvement of property in reliance on a reasonable belief that

plaintiff will not assert his right supports a finding of laches. Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S.
106, 111 (1934).
22The court supports its affirmation of a finding of laches by citing evidence of abandonment
by Bryan and noting that an executory written contract to convey may be cancelled by mutual
agreement orally expressed. 282 N.C. at 271, 192 S.E.2d at 456. The statements of the two
presidents of Bryan are relied upon as evidence of the mutual agreement. The subsequent actions

of defendant, however, indicate that he did not believe plaintiffs interest to be cancelled; see text
accompanying notes 6-9 supra. There was nothing in defendant's conduct that would be evidence
of mutual assent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).

""We agree with the Court of Appeals that the evidence of abandonment by Bryan, followed
by the long delay of the plaintiff, and those under whom it claims.

. .

fully justified the submission

to the jury of the issue of laches." 282 N.C. at 272, 192 S.E.2d at 456.
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determine whether title passed when the tract was staked out, that
determination should have preceded a delineation of the time period
that the jury could consider in its deliberation on the issue of laches. If
title passed when the tract was staked off, plaintiff's interest could not
have been divested by his failure to bring suit thereafter. 24 The only time
period that can be considered without determining whether or not title
passed is the six or seven years from the time of conveyance until the
selection of the tract. If the court sought to evade resolution of the issue
as to what estate was reserved, the judgment should have been reversed
and a new trial ordered at which the instructions on the issue of laches
would reduce the time period to be considered from fifteen years to six
or seven years.
Further analysis reveals that there is a more fundamental weakness
in the court's application of laches, a weakness that indicates that the
doctrine was wholly inapplicable. The basic presumption of laches is
that the claimant had an equitable cause of action, but that he delayed
bringing suit for an unreasonable period of time. 21 In Builders Supplies
Co. neither plaintiff nor his predecessors had any reason to bring suit
before 1967. At no time prior to that date did defendant take any action
that was adverse to the reserved interest in the sand and gravel on the
thirty-five acre plot. Gainey's use of the surface for planting and grazing
was consistent with the severed estate in which he held title to the
surface and Bryan and its successors held title to the sand and gravel.
In fact, the defendant consistently acted as though there was an outstanding interest in the sand and gravel. The evidence shows that although he removed sand and gravel from the rest of the land conveyed,
he worked only up to the boundary indicated by the stakes. 6 When
plaintiff went on the property to conduct a survey, Gainey himself
helped locate some of the stakes of the earlier survey. In his actions
toward plaintiff and its predecessors, Gainey gave no indication that a
"4This assertion is implicit in a quotation cited by the court from 58 C.J.S. Mines and
Minerals § 162 (1948) (emphasis added): "Where the grantor reserves not the title but a mere
equitable right to enter on the land and drill an oil well, such right may be barred by an unreasonable delay in exercising it; a party holding such an equitable right cannot delay its exercise ....
"
The implication is obvious: the equitable defense of laches may bar only an equitable right such

as that cited.
3See text accompanying note 1 supra.

"Defendant's behavior in this respect is further proof of the intention of the parties to reserve
in the grantor a mineral estate. A profit Aprendre is normally nonexclusive; the right may be shared
by the owner of the land or granted by him to another party. See 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 417 (1970).
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suit was necessary. There was no cloud on plaintiff's title until the
2
defendant took some action that was adverse to plaintiff's interest.
Conduct of the defendant that gives rise to the cause of action has been
cited as one of the basic elements of laches.28 There was no such conduct
on the part of Gainey until he objected to the test drillings; consequently
laches should not have been applied.
Because the court should not have barred the action, it is appropriate to consider the more basic question of the grantor's retained interest.
The court of appeals initially determined plaintiff's interest to be an
easement, 9 but subsequently characterized it as a profit i prendre 0
The supreme court, through Justice Lake, agreed with the court of
appeals that the grantor had not reserved an easement. The court noted
that while a profit A prendre is similar to an easement, a profit enables
the owner to enter the land of another and remove a part or product of
the land, while an easement entitles the owner to the beneficial use of
another's land without removing anything from it.31
The basic issue to resolve is whether the retained interest was a
profit A prendre or a mineral estate. The court stated that granting a
right to enter one's land and remove timber would give rise to a profit,
but a deed to all the trees on the land would convey the present title to
the standing timber. However, the distinction is not always so objec32
tive:
The intent of the parties, as disclosed by the conveyance, when
read in the light of surrounding circumstances known to the parties,
determines whether the conveyance is a grant of a profit Aprendre or
a grant of a present estate in the designated portion 3 of the grantor's
land, assuming the sufficiency of the deed otherwise.
""A cloud upon title is in itself a title or encumbrance, apparently valid, but in fact invalid,"
McArthur v. Griffith, 147 N.C. 545, 549, 61 S.E. 519, 521 (1908). A cloud upon title must be
"apparent" or valid "on its face." Id.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (rev. 4th ed. 1951); cf.
Annot., 78 A.L.R. 24 (1932).
2See text accompanying note 18 supra.
2*"We agree with defendants that the easement now before us leaves a lot to be desired with
respect to certainty and clarity . . . . Nevertheless we are, in our opinion, bound by the result
reached in Gas Co. v. Day, 249 N.C. 482, 106 S.E.2d 678 (1958) . . . ." 10 N.C. App. at 366,
178 S.E.2d at 796. Gas Co. v. Day held valid a conveyance of an easement for pipelines giving the
gas company the right to select at a later time the path to be followed.

3114 N.C. App. at 683, 189 S.E.2d at 660 (1972).
11282 N.C. at 266, 192 S.E.2d at 453. See generally J.
NORTH CAROLINA § 309 (1971).
"2See text accompanying note 47 infra.
m282 N.C. at 267, 192 S.E.2d at 453 (citation omitted).

WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN

1973]

LA CHES

1157

The supreme court concluded that the intent of the parties, as disclosed
by the conveyance, was to reserve in the grantor a mineral estate in sand
and gravel in the thirty-five acre tract.
The court of appeals had dismissed the possibility of a present
estate because it believed that such an interest could not be held in sand
and gravel.34 Justice Lake corrected the mistaken impression by citing
the legislative inclusion of sand and gravel in the definition of "minerals" in the Mining Act of 1971.11 Although a reservation of "all the
minerals" on a tract of land might be held to exclude the sand and
gravel, a reservation specifically mentioning them gives rise to a mineral
estate."
The supreme court felt that this case closely resembled Outlaw v.
Gray,37 in which a grant of the right to enter land for the purpose of
searching for and removing marl deposits and fossil substances was held
to create a fee in those minerals. The only distinction that the court
could find between the two cases was that the land in Gray was specifically described.
The question left unresolved by the court was the sufficiency of the
description in the deed to create such a mineral estate. The North
Carolina cases dealing with indefinite description speak in terms of the
admissibility of parol evidence to fit the description to the conveyance. 8 Several cases were cited to support the proposition that a deed
is too indefinite if it does not describe accurately the property to be
conveyed or refer to something extrinsic by which the property may be
identified.3 9 One line of cases holds that an easement may be located
subsequent to the conveyance." Justice Lake was unable to discover any
precedent for applying that rule to a grant of a possessory interest,
although he interpreted language in Harris v. Woodard" to imply the
validity of such an application. Harrishad held a description to be too
N.C. App. at 681, 189 S.E.2d at 660.
GEN. STAT. § 74-49(6) (Supp. 1971).
1The court of appeals relied on Lillington Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 203 N.C. 151, 165 S.E.
351 (1932), in concluding that a mineral estate could not be owned in sand and gravel. Lillington
held that digging commercial sand and gravel was not "mining" as that term was used in a tax
statute. 14 N.C. App. at 681, 189 S.E.2d at 659.
37163 N.C. 325, 79 S.E. 676 (1913).
IsSee cases cited note 39 infra; Farmer v. Batts, 83 N.C. 387 (1880).
I 2McDaris v. Breit Bar "T" Corp., 265 N.C. 298, 144 S.E.2d 59 (1965); Baldwin v. Hinton,
243 N.C. 113, 90 S.E.2d 316 (1955); Katz v. Daughtrey, 198 N.C. 393, 151 S.E. 879 (1930).
"0E.g., Gas Co. v. Day, 249 N.C. 482, 106 S.E.2d 678 (1958).
41130 N.C. 580, 41 S.E. 790 (1902).
3414

"N.C.
3
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indefinite because it provided "[n]o beginning point, nor directions, nor
distances. . . ,and there is nothing which authorizes anyone to lay off
the lines of any particularthree acres."'" Further support for the possible creation of an estate was found in Thompson's treatise on real
property," in which the author states that a grant of a specific number
of acres out of a larger tract, to be selected later by the grantee, should
be treated as a contract to convey with title passing to the grantee when
the selection is made. The court seemed to approve this line of reasoning
although it refrained from a final determination.
Although some of the cases dealing with indefiniteness of description are entrenched in the technical aspects of the application of the
parol evidence rule,4 one basic inquiry is almost universally present.
The courts seek to determine if there is extrinsic evidence that can make
clear the particular interest in real property that the parties intended to
convey and receive.15 Where that inquiry can be answered in the affirmative, the extrinsic evidence should be allowed, and the conveyance held
valid. It has been held in one case"6 that making the boundaries of a plot
of land, followed by possession, may be proved to fit the description in
a deed to the land. By analogy, the description in Builders Supplies Co.
should have been held to be sufficient. No title passes, as suggested by
Thompson, until the property is selected and staked off. Once the land
is marked, evidence of its location can be admitted to fit the description
7
to the land.
The rule of construction granting great weight to the intention of
the parties is a significant factor in this context. 8 The situation in
Builders Supplies Co. did not involve the possibility of forcing a grantor
to convey, or the grantee to receive, a tract of land other than he
"Id. at 581, 41 S.E. at 791 (emphasis by the court). Justice Lake apparently overlooked the

word "particular" in the citation. Authorization to lay off a particular three acres requires more
specificity than the formula suggested by Thompson; see text accompanying note 43 infra, which
would allow the grantee to select the specific number of acres anywhere on the larger tract.
116
G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON T14E MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3053 (repl.
1962).
"See, e.g., Johnson v. Branning Mfg. Co., 165 N.C. 105, 80 S.E. 980 (1914) (parol evidence
not admissible with patent ambiguity).

"Cf. Farmer v. Batts, 83 N.C. 387 (1880).
"Edwards v. Deans, 125 N.C. 59, 34 S.E. 105 (1899).
"It should be noted that in treating the intended conveyance as a contract to convey, the
appropriate statute of limitations would be applicable in an action at law. In North Carolina the
period would be ten years if the instrument is under seal, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(2) (1969), or
three years if not under seal, id. § 1-52(1) (Supp. 1971).
"See text accompanying note 33 supra.

19731

IMPLIED WARRANTY

1159

intended. Rather, the parties specifically agreed that the selection of the
particular tract was at the will of one of the parties, to take place at a
later time. Any problem of notice to third parties that might arise would
be easily avoided by requiring recordation by the grantee as soon as a
final selection of the tract is made.
The supreme court suggested a logical solution to the question
presented in Builders Supplies Co., when it cited with apparent approval
the approach propounded by Thompson. Unfortunately, an improper
application of the doctrine of laches precluded a final determination.
Hopefully, the court will follow the dictum found in Builders Supplies
Co. when the question reappears and hold such a description valid to
convey real property.
PAUL HERBERT STOCK

XI
SALES
Recovery for Personal Injury under Implied Warranty
In Gillispie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.1 plaintiff, severely
cut by exploding soda bottles, chose to pursue his case on a theory of
breach of implied warranty by the retailer rather than to pursue a tort
action against the manufacturer based on strict liability or negligence.
This choice was not surprising as a brief survey of North Carolina's
rather piecemeal approach to protection of the consumer will show.
The North Carolina Supreme Court first rejected the doctrine of
caveat emptor and applied the doctrine of implied warranties in a sales
transaction in Swift & Co. v. Etheridge.' In Thomason v. Ballard &
Ballard Co.,3 however, the court held that a manufacturer of food
products was not an insurer of his products nor was he liable "upon an
'4
implied warranty to one with whom he had no contractual relation. 1
The consumer's ability to recover was further limited when the court
later held that an implied warranty of fitness does not extend to the
'14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972).
2190

N.C. 162, 129 S.E. 453 (1925).

3208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935).
1d. at 4, 179 S.E. at 32.
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container in which the product came from the manufacturer.' However,
section 2-314(2)(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which became
effective in North Carolina in 1967, has since been interpreted to eliminate this distinction.'
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not yet abolished the privity requirement in warranty actions,7 but several exceptions to the rule
have been recognized. Where written assurances on the product's con-

tainer were addressed to the ultimate consumer, the court held that the
consumer could recover from the manufacturer.' This exception was
later limited to sales of goods for human consumption sold in sealed
packages? In Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co." the court reaffirmed
the requirement of privity and denied recovery to the consumer from a
soft drink manufacturer. In a concurring opinion" Justice Sharp advocated the elimination of the privity requirement. In a later case, Tedder
v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., the court recognized that "the limitation of
warranty to the contracting parties has been under vigorous assault all
Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961).
6See text accompanying notes 26-29 infra. The Uniform Commercial Code was enacted into
positive law in North Carolina by the 1965 legislature and became effective on July 1, 1967, Ch.
700, §§ 1-11, [1965] N.C. Sess. L. 768 (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965),
as amended, (Supp. 1971)).
7
Some courts have differentiated between two types of privity, "horizontal" and "vertical."
Professor Nordstrom explains the difference as follows:
A manufacturer sells his goods to a wholesaler who sells them to a retailer; the retailer
sells those goods to a consumer who uses them or gives them to some third party who
uses them. As goods are moving "down" the distributive chain from manufacturer to
consumer, the contractual relationships (or sales) are "vertical." When they are placed
in the hands of the ultimate purchaser, they have left the commercial distributive chain
and the connection between the ultimate purchases and the person who was injured by
their use can be described is "horizontal." For horizontal privity the injured party is
trying to place himself in the position of the buyer and take advantage of warranties
made to the buyer; for vertical privity the buyer (or the one in his place) is attempting
to take advantage of the warranties made by those who did not "sell" to the buyer.
R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 91, at 282-83 (1970).
"Privity" as used in the text accompanying this footnote refers to vertical privity. Although
the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by North Carolina takes no position on the question
of vertical privity, it does liberalize horizontal privity by extending the seller's warranty against
personal injury to any natural person in the family or household of the buyer and to any guest in
his home provided such party could reasonably be expected to use, consumer, or be affected by
the goods. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965).
'Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
'Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 668, 136 S.E.2d 56, 62
(1964).
10263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
"Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754.
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over the country" and cited Justice Sharp's concurring opinion in
Terry." The Court held that the evidence in Tedder was sufficient to go
to the jury on a theory of implied warranty of merchantability running
directly to the consumer from the manufacturer because the manufacturer's mass advertising was addressed directly to the consumer and
because the manufacturer's product was placed in the hands of the
consumer with no handling by the retailer.13 The privity requirement
was thus liberalized but not abolished in food and drink cases."
Prior to Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp." the North Carolina
Supreme Court had required privity in negligence actions against the
manufacturer but had recognized exceptions for dangerous instrumentalities 6 and unwholesome food and beverages. 7 In Corprew the court
recognized that the exceptions had "swallowed up the general rule" and
abandoned the privity requirement in negligence actions. 8 Nevertheless,

the consumer still faces a difficult problem of proof of fault by the
manufacturer in negligence actions. He may be aided in some cases by
the rule of res ipsa loquitur, which permits a reasonable inference of
negligence merely from proof of the circumstances of the occurrence
that produces injury, 9 but the North Carolina Supreme Court has con12270 N.C. 301, 305, 154 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1967).
r1id.
at 305-06, 154 S.E.2d at 340. The bottling company had advertised extensively over local
television stations, addressing its appeal to consumers with such slogans as "Come Alive" and
"You're in the Pepsi Generation." In addition, the bottler's agent placed the bottles on the retailer's shelves; therefore, only the bottler and the consumer actually handled the bottles.
A number of courts have recognized that the manufacturer is the one who stimulates consumer
buying through mass advertising; that the manufacturer is the one who is most often financially solvent; and that the manufacturer is the one who ultimately bears the loss if the court
requires a series of warranty actions. Those courts have thus abandoned the requirement of vertical
privity in warranty actions. See, e.g., Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1966); Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
""The questions whether by marketing food and drink in sealed containers the processor
thereby impliedly warrants fitness for human use and whether the warranty extends directly to the
ultimate consumer who breaks the seal, are questions not fully presented on this record. The answer
will come when the facts present the questions." 270 N.C. 306, 154 S.E.2dat 340. See also Home
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vick, 17 N.C. App. 106, 193 S.E.2d 322 (1972); Byrd v. Star Rubber Co., 11
N.C. App. 297, 181 S.E.2d 227 (1971).
15271
N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
"Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285, 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949).
"Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N.C. 623, 169 S.E. 194 (1933).
"1271 N.C. at 497, 157 S.E.2d at 106.
"Byrd, Proof of Negligence in North Carolina-PartI. Res Ipsa Loquitur, 48 N.C.L. REV.
452, 454 (1970) (footnote omitted): "When a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen, if those who have the management use the proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
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sistently rejected the application of this rule in cases of injuries caused
by exploding bottles and foreign substances in food or beverage.2" Instead, the court has constructed a unique doctrine that requires proof
of such an occurrence together with proof of similar occurrences to
permit an inference of defendant's negligence.2"
North Carolina's refusal to eliminate the privity requirement in
warranty actions and its failure to adopt the doctrine of strict tort
liability leaves the injured consumer with little choice but to bring an
action for breach of implied warranty against the retail seller. Gillispie
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.2 illustrates some of the problems
the consumer plaintiff encounters in pursuing such an action.
Plaintiff in Gillispiewent to defendant's store to purchase a carton
of Coca-Cola and a carton of Sprite. He picked up a carton of each from
the shelf and walked directly toward the checkout counter with one
carton in each hand. When he reached a point about ten feet from the
checkout counter, two of the Sprite bottles exploded and plaintiff's wrist
was severely lacerated. 3 Gillispie brought an action in superior court
against A & P alleging a breach of defendant seller's implied warranty
of merchantability. Such a warranty is imposed by section 2-314 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from a want of care."
There is some difficulty in applying the rule of res ipsa loquitur to claims for injuries resulting
from defective products. In the usual res ipsa loquitur situation, the conditions and instrumentalities most likely to cause the injury are under the control and management of the defendant. In
contrast, when the injury is caused by a defective product, the manufacturer no longer has control
of the product and it has normally passed through several hands. Thus, one has more difficulty in
pointing the accusing finger at the manufacturer merely from proof of the circumstances of the
occurrence which caused injury. However, courts may take a liberal view of res ipsa loquitur in
the products liability field. See, e.g., Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d
344 (1952); Ferrell v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 320 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). See
also Fricke, PersonalInjury Damages in ProductsLiability, 6 VILL. L. REV. 1,7-34 (1969); Keeton,
Proofof the Manufacturer'sNegligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675 (1963).
"Byrd, Proofof Negligence in North Carolina-PartII. Similar Occurrences and Violation
of Statute, 48 N.C.L. REV. 731 (1970); see Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154
S.E.2d 337 (1967); Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.C. 504, 80 S.E.2d 253 (1954).
2
See Byrd, supra note 20.
2114 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972).
"Id. at 3, 187 S.E.2d at 443.
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(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as...
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and...
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require ....21
a directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's
Defendant's motion for
25
evidence was allowed.
On appeal plaintiff first argued that Prince v. Smith, 0 which held
that an implied warranty of fitness did not extend to the container in
which a product was sold, should be held superseded by Code section
2-314(2)(e).27 The court of appeals agreed with plaintiff that "the nature
of bottled drinks, such as Sprite, requires a container which is adequate
to contain the drink without breaking or exploding when handled with
ordinary care."'20 The court reasoned: "The fact that it is the container,
make the
rather than the product inside which causes injury, does not
29
injury any less a result of the seller's breach of warranty.
A second and more difficult problem was whether there had been
a "sale" at the time the bottle exploded. Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code is entitled "Sales," but section 2-102, which delineates the scope of Article Two, states, "Unless the context otherwise
requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods ... ."I' The
word "transactions" is nowhere defined in the Code. Professor Peter
Donovan suggests:
The term "transaction" presumably includes "contracts" and "agreements"-concepts that are extensively used throughout the article.
Section 2-106(1) states that these concepts are "limited" to understandings "relating to the present or future sale of goods." The same
section defines "sale" to require "the passing of title from the seller
to the buyer for a price." Because of the extensive appearance of these
several terms throughout the article and their definitional structure, it
can be concluded that a sale or a contract for the sale of goods is a
jurisdictional requirement of Article 2 ... ,
24

N.C. GEN. STAr. § 25-2-314 (1965).
1514 N.C. App. at 3, 187 S.E.2d at 443.
26254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961).

21N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314(2)(e) (1965). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
2114 N.C. App. at 4, 187 S.E.2d at 443.

22d.

11N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-102 (1965).
3"Donovan, Recent Development in Products Liability Litigation in New England: The
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Even if the term "transactions" were "given a broad application reach-

ing well beyond sales and contracts for sale, there would be no express
Code basis for finding a warranty of merchantability in non-sales
cases.""2 Section 2-314 specifies that the warranty of merchantability
in a "contract for sale" entered into by a merchant
is implied
33
"seller.,

The question for the court of appeals in Gillispie was whether a
"sale" of an article in a self-service market was completed before payment. 34 Several courts, prior to the advent of the Uniform Commercial
Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 19 U. ME. L. REv. 181, 198 (1967).

3R. NORDSTROM, supra, § 21, at 43 (1970).
mN.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314(1) (1965) (emphasis added). However, the Code draftsmen
point out in a comment that the warranty sections are not designed to disturb lines of case law
growth which do not confine warranties to sales contracts or the direct parties to such contracts.
See id. § 25-2-313, Official Comment 2 (1965).
3
1The self-service market is only one of several areas in which the concept of a "sale" has
troubled the courts. They have also debated whether the giving of a blood transfusion, the serving
of food, or the dressing of hair constitute "sales of goods" or only sales of services which do not
carry implied warranties of merchantability. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF Ti E LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

9-6, at 287 (1972).

The issue with respect to food has been resolved by Code section 2-314(1): "Under this section,
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314(1) (1965). In Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d
342 (1963), the Connecticut Court of Common Pleas held that beauty parlor treatments do not
constitute sales for purposes of article two warranty provisions. However, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 593, 258 A.2d 697, 701 (1969), rejected the
distinction between a sale and the rendition of services as a highly artificial one:
The transaction, in our judgement, is a hybrid partaking of the incidents of a sale and a
service. It is really partly the rendering of service, and partly the supplying of goods for
a consideration. Accordingly, we agree . . . that an implied warranty of fitness of the
products used in giving the permanent wave exists with no less force than it would have
in the case of a simple sale.
The leading case in the blood transfusion area has been Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308
N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). There, the New York Court of Appeals held that the contract
between hospital and patient was primarily one for services and "the furnishing of blood was only
an incidental and very secondary adjunct to the services performed .

. . ."

Id. at 103, 123 N.E.2d

at 795. However, the Florida Supreme Court has characterized the furnishing of blood for a
consideration as a "sale." Community Blood Bank v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). In
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court based its decision not on the sales-service distinction but on whether an implied warranty of
fitness should be imposed in this "non-sales" setting. Professors White and Summers, in their
treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code, conclude: "The law [in this area] is today in a state of
flux. If one takes a longer view, it is apparent that the courts have continuously extended the seller's
liability, and the service-sale cases are not likely to be an exception." J. WHITE & R. SUMMEaRS,
supra, § 9-6, at 288.
Courts have also confronted the question of applicability of Code warranties to bailment
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Code, held that there was no "sale" of a product and thus no implied
warranty until payment was received." In Lasky v. Economy Grocery
Stores,36 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts apparently relied on a "title" theory of sale in denying recovery: "Possession alone
was not in these circumstances sufficient to pass title to the bottle. Title
did not pass until the delivery became absolute upon the payment of the
price to the cashier." A New York trial court, however, in SanchezLopez v. Fedco Food Corp.3 7 recognized the changes in retail food sales
wrought by the emergence of the self-service market and allowed recovery before payment:
The grocer who formerly wrapped his package and delivered it to the
consumer in exchange for a cash payment is gradually departing from
the commercial scene. The public today is welcomed into large supermarkets where it is requested to take personal and physical possession
of merchandise and to continue handling the same without interference
from the seller. The point at which the Warranty of fitness or merchantability applies certainly must be shifted from the classical conception of a passage of title only when cash is paid by the consumer. .

.

. [B]y presenting himself to the cashier with his merchan-

dise cart for the purpose of registering his purchases and paying for
them, plaintiff evinced a definite intention to accept the offer of the
seller. A bilateral contract of sale was thereupon effectively entered
into at the time when he presented the merchandise to the checker. For
the purpose of Warranty protection, the sales concept could well be
extended to meet the circumstances of the present case ....
The North Carolina Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the
title concept had been abandoned under the Uniform Commercial Code
as a tool for resolving sales problems."8 The Code draftsmen specified
transactions. For treatment of the problems in this area and a recommendation that the policies
of article two of the Code at least be applied by analogy, see Comment, ProductsLiability of the
Bailorfor Hire for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective Goods, 51 N.C.L. Rav. 786, 794

(1973).
3Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E.2d 305 (1946); Day v. Grand
Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 113 N.Y.S.2d 436, aff d, 304 N.Y. 821, 109 N.E.2d 609 (1952);
Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949), affd, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
11319 Mass. 224, 227, 65 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1946).
-127 Misc. 2d 131, _ 211 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956-57 (N.Y. City Ct. 1961).
114 N.C. App. at 5, 187 S.E.2d at 444. In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C.
620, 632, 174 S.E.2d 511, 518 (1970), the North Carolina Supreme Court noted: "The most basic
departure from previous law which is found in the Uniform Commercial Code is the abandonment
of the concept of title as a tool for resolving sales problems. This departure is evidenced by G.S.
25-2-401 which, in effect, holds that title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer when the
goods are delivered to the buyer."
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in a comment to the title section of the Code that "this Article deals
with the issues between seller and buyer in terms of step by step performance or nonperformance under the contract for sale and not in
terms of whether or not 'title' to the goods has passed."39 Relying on
that section," the court of appeals held that "the time of payment is not
determinative of the question of when a sale takes place. If there has
been a completed delivery by the seller, the sale has been consummated
and implied warranties arise under G.S. 25-2-314."' The court pointed
out that the presence of the drinks on a shelf in a self-service market
"constituted an offer for sale and delivery at a stated price" and delivery
was completed when the "plaintiff took the drinks into his possession
with the intention of paying for them at the cashier's counter.""
The court thus seemed to be resolving the sales question by viewing
each step of the transaction as suggested by the Code draftsmen. 3
When considering defendant's contention that there was no sale because
plaintiff could return the drinks to the shelf at any time, however, the
court appeared to analyze the question in terms of passage of title.
Basing its answer on Code section 2-401(4),'" the court held that "passage of title" was not delayed by the purchaser's right to return the
goods. So long as the purchaser retained possession of the product
intending to pay, he had "title," and the seller had only a security
interest to enforce payment. The court of appeals thus reverted to use
of a concept that it had earlier declared abandoned by the Code, neglecting the admonition of the Code draftsmen to "avoid making practical
issues between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible
something, the passing of which no man can prove. .

.."41

3
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-401, Official Comment 1 (1965). See also id. § 25-2-101, Official
Comment (1965).

"Id.
§ 25-2401(2) (1965).
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at
which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the

goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title

is to be delivered at a different time or place; and in particular and despite any reservation of a security interest by the bill of lading . ...
"114 N.C. App. at 5, 187 S.E.2d at 444.
"Id. at 6, 187 S.E.2d at 444.
'"See text accompanying note 39 supra.

"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-401(4) (1965): "A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive
or retain the goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance revests title to

the goods in the seller. Such revesting occurs by operation of law and is not a 'sale.'"
"114 N.C. App. at 6, 187 S.E.2d at 444.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-101, Official Comment (1965).
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Although the court's reasoning is thus somewhat inconsistent, it did
resolve the issue in plaintiffs favor. The evidence would support a jury

finding of a "sale" and was sufficient to go to the jury on the question
of whether there was a breach of implied warranty which caused plain-

tiff's injury.4"

Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals construed broadly
the sale requirement of the Code implied warranty provision, that re-

quirement is only one of several contractual barriers to recovery historically associated with warranty actions" and retained by the Code with
only a "few rather conservative steps" toward mitigation. 49 The privity
requirement is retained with only limited additions to those who may

recover from the seller.5" In addition, since the warranty of merchantability is implied in a contract for sale, the Code allows the parties
involved to agree in the contract that no warranty shall arise.51 The
714 N.C. App. at 6, 187 S.E.2d at 444-45.
"See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1127-34 (1969).
"Clifford, Article Two: Sales, 44 N.C.L. REv. 539, 577 (1966).
"0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965) provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such a person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
In the 1972 Official Text of the Code, § 2-318 provides three alternatives with the 1962 version
of § 2-318 included as Alternative A. States are directed to select one of the alternatives. Alternative B provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
Alternative C provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section
with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends. As
amended 1966.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (1972 Official Text).
The draftsmen explain:
[Alternative B] is designed for states where the case law has already developed further
and for those that desire to expand the class of beneficiaries. [Alternative C] goes
further, following th trend of modern decisions as indicated by Restatement of Torts
2d § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1965) in extending the rule beyond injuries to the
person . . ..
Id., Official Comment 3.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-316 (1965).
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notice requirement of the Code" also presents difficulties to the consumer; unless a buyer notifies his seller of any breach of warranty within
a reasonable time 53 after he discovers or should have discovered the

breach, he will be barred from recovery. 4 Furthermore, the seller may
contractually require notice within an earlier time if it is not "manifestly
unreasonable. ' '1 5 In the absence of such a contractual provision the Code
extends the reasonable time available for a "retail consumer" to give
notice,"0 but it also applies the notice requirement to nonpurchasing
consumers who fall within the scope of section 2-318.11
Increasing displeasure over these traditional barriers to recovery by
the injured consumer embodied in warranty has aided the development
of strict tort liability in products liability actions. 8 In addition to case
law development,59 the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts"0
have expressed the modern view "that the so-called warranty claim is
one of strict liability in tort when personal injury rather than commercial loss is involved."'" The draftsmen make clear the distinction between liability in tort under Restatement section 402A and liability
based on contractual relations:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the
52

1d. § 25-2-607 (1965).

AId. § 25-1-204(2) (1965).
54Id. § 25-2-607 (3) (a) (1965).
-Id. § 25-1-204(1) (1965).
mId. § 25-2-607, Official Comment 4 (1965).
57Id., Official Comment 5.
"Donovan, supra note 31, at 238.
"See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr, 896
(1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
"Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, Survey of North CarolinaCase Law, 43 N.C.L. REv. 906, 937 (1965).
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Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to

warranties; and it is not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer" and "seller" in those
62

statutes.

North Carolina is one of a diminishing minority of states that have
not yet recognized strict liability in tort." However, the court of ap-

peal's broad construction of the code warranty of merchantability in
Gillispie along with the forward steps in consumer protection taken by

the North Carolina Supreme Court in Tedder64 and Corprew" indicate
a willingness to move beyond the narrow confines of prior tort and
contract case law. 6 If the issue is properly presented the North Carolina

Supreme Court might be willing to accept the theory of strict liability.

7

The court should recognize "that the implied warranty of the Uniform

Commercial Code and the strict tort theory of the Restatement are
complementary rather than conflicting bodies of law." 6 The Code is

designed to govern the rights and duties of parties engaged in a contractual transaction and to allocate the commercial losses that might arise
from such transactions. In contrast, "the Restatement doctrine was
designed to allocate the burden of loss when a person is injured by a
defective product." 6 "Public policy demands that the burden of acci2

RESTATEMENT (Second) of Torts Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment m at 356 (1965).
"See Schwartz, A ProductsLiability Primer,33 AM. TRIAL LAWYERS L.J. 64, 69 (1970). The
author's survey of the various jurisdictions finds that twenty-six courts accept the doctrine of strict
liability: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin.
Four states have enacted statutes that accept strict liability: Alabama, Arkansas, Virginia,
Wyoming.
Federal courts interpreting state law have concluded that three other states would accept the
doctrine: Colorado, Indiana, Vermont.
"See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra. See also Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vick, 17 N.C.
App. 106, 108, 193 S.E.2d 322, 324 (1972). Although the court of appeals reaffirmed the requirement of vertical privity in warranty actions, Judge Graham added: "We find persuasive plantiff's
arguments in favor of abandoning the privity doctrine in warranty actions. However, the authority
to reexamine the rule belongs to the Supreme Court and not to us."
OSee
notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
"8 See text accompanying notes 3-21 supra.
7
" See Comment, 51 N.C.L. REv., supra note 34, at 810-814. The author advocates adoption
of strict tort liability in bailment for hire cases where defective goods cause personal injury.
"Comment, Products Liability in Michigan: Implied Warranty, Strict Tort, or Both?, 15
WAYNE L. REv. 1558, 1575 (1969).
"Id. at 1576.
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dental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
..

"70

Until the Court adopts the doctrine of strict tort liability,

however, the consumer's ability to recover in North Carolina for personal injury will continue to be limited by traditional contractual barriers associated with warranty actions.
MICHAEL

E. KELLY

Revocation of Acceptance-Caveat Venditor?

In Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen' the North Carolina Supreme Court had its first opportunity to consider the requirements of a
rightful revocation of acceptance as set forth in section 25-2-6082 of the
North Carolina Uniform Commercial Code. In Performance Motors
the seller of a mobile home sued the buyer to recover the unpaid balance
of a promissory note executed by the buyer as part consideration for the
purchase of the home. The amount sued for was the difference between
the total note and the amount raised by public auction of the mobile
home, which had been repossessed by claim and delivery.'
The buyer admitted execution of the note and default in payment
but counterclaimed for rescission based on the seller's breach of warranties, express and implied.' She sought recovery of her down payment
(4,000 dollars), the three monthly payments made on the note (360.63
dollars), and incidental damages (153.60 dollars), plus interest from the
date of the alleged cancellation of the contract. 5
She offered evidence that during the negotiations leading to the sale
the seller represented to her that the mobile home was new, of sound
construction, and would "last a lifetime."' The buyer also testified that
Performance Motors had agreed to deliver and set up the mobile home
on her lot but that she was forced to pay the set-up expenses because
her lot was not in a regular mobile home park. She then offered her
7

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS EXPLANATORY NOTES

§ 402A, comment c at 349 (1965).

1280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972).
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-608 (1965), quoted note 41 infra.
3280 N.C. at 388, 186 S.E.2d at 163.
4
1d.
Vd.
'Id. at 393, 186 S.E.2d at 166.
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testimony and the testimony of friends and visitors to her home as to
the defects observed in the mobile home.
The buyer stated that on the day of delivery she noticed that the
home had not been leveled properly and that ground could be seen
through the floor. She testified that she told plaintiff's workmen that
"this is not right and I do not want it" 7 and that although she made the
first three payments on the note, she complained continually to the
plaintiff about the defects.8 After getting unsatisfactory responses, she
ceased making payments.
Plaintiff testified that he inspected the home in response to the
defendant's complaints and found only one defect worth noting- a
buckled hall panel. He agreed to repair it but was told by defendant that
other things needed to be fixed, preferably at the same time.' He testified that defendant agreed at that time to send him a list of all alleged
defects but that she never did so. 1"

Plaintiff contended that no warranties were implied other than to
deliver and set up the home as the defendant saw it on the sales lot. The
signed security agreement contained a clause "warranting" that "'the
Buyer admits, upon inspection, that the collateral is as represented by
Seller and acknowledges acceptance and delivery thereof in good condition and repair.' "" Plaintiff contended that this clause operated as a
waiver by defendant of all warranties and thus rendered incompetent her
testimony as to the defective condition of the mobile home under the
parol evidence rule.1 2 Significantly, the security agreement was signed
before delivery actually took place.
The jury found in favor of the defendant, awarding her four thousand dollars plus interest, and plaintiff appealed.' 3 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals awarded a new trial for failure of the trial judge to
give a correct damage instruction, and the supreme court granted certiorari."
In an opinion by Justice Huskins, the order for a new trial was
affirmed, but on the basis that neither the instruction of the trial judge
Id. at 390, 186 S.E.2d at 164.
Vd.

Old.
111d. at 391, 186 S.E.2d at 164.
1Id. at 392, 186 S.E.2d at 165.
12d.
131d.
14ld.

1172

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

nor the damage instruction of the court of appeals was correct under
sections 25-2-711, 25-2-714, and 25-2-715.11 The court, interpreting several provisions of the North Carolina codification of the Uniform Commercial Code for the first time, held that (1) defendant's testimony was
competent as to the defective condition of the home, because such testimony was evidence of additional consistent terms of sale allowable
under the parol evidence rule (section 25-2-202) when the written agreement was not intended as final and exclusive; 6 (2) the evidence was
insufficient to make out an express warranty by the seller, for it was only
the "puffing of his wares"; 7 (3) the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purposes such goods are used (section 25-2-314)
were not excluded or modified as permitted by section 25-2-316, so that
the sale carried the implied warranties with it;8 (4) the buyer did not

waive the right to inspect after delivery by making the down payment;
and (5) the existence of the delivery obligation prevented defendant's
examination before entering the contract from operating as a waiver of
the implied warranties under section 25-2-316(3)(b). 9
The court further held that the remedies available to the purchaser
depended on whether (1) she had rejected the goods initially, (2) she had
accepted the goods and not revoked her acceptance, or (3) she had
accepted the goods but later revoked that acceptance. 0 If the defendant
accepted and never rightfully revoked that acceptance, then her only
remedy was for damages based on the breach of warranty, with the
measure of damages being the difference in the value of the goods when
accepted and the value the goods would have had if they had been as
warranted, unless special circumstances showed proximate damages of
a different amount.2' However, if the defendant could prove either rejection or revocation of acceptance, she had a right to recover so much of
the price as had been paid plus any incidental or consequential damages
she might prove under sections 25-2-711 (1) and 25-2-715.21 This concept
of available remedy differs from the pre-Code choice; under the Code
the buyer who revokes his acceptance is not required to elect between a
11d. at
'lId. at
171d. at
'lid. at
111d. at
"Id. at
21ld. at
2Id.

395-96, 186 S.E.2d at 167.
393, 186 S.E.2d at 165.
393, 186 S.E.2d at 166.
394, 186 S.E.2d at 166.
394-95, 186 S.E.2d at 166-67.
395-96, 186 S.E.2d at 167.
396, 186 S.E.2d at 167.
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recovery of purchase money or damages for breach of implied war23
ranty.
The court's decision gave effect to the defendant's allegation of
rescission as an allegation of revocation of acceptance. The 'Code does
not use the term "rescission." However, Justice Huskins assumed, but
did not decide, that rescission was still available under the "invalidating
cause" provision, section 25-1-103.24 The court concluded that the defendant had not sufficiently established rejection but that the evidence
would permit a jury to find that she had accepted the goods and subsequently revoked her acceptance. Issues for the new trial were formulated
accordingly32
PerformanceMotors v. Allen is a significant contribution to North
Carolina case law primarily for its interpretation of the statutory provisions dealing with the requirements of revocation of acceptance and the
remedies available upon revocation. The case also contains a short discussion of the parol evidence rule that indicates that a more liberal
2
interpretation of this traditional consumer nemesis is probable. 1
The parol evidence rule was involved because plaintiff alleged that
the clause in the security agreement acknowledging "acceptance in good
condition and repair" constituted a waiver by the buyer of all warran3See Hajoca Corp. v. Brooks, 249 N.C. 10, 105 S.E.2d 123 (1958).
2280 N.C. at 396, 186 S.E.2d at 167.
25d. at 396-97, 186 S.E.2d at 168.
2
3Additional guidance on the proper role of the Code's parol evidence rule can be obtained by
comparing § 25-2-202 (parol evidence rule) and § 25-2-316 (express warranty disclaimer) with the
provision in the North Carolina Consumer Credit Sales Act on express warranty disclaimers:
"With respect to any consumer credit sale, the agreement may not contain any provision limiting,
excluding, modifying or in any manner altering the terms of any express warranty given by any
seller (excluding assignees) to any buyer and made a part of the basis of the bargain between the
original parties." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-20 (Supp. 1971).
This new provision was designed to deal with the situation in which the consumer argues that
purchased goods are defective but is met with the seller's defense of an express warranty disclaimer
in the standard sales agreement form. 2 R. SMITH & D. CLIFFORD, N.C. PRACTiCE UCC FORMS
ANNOTATED

17 (Supp. 1972).

However, the Code's provision on warranty disclaimers clearly makes the equivalent rule
somewhat subject to the operation of the parol evidence rule and thus potentially weaker. It is
arguable that comparison of the two statutes should direct the court to bypass any consideration
of the parol evidence rule in consumer credit sales transactions, since that appears to be the
intended effect of the new consumer credit sales provision when an express warranty disclaimer is
used as a defense by the seller to a breach of warranty charge. R. SMITH & D. CLIFFORD, supra
at 19. The problem with this analysis is that the statutory prohibitions just discussed apply only to
express warranty disclaimers, and as such, do not control as to the effect of the parol evidence
rule when an implied warranty disclaimer is raised by the seller as a defense to a breach of warranty
action.
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2
tiesY.
Plaintiff contended that once the security agreement had been
introduced into evidence, defendant's testimony about the defective condition of the home was incompetent to contradict the terms of the
written agreement. The court did not agree and allowed defendant's
testimony by finding that the agreement was not intended as final28 and
that defendant's testimony was evidence of consistent additional terms
of sale.
Although the result reached was proper, there is some question as
to whether there was any real need for consideration of the parol evidence rule in this case. The defendant was attempting to show a breach
of implied warranties, but the disputed clause in the security agreement
clearly was not fashioned in such a way as to be an effective waiver of
implied warranties under section 25-2-316.21 Use of the word "terms"
in the Code's parol evidence rule seems to suggest that because implied
warranties arise by operation of law, they should not be considered
"terms" of the agreement but inducements to contract. 03 This would

21280 N.C. at 392, 186 S.E.2d at 165.
mid. at 392-93, 186 S.E.2d at 165; see I R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2202.10, at 292 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]. With regard to the finality intended,
the intent of both parties should be considered. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES
§ 53, at 162 (1970). It is not enough that one party intended finality; both parties must have had
that intention. Id. When a printed form contract is involved there exists the possibility that the
buyer neither read nor fully understood, if he did read, the legal provisions contained within. In
such cases, when a clause modifies an obligation orally agreed upon previously, but the significance
of the clause is not obvious to the buyer, the requisite finality would seem to be lacking when
measured either subjectively or objectively. See Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1967).
"The clause relied on by plaintiff in Performance Motors clearly does not meet the statutory
tests imposed by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-316 (1965) (warranty disclaimer provision), in that the
clause was not conspicuous enough and did not mention merchantability, as is required of a written
warranty disclaimer.
-" ANDERSON § 2-202.13, at 293-94; see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THlE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-10, at 71-72 (1972). Ofgreat significance in interpretation of the parol evidence rule is the use of the word "terms" in the provision.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression
of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (§ 25-1-205) or by course of performance (§ 25-2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing
to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-202 (1965).
The Code thus rejects the notion that because a writing is intended to be final as to some
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mean that testimony as to the defective condition of goods could be
excluded only if a waiver clause in the written agreement met the tests

of section 25-2-316 and excluded the implied warranties.
The most significant part of the decision dealt with the Code provi-

sions on acceptance, revocation of acceptance, and the remedies made
available by revocation. The buyer in Performance Motors was faced

with the task of convincing the court that her constant complaints from
September to December were reasonable, good faith efforts to comply

with the requirements of proper notice of breach set forth in section 252-607. 11 This statute makes plain that acceptance precludes any rejection of the goods and that return of the goods after acceptance must be

by way of the revocation of acceptance procedure. Effective notice of
breach is thus a precondition to the exercise of revocation rights. The

availability of revocation after acceptance does, however, extend the
time in which notice of defect can be given.32 Acceptance also shifts its
burden to the buyer to show that the goods are non-conforming, whereas

if the goods are initially rejected the burden is on the seller to establish
33
that the goods were conforming.

As to the sufficiency of the notice of breach required before attempted revocation, the making of constant complaints should be held
matters it is to be taken as final on all matters. R.

NORDSTROM,

supra note 28, § 53, at 163. A

narrow construction of "terms" is desirable as a means of enabling aggrieved parties to present
evidence of agreements made but not integrated in the writing. The Code has thus apparently
modified the parol evidence rule so that the presumption of total integration is no longer operable.
I ANDERSON § 2-202.11. The decision is left to the court as to whether the written agreement was
intended by the parties as final and exclusive. Id.; see, e.g., Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner,
26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966).
"The pertinent parts of the statute are:
(1) The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted.
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accepted
and if made with knowledge of a non-conformity cannot be revoked because of it unless
the acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be
seasonably cured but acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided
by this article for nonconformity.
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy: . ..
(4) The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the goods
accepted . . ..
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-607 (1965).
31R. NORDSTROM, supra note 28, § 142, at 430.
13Id. at 431.
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to be sufficient.34 Written notice of breach is not required and no particular content is specified." In keeping with a liberal interpretation of
the Code, any reasonable attempt in good faith to communicate to the
seller that something is wrong with the goods should be sufficient."
There should be no penalty for omissions in the enumeration of defects 37 because the.purpose of such notice is to provide the seller an
opportunity to make some adjustment or compromise. 8 Notice of
breach must come within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or
should have discovered the defect. Determination of what constitutes a
reasonable time is a question of fact for the jury, 9 and in general, more
leeway is accorded the non-merchant buyer.4"
After establishing compliance with the notice-of-breach requirements, the buyer who wishes to revoke must show that he is eligible to
do so by meeting the tests set forth in the revocation provision, section
25-2-608.' The requirements for revocation are that the goods must be
nonconforming and that the nonconformity must substantially impair
the value of the goods to the buyer. No revocation is possible if (1) the
buyer accepted a nonconforming tender without having reason to believe that it would be cured; (2) the buyer failed to discover the nonconformity at the time of acceptance because of his failure to make a
312 ANDERSON § 2-607.27, at 218.
3Id.
uId. § 2-607.29, at 219.
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-607, Official Comment (1965); see 2 ANDERSON § 2-607,34, at
222-24.
u2 ANDERSON § 2-607.31, at 221.
39
1d. § 2-607.44, at 228.
'0Id. § 2-607.37, at 226.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-608 (1965) provides:

(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured
and it has not been seasonably cured: or
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the
seller's assurances.

(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change
in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective
until the buyer notifies the seller of it.

(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the
goods involved as if he had rejected them.
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reasonable investigation; or (3) the seller did cure after the buyer's
42
notice of breach.
Because of the substantial-impairment-in-valife test, the buyer
needs a more serious complaint to establish revocation than to establish
rightful rejection. 3 Several policy reasons support this requirement.
First, the right to revoke gives the buyer a longer period of time in which
to escape his bargain and enables him to shift back to the seller the risk
of any depreciation occuring during the buyer's possession." Thus, more
than trivial nonconformities are required as the basis of rightful revocation. It should be noted that what constitutes substantial impairment
should vary according to the needs of the particular buyer.45 Clearly, not
all breaches of the agreement substantially impair the value of the contract.
Secondly, there is a danger that revocation of acceptance will become a contrived defense or automatic answer to legal actions brought
for overdue payments under a sales agreement. In such a situation, the
requirements of notice and substantial impairment in value seem necessary to prevent abuse of the remedy.
With regard to the sufficiency of notice of revocation, somewhat
more stringent standards than apply to notice of breach are applicable.
Not only must the notification occur within a reasonable time, but there
should be a more specific description of the nonconformity than is
required for a proper notification of breach." Since revocation of acceptance generally occurs after the buyer realizes either that the seller
will not attempt to cure or that attempts to cure will be unsatisfactory,
there is often a significant lapse of time between notice of breach and
notification of revocation, as there was in Performance Motors. Often
contributing to this delay is the fact that the buyer may need time in
which to ascertain whether the nonconformity in fact substantially impairs the value of the goods.47 Courts have been cognizant of the dilemma and have held that a five-week delay between notice of breach
and revocation was reasonable in one case, 48 that a delay of approximately six weeks between notice of breach and revocation was reasona4122
ANDERSON § 2-608.4, at 240.
'3J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, § 8-2, at 250, 260.
"Id. at 247.
"Id. at 260.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-608, Official Comment 5 (1965).
'Ltanners v. Whitney, 247 Ore. 223, 428 P.2d 398 (1967).
4"Brown v. Hassenstab, 212 Ore. 246, 319 P.2d 929 (1957).
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ble in another case," and that use of a carrying trailer for 50,000 miles
between notice of breach and revocation was reasonable in still another
case.50
Because no form or content of the notice is specified, any conduct
clearly manifesting the buyer's desire to get his money back should be
sufficient. 1 Considerations of good faith on the part of the seller and
the necessity of giving effect to convenient and inexpensive methods of
revocation seem adequate criteria on which to judge the reasonableness
of the method of notice. Whether the notice was reasonable is generally
an issue for the jury. Payments made after the discovery of breach do
not waive the buyer's right to later revoke acceptance, 2 and tender of
the goods back to the seller is not required.53
The particular factual situation of Performance Motors raises the
question of whether the defendant's occupation of the mobile home in
the interim between alleged revocation and repossession by the seller
was so inconsistent with revocation as to bar that claim. Two avenues
of relief are suggested. The defendant might claim that her subsequent
use after revocation was necessary to mitigate damages,54 or the seller
might be allowed a credit equal to the reasonable value of the use if
revocation is successfully established. Hopefully, these suggestions will
provide a means of assuring that the interests of each party are recognized and dealt with fairly after revocation.
CONCLUSION

It appears that the North Carolina Supreme Court was justified in
holding that the buyer's continued complaints coupled with cessation of
payment could constitute sufficient notice of revocation of acceptance.
Clearly, the making of payments in the interim between notice of breach
and revocation does not bar the right to revoke; just as clearly, the use
and occupation of the home after attempted revocation should not bar
the buyer from establishing revocation, especially since in this case the
seller took no action in response to the buyer's action. Indeed, the Code
4

Koehler v. Dennison, 72 Ore. 362, 143 P. 649 (1914).
-1Trailmobile Div. of Pullman, Inc. v. Jones, 118 Ga. App. 472, 164 S.E.2d 346 (1968).
"2 ANDERSON § 2-608.16, at 245.
"Parker v. Johnston, 244 Ark. 355, 426 S.W.2d 155 (1968).
"Campbell v. Pollack, 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966); see 2 ANDERSON § 2-608.18, at
246.

'R.

NORDSTROM,

supra note 28, § 153, at 433 n.48; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25.2-715 (1965).
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in section 25-2-711 (3)55 gives the buyer who rejects or revokes a security
interest in the goods. The seller's rights can be given effect by allowing
the suggested setoff in the amount of the reasonable value of the use.
The opinion is also correct in interpreting the Code's damage provisions. The fact that a buyer who revokes his acceptance has an adequate
remedy at law for damages is no longer a bar to cancellation-the
remedies of damages for breach and cancellation are now available
concurrently and are not mutually exclusive."
The court's interpretation of the Code is to be applauded as both
literally correct and within the spirit of the Code with respect to providing greater protection for the unwary non-merchant buyer whose attempts to protect himself and his bargain should not be thwarted by
legal technicalities and formalism.
LUTHER PARKS COCHRANE

XII
TAXATION
Ad Valorem Taxes on Imported Goods
In In re Asheville Citizen-Times Publishing Co.' the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that a newspaper publisher's entire supply
of newsprint-293.1 tons imported from Canada and 191.6 tons from
domestic sources-on hand in the original package on assessment date
is subject to ad valorem taxes. The Asheville Citizen-Times Publishing
Company had contended that a portion of the newsprint was immune
from state taxation under article one, section ten of the United States
Constitution, which provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent
of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws
. ...

"

Specifically, the taxpayer had asserted that all the imported

newsprint was exempt from taxation except the amount necessary to
meet current operational requirements, an amount that should be determined by multiplying the average daily consumption of newsprint by the
time necessary to order and receive it from the Canadian supplier. Such
"N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 25-2-711(3) (1965).
"See note 23 and accompanying text supra.

'In re Asheville Citizen-Times Publishing Co., 281 N.C. 210, 188 S.E.2d 310 (1972).
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a calculation, argued the taxpayer, was a proper application of the
"time necessary for delivery" rule.2
The Buncombe County Board of Equalization and Review had
found that the entire supply of newsprint on hand was necessary to meet
current operational requirements. 3 On appeal,4 the State Board of Assessment made separate findings of fact and conclusions of law sustaining the action of the local board. 5 The publishing company then petitioned for review6 in Buncombe County Superior Court, which found
that the evidence supported the State Board's findings, that the publisher had failed to show that the newsprint was kept for any other
business reason, and that the newsprint was therefore subject to ad
7
valorem taxes.
Prior to a determination of the taxpayer's appeal to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, the supreme court granted certiorari to
consider the constitutional questions whether the county could tax the
goods and, if it could, whether the entire supply was subject to taxation. 8
The court affirmed the conclusion of the State Board that the newsprint
was required to meet the publisher's current operational needs and was
not exempt from local property taxes.'
An understanding of the statutory provisions for administrative
and judicial review of decisions of the local taxing authority is essential
to an analysis of In re Asheville Citizen-Times Publishing Co. Against
this background the court's disposition of the case may be examined in
light of the approach taken in similar cases by the United States Supreme Court.
Because judicial review of administrative decisions is limited, the
only grounds upon which the North Carolina Supreme Court could have
VId.

at 211, 188 S.E.2d at 311. This rule for determining the quantity of goods necessary to

meet current operational requirements has been applied in other jurisdictions. E.g., City & County
of Denver v. Denver Publishing Co., 153 Colo. 539, 387 P.2d 48 (1963).
3281 N.C. at 211, 188 S.E.2d at 311.
'The right to appeal to the State Board is provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (1964).
1281 N.C. at 212, 188 S.E.2d at 312. When an appeal is taken, the State Board has full

authority to make final decisions reversable only upon a showing of error of law or abuse of
discretion. See In re Reeves Broadcasting Corp., 273 N.C. 571, 160 S.E.2d 728 (1968).
'281 N.C. at 212, 188 S.E.2d at 311-12. The taxpayer may petition for review by the superior

court of the county where he resides when the original determination has been made by a county
board and has been appealed to the State Board. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-309 (1964).
7281 N.C. at 213, 188 S.E.2d at 312.
'Id.
9Id.
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held for the taxpayer were (1) that the findings of fact of the Board were
unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence or (2)
that there had been a violation of a constitutional provision."0 Although
the only evidence before the Board was the affidavit of Mr. John Q.
Schell, treasurer and general manager of the publishing company," the
court was unwilling to say that the factual determinations were not
supported by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, the court concluded that the finding of taxability of
imported newsprint comported with constitutional criteria developed in
a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Brown v. Maryland" and
culminating in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers.13 While holding unconstitutional a state requirement that prior to sale importers of
goods take out a license from the state, Chief Justice Marshall speaking
for the Court in Brown conceded that the constitutional prohibition does
not abridge the state's power to tax "when the importer has so acted
upon the thing imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed up
"4
, In Hooven & Allison
with the mass of property in the country ...
5
Co. v. Evatt the Court held that hemp imported from the Philippines
and stored in the original package in a warehouse at the factory prior
to use in manufacturing cord was not subject to state taxes. Emphasizing that goods imported for use do not lose their immunity from taxation more readily than do goods imported for sale,"6 the majority recognized that there is a point "capable of practical determination, when it
can be fairly said that [the imported goods have] become part of the
mass of taxable property within a state .... ,17 The Court suggested
that this point might be when the presence of the goods in the factory
was so essential to current manufacturing requirements that they could
be said to have entered the manufacturing process and therefore to have
1"N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 143-315 (1964). In In re Reeves Broadcasting Corp., 273 N.C. 571, 160

S.E.2d 728 (1968), the court said that When judicial review is sought in a superior court, that court
may not make findings different from those of the State Board that are supported by material and
substantial evidence, because such findings are the exclusive function of the Board.
"Brief for Appellant at 2, In re Asheville Citizen-Times Publishing Co., 281 N.C. 210, 188
S.E.2d 310 (1972).
1225 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
13358 U.S. 534 (1958).

1"25 U.S. at 441.
13324 U.S. 652 (1944).
111d. at 667.
"Id.
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been put to the use for which they were imported. 8 Thus the concept of
"current operational requirements" originated in Hooven & Allison.
It remained for the Court in Youngstown to amplify the "current
operational requirements" aspect of the "put to use" concept. In that
case the manufacturer stored a two- to three-month supply of imported
ore in ore yards within an area described as the "plant" and at varying
distances from the furnaces." A one- to two-day supply of ore was kept
in bins next to the furnaces. The Supreme Court sustained a finding by
the local authority that the entire supply of ore was subject to ad valorem taxes. The Court listed such factors as irrevocable commitment
to supply, necessity to meet current manufacturing requirements and
actual use'0 in support of its finding that the ore had entered the manufacturing process. Thus, according to the Youngstown Court, if the
imported goods have been committed to use and if they are so essential
to current needs that they may be said to have become part of the
manufacturing process, they have lost their character
as imports and
21
their constitutional immunity from state taxation.
The physical treatment of the newsprint by The Asheville CitizenTimes Publishing Company closely resembled the situation in
Youngstown. The publisher stored almost all of its newsprint, a fourto six-week supply, in an underground warehouse next to its publishing
facilities. A four- to six-day supply of newsprint was maintained in a
storage room next to the printing area itself. Domestic and imported
newsprint were commingled.2 2 The original packages remained intact
until just before the newsprint was put on the presses.
In support of its arguments 23 the petitioner Asheville CitizenTimes relied 4 upon another factually similar case, City & County of
Denver v. Denver Publishing Co.,25 in which the Colorado Supreme
Court upheld the local taxing authority's application of the "time necessary for delivery" rule for determining the quantity of imported newsprint subject to ad valorem taxes. 2 The Colorado court found this re18ld.

"1358 U.S. at 536 n.2.
2Id. at 546.
2"Id. at 543.
"281 N.C. at 212, 188 S.E.2d at 311.
"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
2"Brief for Appellant at 6-8.
"153 Colo. 539, 387 P.2d 48 (1963).
2"Id. The publishing company consumed sixty tons of newsprint per day. Of a total inventory
of 2,020 tons-a thirty-five-day supply-30% was stored in the original package at the publishing
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finement of the "put to use" concept consistent with Youngstown, saying, "That decision cannot be viewed as creating an isolated principle,
but must of necessity be connected with the particular factual situations
which underlie it and, fundamentally, it must be placed in historical
perspective."2 7 Ironically, in the Asheville Citizen-Times opinion Justice
Branch quoted" with approval the Colorado court's reading of
Youngstown while rejecting the precedential value of the Denver case.
Considering the instant case in light of the Youngstown criteria for
taxability, he emphasized that the facts supported a finding that the
newsprint was not being merely stored but was necessary to meet current operational requirements;29 as in Youngstown, the goods were actually being put to use.3" Under a fact pattern as similar to Youngstown
as the one before the North Carolina court, the conclusion was inescapable that the newsprint was in use and taxable. The element common
3 1
to both cases is the daily removal of goods from storage to processing.
In other words, being held for use constitutes commitment to use, one
of the factors sufficient under Youngstown to subject imported goods
to ad valorem taxes.
Because the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions is
limited by statute, 32 the direction of the court's inquiry into the facts is
set by the findings of the State Board of Assessment. It is not clear from
Justice Branch's opinion that the same factual situation would not support an application of the "time necessary for delivery" rule. The opin-3
ion does cite two California cases in which the rule has been rejected,
but it does not criticize the use of the rule in the Denver case. What
distinguishes the instant case from Denver, however, is the initial approach of the administrative agency. Furthermore, In re Asheville
Citizen-Times Publishing Co. is overwhelmingly susceptible to the
Youngstown result.
ANTOINETTE R. WIKE
plant, 45% at the publisher's warehouse, and 25% at a rented warehouse. The time necessary for
delivery from Canada was six days. The board held that 360 tons of newprint were taxable.

"Id. at 543, 387 P.2d at 50.
11281 N.C. at 218, 188 S.E.2d at 315.
"9d.at 220-21, 188 S.E.2d at 316-17.

"1358 U.S. at 546.
31281
"See
3281
pers, Inc.

N.C. at 215, 220, 188 S.E.2d at 314, 316.
note 10 supra and accompanying text.
N.C. at 219, 188 S.E.2d at 316. The Denver approach was followed in Knight Newspav. City of Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 438, 168 N.W.2d 318 (1969). Moreover, in this case
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Inheritance Tax and the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act-A Trap For the
Unwary Donor
In Korschun v. Clayton1 the deceased taxpayer had made an inter
vivos transfer of 103 shares (valued at 55,978.44 dollars) of Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of Goldsboro stock to himself as custodian for his
minor son under the provisions of the North Carolina Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act. 2 Korschun died while serving as custodian and before
his son had reached the age of twenty-one, when the custodianship
would have ended. The gift was made more than three years prior to
the death of the custodian. The executor of Korschun's estate filed with
the North Carolina Commissioner of Revenue an inheritance and estate
tax return that did not include the custodial property in the estate. The
commissioner assessed an additional inheritance tax of 3,249.76 dollars
on the custodial property, and the executor paid under protest. Suit was
brought by the executor to recover the additional inheritance tax, and
the Superior Court of Wayne County determined that the tax has been
incorrectly assessed. The Commissioner of Revenue appealed to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision.'
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act was promulgated in an effort to
create a device for the transfer of securities and other property to minors
that would avoid the bothersome formalities and expense of a trust while
maintaining the flexibility attendant to most trust arranagements.4 A
further desire was to qualify the gift for the three-thousand dollar annual gift tax exclusion per donee available under section 2503(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 5 The result was the creation of a new
the Michigan court distingished between newsprint intended for eventual use and that which is
essential for current operational needs. This distinction is reminiscent of Justice Black's dissent in
Hooven & Allison, where he argued that under Brown "use" equals "held for use." 324 U.S. at
689. See generally Note, State Taxation of Imports-When Does an Import Cease to be an
Import?, 58 HARV. L. REv. 858 (1945), in which Professor Thomas Reed Powell criticized Justice
Black's equation.
'13 N.C. App. 273, 185 S.E.2d 417 (1971).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-68 to -77 (1966). North Carolina initially adopted the Model Gifts

of Securities to Minors Act but later changed to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, Ch. 1166,
14, [1959] N.C. Sess. L. 1315,formerly ch. 1061,
GEN. STAT.

§§

§§ I-

1-3, [1955] N.C. Sess. L. 1035 (now N.C.

§§ 33-68 to -77 (1966)). Presently there is also in existence a Revised Uniform Gifts

to Minors Act. All three acts yield the same tax problem addressed by this note.
113 N.C. App. at 280, 185 S.E.2d at 421.
'Aland, Tax and Substantive Aspects of Gifts to Minors, 18 ALA. L. REV. 82, 100 (1965).
'Ziegler, Gifts to Minors-Three Variations, 24 TAX LAYWER 297, 301 (1971). A gift under

the Uniform Act complies with § 2503(c) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and is therefore not
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type of fiduciary, the custodian, who would possess neither legal nor
equitable title but would have broad powers with respect to custodial
property.
Under the North Carolina Uniform Gifts to Minors Act the custodian is to invest and manage the property6 and to pay so much of the
custodial property as he deems advisable for the support, maintenance,
education, and benefit of the minor.7 The minor actually holds the legal
title to the property,8 but the custodian is empowered to sell the property
or vote it if the property is securities.' When the minor reaches the age
of eighteen"0 the custodian pays over the remaining portion of the custodial property and the custodial relationship terminates., The Act also
provides that a donor can name himself custodian and he will have the
same powers as would a non-donor custodian. 2 By comparing the transfer to one made in trust, a parallel can be drawn between a donor under
the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act who named himself custodian and a
settlor of a trust who named himself trustee. Thus, by analogy to a trust
situation, the custodial property can more logically be taxed in the
estate of a donor-custodian who died while possessed of the broad powers over the property that are conferred to a custodian under the Uniform Act. Both the federal estate tax and the North Carolina inheritance tax have provisions that would seem to require taxation of the
custodial property when the custodian dies while possessed of such control over the transferred property, 3 and the applicability of these provisions has been upheld by the federal and North Carolina courts."
The applicable North Carolina inheritance tax statute' 5 imposes an
considered a gift of a future interest. Gifts of future interests do not qualify for the annual
exclusion.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71(a) (1966).
1d. § 33-71(b) (Supp. 1971).
81d. § 33-70(a) (1966).
Old. § 33-71(f) (1966).
"In 1971 North Carolina lowered the age of distribution to eighteen for purposes of the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. Id. § 33-71(d) (Supp. 1971). The Korschun custodianship, established prior to the statutory change, was not affected and was to continue until the donee reached
age twenty-one.
"Id. § 33-71(d) (Supp. 1971).
IVd. § 33-69 (1966).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§§

2036, 2038; N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 105-2(3) (1972); see note 15

infra for the full text of the North Carolina statute.
"See, e.g., cases discussed in text accompanying notes 1 supra and 45 infra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(3) (1972):
A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property, real or
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inheritance tax on the transfer of any property in trust or otherwise
when the transfer is intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death, including a transfer in which the transferor has retained for his life or any period not ending before his death, the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property or the right to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom."6 Because the donor-custodian Korschun was the
father of the donee, an unemancipated minor, a duty of support ran
from the custodian to the donee.'7 The Korschun court first reasoned
that since the Uniform Act empowers the custodian to use so much of
the custodial property for the support of the minor as he in his discretion
adjudges suitable and proper,"8 the legal obligation of the donor to
support his minor child might have been satisfied out of the custodial
property. Consequently, the donor-father was deemed to have retained
for a period not ending before his death the enjoyment of the custodial
property under the North Carolina inheritance tax statute. 19
Secondly, the court of appeals thought that the power to vote the
custodial stock under the terms of the Uniform Act was a further retention of the enjoyment of the transferred property because the donor was
the majority stockholder of the issuing corporation and had the opportunity as custodian to continue his control over the corporation." The
court held it immaterial that the donor had made no pledge of the stock
to secure credit for himself and that he had received no income therefrom. In fact, no part of the gift was ever used for the support of the
personal, or of any interest therein or income therefrom, in trust or otherwise, to persons
or corporations, in the following cases:

(3) When the transfer of property made by a resident, or nonresident, is. . . made
in contemplation of the death of the. . . donor, or intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after such death, including a transfer under which the transferor has
retained for his life or any period not ending before his death (i) the possession or
enjoyment of, or the income from, the property or (ii) the right to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
Isld.
'13 N.C. App. at 277, 185 S.E.2d at 419; Layton v. Layton, 263 N.C. 453, 139 S.E.2d 732
(1965).

"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71(b) (Supp. 1971). The custodian's discretion to apply the custodial
property for the support of the minor exists with or without court order, with or without regard to
the duty of himself or of any other person to support the minor, and with or without regard to
any other income or property of the minor that may be applicable or available for any purpose of
support or maintenance.
113 N.C. App. at 277, 185 S.E.2d at 419-20; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(3) (1972).
2113 N.C. App. at 277, 185 S.E.2d at 420.

1973]

INHERITANCE TAX

1187

minor donee. 21 Judge Morris stated that it was of no moment that the
rights and powers of the custodian were never exercised; the factors
requiring taxation were the existence of the power to use the custodial
property for the support of the minor and the right to vote the custodial
22
stock as the donor-custodian saw fit.
The third reason given by the court for the inclusion of the custodial
property in the estate of the donor-custodian was the power of the
custodian to terminate the custodial relationship by paying over to the
minor all the custodial property. 3 Since the custodian has the power
to "expend for the minor's benefit, so much or all the custodial property
as the custodian deems advisable for the support, maintenance, education and benefit of the minor in the manner, at the time or times, and
to the extent that the custodian in his discretion deems suitable and
proper '2 4 he has complete discretion to terminate the custodial relationship at any time. This power was compared by the court to the power
of a settlor-trustee to terminate the trust at will. Since an earlier North
Carolina case 5 had equated a transfer in trust wherein the transferor
retained the power to terminate the trust at will with a transfer "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . . .
death," 26 there was no difficulty in finding such a transfer taxable under
the North Carolina inheritance tax statute although the statute itself
makes no specific mention of taxing a transfer with the retention of the
27
right to terminate.
The court also cited an Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling
and three federal estate tax cases as authority for the inclusion of the
custodial property in the estate of the donor-custodian for North Carolina inheritance tax purposes. Before examining these federal authorities
one must understand the relationship between the federal estate tax
statutes and the North Carolina inheritance tax statutes. The present
North Carolina inheritance tax statute' is substantially the same as it
was when it was adopted in 1939 at the same time that a new Federal
Internal Revenue Code was promulgated and adopted. The language of
WId.
at 278, 185 S.E.2d at 420.
22
d.
2Id. at 279, 185 S.E.2d at 421.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71(b) (Supp. 1971).
"State & City Bank & TRUST Co. v. Doughton, 188 N.C. 762, 125 S.E. 621 (1924).
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(3) (1972).
2d.
'Id. §§ 105-2 to -32 (1972).
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section 81 l(c) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code is basically the same
as that used in the contemporaneous North Carolina inheritance tax
statute. Both statutes tax transfers which were made in contemplation
of death "or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after. . . death .... ,,21 Both also tax transfers under which the transferor has retained for his life or for any period not ending before his
death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the property or the income therefrom. 3 ° Section 811(c) of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code was the predecessor of sections 2035, 2036, and
2037 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which are in force today. The
controlling language of these sections is virtually identical to that of
section 811(c). Thus, section 2036 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
and North Carolina General Statute section 105-2(3) use exactly the
same language.
Section 2038 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which taxes transfers in which the transferor has retained the right to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate, is based upon section 811(d) of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code. No comparable section can be found in the North Carolina inheritance tax statute,3 1 but such language has been read into the
statute by judicial decision. In State & City Bank & Trust Co. v.
Doughton31 the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the
power to terminate a trust was contemplated in the statutory phrase
"intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . . .
death . . . -33 Consequently, the court included property transferred
subject to a power to terminate in the estate of the donor for inheritance
tax assessment. Since the two statutory schemes tax the same types of
transfers, the revenue rulings and federal cases construing the federal
statutes, while not controlling, 34 are valuable aids in interpreting the
North Carolina inheritance tax statute.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 81 1(c), 53 Stat. 121 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036);

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(3) (1972).

"Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 81 1(c), 53 Stat. 121; N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

105-2(3) (1972).

3

'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2 (1972).

-188 N.C. 762, 125 S.E. 621 (1924).

3N.C. GEM. STAT. § 105-2(3) (1972) now contains this same language.
311t must be emphasized that federal court decisions construing federal estate tax statutes are
not binding upon North Carolina courts in construing analogous North Carolina inheritance tax
statutes. However, since the purpose of the two statutory schemes is similar, to tax transfers made
at death, the reasoning used in construing the more heavily litigated federal estate tax statutes
should be heeded.
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Revenue Ruling 57-366,11 cited by the Korschun court,36 states
that "[t]he value of property transferred by a donor to himself as custodian for a minor donee, pursuant to the provisions of the model
custodian act adopted by a number of the states, is includible in the
donor's gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes in the event of his
death while acting as custodian and before the donee attains the age of
'37
21 years.
Estate of Jack F. Chrysler,8 a federal decision also cited in
Korschun,3 lent support to two of the reasons stated by the Korschun
court for including custodial property in the estate of the donorcustodian-fulfillment of the legal obligation of the donor-custodian to
support the minor donee and the retention of the power to terminate the
custodial relationship at will. In that case decedent made transfers to
himself as custodian for his children under the New York Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act and died in that capacity prior to the donees' attaining
the age of twenty-one. The Tax Court held that because the Uniform
Act gave the donor the power to use custodial funds for the support of
the donees, he had retained the "possession or enjoyment" of the property and thus was subject to taxation under section 2036(a)(l).10 The
11957-2 CuM. BULL. 618.
1113 N.C. App. at 278, 185 S.E.2d at 420.
"Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 CUm. BULL. 618, deals with transfers under the Model Custodian
Act only. In 1959 the Internal Revenue Service issued Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 212,
with the stated purpose of clarifying the position of the Internal Revenue Service in regard to the
federal tax consequences of gifts to minors under both the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act and the
Model Gifts of Securities to Minors Act. The Service stated that any transfer under either of the
acts would qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion authorized by section 2503(b) of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code. As to the federal estate tax, the Service reaffirmed the position taken in
Rev. Rul. 57-366 by stating that if the donor of gifts to minors under either of the acts appoints
himself custodian and dies while serving in that capacity, prior to the minor donee's attaining the
age of twenty-one, the value of the property so transferred would be included in his estate for estate
tax purposes. North Carolina adopted the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act without major alteration,
see note 2 supra. Subsequent changes have been made in the North Carolina Act, but the Revised
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act as approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws is yet to be adopted by North Carolina, see, e.g., ch. 247, § 3 11971] N.C.
Sess. L. 180 (now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-69.1 (Supp. 1971)).
ls44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966) (court of appeals
held in reversing that since the property had previously been given outright to the minor children
the decedent could not transfer it to them again pursuant to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act and
therefore decedent could not have the powers granted therein-he could not terminate nor could
he apply the funds to fulfill his legal obligation of support owed the minors).
1113 N.C. App. at 278, 185 S.E.2d at 420.
4044 T.C. at 68; see, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036l(b)(2) (1960).
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court also felt that section 2038(a)(1) 4" applied to the transfer because
the donor under the Uniform Act had the power to terminate the custodial arrangement at will.4" Because section 105-2(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes has been judicially construed to tax transfers
with retained powers of termination 3 and because section 105-2(3)(i)
of the North Carolina General Statutes contains the exact language of
section 2036(a)(1)44 of the federal law, the Chryslerdecision was of great
precedential value.
Two recent Tax Court cases not discussed in Korschun reaffirmed
the position taken in Chrysler s that sections 2036 and 2038 demand
inclusion in the gross estate of the donor-custodian of any assets transferred to the parent as custodian for his minor children under a state's
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act when the donor-custodian dies while holding such powers conferred by the Act and prior to the minor donee's
attainment of majority. In Estate of Harry Prudowsky4t a deceased
father had made gifts of stock to his children pursuant to the Wisconsin
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act," had named himself custodian, and had
died in that capacity before the children reached majority. Since the
Wisconsin Act gave the custodian the power to terminate the relationship at will and to apply the custodial assets to satisfy the donorcustodian's obligations of support, the court found no difficulty in assessing an estate tax upon the assets transferred. The court stated: "We
have consistently held that a tranferor-parent [sic] custodian, who dies
while the custodianship is in effect, possesses at his death precisely those
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a)(1).
444 T.C. at 68. After the Chrysler decision came two cases in which gifts had been made by
donors who had no legal obligation to support the minor donees. Both donors named themselves
custodian and both asserted that the respective Uniform Gifts to Minors Act employed provided

a sufficiently ascertainable standard to negate the distributive discretion given under the Acts and

thus that a section 2038(a) inclusion for federal estate tax purposes was improper. However, the
two courts disagreed with these contentions and found the property taxable in the estate of the
donors who had died in the capacity of custodian. In both these cases, Dorothy Stuit v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 580 (1970), affd, 452 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1971), and Estate of Charles M. Jacoby,
39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 813 (1970), the court would not accept the argument that the phrase "for

the minor's support, maintenance, education, and benefit" provided an ascertainable standard
which would control the distributive powers of the custodian. Each court objected to the word
"benefit."
4'See text accompanying note 32 supra.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(1).
"See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
4655 T.C. 890 (1971).
"Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 880.61 to .71 (Supp. 1971).
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result in the inclusion in his
powers which under sections 2036 and 2038
' ' 48
gross estate of the assets transferred.
In Eichstedt v. United States4 9 a gift of securities held as community property was made to the father-donor as custodian for his
children under the California Gifts of Securities to Minors Act. He died
possessed of the power to terminate the relationship and the power to
use the custodial property for the satisfaction of his legal obligation to
support the minor donees before the donees attained age twenty-one.
The court applied the exact reasoning used in Prudowsky50 and found
one-half of the securities taxable in decedent's estate under sections
2036(a)(1) and 2038(a).11 Thus the federal estate tax law has established
a well-defined position in regard to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Acts
as presently in force in the various states.
Lober v. United States 2 was also cited by the Korschun court in
support of the legal authority to assess a death tax upon a transfer, made
in trust or otherwise, when the transferor dies possessed of the power
to terminate. In Lober an irrevocable inter vivos trust was created with
thesettlor as trustee and his children as beneficiaries. The United States
Supreme Court held that since the trust gave the settlor, as trustee, the
right to accumulate and reinvest income until his children reached
twenty-one years of age, at which time they were to be paid the accumulated income, and to hold the principal of the trust until the beneficiary
reached twenty-five or turn over all or any part of the principal to the
beneficiaries at any time he saw fit, the settlor had sufficient power to
alter, amend, or revoke the trust so that the trust property was includible in his gross estate for estate tax purposes under section 81 l(d)(2)5 3
If the custodial relationship can be analogized to a trust, as the
Korschun court stated it could,54 the precedential value of Lober is
obvious-both Lober and Korschun died possessed of the power to
terminate the property relationship they had created, not by revocation
1155 T.C. at 893.
"72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.

12,891 (N.D. Cal. 1972). For a holding exactly the same as Eichstedt

except that an irrevocable trust with settlor as trustee was used instead of the California Gifts of
Securities to Minors Act see Estate of Russell Harrison Varian, 47 T.C. 34 (1966), affd per

curianm, Varian v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
"See text accompanying note 46 supra.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036(a)(1), 2038(a).
52346 U.S. 335 (1953).
11Id. at 337. Section 81 l(d)(2) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code was the predecessor of the
present § 2038 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
"13 N.C. App. at 279, 185 S.E.2d at 420-21.
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so that the property transferred would return to them but by acceleration of the time of enjoyment. Each transferor could give up all control
over the gift property and thereby accelerate the time of possession and
enjoyment."5
In the Korschun opinion the court stated that the retention of the
power to vote the stock transferred pursuant to the North Carolina
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act was one of the reasons for including the
value of the stock in the donor-custodian's estate for state inheritance
tax purposes.5 However, in construing the federal estate tax statutes,
the United States Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Byrum57 has taken
the opposite stance as to the legal significance of a donor retaining
voting power over transferred stock. The settlor in that case had transferred shares of a closely held corporation to an irrevocable trust for
the benefit of his children. The shares of stock retained by the decedent,
when added to those transferred to the trust, constituted more than a
majority of the outstanding stock and thus gave the decedent controlling
interest in the corporation since he retained the right to vote the transferred shares. Decedent also retained the right to veto the transfers by
the trustee of any of the shares and to remove the trustee and appoint
another corporate trustee as successor. The Court held that the reservation of these powers did not bring the shares within the donor's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes. According to the Court, reservation of voting control did not constitute a retention of the enjoyment of
the property transferred within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1), 5 nor
did keeping these powers constitute the right to designate the persons
who would enjoy the income within the meaning of section 2036(a)(2).
Thus, in applying similar taxing statutes the federal and North Carolina
-"TheKorschun court also cited Commissioner v. Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946), as additional

justification for the Lober holding. In Holmes the settlor of a trust also reserved to himself as
trustee the power to terminate the trust and distribute the corpus and accumulated income to the
beneficiaries. There the Court was not ready to take the step later taken in Lober-that is,
declaring a transfer included in the gross estate of a transferor because he retained a power to

accelerate the time of enjoyment without altering the identity of the persons who would ultimately
take. In Holmes the Court felt obligated to find that the power to terminate affected "not only
the time of enjoyment but also the person or persons who may enjoy the donation." Id. at 487;
see Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958) for the Treasury's ratification of the Lober position.
1113 N.C. App. at 277, 185 S.E.2d at 420.

57408 U.S. 125 (1972).
IsFor a detailed analysis and criticism of the Byrum decision see Note, Estate Tax and the
Closely Held Corporation-A Nearly FatalBlow to Section 2036, 51 N.C.L. REv. 325 (1972).
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courts reached opposite59 conclusions on what significance should be
attached to retaining voting control over transferred stock."0
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The North Carolina Court of Appeals thus found the powers retained by a donor when he made himself custodian under the North
Carolina Uniform Gifts to Minors Act were sufficient to include the
custodial property in his estate when he died holding such powers prior
to the minor donee's reaching the age of twenty-one. The power bestowed upon a donor-custodian under the Act included the right to use
custodial property to fulfill his obligation of support, the right to vote
custodial stock, and the power to terminate the custodial relationship
at will. Although it disclaimed any reliance upon federal precedent as
authority for assessing the inheritance tax upon Korschun's estate,61 the
court of appeals apparently followed the reasoning of several federal
estate tax cases dealing with the retention of similar powers.
The significance of the Korschun decision lies not in what it says,
for that was predictable, but in the fact that estate planners now have a
judicial statement upon which to rely. The case is important in that it
recognizes for North Carolina inheritance tax purposes certain principles pertaining to the use of Uniform Gifts to Minors Statutes that
federal taxing authorities have recognized since 1957.2 This will allow
estate planners to create estate programs involving gifts to minors under
the Uniform Act with a greater degree of certainty as to their status in
relation to North Carolina inheritance tax.
In the final sentence of the Korschun opinion Judge Morris gives
the following advice: "If a parent donor wishes to avoid inheritance tax
on the transfer, he need only choose as custodian one of those persons
"However, the Byrum holding may not be completely at odds with Korschun. In Byrum the
donor named an independent trustee and was not a fiduciary. 408 U.S. at 126. The donor-custodian

in Korschun, while not a trustee, did owe a fiduciary duty to the minor donee. 13 N.C. App. at
277, 185 S.E.2d at 419. Thus the two cases can probably be distinguished on their facts.
e1See Will of Prange, 201 Wis. 636, 231 N.W. 271 (1930). There settlor placed stock in trust

for his children and retained the right to vote the stock. Under an inheritance tax statute similar
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(3) (1972) the Wisconsin court held the retention of the voting rights

was not sufficient to place the property within the taxable estate of the settlor. The court stated
that the right retained by settlor to vote stock placed in trust was not such a reservation of beneficial

enjoyment that it would make the transfer one intended to take effect after death.
113 N.C. App. at 280, 185 S.E.2d at 421.
"See Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 618, discussed in text accompanying note 35 supra.
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or corporations allowed by the Act other than himself." 3 Certainly this
is good advice. Perhaps better advice would be not to use the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act at all since its utility in overall planning is limited.
The typical reasons asserted for making gifts to minors are: to
redirect income to another taxpayer in a lower income tax rate bracket
to realize an overall tax saving for the family unit; to remove property
from the donor's estate in order to reduce estate taxes; and to provide
for the minor's financial security. A custodianship pursuant to the
North Carolina Uniform Gifts to Minors Act is easily and inexpensively
created, requires no attorney or court involvement, qualifies as a gift of
a present interest for purposes of the three-thousand dollar annual federal gift tax exclusion per donee, 4 and encourages others to have business dealings with the minor since the fear of his disaffirming any contract or obligation is removed. But, how well does this type of fiduciary
relationship satisfy the planning goals of those making gifts to minors?
If a minor dies before reaching the age of eighteen and has not
executed a will, the custodial property will pass by the state intestate
succession laws. In North Carolina this means that if the minor had
never married the custodial property would return to the minor's parents in equal shares." Such a result is usually repugnant to the overall
tax planning motives of the donor, particularly if he is a parent. A donor
could not obtain the tax benefits of generation-skipping under the Uniform Act.66 In some situations it would be advisable to give the minor
a life estate (whether legal or equitable) with a special power of appointment with named takers in default." This is not possible under the
Uniform Act.
Also, under the Uniform Act the property must be paid over to the
1313 N.C. App. at 280, 185 S.E.2d at 421.
"Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 212.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15(3) (1966).
eZiegler, supra note 5, at 315. Generation-skipping is a device used to secure long-term estate

tax savings. Example: A devises a life estate (legal or equitable) in Blackacre to his son B with
remainder to A's grandson, C. A pays estate tax on the value of Blackacre at his death. Upon B's
death his life estate terminates and C's remainder interest becomes possessory. B pays no estate

tax because no interest in Blackacre passed through his estate, the life estate coming to an end
upon his death. Thus one generation obtains the use value of Blackacre without having to pay an
estate tax thereon.
7
A legal life estate would be required where a donor wanted to take advantage of generation-

skipping while maintaining the income tax status of a small business corporation. Subchapter S
small business corporation income tax status would be lost if the gift of securities was in trust.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(2).
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donee upon his attaining the age of eighteen.68 This is not always desirable; one creating such a relationship fifteen years earlier could not possibly foresee how the minor would develop or whether he would have the
capacity to manage the custodial property at age eighteen.

The donor cannot designate who is to serve as successor custodian

in the event the first custodian should die or resign.69 Under the Uniform

Act it is possible that the grantor could be named successor custodian.
Should he die while serving in that capacity, Korschun would be applica-

ble and inheritance tax would attach.7" Neither multiple custodians nor
multiple donees can be named; there must be one custodian and one
donee per custodial relationship." This eliminates any possibility of
flexible income tax planning such as would be available to a trustee who
could "sprinkle" the income among the several beneficiaries according,
2

not only to their need, but to their present income tax situation.1

Also, the types of property that can be transferred pursuant to the

North Carolina Uniform Act are limited to securities, money, or life
insurance.73 No such limitation is placed on a trust. The custodian is

limited to making investments of the custodial property "as would a
prudent man of discretion and intelligence who is seeking a reasonable
18N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 33-71(d) (Supp. 1971).
"Id. § 33-74(b) (1966). However, if the gift had been made by will pursuant to § 33-69.1 the
donor could have designated by will an alternative custodian to serve in the event the custodian
first named predeceases the testator or refuses to accept the appointment as custodian. Id. § 3369.1(c) (Supp. 1971).
"0Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 212, was amplified by Rev. Rul. 70-348, 1970-2 CuM.
BULL. 193, which held that when a donor is appointed successor custodian (as where donor's wife
was the original custodian and upon her death or resignation the court appointed the donor as
custodian) and dies while serving in that capacity before the donee reaches age twenty-one the
custodial property will be taxed in the estate of the donor. The interval during which the donor
had no control over the transferred property (while the wife was custodian) was deemed unimportant by the Service. The Ruling stated that it was not necessary that the power to terminate the
enjoyment of the beneficial interests be retained by the donor at the time of the transfer. The mere
possession thereof by the donor at the time of death is the factor that results in the inclusion of
the value of the transferred property in his gross estate under section 2038(a) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.
7
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-69(b) (1966).
"Itshould be noted that the lack of the ability to "sprinkle" income is necessary if the gift is
to qualify for the annual three-thousand dollar per-donee gift tax exclusion available under section
2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c) (1958), Example (3).
Thus, the absence of the ability to "sprinkle" income among several donees under the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act is not a tax disadvantage unique to that mode of transfer.
"N.C. GEM. STAT. § 33-69(a) (1966). The Revised Uniform Gifts to Minors Act eliminates
this disadvantage by allowing many more types of property to be transferred in custodianship to a
minor donee.
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. ."I' Again, no such

limitation on the type of investments is placed on a trustee."
Under a custodianship the legal title to the property passes to the
minor" and thereby exposes it to the claims of his creditors. This could
be avoided by the use of a trust in which a spendthrift clause could be
incorporated. 7 Also, the use of a trust affords an estate planner greater
certainty since the case law pertaining to trusts is more voluminous and
settled than that dealing with the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.
The preceding examples are illustrative of the advantages to be
obtained by transferring gifts to minors in trust" rather than pursuant
to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. The Korschun decision is an example of the problems that may be encountered by use of the custodianship. It would seem that until the various Gifts to Minors Acts are
amended to afford more flexibility and until the body of case law interpreting the provisions of the Uniform Acts becomes more comprehensive-especially with regard to taxation-that those involved in longterm estate planning should adhere to the trust instrument, notwithstanding its added cost and bother.
RICHMOND STANFIELD FREDERICK

II

XIII
TORTS
Insulating Negligence on Summary Judgment
Recently the North Carolina Supreme Court in McNair v. Boyettel
affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of one of two defendants
74

1d. § 33-71(e) (1966).
Trustees in North Carolina are in the unique position of being controlled in their investments
by a permissive legal list, id. §§36-1 to -5 (1966), and a judicially adopted prudent man standard
75

as enunciated in Sheets v. J.G. Flynt Tobacco Co., 195 N.C. 149, 141 S.E. 355 (1928). However,

the trust instrument itself can give the trustee broader powers.
7
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-70(a) (1966).
"In North Carolina a spendthrift provision in a trust is only effective when the corpus of the
trust generates a clear annual income of less than or equal to five-hundred dollars. Id. § 41-9
(1966).
78

The comparative advantages and disadvantages of § 2503(c) trusts and non-§ 2503(c) trusts
should be examined by the estate planner-such an examination is, however, beyond the scope of
this note.
1282 N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972).
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in a negligence action. Boyette, the first defendant, was driving on a
four-lane expressway at night. He passed the plaintiff, McNair, at an
excessive rate of speed and collided with the car driven by Fowlkes. The
plaintiff, a member of the Durham Community Watch, quickly parked
his car on the median strip and ascertained that no one was injured in
the accident. The cars of Fowlkes and Boyette partially obstructed both
northbound lanes, resulting in a traffic jam behind the vehicles. McNair,
seeing the traffic problem developing, borrowed a flashlight from another driver in order to direct traffic. He took one step back onto the
roadway and was immediately hit by the automobile driven by the
second defandant, Hall. McNair suffered severe injuries and sued both
Boyette and Hall. He charged Boyette with negligently driving, leaving
his car on a public highway, and failing to warn others of the dangerous
condition he had created. McNair alleged that Hall was negligent in2
driving faster than reasonable and in failing to keep a proper lookout.
Boyette moved for summary judgment alleging that his negligence,
if any, was insulated by the negligence of Hall and by the contributory
negligence of McNair. Although the trial court held as a matter of law
that McNair was not contributorily negligent,' Boyette's motion for
summary judgment was granted. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed.4
The opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court is somewhat
cryptic, and it is difficult to discern the exact holding and the reasoning
behind the result. Justice Moore in writing for a unanimous court initially implied, by raising the question of whether the negligence of the
second defendant Hall insulated the negligence of Boyette,5 that the
decisive issue in the case was the defense of third-party insulation. However, Justice Moore never clearly answered this question and, in discussing the facts, addressed himself solely to the actions of McNair, not
those of Hall.' His discussion implies that Boyette was relieved of liabil'Id. at 231-34, 192 S.E.2d at 458-59.
'Brief for Appellant at 3, McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972).
115 N.C. App. 69, 189 S.E.2d 590 (1972).
1282 N.C. at 237, 192 S.E.2d at 461.

'Plaintiff's own affidavit and deposition, considered by the court in passing upon
Boyette's motion for summary judgments, disclose that plaintiff left a place of safety in

the median, . . . took one step onto the traveled portion of the highway immediately
in front of the oncoming vehicle driven by defendant Hall . . . Under these facts,
which as between plaintiff and Boyette on this motion must be taken as true, defendant
Boyette's negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
282 N.C. at 238-39, 192 S.E.2d at 462.
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ity because of the actions of McNair, although the trial court had ruled
that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent7 and his opinion expressly stated that the Supreme Court was not passing on the question
of contributory negligence.' This raises the possibility of the holding that
McNair's actions were the insulating acts even though they were not
found to be contributorily negligent. North Carolina has required that
an insulating act be an act of negligence,' however; hence McNair could
not have been the insulator if he was not contributorily negligent."
Another possible reading is that the actions of the second defendant
insulated the negligence of the first defendant. Although this latter holding is more likely, it is no less surprising in view of the current North
Carolina law concerning insulation and summary judgment. First,
North Carolina requires the insulating act to be negligent" so the court
apparently found the second defendant negligent. However, the liability
of the second defendant was not in issue on the motion. Secondly, the
issue of insulation is a question of proximate cause, and the result here
seems inconsistent with the foreseeability test stated by the court. Furthermore, a decision of these questions on a motion for summary judgment appears unprecedented in North Carolina. There is a serious danger that the plaintiff will not recover from either defendant since the
second defendant might be found not liable. As a result of the inconsistencies and questions raised in the opinion, an examination of the possible bases for the result and the reasoning behind them is needed in order
to determine the implications of this decision.
DETERMINATION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE-INSULATION BY HALL

Since the plaintiff could not have been the insulator, the court must
have based the relief of Boyette on the insulating acts of Hall. The
North Carolina test for determining when an intervening act insulates
the original negligence is really a part of the larger question of proxi7

See note 3 supra.

'282 N.C. at 240, 192 S.E.2d at 463.
'See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.

"Another possible basis for the decision is that the court was holding McNair contributorily
negligent as to Boyette, but possibly not contributorily negligent as to Hall. It is doubtful, however,
that this was the basis for the result, since if such a major alteration to the law of negligence was
the holding, the court would have been much more careful to explain in detail this result and the
reasons behind it.
"See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
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mate cause.1 2 North Carolina cases have expressed various tests, but the
only agreement reached among observers in the area is that the issue is
3
well-muddled.
In Haney v. Town of Lincolnton" the court stated that if the plaintiff would not have been injured butfor the subsequent negligence of the

second defendant, the first defendant was relieved of liability. However,
"but for" is the test for actual, not proximate causation, and by defini-

tion all intervening acts of negligence have an actual causal effect. Because not all subsequent acts have been found to insulate,15 the "but for"

test is inadequate to determine the liabilities of the defendants.

The court in Copple v. Warner6 suggested a test that hinged on the

amount of time between the first and second tortfeasor's actions. This
"time-lapse" test, however, has been effectively and correctly refuted as
17
being almost irrelevant in all but a few cases.
The test most often employed by the North Carolina courts, and
the one cited in McNair, is foreseeability-the first defendant is not
relieved of liability unless the second independent act of negligence
could not reasonably have been foreseen."8 It would seem foreseeable

that a second car would strike another car parked on a highway at night
or someone standing near it. At least the second collision would appear
to be sufficiently foreseeable for the question to be submitted to the jury.
In McNair, however, the court must have ruled as a matter of law that
Hall's collision was not reasonably foreseeable. Thus the court apparently required a strict foreseeability standard-the whole sequence of
""This doctrine of insulating the negligence of one by the subsequent intervention of the active
negligence of another really belongs to the definition of proximate cause. . . . The principle is
stated . . . as follows: 'While there may be more than one proximate cause, that which is new and
entirely independent breaks the sequence of events and insulates the original or primary negligence.'" Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 87, 6 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1940). Proximate cause in North
Carolina has been defined as "a cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
new and independent cause, produced the plaintiff's injuries, and without which the injuries would
not have occurred, and from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen
that such a result, or some similar injurious result, was probable under the facts as they exist."
Adams v. State Bd. of Educ., 248 N.C. 506, 511, 103 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1958).
3
Note, Torts-Insulating Negligence in North Carolina, 33 N.C.L. REv. 498 (1955).
14207 N.C. 282, 176 S.E. 573 (1934).
"E.g., Price v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 161 S.E.2d 590 (1968); Hall v. Coble
Dairies, Inc., 234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63 (1951).
15260 N.C. 727, 133 S.E.2d 641 (1963).
"Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L. REV. 906, 927-30
(1965).
"Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 89, 6 S.E.2d 808, 812 (1940).
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events must have been foreseeable, not just that some injury would
occur. 9 There have been similar results in other parked car cases.2"
In contrast, the North Carolina courts have not imposed the strict
foreseeability doctrine in several other negligence situations they have
not involved parked cars. For example, in Stockwell v. Brown2 the
plaintiff was driving a car toward an intersection from the east. The first
defendant, Brown, was approaching the intersection from the west at an
excessive speed, while the second defendant, York, approached the intersection from the south. York failed to yield the right of way at the
intersection and forced Brown to swerve into the path of the plaintiff's
car. The court did not insulate Brown as a matter of law, but allowed
the entire case to go to the jury. The result in Stockwell seems inconsistent with the result in McNair, for it is doubtful that reasonable men
would find the actions of York in Stockwell to be any more foreseeable
than the actions of Hall in McNair. These seemingly contrary results,
reached by courts that have purportedly applied the same test of foreseeability, indicate that possibly the foreseeability test is not actually being
employed by the courts.
One possible explanation is that the courts have made a policy
determination in parked-car cases that the driver who left his car negligently parked on the highway will not be liable for any subsequent
injury. Thus they are deciding that the negligence of the parking is too
remote to be a proximate cause and are using foreseeability as a label
on which to hang the result. The majority of North Carolina cases
involving parked cars have relieved the first defendant;"2 arguably the
court in McNair was simply relying on precedent. There appears to be
no justification, however, for insulating a defendant in a parked-car case
"To hold that the defendant

.

.

owed the duty to the plaintiff's intestate to foresee

that a third person would operate a car in such a negligent manner as to be compelled
to drive out on to the shoulder of the highway in order to avoid a collision with a car
parked on the opposite side thereof, and thereby strike a person standing on the shoulder, would . . . "practically stretch foresight into omniscience."
Beach v. Patton, 208 N.C. 134, 136, 179 S.E. 446, 447 (1935); see Note, Proximate Cause in North
Carolina, I WAxE FOREST INTRA. L. REv. 59 (1965).
Rowe v. Murphy, 250 N.C. 627, 109 S.E.2d 474 (1959); Howze v. McCall, 249 N.C. 250,
106 S.E.2d 236 (1958); Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940). A few cases in North

Carolina have not dismissed the suit against the original tortfeasor, but these cases can be distinguished from the majority. Cronenburg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.C. 1954), Hall
v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63 (1951); Grimes v. Gilbert, 6 N.C. App. 304,
170 S.E.2d 65 (1969).
21254 N.C. 662, 119 S.E.2d 795 (1961).
"See note 20 supra.
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and not relieving a defendant in a Stockwell-type case. A defendant's
negligence in leaving his car on the highway is certainly no less onerous
than that of a defendant, who, traveling five miles an hour over the
speed limit, is hit by another driver running a stop sign. These different
results for different factual patterns decrease the objectivity and clarity
of the law of negligence for no apparent reason. Consequently, a uniform test should be applied by the
courts to all insulation cases, if one
23
is not already being so applied.
Another test that has been suggested in some North Carolina cases
for determining the liability of the original tortfeasor is actual or constructive awareness, cited as the Sternberg test by the courts. 24 The
foreseeability test differs from the Sternberg awareness test in that
under foreseeability the trier of fact is looking from the point of original
negligence (in McNair, the leaving of the car on the highway by Boyette)
and asking what results are foreseeable due to this negligence. These
questions are fairly speculative since no one can really look into the
future, so the answers must be based on probabilities. However, in
applying the awareness test, the trier of fact is looking from the point
of view of the second defendant (Hall in McNair)and inquiring into his
actual or constructive awareness. These latter questions can be answered
with more certainty, especially with actual awareness, since the issue is
what has happened, not what will happen. Evidence can be introduced
to show whether the second defendant was either actually aware or
should have been aware of the danger. Arguably in some cases, determinations of constructive awareness are no less speculative or easier to
make than determinations of foreseeability, but in the majority of situations concrete facts are available more readily to impute awareness to
the defendant.
It would appear that the court in McNair did not apply the foreseeability test, since reasonable men could at least differ as to the likelihood
3See text accompanying note 24 infra.

"Where a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger
created by the negligence of an original tort-feasor, and thereafter, by an independent

act of negligence, brings about an accident, the first tort-feasor is relieved of liability,
because the condition created by him was merely a circumstance of the accident and
not its proximate cause. Where, however, the second actor does not become apprised of

such danger until his own negligence, added to that of the existing perilous condition,
has made the accident inevitable, the negligent acts of the two tort-feasors are contribut-

ing causes and proximate factors in the happenings of the accident and impose liability
upon both of the guilty parties.
Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N.C. 41, 44, 195 S.E. 88, 90 (1938).
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of Hall's actions. However, the decision can be rationalized by applying
the Sternberg test, for there can hardly be reasonable differences of
opinion as to whether Hall should have recognized the dangerous situation he was approaching. Drivers preceeding Hall had easily seen the
hazard and avoided it; Hall should have also. Thus summary judgment
seems appropriate based on the constructive awareness test of
Sternberg, because Hall can be said to be constructively aware of the
dangerous situation he was approaching.
The Sternberg test not only seems to better explain McNair, but it
also better reconciles the results in all the North Carolina insulation
cases. When the first defendant has been relieved of liability, the judge
must have determined not that the second defendant's act was unforeseeable, but that the second defendant was constructively aware of the
danger.
APPROPRIATENESS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In making a determination that the negligence of Boyette was insulated, the court must have also decided that Hall as the intervening actor
was negligent. An intervening act is a subsequent act that breaks the
chain of causation arising from the original negligence and thus relieves
the first tortfeasor of liability. Other jurisdictions have stated that an
intervening, insulating cause may be either a negligent or non-negligent
act." In most of these cases, however, the intervening acts were events
that by definition could not be negligent, such as intentional torts." The
majority of North Carolina cases have referred to the insulating conduct
as a negligent act. 8 In Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc. 9 the defendant had
negligently left his truck on a highway and as a result the plaintiff was
ultimately struck by a car driven by a second actor. The defendant
moved for summary judgment, claiming that his negligence was insu"'Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234 N.C. 206, 211-12, 67 S.E.2d 63, 66-67 (1951).
"E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Martin, 362 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1966); McIntosh v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 111 Ind. App. 550, 38 N.E.2d 263 (1941); Cornell v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 8
So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1942); Garner v. Prescott, 234 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). Contra,
Pyers v. Tiers, 89 N.J.L. 520, 99 A. 130 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
21Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964) (intentional tort); Fisher v. Mutimer,
293 III. App. 201, 12 N.E.2d 315 (1937) (act of person incapable of negligence); Bellows v.
Worcester Storage Co., 297 Mass. 188, 7 N.E.2d 588 (1937) (crime); Power v. Village of Hibbing,
182 Minn. 66, 233 N.W. 597 (1930) (act of nature).
"E.g. Essick v. City of Lexington, 233 N.C. 600, 605, 65 S.E.2d 220, 224 (1951), Dickson v.
Queen City Coach Co., 233 N.C. 167, 172 63 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1951).
2*234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63 (1951).
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lated by the intervention of the second actor's independent act. The
court denied his motion because there was no allegation of negligence

against the second actor," noting that the defense of insulation was still
available to the defendant if he could prove the second actor negligent.31

Thus North Carolina clearly requires the insulating event to be a negligenct act. 2
Two elements must be satisfied before a motion for summary judgment can be granted-(l) there must be no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and (2) the moving party must be entitled to the judgment

as a matter of law.33 Thus, in granting Boyette's motion for summary
judgment, the court was apparently finding that Hall was negligent as

a matter of law. One authority has noted that in negligence cases, "it is
extremely difficult by any forecast of raw evidence to show that a party
is entitled as a matter of law to summary judgment. Here entitlement

depends not just on raw fact finding by the trier of fact, but on its
evaluation of these facts against a standard of due care. '34 The major-

ity of North Carolina35 and federal" cases have similarly held that
issues of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability should be de-

cided by the jury.
A few North Carolina cases have held that negligence and proximate cause were issues of law for the judge to decide.37 These cases are

distinguishable from McNair, however, on two grounds. First, these
'Id. at 213-14, 67 S.E.2d at 68.
31

3

1d.

See Note, 1 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REv., supra note 19.
3N.C.R. Civ. P. 56.
312MCINTOsH NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1660.5, at 74 (Phillips Supp.
1970). The requirement that there be no genuine issue of material fact would also seem to conflict
with granting the motion in McNair since there would appear to be reasonable doubt as to the
question of foreseeability. The court had to treat this as a question of law in order to pass on the
motion.
"Miller v. Snipes, 12 N.C. App. 342, 183 S.E.2d 270, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 619, 184 S.E.2d
883 (1971); Robinson v. McMahan 11 N.C. App. 275, 181 S.E.2d 147, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 395,
183 S.E.2d 243 (1971).
"Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956); Meeks v. Appalachian Power
Co., 180 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.W. Va. 1960); Heichel v. Lima-Hamilton Corp., 98 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.
Ohio 1951); Brewer v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 11 F.R.D. 550 (S.D. Iowa 1951). The North
Carolina rule for summary judgment is almost identical to the federal rule for summary judgment
(FED. R. Civ. P. 56), so federal cases applying the federal rule should be helpful in interpreting
the new North Carolina rule.
3Rogers v. Green, 252 N.C. 214, 113 S.E.2d 364 (1960); Hudson v. Petroleum Transit Co.,
250 N.C. 435, 108 S.E.2d 900 (1959); Godwin v. Nixon, 236 N.C. 632, 74 S.E.2d 24 (1952); Murray
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E.2d 326 (1940).
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cases were dismissed in favor of defendants because the plaintiffs had
failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a duty or a breach of
duty, not because of an evaluative determination of the absence of
proximate cause.38 For example in Hudson v. Petroleum Transit Co.,31
cited by the court,40 the action was dismissed because the plaintiff failed
to prove that the defendant had been speeding. The questions of the
existence of a duty or a breach of duty are fairly easy issues to decide
by relying on precedent cases involving similar factual patterns. For
example, a question as to whether North Carolina law holds that a
motorist owes a duty to his passenger to drive safely could easily be
answered by resorting to prior cases. Questions of proximate cause,
however, must be determined on a case-by-case approach since they
involve facts and policy considerations peculiar to the particular case
before the court. Decisions on negligence as a matter of law are justifiable when the key element is lack of a duty, but such decisions are much
less appropriate when the issue is proximate cause. A second and possibly more important difference between these prior cases and McNair is
that these actions were dismissed in favor of defendants by directed verdicts after the plaintiff had presented all his evidence. Unlike McNair,
none of these cases were decided at the summary judgment level where
only a forecast of the evidence is presented.
The four cases cited by Justice Moore in McNair as authority for
granting summary judgment were not negligence actions. Two dealt
with contracts,41 one with sovereign immunity,42 and one with administrative law. 3 These cases similarly did not involve the evaluative process necessary to determine proximate cause and provide no justification
for this extension of summary judgment.
The danger of the summary judgment holding is that McNair may
be left with no avenue of relief. Boyette has been relieved of liability
31One case cited by the court in McNair, Godwin v. Nixon, 236 N.C. 632, 74 S.E.2d 24

(1953), did dismiss an action against one defendant because the court determined that his negligence was insulated by a second defendant's negligence. The court in Godwin, however, seemed to

use a but-for test for determining issues of insulation, which is not a valid test, as it is really the
test for actual causation. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. Furthermore Goodwin was
also not a summary judgment case.
39250 N.C. 435, 108 S.E.2d 900 (1959).
4282 N.C. at 236, 192 S.E.2d at 461.

"1Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. v. State Ports Authority, 280 N.C. 251, 185 S.E.2d 793 (1972);

Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971).
2
Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972).
13Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 186 S.E.2d 400 (1972).
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because his negligence was insulated by Hall. Although the court denied
ruling on Hall's negligence," it must have determined that Hall was
negligent since North Carolina requires the insulating event to be negligent. Hall, however, is entitled to a separate trial on his liability for
negligence and in this subsequent trial, a jury could find him not negligent. Thus McNair would recover from no one because of contrary
factual findings in two different proceedings on the same issue-Hall's
negligence.
CONCLUSION

The court erred in granting Boyette's motion for summary judgment. The result reached by the court is not explainable by the foreseeability test purportedly used because the foreseeability of Hall's actions
was not so unreasonable that it should not have gone to the jury.
Whether the real basis for freeing Boyette was a policy judgment in
parked-car cases or whether another test was used, the court should
have fully discussed the test applied and not simply dismissed the case
under the convenient label of foreseeability.
Furthermore, the issues of negligence and proximate cause require
considerations of the reasonable man standard, which is better applied
by the twelve laymen of the jury than by a single trial judge. The
unfortunate effect of this decision is that McNair will be left without
any remedy if later Hall is also freed from liability. Such a result in this
case would be most unjust and easily avoided if the actions against both
Boyette and Hall were allowed to be decided simultaneously.

E.

GRAHAM McGOOGAN, JR.

XIV
WELFARE
Unemployment Compensation-The "Available for Work" Requirement
Applied to Voluntary Retirees
In In re Thomas' the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that
an unemployed person who has done everything possible to obtain work
11282 N.C. at 240, 192 S.E.2d at 463.
1281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972).
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and who is otherwise eligible for benefits may be denied unemployment

insurance benefits solely because employers do not customarily hire
persons in his age group. The court affirmed the use of the Employment
Security Commission's special test 2 to determine whether voluntary retirees are "available for work ' 3 under section 96-13(3) of the North
Carolina General Statutes. The Commission had held that a claimant
was not "available for work" and therefore ineligible for benefits because she did not have "a reasonable chance of obtaining employment
within her locality because of her advanced age, lack of skills, and
limited education."' 4 Such a result does not seem appropriate in a state
whose employment security policy is to assist those "persons unemployed through no fault of their own." 5
Claimant, a seventy-year-old female, had been a laundry worker in
Winston-Salem for twenty years prior to her voluntary retirement on
June 10, 1970.6 Exactly one week after retiring, claimant filed for benefits under North Carolina's Employment Security Law. Consistent with
section 96-14(1)1 she was disqualified from receiving benefits for eight
weeks because she had "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer." After the disqualification period, she filed
'The only issue directly addressed was the burden-of-proof issue. While the court lessened the
burden on a voluntarily retired claimant by requiring proof of availability only by a greater weight
of the evidence, it affirmed the use of a special test for establishing availability for voluntary
retirees by stating that the Commission was "free from error save and except the placing of an
undue burden on the claimant." Id. at 603, 189 S.E.2d at 248.
In Decision No. 4300 (N.C. Employment Security Comm'n Mar. 9, 1971), reprinted, Record
at 24, 28-29, In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972), the court stated:
A voluntary retiree shall not be considered available for work unless it can be
established that (1)she is physically able to work; (2) she is available for work and
genuinely interested in full-time employment; (3) she places no undue restrictions on her
availability for full-time work; and (4) full-time work which she can do is available in
the area wherein she resides, and she has a reasonable chance of obtaining such employment.
'In addition to availability for work, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-13 (Supp. 1971) also requires a
claimant to register for work, report regularly to the Commission office, make a formal claim, be
able to work, and actively seek work.
'Decision No. 4300 (N.C. Employment Security Comm'n Mar. 9, 1971), reprinted, Record
at 24, In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (1965).
'281 N.C. at 599, 189 S.E.2d at 245.
7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14 (1965) provides: "An individual shall be disqualified for benefts:
(1)For not less than four, nor more than twelve consecutive weeks of unemployment . . . if it is
determined by the Commission that such individual is . . .unemployed because he left work
voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer. .. ."
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claims for twenty-three consecutive weeks," but benefits were denied

because claimant had not been "available for work" as required by
section 96-13(3). The evidence before the Commission showed that

claimant was in good health, had sought employment at a variety of
institutions that might employ domestic workers, and had shown a

general willingness to return to work. 9 The Commission found that the
claimant was not attached to the labor force and therefore was unavailable for work because her age"0 prevented a "reasonable chance" of

finding work, a requirement that the Commission only imposes upon
voluntary retirees." The Supreme Court of Forsyth County affirmed,

but the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed 2 on the theory that
no legal significance should be attached to the fact that employers do

not usually hire persons seventy years of age. Without revealing its
reasons, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the

3
Commission's ruling on the "available for work" test.
The Commission's ruling should not have been affirmed in Thomas

because the Commission erred in (1) applying a special "available for

work" test to one group of citizens, (2) penalizing a voluntary retiree
beyond the statutorily limited period, and (3) considering the hiring
practices of local employers in determining whether a labor market
existed. This note will first review the statutory scheme for unemploy-

ment benefits in North Carolina. Secondly, it will examine the "available for work" test and its components-definition of the labor market
and proof of attachment thereto."
sClaimant was disqualified from June 10, 1970 through Aug. 11, 1970. The twenty-three
consecutive claims began on Aug. 12, 1970. Benefits for Aug. 12, 1970 through Nov. 3, 1970 were
denied. No appeal was taken. The present decision was limited to a determination of benefits for
the period from Nov. 4, 1970 through Jan. 19, 1971. See In re Thomas, 13 N.C. App. 513, 513,
186 S.E.2d 623, 624 (1972).
'Decision No. 4300 (N.C. Employment Security Comm'n Mar. 9, 1971), reprinted, Record
at 24, In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972); Testimony before Appeals Deputy,
Winston-Salem, N.C., Feb. 10, 1971, Record at 14, In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245
(1972).
"The Commission cited claimant's age, lack of experience, and limited education as reasons
for her slight chances of finding work. It has been pointed out that she was no less skilled and
educated at the time of these claims than during the previous twenty years when she was successfully employed. In re Thomas, 13 N.C. App. 513, 519, 186 S.E.2d 623, 627 (1972) (Graham, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
"See note 2 supra.
"In re Thomas, 13 N.C. App. 513, 186 S.E.2d 623 (1972).
13See note 2 supra.
"The idea that a claimant satisfies the "available for work" test by successfully meeting these
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North Carolina's Employment Security Law 5 was enacted in 1936
to secure for its citizens the benefits of federal social security legislation,
which provided for the return of large amounts of money to those states
that passed unemployment insurance programs." Since the law had its
origins in the Depression of the 1930's, its implementation has been
guided by a policy of relieving the economic burden of unemployment
caused by forces beyond the control of the individual. 7 But unemployment alone does not qualify one for benefits.' The heart of the other
conditions that must be met lies in sections 96-13 and 96-14, the provisions for eligibility and disqualification. These two sections must be
construed together 9 as part of a single plan to provide benefits only for
deserving claimants. The crucial part of the eligibility provision is section 96-13(3), which requires that a claimant be able to work, be available for work, and satisfy the Commission that he is actively seeking
work. 20 Under section 96-14, claimants are temporarily disqualified for
voluntarily leaving work, for being discharged for misconduct, and for
refusing to apply for or accept suitable work.2 ' Once the period of
temporary disqualification is over, a person may become eligible for
benefits again if he meets the standards of section 96-13. Viewed together, these two sections should limit benefits to those who cannot find
work through no fault of their own. 22
In applying its special "available for work" test for voluntary retirees, the Thomas Commission concluded that the only portion of the
test not met was the requirement of a reasonable chance of obtaining
two criteria is supported in Freeman, Able to Work and Available to Work, 55 YALE L.J. 123,
124 (1945).

"N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
"In re Tyson, 253 N.C. 662, 664-65, 117 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1961).
"TSee In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 633, 161 S.E.2d 1, 5-6 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2
(1965); Note, Unemployment Insurance-Availabilityfor Suitable Work-Effect of Claimant's
Refusal to Work on Sabbath, 34 N.C.L. REv. 591, 595 (1956).
"Freeman, supra note 14, at 123.
"In re Miller, 242 N.C. 509, 512-13, 91 S.E. 241, 244 (1956).
21AII states require that a claimant be able to work and available for work. R. ALTMAN,
AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 2 (1950). A majority of states also require that a claimant actively seek
work. Note, 34 N.C.L. REV., supra note 17, at 595. North Carolina added the requirement for
actively seeking work in 1947 to assure that more than token efforts are made to find work.
Employment Security (Nee Unemployment Compensation), A Survey of Statutory Changes In
North Carolinain 1947, 25 N.C.L. REv. 376, 420 (1947).
21N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 96-14(1) to -14(2) (1965), § 96-14(3) (Supp. 1971).
'In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 633, 161 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1968); see Packard, Unemployment
Without Fault: DisqualificationsFor Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 17 VILL. L. REV. 635,
635-36 (1972).
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work. 23 The basic error in the Commission's position in applying an
additional requirement to voluntary retirees is that it abandoned the

unified statutory scheme as set out in sections 96-13 and 96-14. A claimant's present status should first be investigated to determine his eligibil-

ity. Every unemployed worker who is eligible under section 96-13 is
subject to being disqualified for certain voluntary acts. 24 After the penalty period,25 section 96-13 is designed to test a claimant's availability

under the same test as used for claimants who never suffered a penalty.
However, the test approved in Thomas now singles out voluntary reti-

rees for the equivalent of a permanent penalty by requiring that they
have a reasonable chance of obtaining a job before they can re-establish

eligibility. An Oklahoma case2 1 indicates a more equitable application
of the availability test to one who has voluntarily left work. Claimant,

who was disqualified for quitting work to get married, was tested after
the penalty period on her active return to the labor market.27 Her efforts
to find work and her attitude toward work were examined, but not the

probability of her finding work.
It is generally understood that availability for work is required to

assure presence in the labor market.28 The first step in establishing this
presence is to define the labor market in the individual case. While 2the
Thomas Commission alluded to attachment to the labor market,

it

seemed to rest its decision on a determination that a labor market did
not exist for the claimant in Winston-Salem because employers gener13The Commission held that claimant had not established herself to be available for work
because "it does not appear that she had a reasonable chance of obtaining employment." Decision
No. 4300 (N.C. Employment Security Comm'n Mar. 9, 1971), reprinted, Record at 24, 29, 281
N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972). This statement infers that the other three parts of its test were
fulfilled. See note 2 supra. By meeting the first three parts of the test, the claimant satisfied the
requirements imposed on all other claimants. The first three requirements of the four-prong test
are either explicitly stated in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-13(3) (1965) or have been traditionally interpreted as part of the "available for work" test. See Note, 34 N.C.L. REV., supra note 17, at 603.
"See Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 455, 100 A.2d 277, 281 (1953).
5A majority of states deny benefits to claimants who have voluntarily left work. The period
of disqualification varies by state. For cases disqualifying claimants for voluntarily leaving work,
see Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 352 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1961);
Mogan v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 199 Pa. Super. 653, 186 A.2d 643 (1962).
"Decision No. 101-BR-64, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BENEFIT SERIES SERV., UNEMPLOYMENT
INS., No. AA-160.35-37 (Okla. App. Tribunal 1964).
27d.
21Dwyer v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 321 Mich. 178, 188, 32 N.W.2d 434, 438

(1948).
2'Decision No. 4300 (N.C. Employment Security Comm'n Mar. 9, 1971), reprinted, Record
at 24, In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972).
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ally refused to hire employees of advanced age. 0 In characterizing the
labor market in terms of a person's age and the hiring policies of employers, the Commission has adopted a view contrary to that of many
jurisdictions3 and in conflict with the policy of aiding those who are
unemployed for causes beyond their control. 32 No importance should
be attached to the probability of a person's being hired:
A labor market for an individual exists when there is a market for the
type of services which he offers in the geographical area in which he
offers them. "Market" in this sense does not mean that job vacancies
must exist; the purpose of unemployment compensation is to compensate for the lack of appropriate job vacancies. It means only that
the type of services which an individual is offering is generally performed in the geographical area in which he is offering them. 33
A restrictive definition of the labor market that gives significance
to local hiring practices denies effect to a major goal of unemployment
insurance-protection from unemployment due to economic forces beyond the individual's control.34 When it is realized that the youth segment of the labor force increased by almost fifty percent 3 in the last
decade, thus causing many older workers to be less in demand, the
conclusion is certain that the inability to find work because of arbitrary
age limits does result from economic forces.36 Domestic work that the
claimant could perform was regularly being done in the Winston-Salem
area,3 7 so the labor market should have been recognized. Thomas was
not a case in which no one buys the type of services offered anymore,
3

'See note 10 supra.
'Reger v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 651, 46 A.2d
844, 845-46 (1946); Freeman, supra note 14, at 124, 133.
32
See Note, 34 N.C.L. REv., supra note 17, at 595.
3Freeman, supra note 14, at 124. In Employment Security Comm'n v. Kosic, 12 Ariz. App.
3

455, 471 P.2d 757 (1970), claimant had moved to a place where only several job opportunities
existed in her field and there were no vacancies at the time. The court refused to use this lack of

vacancies as a factor in defining a labor market for the claimant.
34See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (1965); In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 632, 161 S.E.2d 1, 5
(1968); Note, 34 N.C.L. REV., supra note 17, at 595.

-"Youth (persons from fourteen to twenty-four years old) in the labor market grew by 48%O
in the period from 1960 to 1970. W. HABER & M. MURRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE
(1966).
"-The following are recognized as economic factors which may cause unemployment: chang-

AMERICAN ECONOMY 5

ing demands for products, seasonal variations in business activity, and movement of workers into
the labor force. Id. at 3.
"See 13 N.C. App. at 516, 186 S.E.2d at 626.
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as might be the case with a blacksmith or lithographic stone polisher.38
Thomas is comparable to the case in which employers refused to hire

wives of servicemen39 for fear that they would be quickly on the move.
Since refusal to hire because of transiency is unrelated to the kind of

work regularly done in the area, the labor market was recognized.
Commentators substantiate the general rule that the existence of a

labor market is not to be denied simply because employers do not hire
older workers.

0

A sixty-seven-year-old bookkeeper in New York,41 an

eighty-two-year-old cook in Illinois,4 2 and a sixty-nine-year-old bakery
salesman in North Dakota43 all found difficulty in securing new work
because of their age, but the unemployment agencies in those jurisdictions recognized that a labor market existed.
Establishing that a labor market exists is only half the battle in

proving availability for work. It must still be determined that the claimant was attached to the existing market" by assessing factors such as

the claimant's good faith efforts to find employment," willingness to
accept new work, and restrictions upon availability. 7 Unfortunately,
a favorable evaluation on any one of these factors does not guarantee

that a claimant is truly deserving. No test can be devised to treat equitably the individual circumstances of every case.A8 Nevertheless, the fac3'Weiner v. Director, Div. of Employment Security, 327 Mass. 360, 99 N.E.2d 57 (1951). The
court found that claimant's occupation was gone and since he could do no other work, there was
no labor market for his services.
3
In Reger v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A.2d 844
(1946), the court commented on the existence of a labor market as it tested the claimant's availability.
"See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 14, at 133.
'Decision No. 162, 418, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BENEFIT SERIES SERV., UNEMPLOYMENT INS.,
No. AA-235.1-63 (N.Y. App. Bd. 1971).
"2 Decision No. 71-BRD-474, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BENEFIT SERIES SERV., UNEMPLOYMENT
INS., No. AA-235.1-61 (Ill. Bd. of Review 1971).
3
Decision No. AT-1-1407-72, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BENEFIT SERIES SERV., UNEMPLOYMENT INS., No. AA-235.1-69 (N.D. App. Tribunal 1972).
"Dwyer v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 321 Mich. 178, 184, 32 N.W.2d 434, 438
(1948).
45
Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 458, 100 A.2d 277, 282 (1953).
"Puter v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 22 Conn. Supp. 96, 162 A.2d
526 (Super. Ct. 1960); Dubois v. Maine Employment Security Comm'n, 150 Me. 494, 406, 114
A.2d 359, 365 (1955).
"Note, 34 N.C.L. REv., supra note 17, at 603.
"The pitfalls inherent in any attempt to narrowly define the test of availability have been
recognized by this state's highest court. The court recognized the ambiguity of any test and
proposed that the best evaluation in each case will come by directing attention to the legislative
purpose of providing temporary income to those involuntarily unemployed, but physically able to
work and desirous of work. In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 633-34, 161 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1968).
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tors mentioned indicate that the attachment test primarily examines the
claimant's good faith intention to work" and the objective manifestations 0 of his attitude toward new work. In testing a claimant's attachment, age can be a factor, but only as it relates to his ability to work."'
It is logical to consider a claimant unattached to the labor market if his
age is such that he cannot perform suitable work done in the community. Such an inquiry in Thomas would have shown that the claimant's age certainly did not restrict her attachment to the labor market,
for she had worked efficiently until a few months before the claims
arose. The evidence showed that her health was good and that she placed
no restrictions upon her availability. In fact, there is testimony in the
record that she was willing to sacrifice her social security benefits by
obtaining full-time work. 2
In assessing Mrs. Thomas' claim, the Commission showed some
doubt as to her willingness to accept work, but rested its denial of
benefits on the lack of reasonable opportunity to find work. 3 The
Commission concluded that employer refusal to hire workers in her age
bracket precluded the existence of a labor market54 so that by implication there could be no attachment. Most jurisdictions, however, would
have emphasized the depth of her attachment instead of questioning the
55
existence of a labor market.
While it has been argued that voluntary retirement should not lead
to the imposition of a stricter "available for work" standard than is used
with other claimants,56 experience proves that voluntary retirement must
"Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 458, 100 A.2d 277, 282 (1953).
5Packard, supra note 22, at 640.
" 1Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 462, 100 A.2d 277, 285 (1953). For cases
in which age restricted physical ability to work and therefore made the claimant unavailable for
work, see Di Martino v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 196 Pa. Super. 606, 176
A.2d 140 (1961); Palovich v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 194 Pa. Super. 198,
166 A.2d 339 (1960).
5rrestimony before Appeals Deputy, Winston-Salem, N.C., Feb. 10, 1971, Record at 14, In
re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972).
ODecision No. 4300 (N.C. Employment Security Comm'n Mar. 9, 1971), reprinted, Record
at 24, In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972).
"See text accompanying note 10 supra.
"The desired emphasis upon bona fide attachment instead of probability of finding work is
shown in the following cases. In Puter v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 22
Conn. Supp. 96, 162 A.2d 526 (Super. Ct. 1960), a sixty-six-year-old retiree was not attached to
the labor force because he was unwilling to accept work if he had to give up his pension funds, In
Dwyer v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 321 Mich. 178, 32 N.W.2d 434 (1948), a fiftyfive-year-old retiree was denied benefits because he did not actively seek work.
-"See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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be given some evidentiary weight when testing labor market attachment.57 The act of voluntarily retiring can be used to show detachment

from the market, as an inference to be overborne by facts to the contrary "8 or as a presumption only to be overcome with strong evidence

of a return to the market,59 but should not be an insurmountable barrier
to proving attachment." In Thomas, after the eight-week disqualifica-

tion period, the Commission gave unwarranted emphasis6' to the retirement evidence when its inference of detachment was clearly oversha-

dowed by evidence of diligence in seeking work, physical capability, and
sincere desire to work. 2 Probably the best statement of the desired
attachment to the labor market is that one must be "unequivocally ex-

posed"63 to it. The manager of the Winston-Salem office of the Commission testified:
She has satisfied the interviewers . . . of the sufficiency of her efforts
to find work and that she has made an active search. She. . .is doing
those things that an unemployed person would do to find employment.
She has satisfied us during this period that she was physically able to
work. In my judgment, she has not done anything or has not failed to
do anything which has caused her to be unable to find a job.'

The Thomas decision is important because the Commission's definition of the labor market may be extended to other employee classifica-

tions in addition to voluntary retirees. 5 It is possible that in North
"Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 458, 100 A.2d 277, 283 (1953).
5
8Id.
5
See Decision No. 765-F-62, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BENEFIT SERIES SERV., UNEMPLOYMENT
INS., No. AA-160.35-27 (Tex. App. Referee 1962).
mUsing the prior act of voluntary retirement as an insurmountable barrier, rather than as
evidence of depth of attachment, would permit permanent disqualification. The fact that disqualification provisions, such as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971), have stated
time periods shows no intent for permanent disqualification.
"The court recognized that the Commission gave undue emphasis and remanded for a determination of availability by a greater weight of the evidence. Even though the court recognized that
the burden of proof imposed by the Commission was unfair, it still allowed penalization because
of voluntary retirement. While the court lessened the burden of proof to show availability, it left
unchanged the facts which only a voluntary retiree must prove to establish availability. 281 N.C.
at 603, 189 S.E.2d at 248.
zSee text accompanying note 9 supra.
"Reger v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 651, 46 A.2d
844, 846 (1956).
"Testimony before Appeals Deputy, Winston-Salem, N.C., Feb. 10, 1971, Record at 14, In
re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972).
"In Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 5, In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245
(1972), the Commission argued for reversal of the Court of Appeals decision because it would mean
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Carolina a person would be unavailable for work simply because employers do not hire wives of soldiers, people with children, involuntary
retirees, or wives of students?
Thomas indicates that the North Carolina Employment Security
Commission goes further than most state commissions to penalize voluntary retirees who wish to re-enter the labor force.06 Although unemployment benefits are not intended to replace pensions or provide oldage benefits or subsidize disability, " the fear that elderly retirees will
exploit the unemployment compensation laws should not excuse the
denial of benefits in a case where all the eligibility requirements are met
and the person is not disqualified. The Commission is equipped with the
authority to weed out the sham claims." Most voluntary retirees seeking
to collect benefits probably could not show the necessary search for
work or requisite mental attitude toward new work. Every claimant,
regardless of age, should be judged by the same standards on the basis
of individual exposure to the job market.69 Illinois7" provides a lesson in
the desired treatment of older claimants. In a fact situation similar to
Thomas, an eighty-two-year-old cook was unemployed and applied for
work at cafeterias, cafes, and nursing homes, only to confront a general
unwillingness to hire a person of that age. Deciding the same issue as
in Thomas, whether she was available for work, the review board afforded no weight to her slight chance of securing employment. Their
finding rested upon the fact that the woman had worked into her twilight
years, had actively sought work, and displayed an earnest desire for
7
work. '
It is possible that the discrimination of the Commission toward
that it could "no longer give any legal significance to employers' customary practices and policies
in not accepting applications from persons above certain ages," Are the Commission's policies
going to directly reflect any practices which employers adopt in relation to age? The Commission's
apparent desire to follow the lead of employers leads to uncertainty about the legal definition of
the labor market in North Carolina.
"See Reger v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 649, 46
A.2d 844, 846 (1946).
6
See In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 633, 161 S.E.2d 1, 5-6 (1968).
IsSee note 20 supra. Within the traditional framework of the "available for work" test, the
Commission has been able to require a genuine desire to work and an objective manifestation of
thahdesire.
69
Reger v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 649, 46 A.2d
844, 846 (1946).
7"Decision No. 71-BRD-474, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BENEFIT SERIES SERV., UNEMPLOYMIENT
INS., No. AA-235.1-61 (Ill. Bd. of Review 1971).
"Id.
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voluntary retirees in assessing their benefit claims is but a reflection of
the misconceptions and prejudicies held by the general public. It is
popular among segments of our society to harbor the belief that those
applying for unemployment benefits are lazy chiselers and potential
leeches on society. Since many citizens have forgotten the experience of
the Depression or never had the education that it afforded in the frustrations of involuntary unemployment, it is natural that some claimants are
viewed with suspicion and penalized unmercifully for anything that
might hint of fault in bringing about one's own unemployment. In the
application of the Employment Security Law, it should be remembered
that bona fide unemployment exists even with a so-called "fullemployment" 2 economy and that in a relatively healthy economy such
as ours is today, many people cannot find work because employers are
able to choose workers from some groups and not from others. Employment security laws are basically social insurance programs, designed to
insure against the hardships of unemployment. As with any insurance
plan, 73 the eligibility and disqualification provisions seek to assure that
payment is not made to those who contrive to receive payment. Discrimination against a single group, such as voluntary retirees, will not equitably end the risk of deliberate unemployment. These eligibility provisions
must be applied to persons, not groups, to reveal whether an individual
is unemployed for reasons beyond his control or whether he has acted
to bring about his unemployment.
MICHAEL

H. GODWIN

xv
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The Arising-out-of Requirement and the Increased-Risk Theory:
A Frankie and Johnnie Tragedy
Almost everyone is familiar with the story of Frankie and Johnnie.
Johnnie was Frankie's man, but he was doing her wrong. As a result of
"In re Tyson, 253 N.C. 662, 664-65, 117 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1961).
3
Economists aim at an economy stabilized with an unemployment level of about 3 to 4%.
Council of Economic Advisors, Employment and Its Relation to Output, in READINGS IN MONEY,
NATIONAL INCOME AND STABILIZATION POLICY 273, 275 (W.Smith & R. Teigen ed. 1965).
11W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 35, at 282-84.
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this fact or fantasy, Frankie took Johnnie's life) Suppose, for a moment, that this folk tale took place in a more modern setting. Assume
that Johnnie was employed as a clerk by the local quick-food mart and
that Johnnie and his wife Frankie were experiencing serious marital
problems. Frankie was under the impression that Johnnie's employment, especially his alleged sexual relationship with a female clerk, was
the chief cause of all their recent marital troubles. Frankie's periodic
bouts with the bottle served to reinforce her apprehensions. Finally, the
whole issue came to a climax one afternoon when Frankie entered the
store and calmly preceeded to shoot and kill Johnnie, the female clerk,
and the employer.
Now assume that Johnnie's employer was subject to the North
Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act 2 and that the survivors of the
deceased employees sought compensation from the estate of the deceased employer on the theory that the employees' deaths were accidental injuries "arising out of" and "in the course of" the employment.'
Of such is the modern sequel to an old story.
Under substantially similar facts4 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed a favorable award for the claimants in the case of
Robbins v. Nicholson.5 The parties had stipulated that the injury was
by accident and that it had occurred during the course of employment.
Thus the case involved only one real issue: did the injury and resulting
deaths "arise out of" the employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act?7 In affirming the award by the Industrial
Commission, the court of appeals answered this question affirmatively
'The actual story was based on the most sensational murder case in the history of the Toe
River Valley of Western North Carolina. The defendant, Frankie Silvers, was accused of killing
her husband, Charlie Silvers. Frankie was sentenced to death in 1832, and on July 12, 1833, she
became the first woman hanged in North Carolina. See M. SHEPPARD, CABINS IN THE LAUR13L
25-39 (1935).
2

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 97-3 (1972) raises a presumption that all employers and employees have

come under the provisions of the Act unless notice to the contrary has been given.
3
1d. § 97-2(6) (1972) provides that "injury and personal injury mean only injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment . .. ."
'The actual case differs only in that the employee was the wife (Terri Lewis), the clerk was a
male (Charlie Robbins), and the assailant was the jealous husband (Daniel Lewis). The employer,
O.T. Nicholson, who operated the grocery store and adjacent coal yard, was also killed during the

course of Lewis' attack. There was no evidence of any illicit sexual relationship between the wife
and any of her fellow employees. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972).
-10 N.C. App. 421, 179 S.E.2d 183 (1971).
'ld. at 423, 179 S.E.2d at 184.
'Id. at 423-24, 179 S.E.2d at 185.
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and held, "In North Carolina there is no requirement that the injury
should be foreseen if it resulted from the employment nor does the
employment have to be the 'sole' cause of the injury; it is sufficient if
there is 'some' causal connection between the employment and the injury."' 8 Accordingly, the court felt that the Commission's findings of fact
were sufficient to support the compensation award.'
However, on further appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court
encountered more difficulty in applying the "arising out of" section of
the statute. 0 It was not absolutely clear which interpretive test the court
of appeals had applied; however, the court definitely rejected any type
of strict foreseeability test." Nevertheless, in reversing the court of
appeals Justice Sharp disposed of the appeal on general alternative
grounds by saying that under the increased-risk test,12 the tort concept
of proximate cause," or the personal nature of the risk involved, 4 the
accident did not "arise out of' the employment. As a result of this
decision the claimants got nothing.
It has long been recognized that workmen's compensation is not
intended to be a general insurance policy designed to cover all employees for all injuries from all causes.15 This policy has influenced almost
every judicial interpretation of the seemingly simple statutory language,
"arising out of and in the course of employment."'" For example, one
11d. at 425, 179 S.E.2d at 185. The court cited Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 132
S.E.2d 865 (1963) (idiopathic condition held no bar to compensation), and Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C.
App. 448, 162 S.E.2d 47 (1968) (parking lot accident arose out of employment), as support for its
interpretation of the "arising out of" requirement.
'The Commission's finding of fact no. 11 was as follows: "The employment. . . at the...
store was the chief origin of the matrimonial difficulties. . . . The employment. . . was the direct
cause of the fatal assault ....
" 10 N.C. App. at 426, 179 S.E.2d at 186.
"Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972).
"See text accompanying note 8 supra.
"The court held that the possibility that an employee's spouse would become jealous was a
risk "common to the neighborhood" and therefore not an increased risk of the employment. 281
N.C. at 242, 188 S.E.2d at 356; see text accompanying note 30 infra.
"The court held that the risk of murder was not one that a rational mind would anticipate
as incident to the employment and therefore could not be a foreseeable injury arising out of the
employment. 281 N.C. at 242, 188 S.E.2d at 356; see text accompanying notes 30-34 infra.
"The court found that the origin of the matrimonial difficulties was the alcoholism of the
husband and not the employment and that this was a personal non-job-related risk. 281 N.C. at
242, 188 S.E.2d at 355; see text accompanying note 27 infra.
"See Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951), where
the court stated: "However, it must be borne in mind that the Act was never intended to provide
the equivalent of general accident or health insurance."
"See Pope v. Goodson, 249 N.C. 690, 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959); Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co., 222
N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751 (1943). Both decisions acknowledge the general proposition that the Act
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commentator has said, "Few groups of statutory words in the history
of law have had to bear the weight of such a mountain of interpretation
as has been heaped upon this slender foundation.'""
Because of the general nature of the statutory language, the function of the courts has been to apply the underlying policy considerations
to specific factual situations." No one will doubt that the courts must
draw the line at some point and thereby restrict the coverage of the act.'"
The purpose of this note is to examine the justness of the line drawn by
the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Robbins case.
The statutory words "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment have been judicially interpreted in North Carolina to embody
two separate and distinct requirements. 0 Pursuant to this dualistic approach the "arising out of" language has been construed to refer to the
causation of the injury, while the "in the course of' language has been
does not provide compensation for every injury sustained in the course of employment, but only
for those that are also deemed to arise out of the employment.
171

A.

LARSON,

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW

§ 6.10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as

LARSON].

"The judicial function in this area has been well stated by Professor Malone in his text on

the subject: "In view of the fact that workmen's compensation purports to carve out 'employment
risks' from the general body of perils that beset all mankind, and to accord to these employment

risks a distinct treatment, it is essential, in theory at least, that an effort be made to determine
what risks are employment risks and what risks are not." W. MALONE & M. PLANT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 214 (1963).
"The North Carolina Supreme Court has characterized its line-drawing function as follows:
"[T]he rule is that benefits under the Act 'should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict

construction.'" Petty v. Associated Transp., Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 426, 173 S.E.2d 321, 328 (1970).
The justification for this type of liberal approach has been well stated by one commentator as
follows:
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer-employee represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advangages in order to gain
others which are of more importance to both him and to society. The employer gives
up immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the employee
surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead a more modest clain
for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
W. MALONE & M. PLANT, supra note 18, at 64-65 (emphasis added).
Note that in North Carolina the maximum amount an employee can receive in compensation
regardless of the degree of harm inflicted is $20,000. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-41 (1972). Compare
this with the interstate railroad worker who can still maintain an action based on negligence against
his employer under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970). Essentially
the statute provides that the employer is liable for negligent injury even if the employee is guilty
of contributory negligence and the fellow-servant rule and the assumed risk defenses are abolished,
" 0E.g., Wilson v. Town of Mooresville, 222 N.C. 283, 22 S.E.2d 907 (1942); Plemmons v.
White's Serv., Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938); Harless v. Flynn, I N.C. App. 448, 162
S.E.2d 47 (1968). See also Smith, Nine Months of Workmen's Compensation in North Carolina,
8 N.C.L. REV. 418 (1930).
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interpreted as applicable to the time, place, and circumstances of the

employment.21 Both of these requirements must be met by the claimant
2
2
as a condition of recovery.

In general it has been conceptually easier to define the time, place,
and circumstances of employment than to construct a causally related

formula with which to interpret the "arising out of' requirement. Accordingly, it has not been much of a problem to determine whether the

employee was in fact performing his duties at the time of the injury.23
The real problem is that there are several distinct types of risk to which
the employee is exposed while on the job.2 4 As a result, the problem of

defining compensable risk under the "arising out of" section has generated the most controversy.
There are three general types of such risks: risk distinctly associated with the employment, risk personal to the employee, and neutral

risky. The injury resulting from a job-related risk is one strictly confined
to the hazards resulting from the employment and is a compensable
injury if it occurred during the course of the employment.2 An injury
resulting from a personal risk is one that is completely unrelated to the
employment and therefore is not compensable.2

Between these two

2'See, e.g., cases cited note 20 supra. See also 1 LARSON § 7.00.
aE.g., Sweatt v. Board of Educ., 237 N.C. 653, 657, 75 S.E.2d 738, 742 (1953).
aOne of the initial problems involved the employee who was injured at some point while
moving to or from work. Today this type of case is seldom litigated since generally accepted rules,
such as the going-and-coming rule, have been established. For example, in Bass v. Mecklenburg
County, 258 N.C. 226, 233, 128 S.E.2d 570, 575 (1962), the court stated: "Probably, as a general
rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's
premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include
adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied
consent of the employer."
"I LARSON § 7.00.
-id. §§ 7.10-.30.
"A liberal interpretation of job-related risk was made in Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 99
S.E.2d 862 (1957), where a thirteen-year-old farm laborer who lived on the premises was killed by
a car while crossing the highway upon his return home from work. The court held that the fact he
had to cross the highway on his way to and from work constituted an additional hazard of
employment. A more typical example is Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co., 224 N.C. 841,
32 S.E.2d 623 (1945), in which a plumber was caulking with hot lead on a partially finished building
and died a few hours later from exhaustion and sunstroke. Compensation was allowed; the possibility of sunstroke was held an increased risk of the employment.
"In Cole v. Guilford County, 259 N.C. 724, 131 S.E.2d 308 (1963), a seventy-four-year-old
juror fell on a cement porch while leaving the courthouse solely because her leg gave way as the
result of an idiopathic condition. Compensation was denied as this was held to be a personal risk.
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seemingly clear types lies the neutral risk-one that is unrelated to the
employment or to the personal problems of the employee."8

The courts have developed three principle theories to determine
whether an employee is entitled to compensation for the above risks.

They are the peculiar- or incrased-risk theory, the street-risk theory, and
2
the positional-risk theory.
Most early workmen's compensation decisions relied on the
increased-risk doctrine and thus required that the risk of injury be
greater for the worker than for the general public. 0 This strict interpre-

tive approach denied compensation in many cases where it appeared
justified. 3' The harsh results of such decisions led to what has been
commonly referred to as the street-risk doctrine. This doctrine permitted compensation when the nature of the employee's duties required

him to go into the street more often than the ordinary citizen. Thus any
injury by accident was an increased risk of the employment.33 In fact,
the street-risk doctrine is in reality nothing more than the application
of the tort cause-in-fact analysis to the increased-risk doctrine, i.e., but
for the duties that required him to travel in the streets the employee
would not have been injured. This same concept has been expanded to
2Two examples of neutral-risk cases where compensation was denied are Plemmons v. White's
Serv., Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938) (service station attendant died of hydrophobia
resulting from dog bite received while engaged in his duties), and Walker v. J.D. Wilkins, Inc,,
212 N.C. 627, 194 S.E. 89 (1937) (employee injured when tornado unexpectedly struck plant and
partially demolished building). See also Note, Workmen's Compensation-NeutralRisk-Causal
Relation Between Employment and Injury, 39 N.C.L. REv. 102 (1960).
"See generally I LARSON §§ 6.20-.40. North Carolina, as evidenced by the Robbins decision,
still adheres to the increased-risk doctrine as originally expressed in Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 735, 155 S.E. 728, 729-30 (1930) (compensation denied for death of night
watchman killed by fellow employee because it was not an ordinary risk connected with the
employment or an extraordinary risk indirectly connected).
"See, e.g., Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 N.E. 728 (1930).
"Compare Walker v. J.D. Willins, Inc., 212 N.C. 627, 194 S.E. 89 (1937) (compensation
denied to employee injured when tornado struck plant) with Perkins v. Sprott, 207 N.C. 462, 177
S.E. 404 (1934) (compensation awarded to employee whose eye was put out by flying glass resulting
from baseball hitting window of delivery truck).
3"See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 19 Cal. 2d 622, 122
P.2d 570 (1942). But see Donahue v. Maryland Cas. Co., 226 Mass. 595, 116 N.E. 226 (1917) (risk
of slipping on ice while on street held not peculiar to work, but a hazard common to persons
engaged in any employment). North Carolina has apparently adopted the positional street-risk
doctrine. See Allred v. Allred-Gardner, Inc., 253 N.C. 554, 117 S.E.2d 476 (1960) (an injury caused
by a highway accident is compensable if the employee at the time of the accident is acting in the
course of his employment); Kiger v. Bahnson Serv. Co., 260 N.C. 760, 133 S.E.2d 702 (1963).
"E.g., City of Atlanta v. Parks, 60 Ga. App. 16, 2 S.E.2d 718 (1939); Mueller Constr. Co.
v. Industrial Bd., 283 Ill. 148, 118 N.E. 1028 (1918).
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cover non-street injuries under what has been called the positional-risk
3
theory. 1
In the Robbins case the risk may have been personal or neutral. 5
Since a personal risk is generally defined as one completely unrelated
to the employment, the better classification would have been as a neu-

tral risk. 6 The supreme court in fact mooted this question when it held,
"[E]ven if it were conceded that the employment was the major source
of friction . . . that friction was not a risk arising out of the nature of
[the] employment. 3' 7 In effect, the court was saying that under the

increased-risk theory there could be no compensation for either neutral
risk or personal risk.
Is this strict statutory approach both fair and reasonable?" Or to
be more direct, in light of the expressed policy of liberal statutory
interpretation in favor of the injured employee,39 was there a rational
basis for permitting recovery? Initially one should strongly emphasize
that both employees were injured while actively engaged in the duties
of their employment." In addition, the Industrial Commission made
findings of fact that the employment was the chief cause of the matri-

monial difficulties that resulted in the accident." Although this finding
arguably is immaterial,42 such findings have prompted recovery in other
34

ndustrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d 804, 214 P.2d 41

(1950) (court allowed compensation because employment brought employee into what became a
position of danger, even though danger not foreseeable and risk not peculiar to particular location).
3The Commission's findings of fact would seem to establish this as an employment-related
risk. See note 9 supra.
311 LARSON §§7.20-.30.
27281 N.C. at 242, 188 S.E.2d at 355. It would appear that all job-related risk would fall
readily within the increased-risk theory and therefore be considered work-connected. Here the
court is distinguishing the two by holding that even though the job may have been the major cause
of the assault (i.e., job-related), the source of the assault (i.e., a jealous spouse) was not a peculiar
or special risk of the employment under the increased-risk theory. For a clear expression of this
theory see Pope v. Goodson, 249 N.C. 690, 692, 107 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1959).
3It appears to be sound, given the prior policy arguments, note 19 supra, that when the cause
of the assault is strictly personal and the employment contributed nothing to the event, to hold
that the assault did not arise out of the employment. However, when the assault can be classified
as neutral then the compensation award would seem justified. See generally 1 LARSON § 11.20.
"gSee note 19 supra regarding the alleged liberal interpretation of the Act in favor of the
injured employee.
"°See text accompanying note 6 supra.
"1See note 9 supra.
2
Nonetheless, the court's treatment of the Commission's findings of fact in Robbins is hard
to reconcile with the court's previously enunciated policy toward such findings: "[W]here the
evidence before the Commission is such as to permit either one of two contrary findings, the
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situations. For example, the street-risk cases offer convincing examples
of fact situations in which the courts have awarded compensation by
allowing a strong "in the course of" showing to override a weak "arising
out of" showing." The same kind of analysis can be used to characterize recoveries under the positional-risk test in non-street cases. 4
This approach of allowing a strong showing of one of the two
requirements to determine coverage is beneficial in that it allows the
courts to employ the dual statutory requirements in a manner that
closely approaches the original policy of workmen's compensation
acts.45 For example, the primary purpose was to take away the "unholy
trinity" of the common-law tort defenses (assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule) from the employer and to
impose a statutorily limited strict liability.46 Such judicial theories as the
increased-risk doctrine are actually subtle applications of these old tort
defenses. Professor Wex Malone has recognized this problem:
In both the situation of the personal assault and the situation of
the epileptic seizure it appears that the courts have retreated to the old
tort idea that the employee had only himself to blame if he was injured
and hence he does not deserve a compensation award unless he can tie
his injury to his employment in some way. This must be regarded as a
residual trace of the old fault notion that has been repudiated in other
areas of compensation law. The attitude described is in derogation of
the familiar notion that the employer takes the employee as he finds
him.47
A court should not arbitrarily interpret both the "in the course of"
and the "arising out of" requirements as completely independent of each
other. A more interdependent analysis is required. Professor Malone
has conceptualized this approach in graphic imagery.4" He perceives the
determination of the Commission is conclusive on appeal to superior court and in this Court."
Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 438, 132 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1963).
"See note 32 supra.
"See note 34 supra.

" Workmen's compensation acts rest upon the economic principle that consumers who use the
product should be the ones to bear the cost of injuries and death that are incident to the production
of the goods. J. KEECH, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 1929-1940, at 3-8
(1942).
"For a general discussion of these defenses and many of the complicated rules that developed

around them see Tampa Shipbldg. & Eng'r Co. v. Thomas, 131 Fla. 650, 179 So. 705 (1938).
"Malone, Some Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's Compensation,
16 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (1963).
"Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual Requirement
Reappraised, 51 N.C.L. REV. 705, 717-20 (1973).
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"in the course of" requirement as a circle whose center embraces only
those accidents that happen while the victim is at work, moving from
one work spot to another, or is otherwise responding to the call of duty. 9
Likewise, the "arising out of' requirement is envisioned as a circle
whose center embraces those hazards restricted to the particular employment Uob-related risk). Farther out on the circle's radius is the socalled neutral risk, and the personal risk is found at the circle's perimeter." In applying this graphic analysis to actual fact situations, Professor Malone says,
Because any employment accident must be assessed in terms of
its location on the radius of each of the two circles, an accident event
may be securely at the center of the "during the course of" requirement
and yet out at the very edge of the circle representing "arising out of."
• . . The important observation to be made here is that the trier's final
conclusion that the accident risk is or is not compensable is a judgment
of a composite character.5'
Thus, Professor Malone concludes that the worker injured while actively engaged in the performance of his duty, since he is near the center
of that circle, has a fair chance of receiving compensation even though
2
the injury was the result of a neutral risk or a personal risk.1
If one applies this interdependent analysis to the facts in the
Robbins case, both the Industrial Commission and the court of appeals
appear to have been correct in upholding the claims for compensation.
In Malone's terminology, the injury occurred at the very center of the
"in the course of" circle. In addition, the type of risk involved, whether
labeled neutral or personal, was somewhere within the "arising out of"
circle, and therefore the claimants should have recovered.
Unfortunately the North Carolina Supreme Court gave little or no
consideration to the strong "in the course of' factor when it applied the
increased-risk theory to the "arising out of" requirement. Nonetheless,
11Jd. at 719-20.
11Id. at 720.
11Id. at 721.
"Professor Larson also argues for a merger of the two requirements into a "quantum theory"
of work connection in which a minimum amount of work-connection would have to be shown. If
the "arising out of" quantity is very small but the "in the course of" quantity is large, then the
quantum would add up to the necessary minimum. Larson has said: "In practice, the 'course of
employment' and 'arising out of employment' test are not, and should not be, applied entirely
independently; they are both parts of a single test of work-connection, and therefore deficiencies
in the strength of one factor are sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in the other." 1
LARSON § 29.10.
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it is most interesting to note that the authority relied on by the court to
justify its result clearly lends support to the interdependent approach
discussed above. The court relied extensively on two decisions from
foreign jurisdictions whose facts demand a brief summary for they vividly demonstrate situations where both the "in the course of" and "arising out of" requirements were at the outer perimeters of Professor
Malone's circles and thus would have been non-compensable injuries
even under his liberal approach.
In the first case53 the claimant was the manager of a motel who
lived in an apartment over the motel in order to be available for work
at any time. Her husband was an unemployed alcoholic and had repeatedly demanded that she quit her job. One evening while she was preparing supper he repeated this demand, and upon her refusal to quit, he shot
her and then committed suicide. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld a
denial of compensation."
In the second case 5 the claimant was a married woman working
the night shift as a switchboard operator at a local motel. About 3:00
a.m. she went with the night manager into the dining room for some
food. The claimant's husband suddenly appeared and physicially beat
the pair. On appeal the Illinois Supreme Court held against the claim5
ant. 1
In both of the above cases there was no formal statement by either
court that compensation was being denied because there was neither a
strong "in the course of" nor a strong "arising out of" showing. Nevertheless, the factual realities of the two cases lend substantial support to
Malone's theory. Both the preparation of supper and the coffee break
"Duerock v. Acarregui, 87 Idaho 24, 390 P.2d 55 (1964) (court held the risk was not occasioned by, incident to, or a condition of employment).
5The court held: "The risk existed before her employment. It was a personal risk she brought
with her, a part of her domestic and private life." Id. at 37, 390 P.2d at 63.
"State House Inn v. Industrial Comm'n,32 Ill. 2d 160, 204 N.E.2d 17 (1965).
"The court held: "[A]n injury does not arise out of the employment if it is caused by reason
of something unrelated to the nature of the employment." Id. at 163, 204 N.E.2d at 19.
"Professor Malone has stated, "There is no formal rule or doctrine that recognizes the
interaction between the concepts." Malone, supra note 48, at 721.
"See, e.g., for examples of similar fact situations where compensation was denied in accord
with Professor Malone's theory: Wyckoff v. Indus. Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 288, 482 P.2d 897
(1971) (deputy sheriff on call 24 hours a day shot while off duty); Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 116 Ga. App. 284, 157 S.E.2d 60 (1967) (decedent shot by jealous husband while at work at
grocery store but while on lunch hour); Devlin v. Ennis, 77 Idaho 342, 292 P.2d 469 (1956)
(employee shot and killed by employer on premises prior to opening of business). On the other
hand, the street-risk cases, note 32, supra, in which the strong "in the course of" showing has
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provided weak "in the course of" claims that failed because of even

weaker "arising out of" showings.
It is regrettable that the Robbins court failed to recognize the
factual differences that could have been used to distinguish the two cases

above. It seems only fair that such a strong "in the course of" showing
as in Robbins should have served to alleviate the unduly strict "arising

out of" analysis. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that
the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed in

favor of the claimant.59 But it seems obvious from the Robbins decision
that the most liberal interpretation in North Carolina is in favor of the

insurance companies. Thus it seems highly appropriate to end this modern sequel to such an ancient tragedy with the words of Frankie Silvers,

recited from the scaffold before her execution and still relevant to the
survivors of many injured employees in this state:
But 0, that dreadful Judge I fear;
Shall I that awful sentence hear?"0
0. MAx GARDNER III
become the primary basis of recovery, indicate a type of de facto adoption of the Malone analysis.
Claimants have also been relieved of the burden of proving the causative "arising out of" requirement in unexplained-fall cases. See, e.g., Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 132 S.E.2d 865
(1963) (compensation upheld where evidence was that injured employee died from either angina
or loss of blood resulting from accidental injury to his head from a fall); Robbins v. Bossong
Hosiery Mills, 220 N.C. 246, 17 S.E.2d 20 (1941) (employee, while reaching up to take some
objects from a rack in the course of her normal duties, lost her balance and fell for some undisclosed reason; compensation awarded).
"See note 19 supra. Larson has stated that his "quantum theory" of work-connection, note
52 supra, forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in liberally
interpreting the compensation act. 1 LARSON § 29.10.
""The Frankie Silvers Song," in M. SHEPPARD, supra note 1, at 36.

